תורה
יכוין בקריאת חמשה פסוקים אלו שהם כנגד הֶ דמילוי הה ראשונה דשם ב''ן להשאיר בו הארה מתוספת נפש משבת שעברה:
ו (יט) וּמִכׇּל־הָ֠חַ֠י מִֽכׇּל־בָּשָׂ֞ר שְׁנַ֧יִם מִכֹּ֛ל תָּבִ֥יא אֶל־הַתֵּבָ֖ה לְהַחֲיֹ֣ת אִתָּ֑ךְ זָכָ֥ר וּנְקֵבָ֖ה יִֽהְיֽוּ׃
וּמִכָּל דְּחַי מִכָּל בִּשְׂרָא תְּרֵין מִכֹּלָא תָּעֵיל לְתֵבוֹתָא לְקַיָּמָא עִמָּךְ דְּכַר וְנָקְבָּא יְהוֹן:
(כ) מֵהָע֣וֹף לְמִינֵ֗הוּ וּמִן־הַבְּהֵמָה֙ לְמִינָ֔הּ מִכֹּ֛ל רֶ֥מֶשׂ הָֽאֲדָמָ֖ה לְמִינֵ֑הוּ שְׁנַ֧יִם מִכֹּ֛ל יָבֹ֥אוּ אֵלֶ֖יךָ לְהַֽחֲיֽוֹת׃
מֵעוֹפָא לִזְנוֹהִי וּמִן בְּעִירָא לִזְנַהּ וּמִכֹּל רִחֲשָׁא דְאַרְעָא לִזְנוֹהִי תְּרֵין מִכֹּלָּא יַעֲלוּן לְוָתָךְ לְקַיָּמָא:
(כא) וְאַתָּ֣ה קַח־לְךָ֗ מִכׇּל־מַֽאֲכָל֙ אֲשֶׁ֣ר יֵֽאָכֵ֔ל וְאָסַפְתָּ֖ אֵלֶ֑יךָ וְהָיָ֥ה לְךָ֛ וְלָהֶ֖ם לְאׇכְלָֽה׃
וְאַתְּ סַב לָךְ מִכָּל מֵיכַל דִּמִתְאֲכֵל וְתִכְנוֹשׁ לְוָתָךְ וִיהֵי לָךְ וּלְהוֹן לְמֵיכָל:
(כב) וַיַּ֖עַשׂ נֹ֑חַ כְּ֠כֹ֠ל אֲשֶׁ֨ר צִוָּ֥ה אֹת֛וֹ אֱלֹהִ֖ים כֵּ֥ן עָשָֽׂה׃
וַעֲבַד נֹח כְּכֹל דִּי פַקֵּיד יָתֵיהּ יְיָ כֵּן עֲבָד:
ז (א) וַיֹּ֤אמֶר יְהֹוָה֙ לְנֹ֔חַ בֹּֽא־אַתָּ֥ה וְכׇל־בֵּיתְךָ֖ אֶל־הַתֵּבָ֑ה כִּֽי־אֹתְךָ֥ רָאִ֛יתִי צַדִּ֥יק לְפָנַ֖י בַּדּ֥וֹר הַזֶּֽה׃
וַאֲמַר יְיָ לְנֹחַ עוּל אַתְּ וְכָל אֱנַשׁ בֵּיתָךְ לְתֵבוֹתָא אֲרֵי יָתָךְ חֲזֵיתִי זַכַּאי קֳדָמַי בְּדָרָא הָדֵין:
6 (19) And of every living thing of all flesh, two of every sort shalt thou bring into the ark, to keep them alive with thee; they shall be male and female.
(20) Of birds after their kind, and of cattle after their kind, of every creeping thing of the earth after its kind, two of every sort shall come to thee, to keep them alive.
(21) And take thou to thee of all food that is eaten, and gather it to thee; and it shall be for food for thee, and for them.
(22) So Noaĥ did according to all that God commanded him; thus he did.
7 (1) And the Lord said to Noaĥ, Come thou and all thy house into the ark; for thee have I seen righteous before Me in this generation.
