הסכם כבוד הדדי כמענה לאתגרי הזמן

(1) A man takes a woman [into his household as his wife] and becomes her husband. She fails to please him because he finds something obnoxious about her, and he writes her a bill of divorcement, hands it to her, and sends her away from his house;

(1) A man takes a woman [into his household as his wife] and becomes her husband. She fails to please him because he finds something obnoxious about her, and he writes her a bill of divorcement, hands it to her, and sends her away from his house;

The Gemara explains: It is necessary lest you say that he has performed the mitzva the Merciful One placed upon him by means of levirate marriage, and now that he has divorced her she should once again stand in relation to him with the prohibition proscribing a brother’s wife, which was her status before the mitzva of levirate marriage came into effect. The tanna therefore teaches us that since he performed levirate marriage with her, the prohibition proscribing a brother’s wife no longer applies at all. The Gemara asks: And say that indeed, the prohibition proscribing a brother’s wife should be in force once again. The Gemara explains: The verse states: “And he will take her to him to be his wife” (Deuteronomy 25:5), which indicates that once he has taken her, she has become like his regular wife in all respects. § The mishna taught: She has the status of his wife in all respects after levirate marriage, except that the responsibility for her marriage contract is upon the property of her first husband. The Gemara inquires: What is the reason for this? It is that from Heaven they acquired a wife for him. Since he did not choose her but married her by force of a Torah commandment, he is not obligated to set aside for her a marriage contract of his own. Rather, he relies upon his brother’s marriage contract. The Gemara adds: And if she does not have anything from the first husband, e.g., if he owned no property, she nevertheless has a marriage contract from the second one, for the same reason that any wife is entitled to a marriage contract in the first place: So that she will not be demeaned in his eyes such that he will easily divorce her. The mishna further stated that the yavam may not say to her: Here is your marriage contract, and similarly, a man may not make such a statement to his wife. Rather, all of his property is mortgaged for her marriage contract. The Gemara asks: What is the relevance of the phrase: And similarly, here? The halakha in both cases appears to be identical. The Gemara explains: It is necessary lest you say that this is the halakha only there, with regard to a yevama, where the yavam did not write a marriage contract for her and therefore never wrote: All property that I have bought and that I will buy is mortgaged to the marriage contract. But here, with regard to a regular wife, where he did write a marriage contract for her that included the clause: That I have bought and that I will buy, say that she relies upon that which he has set aside, and therefore there is no need for a full lien on all his property. The tanna therefore teaches us that this is not the case. § The mishna states that if he divorced her she has only her marriage contract. There is no lien upon the property, and he may therefore sell it. The Gemara infers: If he divorced her, yes, that is the case, but if he did not divorce her, no, it is not. The tanna here teaches us indirectly that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Abba, who claims that the only way he can gain full control of all the property is by divorcing her. It was further taught in the mishna that if he remarried her, she is like all women, and she has nothing other than her marriage contract. The Gemara asks: What is the tanna teaching us by mentioning the possibility that he remarried her? We already learned this: With regard to one who divorces a woman and remarries her, he remarries her on the basis of her first marriage contract, and he need not write her a new one. Why is it necessary to emphasize this halakha in the case of a yevama? The Gemara answers: It is necessary lest you say that it is the halakha in the case of a wife, since he writes for her a marriage contract from him, and therefore when he remarries her he does so on the basis of the first marriage contract. But as for his yevama, where he did not write for her the marriage contract but it was written by his brother, in a case where he divorced her and remarried her, say that her marriage contract should be from him and he should write a new one using his own property. Therefore, the tanna teaches us that this is not required. § The Gemara discusses the background for the rule that the husband’s property is mortgaged for the marriage contract. Rav Yehuda said: At first they would write for a virgin two hundred dinars and for a widow one hundred dinars. They would then demand that this amount be available in cash, and then the men would grow old and would not marry women, as they did not all possess such large sums of money, until Shimon ben Shataḥ came and instituted an ordinance that a man need not place the money aside in practice. Rather, all of his property is guaranteed for her marriage contract. The Gemara comments: That opinion is also taught