I. Formalist rules promote change (eg Zimun, Tefilah)
II. Formalist rules are inclusive, later sources complicate (Megilah, Kiddush)
III. Formalist rules are exclusionary, grey area exists (Keri'at HaTorah)
תלמוד ירושלמי מגילה ד:א
משה התקין את ישראל שיהו קורין בתורה בשבתות ובימים טובים ובראשי חדשים ובחולו של מועד שנאמר [ויקרא כג מד] וידבר משה את מועדי ה’ אל בני ישראל:
Yerushalmi Megilla 4:1
Moshe enacted that Israel should read the Torah on Shabbatot, on Yamim Tovim, on Rashei Chodashim, and on Chol Ha-mo’ed, for it is written “And Moshe declared God’s appointed times to the children of Israel” [Vayikra 23:44].
דתניא (שמות טו, כב) וילכו שלשת ימים במדבר ולא מצאו מים דורשי רשומות אמרו אין מים אלא תורה שנאמר (ישעיהו נה, א) הוי כל צמא לכו למים כיון שהלכו שלשת ימים בלא תורה נלאו עמדו נביאים שביניהם ותיקנו להם שיהו קורין בשבת ומפסיקין באחד בשבת וקורין בשני ומפסיקין שלישי ורביעי וקורין בחמישי ומפסיקין ערב שבת כדי שלא ילינו ג' ימים בלא תורה
For it was taught in a baraita: “And they walked for three days in the wilderness and did not find water.” The expounders of verses said: “water” is only Torah, as it is written, “Lo, all who thirst, go to the water” [Yeshayahu 55:1]. Since they walked for three days without Torah, they became exhausted. The prophets among them stood up and enacted for them that they read on Shabbat, pause on Sunday, read on Monday, pause on Tuesday and Wednesday, read on Thursday and pause on Erev Shabbat [Friday], so that they not rest three days without Torah.
מעיקרא תקנו חד גברא תלתא פסוקי אי נמי תלתא גברי תלתא פסוקי כנגד כהנים לוים וישראלים
Initially they enacted one man [reading] three verses, or alternatively three men [reading] three verses, corresponding to Kohanim, Levites, and Israelites.
עשרה תקנות תיקן עזרא שקורין במנחה בשבת וקורין בשני ובחמישי ...הוא תיקן תלתא גברי ועשרה פסוקי
Ezra issued ten enactments: That they read at Shabbat mincha, and read on Monday and Thursday…He enacted three men and ten verses.
ובנביא אפילו אחד קורא ושנים מתרגמין - שהתרגום אינו אלא להשמיע לנשים ועמי הארץ שאינן מכירין בלשון הקודש... ובתרגום של תורה צריכין אנו לחזור שיהו מבינין את המצות ...
For the Targum is only to make it understood to the women and the unlearned, who do not know the holy tongue… and with the Targum of Torah we need to make an effort in order that they should understand the mitzvot…...
(ג) אֵין פּוֹרְסִין אֶת שְׁמַע, וְאֵין עוֹבְרִין לִפְנֵי הַתֵּבָה, וְאֵין נוֹשְׂאִין אֶת כַּפֵּיהֶם, וְאֵין קוֹרִין בַּתּוֹרָה, וְאֵין מַפְטִירִין בַּנָּבִיא... פָּחוֹת מֵעֲשָׂרָה.
We do not make an abbreviated communal repetition of Shema [for those who missed saying it], and we do not pass before the aron kodesh [as a prayer leader], and they [the kohanim] do not raise their hands [to bless the congregation], and we do not read from the Torah, and we do not read haftara from the Prophets…with fewer than ten.
מלחמת ה’ מגילה ג. (בדפי הריף)
… השנוים במשנתינו [אין פורסין את שמע… ואין קורין בתורה…. פחות מעשרה] כולם חובות הצבור הן ואינן אלא במחויבים בדבר אבל מגילה כשם שהצבור חייב כך כל יחיד ויחיד חייב…
Milchemet Ha-shem Megilla 3a (Rif Pagination)
…The items taught in our mishna [one does not repeat Shema…and does not read the Torah…with fewer than ten] all are obligations of the community and are only for those obligated in the matter. But [with respect to] megilla, just as the community is obligated, so is each and every individual obligated…
הליכות שלמה פרק יב קריאת התורה; מילואים יז
מצוה על כל המתפללים לשמוע את קריאת התורה…ובני חו״ל [=חוץ לארץ] הבאים לארץ ישראל בשנים שאין קריאת הפרשיות שוה, ומפסידים שמיעת פרשה, אין צריכים להשלים ולשמוע הפרשה שחיסרו, דקריאת התורה הוי חובת הצבור. מילואים: בענין קריאת התורה אם היא חובת ציבור או חובת כל יחיד ויחיד… חיובא ליכא אלא בציבור של תפלה.