נביאים
נג (ח) מֵעֹ֤צֶר וּמִמִּשְׁפָּט֙ לֻקָּ֔ח וְאֶת־דּוֹר֖וֹ מִ֣י יְשׂוֹחֵ֑חַ כִּ֤י נִגְזַר֙ מֵאֶ֣רֶץ חַיִּ֔ים מִפֶּ֥שַׁע עַמִּ֖י נֶ֥גַע לָֽמוֹ׃
מִיסוּרִין וּמִפּוּרְעֲנוּת יְקָרֵיב גַלְוָתָנָא וּפְרִישָׁן דְיִתְעַבְדָן לָנָא בְּיוֹמוֹהִי מַן יִכּוּל לְאִשְׁתְּעָאָה אֲרֵי יַעְדֵי שׁוּלְטָן עַמְמַיָא מֵאַרְעָא דְיִשְׂרָאֵל חוֹבִין דְחָבוּ עַמִי עַד לְוַתְהוֹן יִמְטוֹ:
(ט) וַיִּתֵּ֤ן אֶת־רְשָׁעִים֙ קִבְר֔וֹ וְאֶת־עָשִׁ֖יר בְּמֹתָ֑יו עַ֚ל לֹא־חָמָ֣ס עָשָׂ֔ה וְלֹ֥א מִרְמָ֖ה בְּפִֽיו׃
וְיִמְסַר יַת רַשִׁיעַיָא לְגֵהִנָם וְיַת עֲתִּירֵי נִכְסַיָא דַאֲנַסוּ בְּמוֹתָא דְאָבַדְנָא בְּדִיל דְלָא יִתְקַיְמוּן עָבְדֵי חֶטְאָה וְלָא יְמַלְלוּן נִכְלִין בְּפוּמְהוֹן:
(י) וַיהֹוָ֞ה חָפֵ֤ץ דַּכְּאוֹ֙ הֶחֱלִ֔י אִם־תָּשִׂ֤ים אָשָׁם֙ נַפְשׁ֔וֹ יִרְאֶ֥ה זֶ֖רַע יַאֲרִ֣יךְ יָמִ֑ים וְחֵ֥פֶץ יְהֹוָ֖ה בְּיָד֥וֹ יִצְלָֽח׃
וּמִן קֳדָם יְיָ הֲוָת רַעֲוָא לְמִצְרַף וּלְדַכָּאָה יַת שְׁאָרָא דְעַמֵהּ בְּדִיל לְנַקָאָה מֵחוֹבִין נַפְשֵׁיהוֹן יֶחֱזוּן בְּמַלְכוּת מְשִׁיחֵיהוֹן יִסְגוּן בְּנִין וּבְנָן יוֹרְכוּן יוֹמִין וְעָבְדֵי אוֹרַיְתָא דַייָ בִּרְעוּתֵהּ יִצְלְחוּן:
(יא) מֵעֲמַ֤ל נַפְשׁוֹ֙ יִרְאֶ֣ה יִשְׂבָּ֔ע בְּדַעְתּ֗וֹ יַצְדִּ֥יק צַדִּ֛יק עַבְדִּ֖י לָֽרַבִּ֑ים וַעֲוֺנֹתָ֖ם ה֥וּא יִסְבֹּֽל׃
מִשִׁעְבּוּד עַמְמַיָא יְשֵׁיזֵיב נַפְשְׁהוֹן יֶחֱזוּן בְּפּוּרְעֲנוּת סַנְאֵיהוֹן יִסְבְּעוּן מִבִּזַת מַלְכֵיהוֹן בְּחוּכְמְתֵהּ יְזַכֵּי זַכָּאִין בְּדִיל לְשַׁעְבָּדָא סַגִיאִין לְאוֹרַיְתָא וְעַל חוֹבֵיהוֹן הוּא יִבְעֵי:
(יב) לָכֵ֞ן אֲחַלֶּק־ל֣וֹ בָרַבִּ֗ים וְאֶת־עֲצוּמִים֮ יְחַלֵּ֣ק שָׁלָל֒ תַּ֗חַת אֲשֶׁ֨ר הֶעֱרָ֤ה לַמָּ֙וֶת֙ נַפְשׁ֔וֹ וְאֶת־פֹּשְׁעִ֖ים נִמְנָ֑ה וְהוּא֙ חֵטְא־רַבִּ֣ים נָשָׂ֔א וְלַפֹּשְׁעִ֖ים יַפְגִּֽיעַ׃ {פ}
בְּכֵן אֲפַלֵיג לֵיהּ בִּזַת עַמְמִין סַגִיאִין וְיַת נִכְסֵי כְּרַכִּין תַּקִיפִין יְפַלֵג עֲדָאָה חֲלַף דִמְסַר לְמוֹתָא נַפְשֵׁהּ וְיַת מְרוֹדַיָא שַׁעְבַּד לְאוֹרַיְתָא וְהוּא עַל חוֹבִין סַגִיאִין יִבְעֵי וְלִמְרוֹדַיָא יִשְׁתְּבֵיק בְּדִילֵהּ:
53 (8) By oppression and false judgement was he taken away; and of his generation who considered? For he was cut off out of the land of the living, for the transgression of the people to whom the stroke was due.
(9) For they made his grave among the wicked, and his tomb among the rich; because he had done no violence, neither was any deceit in his mouth.
(10) But it pleased the Lord to crush him by disease: if his soul shall consider it a recompense for guilt, he shall see his seed, he shall prolong his days, and the purpose of the Lord shall prosper in his hand.
(11) He shall see the travail of his soul, he shall be sated with seeing: by his knowledge did my servant justify the righteous One to the many, and did bear their iniquities.
(12) Surely I will give him a portion with the great, and he shall divide the spoil with the strong; because he has poured out his soul to death, and was numbered with transgressors; but he bore the sin of many, and made intercession for the transgressors.