in a baraita: At first they would write for a virgin two hundred and for a widow one hundred dinars, and they would grow old and would not marry women, since the women were concerned that their marriage contract money would be wasted or lost, and they had no guarantee that it would be collected. The Sages therefore instituted an ordinance that they should place it, the sum of the marriage contract, in her father’s house, thereby ensuring its safekeeping. And still problems arose, as when he was angry at his wife, he would say to her: Go to your marriage contract, as it was too easy for them to divorce. Therefore, the Sages instituted an ordinance that they would place it in her father-in-law’s house, i.e., in her husband’s house. And wealthy women would craft their marriage contract money into baskets of silver and of gold, while poor ones would craft it into a large vessel for the collection of urine, as their marriage contract was large enough only for a small vessel. And still, when he was angry at her he would say to her: Take your marriage contract and leave, until Shimon ben Shataḥ came and instituted an ordinance that he does not actually give her the money for her marriage contract. Rather, he should write to her: All my property is guaranteed for her marriage contract, and it is not localized to a particular place or object. Consequently, he would need to sell some of his property if he wished to divorce her, and would therefore think carefully before undertaking such a drastic course of action. May we return to you, chapter “Ha’Ishah”

the last one gave her a bill of divorce, he has not disqualified her from marrying into the priesthood, as she is not considered a divorcée at all, this proves by inference that she does not require a bill of divorce from him. The reason is that if she requires a bill of divorce, even if it is only due to uncertainty, why has he not disqualified her from marrying into the priesthood? A bill of divorce of any validity would bar her from marrying a priest. Rather, a bill of divorce given by a man to a woman who is not his wife is clearly of no account, and the reason for the ruling in the latter clause, with regard to betrothal, is that people will say there was no need for a bill of divorce because it was a mistaken betrothal. The Gemara asks: If so, in the first clause too, they will say it was a mistaken marriage. The Gemara answers: The Sages penalized her by requiring her to receive a bill of divorce, lest people say she divorced this man and went back and married the first one. The Gemara counters: If so, in the latter clause of the mishna let us also penalize her. The Gemara responds: The first clause involves a situation where she violated a prohibition through her intercourse, and therefore the Sages penalized her. Conversely, in the latter clause, when she did not violate a prohibition, as she simply became betrothed, the Sages did not penalize her. § The mishna taught that this woman does not have, i.e., she is not entitled to, the payment of her marriage contract. The Gemara explains: What is the reason that the Sages instituted a marriage contract in general, for an ordinary woman? So that she will not be demeaned in his eyes such that he will easily divorce her. The necessity to find money for her marriage contract will prevent a hasty decision to divorce her. However, in the case of this woman, on the contrary, the Sages actually prefer that she will be demeaned in his eyes such that he will easily divorce her, as the marriage was forbidden and she may not remain with him. Consequently, they eliminated her marriage contract to encourage him to divorce her. § The mishna further states that she does not have claim to profits, or sustenance, or worn clothes. Why not? Because the stipulations in the marriage contract, i.e., all the rights of a wife stemming from the stipulations that are part of a marriage contract, are considered like the marriage contract itself. Since she has no marriage contract, she does not have the stipulations in a marriage contract either. § The mishna also teaches that if she took any of the above from this man or from that one she must return anything she took. The Gemara comments: This is obvious. Since she is not entitled to these articles, of course she must give them back. The Gemara explains: It is necessary, lest you say that since she has already taken hold of them we do not remove them from her possession, as this is merely a penalty and she obtained nothing that did not legally belong to her. The tanna therefore teaches us that the court requires her to return even these items. § The mishna taught that the child of either of the men is a mamzer. To clarify this issue, the Gemara cites a different discussion. We learned in a mishna elsewhere (Terumot 2:2): One may not separate teruma from ritually impure produce in order to exempt ritually pure food, and if he separated teruma from impure food unwittingly, his teruma is considered teruma. If he acted intentionally, he has done nothing, that is, his action is of no effect. The Sages debated: What is the meaning of the expression: He has done nothing? Rav Ḥisda said: He has done nothing at all, meaning that even that griva of produce he set aside as teruma returns to its former