Halichot Shlomo 12 Keri'at Ha-Torah; Addendum 17
It is a mitzva upon all who pray to hear keri’at ha-Torah…Those from abroad who come to Eretz Yisrael in years when the reading is not the same, and miss hearing a portion, do not need to make up for it and hear the portion that they missed, for keri’at ha-Torah is a communal obligation. Addendum: Regarding the matter of keri’at ha-Torah, if it is a communal obligation or the obligation of each individual…There is only an obligation within the prayer congregation.
Our rabbis taught [in a baraita]: Everyone counts toward the count of seven, even a minor and even a woman. But our sages said: A woman may not read the Torah, because of kevod ha-tzibbur [the honor of the congregation].
זֶה הַכְּלָל, כֹּל שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְחֻיָּב בַּדָּבָר, אֵינוֹ מוֹצִיא אֶת הָרַבִּים יְדֵי חוֹבָתָן:
This is the rule: Whoever is not obligated in a matter does not discharge the obligation of the masses.
ר”ן מגילה יג. בדפי הרי”ף
הכל עולין למנין שבעה ואפילו אשה ואפי[לו] קטן. פי[רוש] עולין להשלים קאמר ולא שיהו כולם קטנים ולא נשים דכיון דלאו בני חיובא נינהו לא מפקי לגמרי.
Ran Megilla 13a (Rif pagination)
Everyone counts toward the count of seven, even a woman and even a minor. That means they count to complete, and not that all of them be minors or women, for since they are not subject to the obligation, they cannot fully discharge the obligation.
[I] ור”י ב”ר [=ורב יצחק בן רב] יהודה מביא ראיה דנשים מברכות על כל מצות עשה שהזמן גרמא מדאמרינן (מגילה דף כג.) הכל עולה למנין שבעה ואפי[לו] אשה ואפי[לו] קטן ואף על גב דאשה אינה מצווה לעסוק בתורה כדאמר בפרק קמא דקדושין (דף לד.) ובריש בכל מערבין (עירובין כז.) [II] ואור”ת [=ואומר רבינו תם] דאין זו ראיה דברכת התורה לפניה ולאחריה לאו משום תלמוד תורה שאפילו ברך ברכת הערב נא או נפטר באהבה רבה חוזר ומברך…[III] ועוד דאיכא למימר דהא דאשה עולה היינו באמצע שלא היו רגילים לברך כדאיתא בפרק הקורא את המגילה עומד (דף כא.)…ומיהו עולין למנין שבעה משמע בסוף שבעה…
[I] And Rabbi Yitzchak bar Rav Yehuda brings a proof that women recite a beracha over any positive time-bound mitzva from that which we say (Megilla 23a) “Everyone counts towards the number seven, even a woman and even a minor” even though a woman isn’t commanded to occupy herself with Torah, as it says in the first chapter of Kiddushin (34a) and in the beginning of the third chapter of Eiruvin (27a). [II] And Rabbeinu Tam says that this is not a proof, for birkat ha-Torah before and after [the reading] is not [recited] because of Talmud Torah, for even if he recited the beracha of “ve-ha’arev na” or discharged the obligation [of reciting personal birchot ha-Torah] with ahava rabba, he recites the beracha again [for the reading]…[III] further, that one can say that this, that a woman can count, is in the middle [readings] for they weren’t in the habit of reciting the beracha [for those] as is brought in the third chapter of Megilla (21a)….and nevertheless “count toward the number seven” sounds like the end of the seven…
ספר המנוחה, תפילה יב:יז
שנשים נצטווו במצוות הכתובות בתורה, ואם כן יכולות לברך אשר בחר בנו ואשר נתן לנו ולקרות בתורה כאנשים אם לאו משום כבוד צבור…
Sefer Ha-menucha, Tefilla 12:17
For women were commanded in the mitzvot written in the Torah, and if so they can recite the berachot “asher bachar banu” and “asher natan lanu” and read from the Torah like men, were it not for kevod ha-tzibbur…
בית הבחירה (מאירי) מגילה כג.