כתובים
ב (ד) אִם־תְּבַקְשֶׁ֥נָּה כַכָּ֑סֶף וְֽכַמַּטְמוֹנִ֥ים תַּחְפְּשֶֽׂנָּה׃
וְתִבְעֵי הֵיךְ סִימָא הֵיךְ סִימָתָא תִצְבְּיָהּ:
(ה) אָ֗ז תָּ֭בִין יִרְאַ֣ת יְהֹוָ֑ה וְדַ֖עַת אֱלֹהִ֣ים תִּמְצָֽא׃
הֵידֵין תִּתְבַּיֵן דְחַלְתֵּיהּ דֶאֱלָהָא וִידִיעֲתָא מִן קֳדָם אֱלָהָא תִשְׁכָּח:
(ו) כִּֽי־יְ֭הֹוָה יִתֵּ֣ן חׇכְמָ֑ה מִ֝פִּ֗יו דַּ֣עַת וּתְבוּנָֽה׃
מְטוּל דֶאֱלָהָא יָהַב חָכְמְתָא מִן פּוּמֵיהּ יְדִיעֲתָא וּבְיוּנָא:
(ז) (וצפן) [יִצְפֹּ֣ן] לַ֭יְשָׁרִים תּוּשִׁיָּ֑ה מָ֝גֵ֗ן לְהֹ֣לְכֵי תֹֽם׃
יִטְשֵׁי לִתְרִיצֵי שִׁבְהוֹר וּמְסַיֵעַ לְאִילֵן דִמְהַלְכִין בְּלָא מוּם:
(ח) לִ֭נְצֹר אׇרְח֣וֹת מִשְׁפָּ֑ט וְדֶ֖רֶךְ חֲסִידָ֣ו יִשְׁמֹֽר׃
לְמִנְטוֹר אָרְחָתָא דְדִינָא וְאָרְחָתָא דְצַדִיקִין נִנְטַר:
2 (4) if thou seekest her like silver, and searchest for her as for hidden treasures;
(5) then shalt thou understand the fear of the Lord, and find the knowledge of God.
(6) For the Lord gives wisdom: out of his mouth come knowledge and understanding.
(7) He lays up sound wisdom for the righteous: he is a shield to those who walk uprightly,
(8) to keep the paths of justice; and he preserves the way of his pious ones.
משנה
א. כֵּיצַד אֵשֶׁת אָחִיו שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה בְעוֹלָמוֹ. שְׁנֵי אַחִים, וּמֵת אֶחָד מֵהֶם, וְנוֹלַד לָהֶן אָח, וְאַחַר כָּךְ יִבֵּם הַשֵּׁנִי אֶת אֵשֶׁת אָחִיו, וָמֵת, הָרִאשׁוֹנָה יוֹצֵאת מִשּׁוּם אֵשֶׁת אָחִיו שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה בְעוֹלָמוֹ, וְהַשְּׁנִיָּה מִשּׁוּם צָרָתָהּ. עָשָׂה בָהּ מַאֲמָר וָמֵת, הַשְּׁנִיָּה חוֹלֶצֶת וְלֹא מִתְיַבֶּמֶת:
ב. שְׁנֵי אַחִים וּמֵת אֶחָד מֵהֶן, וְיִבֵּם הַשֵּׁנִי אֶת אֵשֶׁת אָחִיו, וְאַחַר כָּךְ נוֹלַד לָהֶן אָח, וָמֵת, הָרִאשׁוֹנָה יוֹצֵאת מִשּׁוּם אֵשֶׁת אָחִיו שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה בְעוֹלָמוֹ, וְהַשְּׁנִיָּה מִשּׁוּם צָרָתָהּ. עָשָׂה בָהּ מַאֲמָר, וָמֵת, הַשְּׁנִיָּה חוֹלֶצֶת וְלֹא מִתְיַבֶּמֶת. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר, מְיַבֵּם לְאֵיזוֹ מֵהֶן שֶׁיִּרְצֶה, אוֹ חוֹלֵץ לְאֵיזוֹ מֵהֶן שֶׁיִּרְצֶה:
ג. כְּלָל אָמְרוּ בַיְבָמָה. כָּל שֶׁהִיא אִסּוּר עֶרְוָה, לֹא חוֹלֶצֶת וְלֹא מִתְיַבֶּמֶת. אִסּוּרָהּ אִסּוּר מִצְוָה, וְאִסּוּר קְדֻשָּׁה, חוֹלֶצֶת וְלֹא מִתְיַבֶּמֶת. אֲחוֹתָהּ שֶׁהִיא יְבִמְתָּהּ, חוֹלֶצֶת אוֹ מִתְיַבֶּמֶת:
ד. אִסּוּר מִצְוָה, שְׁנִיּוֹת מִדִּבְרֵי סוֹפְרִים. אִסּוּר קְדֻשָּׁה, אַלְמָנָה לְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל, גְּרוּשָׁה וַחֲלוּצָה לְכֹהֵן הֶדְיוֹט, מַמְזֶרֶת וּנְתִינָה לְיִשְׂרָאֵל, וּבַת יִשְׂרָאֵל לְנָתִין וּמַמְזֵר:
ה. מִי שֶׁיֶּשׁ לוֹ אָח מִכָּל מָקוֹם, זוֹקֵק אֶת אֵשֶׁת אָחִיו לְיִבּוּם, וְאָחִיו לְכָל דָּבָר, חוּץ מִמִּי שֶׁיֶּשׁ לוֹ מִן הַשִּׁפְחָה וּמִן הַנָּכְרִית. מִי שֶׁיֶּשׁ לוֹ בֵּן מִכָּל מָקוֹם, פּוֹטֵר אֵשֶׁת אָבִיו מִן הַיִּבּוּם, וְחַיָּב עַל מַכָּתוֹ וְעַל קִלְלָתוֹ, וּבְנוֹ הוּא לְכָל דָּבָר, חוּץ מִמִּי שֶׁיֶּשׁ לוֹ מִן הַשִּׁפְחָה וּמִן הַנָּכְרִית:
ו. מִי שֶׁקִּדֵּשׁ אַחַת מִשְּׁתֵּי אֲחָיוֹת וְאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ אֵיזוֹ מֵהֶן קִדֵּשׁ, נוֹתֵן גֵּט לָזוֹ וְגֵט לָזוֹ. מֵת, וְלוֹ אָח אֶחָד, חוֹלֵץ לִשְׁתֵּיהֶן. הָיוּ לוֹ שְׁנַיִם, אֶחָד חוֹלֵץ וְאֶחָד מְיַבֵּם. קָדְמוּ וְכָנְסוּ, אֵין מוֹצִיאִין מִיָּדָם:
ז. שְׁנַיִם שֶׁקִּדְּשׁוּ שְׁתֵּי אֲחָיוֹת, זֶה אֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ אֵיזוֹ קִדֵּשׁ, וְזֶה אֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ אֵיזוֹ קִדֵּשׁ, זֶה נוֹתֵן שְׁנֵי גִטִּין, וְזֶה נוֹתֵן שְׁנֵי גִטִּין. מֵתוּ, לָזֶה אָח, וְלָזֶה אָח, זֶה חוֹלֵץ לִשְׁתֵּיהֶן, וְזֶה חוֹלֵץ לִשְׁתֵּיהֶן. לָזֶה אֶחָד וְלָזֶה שְׁנַיִם, הַיָּחִיד חוֹלֵץ לִשְׁתֵּיהֶן, וְהַשְּׁנַיִם, אֶחָד חוֹלֵץ וְאֶחָד מְיַבֵּם, קָדְמוּ וְכָנְסוּ, אֵין מוֹצִיאִין מִיָּדָם. לָזֶה שְׁנַיִם וְלָזֶה שְׁנַיִם, אָחִיו שֶׁל זֶה חוֹלֵץ לְאַחַת, וְאָחִיו שֶׁל זֶה חוֹלֵץ לְאַחַת, אָחִיו שֶׁל זֶה מְיַבֵּם חֲלוּצָתוֹ שֶׁל זֶה, וְאָחִיו שֶׁל זֶה מְיַבֵּם חֲלוּצָתוֹ שֶׁל זֶה. קָדְמוּ שְׁנַיִם וְחָלְצוּ, לֹא יְיַבְּמוּ הַשְּׁנַיִם, אֶלָּא אֶחָד חוֹלֵץ וְאֶחָד מְיַבֵּם. קָדְמוּ וְכָנְסוּ, אֵין מוֹצִיאִין מִיָּדָם:
ח. מִצְוָה בַגָּדוֹל לְיַבֵּם. וְאִם קָדַם הַקָּטָן, זָכָה. הַנִּטְעָן עַל הַשִּׁפְחָה וְנִשְׁתַּחְרְרָה, אוֹ עַל הַנָּכְרִית וְנִתְגַּיְּרָה, הֲרֵי זֶה לֹא יִכְנוֹס. וְאִם כָּנַס אֵין מוֹצִיאִין מִיָּדוֹ. הַנִּטְעָן עַל אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ, וְהוֹצִיאוּהָ מִתַּחַת יָדוֹ, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁכָּנַס, יוֹצִיא:
ט. הַמֵּבִיא גֵט מִמְּדִינַת הַיָּם, וְאָמַר בְּפָנַי נִכְתַּב וּבְפָנַי נֶחְתַּם, לֹא יִשָּׂא אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ. מֵת, הֲרַגְתִּיו, הֲרַגְנוּהוּ, לֹא יִשָּׂא אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר, הֲרַגְתִּיו, לֹא תִנָּשֵׂא אִשְׁתּוֹ. הֲרַגְנוּהוּ, תִּנָּשֵׂא אִשְׁתּוֹ:
י. הֶחָכָם שֶׁאָסַר אֶת הָאִשָּׁה בְּנֶדֶר עַל בַּעְלָהּ, הֲרֵי זֶה לֹא יִשָּׂאֶנָּה. מֵאֲנָה, אוֹ שֶׁחָלְצָה בְפָנָיו, יִשָּׂאֶנָּה, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא בֵית דִּין. וְכֻלָּן שֶׁהָיוּ לָהֶם נָשִׁים, וָמֵתוּ, מֻתָּרוֹת לִנָּשֵׂא לָהֶם. וְכֻלָּן שֶׁנִּשְּׂאוּ לַאֲחֵרִים וְנִתְגָּרְשׁוּ אוֹ שֶׁנִּתְאַלְמְנוּ, מֻתָּרוֹת לִנָּשֵׂא לָהֶן. וְכֻלָּן מֻתָּרוֹת לִבְנֵיהֶם אוֹ לַאֲחֵיהֶן:
1. Each of the women enumerated in the first chapter causes exemption from levirate marriage and ḥalitza for her rival wives. This is due to the close family relationship she has with her brother-in-law, making her forbidden to him. The single exception is the case explained in this mishna. What is the case of the wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist? For example: If there were two brothers, and one of them died childless, and subsequently a brother of theirs was born, after which the second brother, the elder, took his deceased brother’s wife in levirate marriage, and then died as well. Consequently, two women require levirate marriage: The widow of the first brother who had been taken in levirate marriage by the second brother, and the widow of the second brother, the first widow’s rival wife. The first widow, who had been the wife of the first brother to die, goes out without any obligation to be taken in levirate marriage by the youngest brother who was born later, since she is the wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist. The first deceased brother never lived at the same time as the newly born brother. The second widow, who had been married to the second brother, is exempt due to her rival wife. The mishna discusses an additional situation: If the second brother had performed only levirate betrothal with her, meaning that he had not yet consummated the marriage, and then died, both the wife betrothed by a levirate betrothal to the second brother and the wife of the second brother fall before the youngest brother born after the death of the first brother. In that case, the first wife certainly goes out and is exempt from both ḥalitza and levirate marriage, since she is to him the wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist. The second, however, was never effectively the rival wife of the first brother’s wife, as the first brother’s wife had only been betrothed by levirate betrothal and was not fully married to the second brother. Therefore, she performs ḥalitza and may not enter into levirate marriage.