untithed state, as his entire act is completely disregarded. Rav Natan, son of Rabbi Oshaya, said: He has done nothing with regard to preparing the remaining produce from which he separated teruma, but the fruit he separated is itself teruma. Although the portion he set aside is sanctified as teruma, this does not exempt him from separating more teruma from ritually pure produce. The Gemara clarifies the two opinions: Rav Ḥisda did not say his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rav Natan, son of Rabbi Oshaya, as, if you say it is teruma, on occasion he will be negligent and not separate anything more, assuming that if the portion he set aside has the status of teruma he must certainly have done everything required. The Gemara asks: In what way is this case different from that which we learned in a mishna (Terumot 3:1): With regard to one who separates teruma from a serpent melon [kishut] and it was discovered to be bitter, or from a watermelon and it was discovered to be spoiled, it is teruma, and yet he must go back and separate teruma from another serpent melon or watermelon. No concern is expressed in this mishna that one might neglect to set aside teruma a second time. The Gemara answers: Are you raising a contradiction between the case of an unwitting sinner and that of an intentional sinner? There is a difference between them, as one who was unwitting did not commit a transgression and consequently does not deserve to be penalized, whereas one who was an intentional sinner did commit a transgression. And the Gemara raises a contradiction between this ruling involving an unwitting sinner and another halakha of an unwitting sinner: Here, it is taught that if the one who separated ritually impure produce instead of ritually pure produce was unwitting, his teruma is teruma, which indicates that he does not have to separate teruma again. However, there, with regard to rotten fruit, it is taught that it is teruma and yet he must separate teruma again. The Gemara explains: There, his was an unwitting act that is close to an intentional one, as he should have tasted it first to ensure that he was separating quality fruit. His failure to do so renders him virtually a willful sinner, and therefore the Sages penalized him by obligating him to set aside teruma again. In the case of impure teruma, in contrast, he may not have been able to investigate the matter when he separated the portion. And the Gemara also raises a contradiction between one case involving an intentional sinner and another case of an intentional sinner. Here, it is taught that in the case of an intentional sinner who separates teruma, he has done nothing. There, we learned in a mishna (Demai 5:10), that with regard to one who separates teruma from produce growing in a vessel that is not perforated, for produce that grew in a perforated vessel, which is considered connected to the ground, it is teruma, but he must go back and separate teruma a second time. This ruling is based on the principle that anything that grew in a pot without a hole does not require separation of teruma by Torah law. In this case, the fact that he must again set aside teruma does not mean that the portion he separated is not consecrated at all. The Gemara answers: In a case involving two vessels he will listen. Since the difference between the two vessels is clear to the eye, if the owner is told he must separate teruma again, it can be assumed that he will comply. In contrast, in the case of one vessel he will not listen, as ritually impure and pure produce look the same to him. Consequently, if he is informed that he must set aside teruma a second time despite the fact that the produce he already set aside has the status of teruma, he will take no notice. The Gemara asks another question: And according to the opinion of Rav Natan, son of Rabbi Oshaya, who said that he has done nothing with regard to preparing the remaining produce but it is nevertheless teruma, in what way is this case different from that which we learned in a mishna (Demai 5:10): If one separates teruma from that which grew in a perforated pot for that which is from a non-perforated pot, his teruma is teruma, but it may not be eaten until he removes on behalf of that portion itself teruma and tithe from another place? In other words, the portion he separated as teruma is not entirely consecrated, as it too is considered untithed produce in the sense that teruma must be separated for it. In contrast, one who sets aside impure teruma does not have to separate teruma from that portion itself. The Gemara answers: Here, with regard to ritually impure teruma, it is different, as by Torah law it is in fact full-fledged teruma, but the Sages penalized him by making him separate teruma again. This is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elai, as Rabbi Elai said: From where is it derived with regard to one who separates teruma from poor-quality produce for superior-quality produce that his teruma is teruma? As it is written with regard to teruma: “And you shall bear no sin by reason of it, seeing that you have set apart from it its best” (Numbers 18:32). This verse states that if one separated teruma from inferior-quality produce he has committed a sin, which shows that his action is