… ויש מי שמפרש שלא נאמרו הדברים אלא בזמן שהיו קוראין אמצעיים בלא ברכה ואשה יכולה לקרות באמצע אבל עכשו שכלן מברכין אין אשה קוראה כלל וכן הדין נותן שהרי היאך תברך והיא פטורה …
Beit Ha-bechira (Me'iri) Megilla 23a
…There is one who explains that these things were said only regarding a time when they would read the middle [readings] without a beracha, then a woman would be able to read in the middle. But nowadays, when everyone recites a beracha, a woman does not read at all, and thus logic dictates, for how will she recite a beracha when she is exempt?…
ר”ן מגילה יג.
ולפום עיקר דינא נמי שאינו מברך אלא הפותח והחותם אשה וקטן אין קורין ראשון ולא אחרון משום ברכה לפי שא”א [=שאי אפשר] לקורין האחרים שיצאו בברכתם ומיהו השתא דתקון רבנן שיברכו כולם אשה וקטן קורין אפי[לו] ראשון ואחרון וכיון דקורין ודאי מברכין.
Ran Megilla 13a (Rif pagination)
According to the fundamental law also that only the first and the last recite a beracha, a woman and a minor don’t read the first or the last because of the beracha because it is impossible that other readers would discharge their obligation through their [women’s and minors’] beracha. Nevertheless, now that our sages have enacted that all [readers] recite a beracha, a woman and a minor read even the first and the last, and since they read, they certainly recite a beracha.
(ה) ביו"ט חמשה ביוה"כ ששה בשבת שבעה [אם רצו להוסיף אל יוסיפו] דברי ר' ישמעאל רבי עקיבה אומר ביום טוב חמשה ביוה"כ [ששה ובשבת שבעה ואם רצו להוסיף מוסיפין] הכל עולין למנין שבעה אפילו [אשה אפילו קטן אין מביאין את האשה לקרות ברבים].
(ו) בית הכנסת שאין להם מי שיקרא אלא אחד עומד וקורא ויושב אפילו שבעה פעמים בית הכנסת של לעוזות אם יש להם מי שיקרא עברית פותחין עברית וחותמין אם [אין להם מי שיקרא אלא אחד אין קורא אלא אחד].
(5) On Yom Tov five [read from the Torah], on Yom Kippur six, and on Shabbat seven. If they wanted to add, they may not add, the words of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says, on Yom Tov five, on Yom Kippur six, and on Shabbat seven, and if they wanted to add, they may add. Everyone counts toward the quorum of seven [readers], even a woman, even a minor. [However,] we do not bring up a woman to read before the masses.
(6) A synagogue that only has one person who is able to read [from the Torah], he stands and reads and sits [during the aliyahs] even seven times. A synagogue where a foreign tongue is spoken, if they have someone who is able to read Hebrew, they should [at least] begin in Hebrew and conclude [in Hebrew]. If they have no one who is able to read [in Hebrew] except for one, then only that one person should read.
