Parshas Be'Haalosecha 5785

The issue of establishing a child's paternal relationship goes beyond who to address the Father's Day card to.

In Halacha, establishing a child's father affects who the child may or may not marry since if the child is indeed a child of the father in question, the father's other children would be prohibited for him to marry because of arayos, the cardinal sin of forbidden marital relationships.

However, as we will see, in order to determine a child's father in the eyes of Halacha, there are certain qualifications. The Gemara says in Yevamos:

Rav Moshe Shmuel Shapiro deduces from Rashi the framework of how the paternal relationship is created and subsequently severed in the scenario that there is a conversion.

Once a child is born to the father, the relationship is firmly established. Rav Moshe Shmuel connects the birth of the child to connect to the child by dint of his active role of through the conception of the child months before.

If the child would subsequently to convert to Judasim, Chazal say that the conversion makes him "like a newborn child", thereby reversing the conception-birth connection attributed to the father. This "rebirth" is mentioned in the nomenclature of Chazal earlier in Maseches Yevamos.

But in a case where the child is conceived when the father is a gentile (thus establishing the aforementioned paternal connection) and during pregnancy the mother (and by extension the child) converts, the principle of "becoming like a newborn child" would not apply as the child is still being formed, it would logically follow that the connection to the father should remain in place.

To this point Rashi is telling us, that the relationship to the father becomes severed because of this other Halachic principle that "the Torah dispossesses the seed of the father," which says that although the relationship created by dint of his active role of through the conception of the child months before, there is another consideration - that of the father's relationship to the child throughout the formation of the child. Since the mother converted, the Halachic principle of "the Torah dispossesses his seed" applies and severs his relationship to the child.

It emerges, says Rav Moshe Shmuel Shapiro, that there are two parts in creating a paternal connection to a child (according to my understanding)

1. The father's active role of bringing about the birth of the child months before by conception. Immediately after the child is born, the child becomes his son, and he, the father.

2. Throughout the pregnancy, each passing day of the formation of the child, the paternal relationship is gradually created.

The clear conclusion of the Gemara is that in order for the laws of arayos to apply to paternal relatives, both of these relationships have to remain intact.

Rav Moshe Shmuel Shapiro posits that these two connections (yichusin) are alluded to in Onkelos in Parshas Be'Haaloshecha:

Onkelos writes:

The first part of the passuk refers to the paternal relationship created throughout pregnancy (the word "harisi" relates to the word "hirayon", which means "pregnancy" and particularly the idea of initiating the preganancy as the Ramban here writes:

The second part of the passuk is referring to the father's relationship created at the time of the birth when the child is considered his son, and by extension, he the father.

Until this point is just an elucidated explanation of Rav Moshe Shmuel Shapiro's understanding of Onkelos.

I'd like to add some points and questions on his vort.

1. In detailing these two paternal aspects, Moshe Rabbeinu isn't simply just using an abstract "lomdishe'" idea to make his point. He is saying that in order to expect a person to have a strong level of care and concern for someone or something, there needs to be a connection between them.

Moshe Rabbeinu is telling Hashem that what is being asked of him in relation to his connection to Klal Yisrael is disproportionate; he has neither the paternal connection that grows throughout pregnancy, nor the connection that is created upon birth of the child from his contribution of the conceiver, and is thus asking Hashem to absolve him of being responsible in finding a solution for their plight.

See Or HaChaim who says that although Moshe was considered a "father" in some spiritual respects, it did not translate into the nature of responsibility he was asked to take for them. He writes:

When Hashem does urge Moshe to nevertheless take responsibility, it is in response to his other complaint that the burden was too heavy, not this one.

(However, according to the alternate explanation found in the Or HaChaim, it can be argued that the original complaint was also being addressed, see there)

2. My friend, Rav Yitzchak Iyzik Tendler, asked on the point of Rav Moshe Shmuel Shapiro that there is a paternal relationship created during pregnancy, that it seems to be at odds with a Gemara in Megilla.

We see from here that although the father was not alive at the birth of the child, he was (presumably) alive for a period of time during the pregnancy, and according to Rav Moshe Shmuel Shapiro, there was a point in time when she had a "father" relationship, if so why does the passuk say that she didn't have any father relationship?

The Maharal, in his commentary on Esther, touches on this point. Maharal writes:

I don't fully understand the Maharal, because if the father relationship is reckoned at the time of pregnancy, why does the passuk say "for she had no father?"

Perhaps we can answer this question based on a nuance made by the Ralbag in the understand the drasha of Chazal we can answer this question. Ralbag (brought by Manos HaLevi) writes:

Ralbag says that the passuk is saying that there was never a time when Esther had both parents at the same time. Ralbag only deals with the mother, that there was a period of time when she had a mother (at the time of birth) but it was without the father.

Perhaps we can say that the Gemara can also have the opposite implication as well. When her mother was pregnant, there was a period of time when she had a father, since an aspect of fatherhood does start at pregnancy, but no mother (since as Ralbag says, the mother-connection is not considered during the pregnancy, rather at the birth)

Another mareh makom about this debate as to whether "fatherhood" starts at the time of pregnancy or birth in regards to inheritance laws, like determining who the bechor is, is found in the Gra to Parshas Ki Teitzei. See Peninim MiShulchan Govoha where there are two opposite accounts of what the Gra said, whether it is determined by which child is conceived/pregnancy began first or who was actually born first.

(In the footnote to the shtikl there, there is a tzad that when there are twins who are born from a single drop that splits, then even according to the opinion that we reckon the time of the conception/pregnancy, since in that regard there is a "tie" we would then revert to go after the actual birth. (This would seem to be somewhat of a smach to R' Moshe Shmuel Shapiro that there are two considerations in making the fatherhood, otherwise one would be arbitrary.)