(א) אֵ֣לֶּה הַדְּבָרִ֗ים אֲשֶׁ֨ר דִּבֶּ֤ר מֹשֶׁה֙ אֶל־כׇּל־יִשְׂרָאֵ֔ל בְּעֵ֖בֶר הַיַּרְדֵּ֑ן בַּמִּדְבָּ֡ר בָּֽעֲרָבָה֩ מ֨וֹל ס֜וּף בֵּֽין־פָּארָ֧ן וּבֵֽין־תֹּ֛פֶל וְלָבָ֥ן וַחֲצֵרֹ֖ת וְדִ֥י זָהָֽב׃ (ב) אַחַ֨ד עָשָׂ֥ר יוֹם֙ מֵֽחֹרֵ֔ב דֶּ֖רֶךְ הַר־שֵׂעִ֑יר עַ֖ד קָדֵ֥שׁ בַּרְנֵֽעַ׃ (ג) וַיְהִי֙ בְּאַרְבָּעִ֣ים שָׁנָ֔ה בְּעַשְׁתֵּֽי־עָשָׂ֥ר חֹ֖דֶשׁ בְּאֶחָ֣ד לַחֹ֑דֶשׁ דִּבֶּ֤ר מֹשֶׁה֙ אֶל־בְּנֵ֣י יִשְׂרָאֵ֔ל כְּ֠כֹ֠ל אֲשֶׁ֨ר צִוָּ֧ה ה' אֹת֖וֹ אֲלֵהֶֽם׃ (ד) אַחֲרֵ֣י הַכֹּת֗וֹ אֵ֚ת סִיחֹן֙ מֶ֣לֶךְ הָֽאֱמֹרִ֔י אֲשֶׁ֥ר יוֹשֵׁ֖ב בְּחֶשְׁבּ֑וֹן וְאֵ֗ת ע֚וֹג מֶ֣לֶךְ הַבָּשָׁ֔ן אֲשֶׁר־יוֹשֵׁ֥ב בְּעַשְׁתָּרֹ֖ת בְּאֶדְרֶֽעִי׃ (ה) בְּעֵ֥בֶר הַיַּרְדֵּ֖ן בְּאֶ֣רֶץ מוֹאָ֑ב הוֹאִ֣יל מֹשֶׁ֔ה בֵּאֵ֛ר אֶת־הַתּוֹרָ֥ה הַזֹּ֖את לֵאמֹֽר׃ (ו) ה' אֱלֹקֵ֛ינוּ דִּבֶּ֥ר אֵלֵ֖ינוּ בְּחֹרֵ֣ב לֵאמֹ֑ר רַב־לָכֶ֥ם שֶׁ֖בֶת בָּהָ֥ר הַזֶּֽה׃
(1) These are the words that Moses addressed to all Israel on the other side of the Jordan.—Through the wilderness, in the Arabah near Suph, between Paran and Tophel, Laban, Hazeroth, and Di-zahab, (2) it is eleven days from Horeb to Kadesh-barnea by the Mount Seir route. — (3) It was in the fortieth year, on the first day of the eleventh month, that Moses addressed the Israelites in accordance with the instructions that ה' had given him for them, (4) after he had defeated Sihon king of the Amorites, who dwelt in Heshbon, and King Og of Bashan, who dwelt at Ashtaroth [and] Edrei. (5) On the other side of the Jordan, in the land of Moab, Moses undertook to expound this Teaching. He said: (6) Our God ה' spoke to us at Horeb, saying: You have stayed long enough at this mountain.
- Do you notice an inconsistency in the narrative?
“Formalist” theories claim that (1) the law is “rationally” determinate, i.e., the class of legitimate legal reasons available for a judge to offer in support of his decision justifies one and only one outcome either in all cases or in some significant and contested range of cases (e.g., cases that reach the stage of appellate review); and (2) adjudication is thus “autonomous” from other kinds of reasoning, that is, the judge can reach the required decision without recourse to non-legal normative considerations of morality or political philosophy.
(כח) ...וממה נפשך חייבים חטאת, ובפרט שעינינו רואות שמתבשלים בכלי שני ובכלי שלישי, שבישולן קל.
...For either opinion - they will be liable for a sin offering! We explicitly see that cooking/bishul is occurring in the secondary vessel and tertiary vessel, as [the materials] come to cook easily.
אגרות משה או"ח ד סימן עה
תשובה: לע"ד לא נראה כלל לומר דאיכא דברים שמתבשלים בכלי שלישי....ומה שכתב בערוך השולחן סימן שי"ח סעיף כ"ח דעינינו רואות שתה מתבשל גם בכלי שלישי לא מובן זה ומה שרואין אנו בעינינו שמתאדמין המים זה אינו ענין בשול דאף בקרים ממש מתאדמין במשך זמן וכ"ש בחמין כשאין היד סולדת ולא זהו ענין בשול, ....
Iggerot Moshe Orach Chaim 4:75
In my humble opinion, it does not seem plausible to say that things cook in a tertiary vessel/כלי שלישי [concern of bishul]....And what is found in the Aruch haShulchan 318:28 that "our eyes see that tea also cooks in a tertiary vessel" - this is not understandable. What we see with our eyes is the water reddening; this is not the phenomenon of bishul, as in very cold drinks it also reddens over time, and also in hot drinks that are not very hot and there that is not the phenomenon of bishul....
- What are the Aruch haShulchan and Rav Moshe Feinstein disagreeing about? What do you think could be driving their respective arguments?