…דבימי החכמים לא היה רגילות שיסייע שליח ציבור לקורא בתורה … ומה שנוהגין עכשיו שמסייע ש”צ [=שליח ציבור] לקורא בתורה כדי שלא לבייש את מי שאינו יודע לקרות כענין שמצינו במס[כת] ביכורים (פ”ג מ”ז) שהתקינו שמקרין את הכל…
…For in the days of the Sages it was not the normal practice for the shaliach tzibbur to assist the Torah reader … and the custom nowadays for the shaliach tzibbur to assist the Torah reader is in order not to shame one who does not know how to read, as with the matter that we find in Bikkurim (3:7), that they established that they read the entirety [of mikra bikkurim for the person bringing first fruits] to repeat…
… לפי שאין הכל בקיאין בטעמי הקריאה ואין צבור יוצאין בקריאתו והוא בעיניו כיודע ואם לא יקראוהו בתורה אתי לאינצויי עם ש”ץ [=שליח ציבור] לכך התקינו שיקרא שליח צבור שהוא בקי בקריאה. ומ”מ [=ומכל מקום] גם העומד לקרות יקרא בנחת ובדקדוק עם שליח צבור שלא תהא ברכה לבטלה ואותו שאינו יודע לקרות אין ראוי שיקראהו שליח צבור והויא ברכה לבטלה ולא מסתבר שהוא יברך על קריאת שליח צבור…
…Since not everyone is expert in the cantillation for the reading, and the community do not discharge their obligation with his reading. But in his own eyes, he knows [how to read] and if they do not allow him to read from the Torah, he may come to quarrel with the shali’ach tzibbur. Therefore, they established that the shali’ach tzibbur, who is expert in reading, should read. In any case, the one who stands up to read should also read quietly and precisely along with the shali’ach tzibbur, so it will not be a beracha le-vatala [in vain]. It is not proper for the shali’ach tzibbur to read for someone who does not know how to read [even with assistance], and this is a beracha le-vatala and it does not make sense for him to recite a beracha over the reading of the shali’ach tzibbur…
…כשאינו קורא בעצמו אינו אלא כשאר אנשי הצבור ששומעים א”כ [=אם כן] איך רשאי לברך הא גבי שומעים לא תיקון רבנן ברכה בקה”ת [=בקריאת התורה]. [הג”ה ובדוחק יש ליישב…דהש”ץ [=דהשליח ציבור] אינו מכוין להוציא רק העולה שקורא בשבילו…ולשאר הצבור אינו רק שמיעה בעלמא [שאינו מכוין הש”ץ [=השליח ציבור] כלל להוציאם ולא שייך בזה שומע כעונה ממש לדידהו] ולהכי שייך ברכה לגבי דידיה ולא לדידהו…
…When he does not read himself, he is no different from the rest of the people of the congregation who hear. If so, how is he allowed to recite a beracha – the Sages did not enact a beracha over keri’at ha-Torah for the listeners. [Note: One can resolve this in a forced way…that the shali’ach tzibbur has in mind to discharge only the obligation of the oleh for whom he is reading…and for the rest of the congregation, it is mere hearing [for the shali’ach tzibbur does not intend to discharge their obligation at all, and actual shomei’a ke-oneh does not apply to them] and thus the beracha applies to him [the oleh] and not to them [the congregation]…
הזבין והזבות והנדות והיולדות מותרין לקרות בתורה בנביאים ובכתובים ולשנות במשנה במדרש בהלכות ובאגדות
The zavim and the zavot and the niddot and the yoldot are permitted to read Torah, Prophets, and Writings, and to learn mishna, midrash, halacha and aggada.
שו”ת הר צבי או”ח א:עא
ובנוגע לס”ת [=ספר תורה] של יחיד שמתחילה נכתבה בשביל עצמו ללמוד בה, כבר אמרתי דאפשר שלא אסרו לטלטל ס”ת [=ספר תורה] אלא בס”ת [=בספר תורה] שהוקדשה מתחלה לשם ביהכ”נ [=בית הכנסת], אבל ס”ת [=ספר תורה] שמתחלה נכתבה בשביל היחיד ללמוד בה, בכל מקום שהוא נמצא שפיר מותר לטלטלה עמו.
Responsa Har Tzvi OC I:71
Regarding a Torah scroll of an individual, which was initially written for himself to study with, I already said that it’s possible that they only prohibited moving the Torah scroll when it is one that was dedicated from the outset for the purpose of a synagogue. But a Torah scroll that from the outset was written for the individual to learn from it, he is permitted to move it with him wherever he is.