2. If there were two brothers, and one died, and the second entered into levirate marriage with his brother’s wife while he was already married to another woman, and subsequently a third brother was born to them, and the second brother then died, whereby both of his wives happened before the third brother for levirate marriage, then the first woman, who was the wife of the first brother, is exempt due to the fact that she is the wife of a brother with whom the third brother did not coexist, and the second woman, who was the first wife of the second brother, is exempt due to her rival wife. If the second brother had performed only levirate betrothal with her and then died before fully marrying her, the second woman performs ḥalitza and may not enter into levirate marriage, as the levirate betrothal is not considered a sufficiently valid marriage so as to render her the rival wife of a relation forbidden to the third brother. Rabbi Shimon says with regard to the first clause of the mishna: The third brother either enters into levirate marriage with whichever one he wishes, or he performs ḥalitza with whichever one he wishes. Since he was born after his second brother had already entered into levirate marriage with the first brother’s widow, she is considered the wife of a brother with whom he did coexist, not the wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist. Therefore, he may enter into levirate marriage with her.
3. The Sages stated a principle about a yevama: Whoever is forbidden by a prohibition of forbidden relations to her yavam neither performs ḥalitza nor enters into levirate marriage and is completely exempt. If she is forbidden by a prohibition resulting from a mitzva or by a prohibition stemming from sanctity, as will be explained later, then since in these cases the obligation of levirate marriage is not fundamentally nullified she performs ḥalitza in order to become free of the levirate bond, and due to her prohibition she does not enter into levirate marriage. The Sages stated another principle: If two sisters who had been married to two brothers who subsequently died happened before the third brother for levirate marriage, and one of those sisters is a close relation to this third brother and is therefore forbidden to him, she is exempt from levirate marriage. But the other, her sister who is her yevama, i.e., her sister-in-law, performs ḥalitza or enters into levirate marriage. In this case, they are not ruled to be two sisters who happened before him simultaneously for levirate marriage, since one of them is prohibited to him as a forbidden relation, and therefore she never actually happened before him at all.
4. The mishna explains: A prohibition resulting from a mitzva is referring to secondary forbidden relationships, which are prohibited by rabbinic law. The Sages prohibited marriage to certain women who were not forbidden by the Torah but were nevertheless deemed forbidden incestuous relations. A prohibition stemming from sanctity is referring to marriage of a widow to a High Priest, a divorcée or a woman who has performed ḥalitza [ḥalutza] to a common priest, a daughter born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship [mamzeret] or a Gibeonite woman to an Israelite, and also an Israelite woman to a Gibeonite or to a son born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship [mamzer].