A third example would be that of tzurat ha-pe[t]aḥ. This means that if a Jew does not have sufficient material to build the requisite number of walls, then it is sufficient to place two poles on either end and a beam across them. We consider this a tzurat ha-pe[t]aḥ, the figure of a doorway, and imagine that the doorway constitutes both an entrance and a wall. We accept the illusion that this empty space is really a complete wall.
R' Norman Lamm, pg. 2:
Thus, the Halakhah as a torat ḥayyim, a Torah of Life, tells us something about the importance of illusion in daily life. Normally we use the word "illusion" in a pejorative sense, as a term of derision, as something which is contrary to fact, to reality, to common sense. But my thesis this morning is that that is all wrong. In many of the most significant branches of human endeavor we make use of illusion, and could not get along without it....
Pity the man who prides himself upon possessing "common sense," who "sticks only to facts," and who has nothing to do with sentiment or illusion. What a miserable, cold, dull, impersonal, and boring life he must lead! I do not envy the scientist who carries the laboratory, via his mind, into his home and society; who sees men as objects, as chunks of protoplasm, who thinks only in terms of numbers and size, and reduces all relationships to impersonal equations....
Such people sterilize all beauty and sweetness out of their lives by ignoring such real and marvelous illusions as dignity and love and hope and purpose and happiness and humor.
- How does R' Lamm see these formalisms as a kind of beauty?
- Do you think they are beautiful?
(ז) רֹאשׁ בֵּית דִּין אוֹמֵר מְקֻדָּשׁ, וְכָל הָעָם עוֹנִין אַחֲרָיו מְקֻדָּשׁ מְקֻדָּשׁ. בֵּין שֶׁנִּרְאָה בִזְמַנּוֹ בֵּין שֶׁלֹּא נִרְאָה בִזְמַנּוֹ, מְקַדְּשִׁין אוֹתוֹ....
(7) After the witnesses have been examined and their testimony accepted, the head of the court says: It is sanctified. And all the people respond after him: It is sanctified; it is sanctified. Whether the moon was seen at its anticipated time, on the thirtieth day of the previous month, or whether it was not seen at its anticipated time, in which case witnesses are not necessary to establish the following day as the New Moon, the court sanctifies it and formally proclaims the day as the New Moon....
"...But if even if there are other witnesses, and even if we are already talking about the thirty-first day, when we know even without witnesses when the new month will be celebrated, (because a month cannot last thirty-two days) why are the witnesses allowed to desecrate the Sabbath in order to go up to Jerusalem?
The Mishna in Rosh haShana (2:7) teaches that 'whether the moon was seen at its proper time or not, they sanctify it.' This means that even if thirty days have gone by, and there is no need for witnesses to help determine the start of the new month, nonetheless the court sanctifies it. There is a qualitative difference between a month sanctified automatically and one sanctified by the court based on the testimony of witnesses, and this discrepancy even justifies desecrating the Sabbath...
We see from here that even in a case where the start of the month is already obvious, and thus the witnesses will have no impact on setting the calendar at all, the witnesses make a qualitative difference in the nature of the sanctification of the new moon. The question is always whether the new month be established with sanctification by man or not. If witnesses come forth, then the new month will be sanctified by man, and this warrants desecrating the Sabbath."
- What kind of power does halakhic formalism have here?
To whom may he be compared? To a mathematician who fashions an ideal world and then uses it for the purpose of establishing a relationship between it and the real world, as was explained above. The essence of the Halakhah, which was received from God, consists in creating an ideal world and cognizing the relationship between the ideal world and our concrete environment in all its visible manifestations and underlying structures. There is no phenomenon, entity or object in this concrete world which the a priori Halakhah does not approach with its ideal standard. When halakhic man comes across a spring bubbling quietly, he already possesses a fixed, a priori relationship with this real phenomenon: the complex of laws regarding the halakhic construct of a spring. The spring is fit for the immersion of a zav (a man with a discharge); it may serve as mei hatat (waters of expiation); it purifies with flowing water; it does not require a fixed quantity of forty se’ahs; etc. [See Maimonides, Laws of Immersion Pools, 9:8] When halakhic man approaches a real spring, he gazes at it and carefully examines its nature. He possesses, a priori, ideal principles and precepts which establish the statutes for the purpose of determining normative law: does the real spring correspond to the requirements of the ideal Halakhah or not?
- What do you think of this passage? Are there beautiful parts, and less beautiful parts?
R' Norman Lamm, The Illusions We Live By pgs.3-5
What we must know is this: that illusions are not opposed to fact. Illusions are what the facts add up to in the long run, what give us the ability to understand and interpret facts. Illusions are frequently more consonant with reality than narrow and isolated facts. Illusions are the framework of facts, that which gives them sense and meaning....
Of course, there are some illusions that are harmful and dangerous, such as the illusion of race-superiority or that might makes right. But these are myths: they are false; they build upon them and see them from a broader perspective.
- Do you agree with R' Lamm's distinction between illusion and myth?
...But not all methods of interpreting and augmenting the stories of tradition include women, whether as readers, storytellers, or interpreters....
With its profusion and variety of narratives, codes, and prophecies, Judaism has resources for subtle and multifaceted conceptions of human nature....[h]uman nature needs to be understood as a spectrum of meaningful human differences.
- According to Prof. Adler, what is missing in formalism? Is there a way to fill in such a gap?