(ג) הכל עולים למנין ז' אפי' אשה וקטן שיודע למי מברכין אבל אמרו חכמים אשה לא תקרא בציבור מפני כבוד הציבור: הגה ואלו דוקא מצטרפים למנין הקרואים אבל לא שיהיו כולם נשים או קטנים (ר"ן וריב"ש) ודין עבד כנעני כדין אשה אבל אם אמו מישראל מותר לעלות (הגהות מיי' פי"ב מהל' תפלה) ואסור לקרות בראש מגולה ואין איסור לקרות ע"ה נכבד ועשיר וגדול הדור לפני ת"ח כי אין זה בזיון לת"ח רק כבוד לתורה שמתכבדת באנשים גדולים (א"ז) וממזר מותר לעלות לס"ת (מהר"א מפרא"ג) וע"ל סי' קל"ו מסדר הקרואים:
(3) 3. All count towards the seven who are called up, even a woman and a child who knows who we bless, but the Sages said: A woman shall not read [the Torah] in public, out of concern for the honor of the community. RAMA: And these specifically may be include in those who read, but they may not be all women or children (who are listening) (Ra"n and Riva"sh). And a Canaanite slave is treated as a woman, but if his mother is Jewish he may go up [to read the Torah] (Hagahot Maimoniyot, Prayer and the Priestly Blessing, ch. 12). And it is prohibited to read with one's head uncovered. And there is no prohibition to call up a respected ignoramus, who is rich and powerful, before learned men; for it is not disrespectful to the learned men, rather an honor to the Torah which is honored by great men (Ohr Zaru'a). And a mamzer may go up to [read from] the Torah (Mahar"a of Prague). And see above, Siman 136, for the order of those who are called up.
This paper is not a manifesto to alter existing Orthodox Jewish synagogue practice. Although I believe that women’s aliyyot and Torah reading may be halakhically sanctioned, it is clear that there is no live tradition of such a practice, or indeed any evidence that it was ever more than a sporadic phenomenon that took place in unusual circumstances. It would be wrong to create dissension in communities and synagogues by challenging hallowed practices that are seen as the hallmark of Orthodox Judaism, and I would not want this paper to be used for that purpose. By the same token, if my analysis of the sources is tenable, by what moral justification may women be denied a halakhic privilege if they exercise it in self- selected groups without directly impinging on others’ sensibilities? I believe that the course for which I am arguing is at the very least a legitimate halakhic option that, by restoring to Orthodox women their halakhic capacity to participate in the qeri’at ha-Torah portion of the synagogue service, will invigorate and bring fresh energy to public religious life....
To recapitulate, there appears to be sound halakhic basis for the argument that, where a man reads the Torah women might be called to the Torah for at least some of the aliyyot. In impromptu services held outside the synagogue, or in synagogues where there is consensus that a woman’s Torah reading does not violate community standards of dignity, women may be permitted to read the Torah (or at least portions of it) as well. The only serious objection to qeri’at ha-Torah by women is the one raised by the baraita, namely that women’s Torah reading violates kevod ha-tsibbur, and kevod ha-tsibbur should be regarded as a relative, waivable objection that is not universally applicable.
Because qeri’at ha-Torah by women would be a radical innovation, the practice should not be introduced in a way that directly challenges existing practice or causes dissension within established synagogues, whose minhagim should be respected. However, where women’s aliyyot and Torah reading take place in self-selected groups, the practice may not be attacked on the grounds that it violates binding minhag.
I call Shapiro's article the teshuvah to end teshuvas because we realized that in founding the partnership minyan Shira Hadasha we did not need a posek or a teshuvah to justify or explain what we were doing. We ourselves had direct access ot relevant halakhic texts - and we knew how to read them. It felt disingenuous to rely upon the work of Shapiro for new practices taking place in our minyan. Rabbis were no longer the gatekeepers to Orthodoxy, and it was unnecessary to cite them as authorities. We founded Shira Hadasha not because an Orthodox rabbi had published a teshuvah permitting it; we knew there was halakhic integrity in what we were doing and that was enough for us. We did not need consensus of the larger Orthodox world and were not afraid that we appeared like other, more liberal religious movements.
In the time of the Talmud, being called up to the Torah always involved reading from it, and the phrase “to read in the Torah” was interchangeable with receiving an aliyyah. Therefore, the conclusion I drew from the language of the baraita that if reading is not involved there is no issue of kevod tsibbur, although highly plausible, is not in itself proven. Conceivably, other factors might be involved. And while starting from sometime during the period of the rishonim when use of a ba`al qeri’ah became widespread, a distinction could have been made between a woman’s reading the Torah and her having an aliyyah, this is nowhere spelled out. Apparently, this distinction was suggested only recently, when women’s Torah readings became an issue.
