Dina d’Malchuta Dina

The following source sheet was created by Danielle Kranjec, Associate Vice President for Jewish Education at Hillel International, during her Fellowship in the American Jewish Civics Seminar, a cohort of leading Jewish scholars and educators convened in 2025 by A More Perfect Union and the Shalom Hartman Institute to nurture the emergence of a new field: American Jewish Civics.

This is part of a collection of source sheets on key Jewish themes outlining the Principles of American Jewish Civics, a framework and foundation to inspire and guide civic learning for American Jews.

"The law of the land is the law [for Jews as well]"
דינא דמלכותא דינא

The most basic interpretation of the rabbinic axiom dina de-malkhuta dina is that Jews must obey the laws of the place where they live, even, at times, when they conflict with Jewish law. Borrowing from John Adams, “a government of laws, not men,” we understand the rule of law as central to a fair, functioning, and healthy shared society. And as a small religious and ethnic minority, we are acutely aware that a society governed by the rule of law is a particularly important source of protection for us as Jews.

Beyond these pragmatic considerations, our commitment to the rule of law is also grounded in a deep rabbinic understanding that a moral civilization is not shaped by the capricious exercise of power, but through the application of fair standards of law and jurisprudence that apply equitably to all citizens, and that these standards must respond and adapt – through deliberative, intentional, and transparent processes – to the evolving needs of the polity.

Discussion Questions:

What does it mean to you that Judaism teaches “the law of the land is the law”? Why do you think this principle emerged
When (if ever) is it appropriate for Jews to resist the law of the land? How does our tradition help us balance obedience with prophetic moral responsibility?
The rabbis developed dina d’malchuta dina in contexts of monarchy. What challenges and opportunities arise when applying this principle in a democracy?
How does the concept reflect our minority status throughout history — and how might it change now that Jews have political agency and influence in American civic life?
In your own community, how do you see Jewish institutions navigating civic law (e.g. around zoning, taxes, religious freedom)?
How might this principle inspire us to strengthen civic trust and democratic norms in today’s polarized society?
What responsibilities come with accepting “the law of the land is the law”?
How might this principle challenge us — as Jews — to help shape not just obedient citizens, but a more just society?

בבא קמא קי״ג ב

גּוּפָא – אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: דִּינָא דְמַלְכוּתָא דִּינָא. אָמַר רָבָא: תִּדַּע, דְּקָטְלִי דִּיקְלֵי וְגָשְׁרִי גִּישְׁרֵי – וְעָבְרִינַן עֲלַיְיהוּ.

Bava Kamma 113b

The Gemara relates to the matter of civil law itself. Shmuel says: The law of the kingdom is the law, and the halakhic principle is that Jews must obey the laws of the state in which they reside. Rava said: Know that this principle is true from the fact that the municipal authorities cut down palm trees without the consent of their owners and construct bridges from them, and yet we cross over them. Evidently, the wood is not considered stolen property, which one is prohibited from using, because the law of the kingdom is the law.

Discussion Questions:

What does this example (using public infrastructure) teach us about Jewish trust in civil law?
How might this principle function in a democratic society where citizens can challenge or change laws they believe are unjust?
What are the ethical implications of living under laws we disagree with? Are there limits to this principle?

נדרים כ״ח א

גְּמָ׳ וְהָאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: דִּינָא דְמַלְכוּתָא דִּינָא?

Nedarim 28a

GEMARA: The Gemara asks, concerning the mishna’s statement that one may take a vow to tax collectors: But didn’t Shmuel say: The law of the kingdom is the law, i.e., there is a halakhic principle that Jews must obey the laws of the state in which they live?

Discussion Questions:

Why might the rabbis invoke this principle in a discussion about taxation?
How do we relate Jewish ethics to civic obligations like paying taxes today? How does this affect Jewish ideas about fairness and public trust?

גיטין י׳ ב

אֶלָּא מַתָּנָה, בְּמַאי קָא קָנֵי – לָאו בְּהַאי שְׁטָרָא? וְהַאי שְׁטָרָא חַסְפָּא בְּעָלְמָא הוּא! אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: דִּינָא דְמַלְכוּתָא – דִּינָא.

Gittin 10b

However, with regard to a gift, by what means does the one who receives the gift acquire it from the giver? Is it not via this document? And yet this document is merely a shard, as a document written by gentiles is not considered a legal document according to halakha. Shmuel said: The law of the kingdom is the law, i.e., Jews must obey the laws of the state in which they live. Consequently, every form of property transfer accepted by local law is valid according to halakha as well.

Discussion Questions:

What does this say about how Jewish law adapts to civil legal norms?
In what ways is Jewish law supportive of legal pluralism — and in what ways might it resist?
How do we honor both halakhic and civil legal frameworks in our communal institutions today?

בבא בתרא נ״ד ב

אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי לְרַב יוֹסֵף: מִי אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל הָכִי?! וְהָאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: דִּינָא דְמַלְכוּתָא דִּינָא; וּמַלְכָּא אָמַר: לָא לִיקְנֵי אַרְעָא אֶלָּא בְּאִיגַּרְתָּא! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֲנָא לָא יָדַעְנָא; עוֹבָדָא הֲוָה בְּדוּרָא דְרָעֲוָתָא, בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל דִּזְבַן אַרְעָא מִגּוֹי, וַאֲתָא יִשְׂרָאֵל אַחֲרִינָא רָפֵיק בָּהּ פּוּרְתָּא; אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב יְהוּדָה, אוֹקְמַהּ בִּידָא דְּשֵׁנִי.

