- What is supposed to be the takeaway of this story?
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: סוּכָּה גְּזוּלָה, וְהַמְסַכֵּךְ בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים — רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר פּוֹסֵל, וַחֲכָמִים מַכְשִׁירִין. אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: מַחְלוֹקֶת בְּשֶׁתּוֹקֵף אֶת חֲבֵירוֹ וְהוֹצִיאוֹ מִסּוּכָּתוֹ. וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר לְטַעְמֵיהּ דְּאָמַר: אֵין אָדָם יוֹצֵא יְדֵי חוֹבָתוֹ בְּסוּכָּתוֹ שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ. אִי קַרְקַע נִגְזֶלֶת — סוּכָּה גְּזוּלָה הִיא. וְאִי נָמֵי קַרְקַע אֵינָהּ נִגְזֶלֶת — סוּכָּה שְׁאוּלָה הִיא. וְרַבָּנַן לְטַעְמַיְיהוּ, דְּאָמְרִי: אָדָם יוֹצֵא יְדֵי חוֹבָתוֹ בְּסוּכָּתוֹ שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ, וְקַרְקַע אֵינָהּ נִגְזֶלֶת, וְסוּכָּה שְׁאוּלָה הִיא. אֲבָל גָּזַל עֵצִים וְסִיכֵּךְ בָּהֶן — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל אֵין לוֹ אֶלָּא דְּמֵי עֵצִים....
הָהִיא סָבְתָּא דַּאֲתַאי לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן, אֲמַרָה לֵיהּ: רֵישׁ גָּלוּתָא וְכוּלְּהוּ רַבָּנַן דְּבֵי רֵישׁ גָּלוּתָא בְּסוּכָּה גְּזוּלָה הֲווֹ יָתְבִי. צָוְוחָה וְלָא אַשְׁגַּח בָּהּ רַב נַחְמָן. אֲמַרָה לֵיהּ: אִיתְּתָא דַּהֲוָה לֵיהּ לַאֲבוּהָא תְּלָת מְאָה וְתַמְנֵי סְרֵי עַבְדֵי צָוְוחָא קַמַּיְיכוּ וְלָא אַשְׁגְּחִיתוּ בַּהּ?! אֲמַר לְהוּ רַב נַחְמָן: פָּעִיתָא הִיא דָּא, וְאֵין לָהּ אֶלָּא דְּמֵי עֵצִים בִּלְבַד.
§ The Sages taught: With regard to a stolen sukka and with regard to one who roofs a sukka in the public domain, which is tantamount to robbing land from the public, Rabbi Eliezer deems these sukkot unfit for use in fulfillment of the mitzva, and the Rabbis deem them fit. Rav Naḥman said: This dispute is limited to a case where one assaults another and forcibly evicts him from his sukka, and takes his place in the sukka. In that case, Rabbi Eliezer deems the sukka unfit. And Rabbi Eliezer conforms to his own reasoning, as he said: A person does not fulfill his obligation with the sukka of another. Therefore, in any event, he does not fulfill his obligation with it. If land can be stolen and acquired by the robber, the sukka from which he evicted the owner is a stolen sukka. And if indeed land cannot be stolen, nevertheless, the robber does not fulfill his obligation according to Rabbi Eliezer, as it is a borrowed sukka. And the Rabbis conform to their reasoning, as they said: A person fulfills his obligation with the sukka of another. And since land cannot be stolen and the sukka is merely a borrowed sukka and not a stolen one, the robber fulfills his obligation, despite the fact that he committed a reprehensible act. However, if one stole wood and roofed a sukka with it, everyone agrees, as Rabbi Eliezer concedes, that the original owner of the wood has rights only to the monetary value of the wood. The wood itself belongs to the robber, so it is not a stolen sukka....
There was a certain old woman who came before Rav Naḥman. She said to him: The Exilarch and all the Sages in his house have been sitting in a stolen sukka. She claimed that the Exilarch’s servants stole her wood and used it to build the sukka. She screamed, but Rav Naḥman did not pay attention to her. She said to him: A woman whose father, Abraham, our forefather, had three hundred and eighteen slaves screams before you, and you do not pay attention to her? She claimed that she should be treated with deference due to her lineage as a Jew. Rav Naḥman said to the Sages: This woman is a screamer, and she has rights only to the monetary value of the wood. However, the sukka itself was already acquired by the Exilarch.
- What is supposed to be the takeaway of this story?
- Why does Ulla not give Yalta the cup? What do you think of his reason?
- What do you think of Yalta's actions?
- What is supposed to be the takeaway of this story?
What do we do with these Aggadot?
מוטב תכבה נרו כו' - לאו מהכא יליף חלול שבת דפיקוח נפש נפקא לן מוחי בהם ולא שימות בהם אלא להטעימן הדבר באגדה המושכת את הלב לפי שהיו באים לשמוע הדרשה נשים ועמי הארץ והיו צריכין הדרשנין למשוך את לבבם:
Halakhah and Aggadah by Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel - https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/halakhah-and-aggadah/
To reduce Judaism to law, to halakhah, is to dim its light, to pervert its essence and to kill its spirit. We have a legacy of aggadah together with a system of halakhah, and although, because of a variety of reasons, that legacy was frequently overlooked and aggadah became subservient to halakhah, halakhah is ultimately dependent upon aggadah. Halakhah, the rationalization of living, is not only forced to employ elements that are themselves unreasoned, its ultimate authority depends upon aggadah. For what is the basis of halakhah? The event at Sinai, the mystery of revelation, belongs to the sphere of aggadah. Thus while the content of halakhah is subject to its own reasoning, its authority is derived from aggadah….
To reduce Judaism to inwardness, to aggadah, is to blot out its light, to dissolve its essence and to destroy its reality. Indeed, the surest way to forfeit aggadah is to abolish halakhah. They can only survive in symbiosis. Without halakhah, aggadah loses its substance, its character, its source of inspiration, its security against becoming secularized....
There is no halakhah without aggadah, and no aggadah without halakhah. We must neither disparage the body nor sacrifice the spirit. The body is the discipline, the pattern, the law; the spirit is inner devotion, spontaneity, freedom. The body without the spirit is a corpse; the spirit without the body is a ghost. Thus a mitzvah is both a discipline and an inspiration, an act of obedience and an experience of joy, a yoke and a prerogative. Our task is to learn how to maintain a harmony between the demands of halakhah and the spirit of aggadah.
"Narrating the Law" by Barry Wimpfheimer, pg. 2