5. In the case of anyone who has a brother of any kind, that brother creates a levirate bond causing his yevama to be required to perform levirate marriage if the first brother dies childless. And he is his brother in all respects, except for one who has a brother born from a Canaanite maidservant or from a gentile woman, as these do not have the legal status of brothers. Similarly, in the case of anyone who has a child of any kind, that child exempts his father’s wife from levirate marriage, since his father did not die childless. And that child is liable to receive capital punishment if he strikes his father or curses him. And he is his child in all respects, except for whoever has a child born from a Canaanite maidservant or from a gentile woman, as these do not have the halakhic status of children.
6. In the case of one who betrothed one of two sisters and does not know which of them he betrothed, so that both are forbidden to him, he gives a bill of divorce to this one and a bill of divorce to that one due to the uncertainty. If the man who had betrothed one of these women died before he could give a bill of divorce, and he had one brother, that brother performs ḥalitza with both of them, but he may not take either in levirate marriage. This is because he does not know which woman is his yevama and which is forbidden to him as the sister of a woman with whom he has a levirate bond. If the man who betrothed one of these women had two brothers, one of them performs ḥalitza with one of the sisters, but he may not enter into levirate marriage with her due to the possibility that she is the sister of a woman with whom he has a levirate bond. And one takes the other in levirate marriage if he so desires. If the two brothers married the two sisters before consulting the court, the court does not remove them from their marriage and they are permitted to remain married. The couple who performed levirate marriage second was even permitted to do so, since there was no longer any doubt about the levirate bond.
7. Furthermore, in the case of two unrelated men who betrothed two sisters: If this one does not know which sister he betrothed and that one does not know which sister he betrothed, this one gives two bills of divorce, one to each of the women, and that one gives two bills of divorce. If the two men died before they divorced, and this one had a brother and that one had a brother, then this brother performs ḥalitza with both of them, and that brother performs ḥalitza with both of them. If this one had one brother and that one had two brothers, the single brother performs ḥalitza with both of them, and of the two brothers, one performs ḥalitza and one performs levirate marriage if he so desires. If they married the sisters before consulting the court, the court does not remove them from the marriage and they are not told to divorce them. If this one had two brothers and that one had two brothers, the brother of this one performs ḥalitza with one sister, and the brother of that one performs ḥalitza with one sister. The brother of this one who performed ḥalitza may take the woman who performed ḥalitza [ḥalutza] of that other’s brother in levirate marriage, and the brother of that second one who performed ḥalitza may take the ḥalutza of that other’s brother in levirate marriage. If the two brothers performed ḥalitza with both wives before consulting the court, the two brothers of the second man may not take sisters in levirate marriage lest one marry the sister of a woman who with whom he had a levirate bond. Rather, one performs ḥalitza and one performs levirate marriage if he so desires. If they married their wives before consulting the court, the court does not remove them from the marriage.
8. It is a mitzva for the eldest to consummate the levirate marriage, i.e., the eldest takes precedence over the other brothers, though they too are obligated. But if the younger brother consummated the levirate marriage first, he acquires the yevama as his wife. One suspected by others of engaging in sexual relations with a Canaanite maidservant and she was later set free, or one suspected of relations with a gentile woman and she subsequently converted, may not marry that woman, since this will strengthen the suspicions against him. But if he did marry her, they, the judges of the court, do not remove her from him, i.e., they do not require him to divorce her. With regard to one who is suspected of illicit relations with a married woman and they, the judges of the court, removed her from her husband, i.e., required them to divorce due to this, even if the man suspected of the illicit relations subsequently married her, he must divorce her.
9. An agent who brought a bill of divorce from a country overseas and said: It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence, as required in order to establish the bill of divorce as valid, may not marry the wife, i.e., the divorcée. Since the validity of the bill of divorce is based upon his testimony, marrying the divorcée creates the impression that he had an ulterior motive for his testimony. Similarly, a witness who testified that a certain man died, or testified: I killed him, or: We killed him, may not marry that man’s wife. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he testified: I killed him, his wife may not be married at all based on that evidence, as his testimony is unreliable, but if he said: We killed him, his wife may be married to anyone other than those witnesses.
10. A Sage who refused to release a woman from a vow that rendered the wife forbidden to her husband by that vow, resulting in her being divorced from her husband, may not marry her, so as to avoid suspicion that he rendered her forbidden to her husband in order to marry her himself. However, a judge before whom a woman performed refusal when she was a minor, declaring that she did not desire the husband chosen for her by her family, or before whom she performed ḥalitza, may marry her because he was only one member of the court, thereby alleviating suspicion. And for all of these who were involved in permitting the wife to remarry, i.e., the judge, the agent who brought a bill of divorce, and the one who testified for a woman that her husband died, if they had wives at the time of the ruling or the testimony and their wives died thereafter, then those women they had set free are permitted to be married to them. There is no concern that while their wives were still alive these individuals set their eyes upon another woman. And with regard to all of these women who were prohibited from marrying a certain man due to some suspicion, if they were subsequently married to others and then were divorced or widowed from the second husband, they are permitted to be married to them, i.e., to the judge, messenger, or witness who permitted her to remarry. And all of these women who were prohibited from marrying due to some suspicion are permitted to the sons or to the brothers of those who set them free.