Bava Batra 54b

Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Did Shmuel actually say this? But doesn’t Shmuel say that the law of the kingdom is the law, i.e., the halakha obligates Jews to observe the laws of the locale in which they reside, and the king said that land may not be acquired without a document? Therefore, taking possession should not be effective for acquisition. Rav Yosefsaid to him: I do not know how to reconcile this contradiction, but there was an incident in the village of Dura that was founded by shepherds, where there was a Jew who purchased land from a gentile by giving money, and in the interim another Jew came and plowed it a bit. The two Jews came before Rav Yehuda for a ruling, and he established the property in the possession of the second individual. This accords with the ruling of Shmuel that the property is ownerless until a Jew performs an act of acquisition.

בבא בתרא נ״ה א

אָמַר רַבָּה: הָנֵי תְּלָת מִילֵּי, אִישְׁתַּעִי לִי עוּקְבָן בַּר נְחֶמְיָה רֵישׁ גָּלוּתָא, מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל: דִּינָא דְמַלְכוּתָא דִּינָא, וַאֲרִיסוּתָא דְפָרְסָאֵי – עַד אַרְבְּעִין שְׁנִין, וְהָנֵי זַהֲרוּרֵי דְּזָבֵין אַרְעָא לְטַסְקָא – זְבִינַיְהוּ זְבִינֵי.

Bava Batra 55a

Rabba said: These three statements were told to me by Ukvan bar Neḥemya the Exilarch in the name of Shmuel: The law of the kingdom is the law; and the term of Persian sharecropping [arisuta] is for up to forty years, since according to Persian laws the presumption of ownership is established after forty years of use; and in the case of these tax officials [zaharurei] who sold land in order to pay the land tax, the sale is valid, as the tax officials were justified in seizing it, and one may purchase the land from them.

Discussion Questions:

What tensions or contradictions emerge between halakhic and civil systems in these passages?
How can Jewish legal tradition help us think critically about what makes law legitimate — is it consensus? enforcement? morality?

שולחן ערוך, חושן משפט שס״ט:ח׳

(ח) וכן מלך שכעס על אחד מעבדיו ושמשיו מבני המדינה ולקח שדהו או חצירו אינו גזל ומותר ליהנות בה והלוקחה מהמלך הרי הוא שלו ואין הבעלים מוציאין אותה מידו (וכ"כ לעיל ס"ס רל"ז) אבל מלך שלקח שדה או חצר של אחד מבני המדינה שלא בדינים שחקק הרי זה גזלן והלוקח ממנו מוציאין הבעלים מידו כללו של דבר כל דין שיחקוק אותו המלך לכל ולא יהיה לאדם אחד בפני עצמו אינו גזל וכל שיקח מאיש זה בלבד שלא כדת הידוע לכל אלא חמס את זה הרי זה גזל: הגה ואם חקק לבעל אומנות אחד כגון שחקק למלוה בריבית איזה דבר י"א דלא אמרי' ביה דינא דמלכותא דינא הואיל ואינו חקוק לכל (מהרי"ק שורש ס"ו) י"א דלא אמרינן דינא דמלכותא דינא אלא במסים ומכסים התלוים בקרקע כי המלך גוזר שלא ידורו בארצו כי אם בדרך זה אבל בשאר דברים לא (הרא"ש פ"ד דנדרים בשם הר"מ ומרדכי פ' הגוזל בתרא) וי"ח וסבירא להו דאמרי' בכל דבר דינא דמלכותא דינא (מרדכי שם בשם התוס' ות"ה סי' ש"ט) ולכן המלוה על המשכון יכול למכרו אחר שנה הואיל וכן דינא דמלכותא (שם בשם ר"י בר פרץ) וכן הוא עיקר וכמו שנתבאר לעיל סי' שנ"ו סעיף ז':

Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 369:8

(8) Similarly, if a king becomes angry with one of his servants or assistants from his jurisdiction and he took his field or courtyard, it is not robbery and one is permitted to derive benefit from him. If one purchases it from the king, it belongs to him and the owner cannot remove it from him. If the king took a field or courtyard from one of his citizens not in compliance with the laws he set up, he is a robber and if one purchases it from him, the owner may remove him from the property. The general rule is that any general law that the king sets up for everyone, and not just for one person, is not robbery, and if anyone takes property from one person not known to comply with the laws that are not know to all, then it is robbery. If the law was set for just one industry, such as were he made a law that a certain item can be loaned with interest, there are those who say we do not apply the principle of the law of the land is the law because it was not set for everyone. There are those who say we do not apply the principle of the law of the land is the law except with regards to taxes and property-taxes because the king decrees that people can only live on his lands in this fashion. With respect to other matters, however, we would not apply such a principle. There are those who disagree and hold we apply the principle that the law of the land is the law on all matters. Thus, if one lends on collateral, he may sell the collateral after a year because that is the law of the land. This is the primary view, as was discussed above in 356:7.

Discussion Questions:

According to this passage, what distinguishes just law from legalized theft?
What role does fairness and equality play in halakhic acceptance of civil law?
How might this principle speak to our concerns today about abuses of power, systemic injustice, or unequal application of the law?