effective, as Rabbi Elai proceeds to explain. Rabbi Elai elaborates: And if this inferior portion is not sanctified as teruma at all, why is there a bearing of sin? If the produce does not have the status of teruma he has not done anything, which means that his action cannot be considered a transgression. From here we learn with regard to one who separated from the bad for the good that his teruma is teruma after the fact. Similarly, the teruma of one who separates ritually impure food for pure food is valid teruma by Torah law. After clarifying the opinions themselves, the Gemara analyzes the case in greater detail. Rabba said to Rav Ḥisda: According to your opinion, that you said he has done nothing at all, meaning that even that se’a he set aside returns to its former untithed state, what is the reason for this? It is a rabbinic decree, as perhaps he will be negligent and will not separate teruma a second time. However, is there anything that by Torah law is teruma, as stated by Rabbi Elai, and yet due to the concern: Perhaps he will be negligent, the Sages removed its status as sacred and gave to it the status of non-sacred food? And can the court stipulate and enact a decree to uproot something that applies by Torah law? Rav Ḥisda said to Rabba: And you, do you not hold that the Sages have the power to do so? But didn’t we learn in the mishna that the child is a mamzer from this one and from that one? Granted, the child from the second man is a mamzer, as he was born to a married woman from a man who was not her husband. However, with regard to the child from the first husband, why is he a mamzer? After all, she is his wife, and by Torah law their son is a full-fledged Jew. And the Sages’ declaration that he is a mamzer cannot be seen as a mere stringency, as they thereby permit him to a mamzeret. This shows that a rabbinical decree can uproot a Torah prohibition. Rabba said to Rav Ḥisda that Shmuel said as follows: It is forbidden for the child of the first husband to marry a mamzeret. And similarly, when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said that the child is forbidden to a mamzeret. And if so, why does the mishna call him a mamzer? This is to teach us that the Sages are stringent and render it prohibited for him to marry a regular Jewish woman. With regard to the issue at hand, as he may not marry a mamzeret, the Sages did not in fact uproot a mitzva that applies by Torah law. Rav Ḥisda sent a proof to Rabba, in the hand of Rav Aḥa bar Rav Huna: And can the court not stipulate to uproot something prohibited by Torah law? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: From when does a man inherit from his minor wife, who was married off by her mother or brother, as enacted by the Sages, a marriage that is not valid by Torah law? Beit Shammai say: From when she stands at her fully developed height, i.e., when she grows up and reaches the age of maturity. And Beit Hillel say: From when she enters the wedding canopy. Rabbi Eliezer says: From when she has sexual relations. As soon as she is considered his wife, all the halakhot of a wife apply to her. And he inherits from her and becomes impure for her if she dies, even if he is a priest, and she eats teruma on his account if he is a priest. The Gemara first clarifies various details of this baraita. Beit Shammai say: From when she stands at her height. The Gemara expresses surprise at this statement: Is this the case even though she has not yet entered the wedding canopy? Betrothal alone, without the marriage canopy, is not enough to enable a man to inherit from an adult woman, let alone a minor. The Gemara answers: You must say that Beit Shammai meant from when she stands at her fully developed height and enters the wedding canopy. And Beit Shammai said to Beit Hillel as follows: That which you said, that he inherits her from when she enters the wedding canopy, is not enough. Rather, if she stands at her fully developed height, the wedding canopy is effective for bringing about her marriage, and if not, the wedding canopy is not effective for bringing about her marriage. The Gemara continues its analysis of the baraita. Rabbi Eliezer says: From when she has sexual relations. The Gemara again expresses surprise: But didn’t Rabbi Eliezer say that the actions of a minor girl are nothing, which indicates that marriage and intercourse with her are not considered an act of acquisition. Rather, we must say that he meant from when she matures and has sexual relations. The Gemara returns to the issue at hand, whether the court can stipulate to uproot something prohibited by Torah law. In any event the baraita is teaching that he inherits from her. But here is a case where by Torah law her father, i.e., his relatives, as he is dead, inherits from her, as a minor orphan cannot marry by Torah law, and yet by rabbinic law the husband inherits from her. This shows that the Sages can uproot a Torah mitzva. The Gemara answers: This is no proof, as in monetary matters property declared ownerless by the court is ownerless, and therefore the court can allocate her inheritance as they see fit. As Rabbi Yitzḥak said: From where is it derived that property declared ownerless by the court is ownerless? As it is stated: “And whoever does not come within