גמרא
אִיסוּר מִצְוָה שְׁנִיוֹת מִדִבְרֵי סוֹפְרִים אֲמַאי קָרֵי לֵיהּ אִיסוּר מִצְוָה אָמַר אַבַּיֵי מִצְוָה לִשְׁמוֹעַ דִּבְרֵי חֲכָמִים אִיסוּר קְדוּשָׁה אַלְמָנָה לְכֹהֵן גָדוֹל גְרוּשָׁה וַחֲלוּצָה לְכֹהֵן הֶדְיוֹט וַאֲמַאי קָרֵי לְהוּ אִיסוּר קְדוּשָׁה דִּכְתִיב (ויקרא כ''א) קְדוֹשִׁים יִהְיוּ לֵאלֹהֵיהֶם. תַּנְיָא רִבִּי יְהוּדָה מַחֲלִיף אִיסוּר מִצְוָה אַלְמָנָה לְכֹהֵן גָדוֹל גְרוּשָׁה וַחֲלוּצָה לְכֹהֵן הֶדְיוֹט וַאֲמַאי קָרֵי לֵיהּ אִיסוּר מִצְוָה דִּכְתִיב (שם כ''ז) אֵלֶה הַמִצְוֹת. אִיסוּר קְדוּשָׁה שְׁנִיוֹת מִדִּבְרֵי סוֹפְרִים וַאַמַאי קָרֵי לֵיהּ אִיסוּר קְדוּשָׁה אָמַר אַבַּיֵי כָּל הַמְקַיֵים דִבְרֵי חֲכָמִים נִקְרָא קָדוֹשׁ אָמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא וְכָל שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְקַיֵים דִבְרֵי חֲכָמִים קָדוֹשׁ הוּא דְלֹא מִקְרֵי רָשָׁע נַמִי לֹא מִקְרֵי אֶלָא אָמַר רָבָא קַדֵּשׁ עַצְמָךְ בְּמֻתָּר לָךְ. רַב כַּהֲנָא אָמַר מֵהָכָא (שם י''ח) וּשְׁמַרְתֶּם אֶת מִשְׁמַרְתִּי עֲשׂוּ מִשְׁמֶרֶת לְמִשְׁמַרְתִּי. אָמַר לֵיהּ אַבַּיֵי לְרַב יוֹסֵף הָא דְאוֹרַיְיתָא הוּא. דְּאוֹרַיְיתָא וּפֵרְשׁוּהוּ רַבָּנָן. כָּל הַתּוֹרָה נַמִי פֵּרְשׁוּ רַבָּנָן אֶלָא מִדְּרַבָּנָן וּקְרָא אַסְמַכְתָּא בְּעַלְמָא:
The mishna states that a prohibition resulting from a mitzva is referring to secondary forbidden relationships, which are prohibited by rabbinic law. The Gemara asks: Why is this called a prohibition resulting from a mitzva? Abaye said: This is because it is a mitzva to listen to and obey the words of the Sages.
The mishna states: A prohibition stemming from sanctity is referring to a marriage of a widow to a High Priest, a divorcée or a ḥalutza to a common priest. The Gemara asks: Why are these called a prohibition stemming from sanctity? As it is written with regard to the priests: “They shall be sacred to their God…they shall not take a woman that is a harlot, or profaned; neither shall they take a woman divorced by her husband” (Leviticus 21:6–7).
It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda switches the terms: A prohibition resulting from a mitzva is referring to a widow to the High Priest, or a divorcée or a ḥalutza to a common priest. And why is this called a prohibition resulting from a mitzva? As it is written in summarization at the end of Leviticus: “These are the mitzvot that the Lord commanded Moses for the children of Israel in Mount Sinai” (Leviticus 27:34).
A prohibition stemming from sanctity is referring to secondary relationships forbidden by rabbinic law. And why is this called a prohibition stemming from sanctity? Abaye said: Whoever fulfills the words of the Sages is called sacred. Rava said to him: The language you use is not precise, since if so, whoever does not fulfill the words of the Sages is not called sacred, which implies that he is also not called wicked. However, anyone who transgresses the words of the Sages is in fact referred to as wicked. Rather, Rava said that the reason why this is called a prohibition stemming from sanctity is that the term sanctity indicates differentiation or separation, and there is a principle that you must sanctify yourself by refraining from that which is permitted to you by Torah law. The Sages decreed against secondary forbidden relations so that one would not eventually come to transgress Torah law.
The mishna states that the levirate bond of a widow to a High Priest requires her to perform ḥalitza, and she may not enter into levirate marriage. The Gemara comments: The halakha that a widow does not enter into levirate marriage with a High Priest is taught categorically, merely in a general manner. It is no different whether she is a widow from marriage or she is a widow from betrothal alone.