To read into the Shulhan Arukh a conscious intention that “women may be included, they just may not read” as the author does, is anachronistic, and to suggest that the Shulhan Arukh and its commentators would imply such an innovation in practical halachah without openly calling attention to it, lacks credibility. The author’s attempt to show that such is indeed the opinion of the Shulhan Arukh, Rema, and others is unconvincing. Nothing special can be adduced from the language of the Shulhan Arukh, which was copied precisely from the Tur and not from Rambam (other than the reference to the intellect of the minor, which stems from Rambam but does not use his wording). I have already disputed the suggestion that Rambam distinguishes between women reading the Torah in a synagogue and in a private minyan, and consequently he cannot be a source for what the author claims the Shulhan Arukh means...
If kevod ha-tsibbur means not fostering the impression that there are insufficient men who know how to read, then in the case of additional aliyyot that are wholly voluntary, no misapprehension as to men’s qualifications can result from a woman’s taking one of these aliyyot. It may still be objected, however, that if she reads part of the portion the tsibbur is required to read, kevod ha-tsibbur would apply regardless of how many aliyyot there are. Only if her aliyyah is superfluous from the standpoint both of its ordinal number and its contents would kevod ha-tsibbur not apply. In practice, this hinges on a controversy between Shulhan Arukh and Rema in Orah Hayyim 282:2; the former permits additional readers to repeat sections of the Torah portion that were already read and this is the practice in Sephardic congregations, while the latter writes that the practice in Ashkenazic communities is to forbid doing so, other than on Simhat Torah. Certainly on Simhat Torah, when the custom today is for every male to be called to the Torah serially, there is no possibility that if women are also called up anyone might think this casts doubt on the men’s capabilities.
Where does all this leave us? Regardless of the arguments that can be proffered to permit women’s aliyyot today— that kevod ha-tsibbur can be waived, that it does not apply today when everyone is literate, that it does not apply when the olim rely on the (male) ba`al qeri’ah and do not themselves read—women’s aliyyot remain outside the consensus, and a congregation that institutes them is not Orthodox in name and will not long remain Orthodox in practice. In my judgement, this is an accurate statement now and for the foreseeable future, and I see no point in arguing about it
That leaves us with the possible exceptions. I have already writtten in Benei Banim that if done without fanfare, an occasional aliyyah by a woman in a private minyan of men held on Shabbat in a home and not in a synagogue sanctuary or hall can perhaps be countenanced or at least overlooked, and compare Benei Banim, III, no. 27 concerning sheva berakhot.
What I suggested above about Simhat Torah I have not seen discussed. Simhat Torah is already marked by unusual leniencies, and what goes on then does not necessarily affect the rest of the year. In many synagogues a number of readings take place simultaneously inside and outside the main sanctuary, and another could be added largely for women. This would obviate the need for women go up to the bimah in the men’s section. Also, according to a number of shitot and depending on its structure, women in the ezrat nashim may be halakhically considered to be in the presence of the minyan in the men’s section in spite of the mehitsah, see Benei Banim, II, no. 7; since writing it I found that a key argument had already been put forward by Resp. Avnei Neizer, Orah Hayyim, no. 35, paragraph 15. If so, it might be possible for women to have aliyyot even in the ezrat nashim without ten men being on the women’s side. Such an innovation should only be considered where women strongly desire to participate in the central activity of Simhat Torah, and its implementation should be subject to the decisions of a local halakhic authority.
Our Open Orthodox neighbors certainly are halakhic. Most foundationally, Edah speaks to readers ready to carry out normative demands with devotion. When Saul Berman analyzes playing sports on Shabbat (vol. 1:1 [2000/Heshvan 5761]), or Reuven Singer analyzes, inter alia, the scope of sh’vut restrictions (vol. 3:1 [2003/Tevet 5763]), or Jen Taylor and Dov Linzer debate women writing Torah scrolls (vol. 6:2 [2007/Heshvan, or Yaakov Love discusses inviting gentiles to holiday meals (vol. 7:1 [2008/Tishrei 5769]), they may assume that Jews will follow their guidance on how to behave.