three days, according to the council of the princes and the Elders, all his property should be forfeited, and himself separated from the congregation of the captivity” (Ezra 10:8). This verse indicates that the court can confiscate anyone’s possessions. Rabbi Elazar says that the proof that the court can declare property ownerless is from here: “These are the inheritances that Elazar the priest, and Joshua, son of Nun, and the heads of the fathers’ houses of the tribes of the children of Israel distributed for inheritance” (Joshua 19:51). What do heads have to do with fathers? The expression “the heads of the fathers’ houses of the tribes” is unusual and vague. Rather, this comes to tell you: Just as fathers bequeath to their sons anything they want to, so too, the heads, i.e., the leaders and judges of the people, bequeath to the people anything they want to. This shows that the leaders can take property from one individual and give it to another. It was stated that the husband of a minor becomes impure for her, even if he is a priest. The Gemara asks: But here is a case where by Torah law her father, not the man she married, is obligated to become impure for her, as the latter is not his wife by Torah law, and yet by rabbinic law her husband defiles himself for her. The Gemara answers: This is because she is considered like a corpse with no one to bury it [met mitzva], for which even a priest must become impure. Once she is married, her relatives from her father’s family no longer care for her welfare, which means her husband is the only one who is entrusted with her burial. The Gemara asks: And is she in fact a met mitzva? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Which corpse is a met mitzva? Any corpse that does not have anyone to bury it. If it was in a place where if one calls and others would answer him, this is not a met mitzva. In contrast, this girl does have relatives who can bury her, if necessary. The Gemara answers: Here too, since the members of her father’s family do not inherit from her, she would call and they would not answer her, as they have no desire to go to any trouble for her. Since her husband inherits from her, it is his duty to tend to her burial, and he must therefore become impure for her, as she has the status of a met mitzva.

(8) One who possesses two hundred zuz, may not take gleanings” the forgotten sheaf, peah or the poor man’s tithe. If he possesses two hundred minus one denar, then even if a thousand [men] each give him at the same time, he may accept. If he had [two hundred zuz] mortgaged to a creditor or to his wife’s ketubah, he may take. They do not force him to sell his house or his tools.

(1) A man takes a woman [into his household as his wife] and becomes her husband. She fails to please him because he finds something obnoxious about her, and he writes her a bill of divorcement, hands it to her, and sends her away from his house;

(1) With regard to a deaf-mute who married a halakhically competent woman, and a halakhically competent man who married a deaf-mute: If either man wants to divorce his wife, he may divorce her, and if he wants to maintain her as his wife, he may maintain her. The reason why a deaf-mute man can divorce his wife is that just as he marries her by intimation, i.e., his marriage is not performed by explicit speech, as deaf-mutes rely on gestures, so too, he divorces her by intimation. Likewise, in the case of a halakhically competent man who married a halakhically competent woman, and she later became a deaf-mute: If he wants to divorce his wife, he may divorce her, as a wife does not have to have intellectual capacity to receive a bill of divorce, and if he wants to maintain her as his wife, he may maintain her. If she became an imbecile, he may not divorce her, i.e., a bill of divorce is ineffective in this case. If he became a deaf-mute or an imbecile after they were married, he may never divorce her, as he does not have the legal competence to give a bill of divorce. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri said: For what reason is the halakha that in the case of the woman who becomes a deaf-mute, her husband may divorce her, but in the case of the man who becomes a deaf-mute, he may not divorce his wife? If the bill of divorce written by someone who formerly possessed all his senses and later became a deaf-mute is invalid, it stands to reason that it should not be valid when she becomes a deaf-mute either. They said to him: The man who divorces his wife is not similar to the woman who is divorced, as the woman is divorced whether she is willing or unwilling. Since the woman’s consent is not required, she may be divorced even if she is a deaf-mute. And, conversely, the man divorces his wife only willingly, and therefore the bill of divorce of a deaf-mute, who is not legally competent, is ineffective.

(2) How do we know that these ten essentials are prescribed by the Torah? It is written: "If she fails to please him … and he writes her a bill of divorcement, hands it to her, and sends her away from his house…" (Deuteronomy 24:1). If she fails to please him denotes that he divorces her only voluntarily; if his divorce has been involuntary it is invalid. The wife, however, is divorced whether or not she has been willing.