In reviewing Golinkin’s responsa (largely favorably), Zvi Zohar wrote: “to be a posek, you need a corresponding public— a textually and halakhically competent and involved community that can appreciate the virtuosity and expertise of the author and, recognizing his pre-eminence, follow his rulings because they have been convinced of their correctness. Does Golinkin have such a public? I leave this question open.” I think everyone honest knows the answer to that question. Conservative Jews care about normative tradition, but practice it sentimentally. Halakhah adds depth to the practices they choose to do, but rarely compels them to do something they do not want to, or prevents them from doing what they wish. We crave the truth and power of Jewish teachings in our lives, but spend too little effort seeking it in the mines. But communities that study and practice intensely grow adept at unearthing that very truth and power. Normative study and practice trains one in analyzing important social issues through halakhic lenses. As an example, consult the thrilling issue of Meorot (vol. 6:1 [2007/Shevat 5767] and the subsequent exchange in vol. 6:2 [2007/Heshvan 5768]) devoted to war and peace ethics, where Gerald Blildstein, Michael Broyde, Benjamin Ish-Shalom, Reuven Klapper, Aviezer Ravitzky, and Dov Zakheim consider legal and non-legal sources shaping Jewish approaches to topics including discretionary war and treatment of prisoners. Such discourse reminds me that there is just so much substance—so much there, there—in Open Orthodoxy, that one should not wonder why people would want to join this camp.
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Now, it is tempting to regard partnership minyanim as just Conservative Judaism, circa 1970. But similarity of behavior should not obscure differences in the intellectual scaffolding that surrounds it. For us, this question was closed decades ago. The CJLS permitted women’s aliyot in 1955; since the 1983 decision to ordain female rabbis, non-egalitarian synagogue policies were doomed. By the mid-1990s, women were reading Torah and counting in the minyan in more than 82 percent of North American Conservative communities. One can only assume this proportion has risen since then; if we exclude Canadians, I expect the number approaches 99 percent. These positions were not taken without due consideration of halakhah, but I am sure no one favored egalitarianism because they thought it was the correct reading of tannaitic literature. They did so as public policy, for both ideological and pragmatic reasons. Already in 1955 Marshall Sklare opined that it would be “organizational suicide” for Conservative synagogues to try to preserve “the inferior position of women.” He was right. There can be no traction among modern heterodox American Jews for gender hierarchy as sacred social structure.
In contrast, the Open Orthodox conversation on this topic has an internal halakhic focus, with its attendant strengths and weaknesses. One asset is erudition. Shapiro composed a 51-page article with two columns per page, including 278 footnotes, examining the central rabbinic texts and the relevant early and late authorities. Aaron Blumenthal’s 1955 CJLS paper was a fine work of 14 pages and 34 notes, addressing contemporary mores in equal proportion with classical texts.Comparing these analyses is like looking at the same slide first through a 10x-power microscope and then a 100x-power lens. I am not merely admiring impressive scholarly muscles here, but commenting about the respective constituencies of the two writers. Blumenthal’s readers clearly did not demand comparably exhaustive research, because halakhah does not mean the same thing to both camps. To be Orthodox, as Asher Lopatin said, requires testing one’s views against the normative canon, down to the major 20th-century poskim. So this constituency demands leaders who excel at such research. And we must concede not only the obvious point that those who labor in Torah day and night will know more than those who study occasionally, but also that they will be more adept at plumbing the legal system’s depths, understanding the worldviews of prior sages, and discovering the religious meaning within. One reason Conservativism has been less inspiring to those seeking halakhic commitment may be that we do not play this harp as well.
But with the effort to remain halakhically faithful, and the temperamental preference for defending tradition, comes a shortcoming: a reduced capacity for critique. Orthodox Jews can argue that a rarely practiced alternative might have a surprising theoretical basis, but they find it agonizing to say openly what they clearly think: that in our Western society one cannot practice traditional gender norms without denigrating women, and that Judaism will be improved by practicing it in a new and different way for a new and different world.
I. The slippery slope or "walking the plank." (Sometimes the path isn't slippery, sometimes people are pushed down the slope).
II. Further Meditations on "Authority"
Deploying "authority" for liberal ends (e.g. ensuring the timely delivery and acceptance of a gett)
Rejecting "authority" for illberal ends (e.g. "hilltop youth" violating Shabbat to attack their neighbors).
Sefer Shoftim: Without a king, vulnerable people are victimized.
Sefer Melachim: With a king, vulnerable people are victimized.