Granted, she certainly may not enter into levirate marriage if she is a widow from marriage, since she is forbidden to the High Priest by the positive mitzva stated in the verse: “And he shall take a wife in her virginity” (Leviticus 21:13), and by the prohibition stated in the verse: “A widow, or one divorced…these he shall not take” (Leviticus 21:14). And a positive mitzva, levirate marriage, does not override both a prohibition, not marrying a widow, and a positive mitzva, marrying a virgin, together. However, if she is a widow from betrothal, then there is only a prohibition, as she is still a virgin. In that case, why not say that the positive mitzva of levirate marriage should come and override the prohibition against marrying a widow from betrothal?
Rav Giddel said that Rav said in response: The verse states: “His yevama shall ascend to the gate to the Elders and say: My brother-in-law refused to establish a name for his brother in Israel, he did not wish to consummate the levirate marriage” (Deuteronomy 25:7). As there is no need for the verse to state: “His yevama,” since it is clear to whom the verse refers and no new information is added by this word, what is the meaning when the verse states: “His yevama”? It comes to teach that there is one yevama who ascends for ḥalitza but may not ascend for levirate marriage, and her brother-in-law is not given a choice. Who is this? This is a woman with whom it is prohibited for her yavam to enter into levirate marriage, as he would be liable for the violation of a prohibition, and the positive mitzva of levirate marriage does not override the prohibition.
The Gemara asks: Say that this is referring to those women who are forbidden and would be liable to receive the penalty of karet as well, i.e., that these too may not enter into levirate marriage but nevertheless require ḥalitza. The Gemara answers: The verse states: “And if the man does not wish to take his yevama” (Deuteronomy 25:7). This implies that if he wishes, he takes her in levirate marriage; it depends upon his wishes. However, one who is eligible for levirate marriage is eligible for ḥalitza. And conversely, one who is ineligible for levirate marriage is ineligible for ḥalitza and therefore does not require ḥalitza at all. Since those relations that carry a penalty of karet have no possibility of entering into levirate marriage, they do not require ḥalitza either.
The Gemara asks: If so, those relations who are forbidden as he would be liable for the violation of a standard prohibition also should not require ḥalitza, as they may not enter into levirate marriage. The Gemara answers: But the Merciful One included one category of yevama who is eligible for ḥalitza alone and not levirate marriage through the term: “His yevama.” The Gemara asks: And what did you see to conclude that the additional term is referring to relations who are forbidden and with whom he would be liable for the violation of a prohibition and not those who are liable to receive karet?
The Gemara answers: That stands to reason, since betrothal takes effect with those women who are forbidden and with whom he would be liable for the violation of a prohibition. That is, if a man betroths a woman who is forbidden to him and with whom he would be liable for the violation of a prohibition, then although he violates a prohibition in doing so, the betrothal is valid and cannot be ended without a bill of divorce. Therefore, such a woman also requires ḥalitza. In contrast, betrothal does not take effect at all with those who are forbidden and would be liable to receive the punishment of karet, and therefore in these cases the laws of levirate marriage and ḥalitza do not apply at all.
Rava raised an objection to the explanation of Rav: It is taught in a baraita with regard to a prohibition resulting from a mitzva and a prohibition stemming from sanctity that if he engages in intercourse with such a woman or performs ḥalitza with her, her rival wife is exempt, even though it was prohibited for him to have engaged in intercourse with her in the first place. If it enters your mind that women who are forbidden, as he would be liable for the violation of a prohibition, require ḥalitza by Torah law but do not require levirate marriage, then when he engages in intercourse with his yevama why is her rival wife exempt? If there is no biblical mitzva to engage in intercourse with her, his action would carry no halakhic validity and the rival wife should not be exempt.
Rava raised the objection and he resolved it: The baraita teaches it disjunctively; it did not all deal with the same case. When the baraita says: Engages in intercourse with her, it is referring to a prohibition resulting from a mitzva. If one engages in intercourse with a yevama prohibited to him by rabbinic law, since by Torah law levirate marriage with her is valid, then although his act involved the transgression of a rabbinic decree, he nevertheless fulfilled the Torah mitzva and the rival wife is thereby exempt. When the baraita says: Performs ḥalitza with her, it is referring to a prohibition stemming from sanctity, and by Torah law there is no option of levirate marriage because of the prohibited relation; therefore, only ḥalitza exempts her rival wife.
Rava raised an objection from that which was taught in the Tosefta (Yevamot 11:3): A man with crushed testicles or with other wounds to his genitals or one whose penis has been severed, one who is a eunuch caused by man and not from birth or by disease, or an elderly man, all of whom are incapable of fathering children, one either performs ḥalitza or levirate marriage. How so? If any of these infertile men died, and they had brothers and they also had wives, and they then died childless, and the brothers proceeded to perform levirate betrothal with their wives, or gave them a bill of divorce, or performed ḥalitza, whatever they did is done; i.e., their act was effective. And if any one of the brothers engaged in intercourse with the widow of one of those infertile men, he thereby acquired the woman as a wife according to the laws of levirate marriage.
The inverse is also true: If the brothers died childless, and the infertile men proceeded to perform levirate betrothal with their wives, or gave a bill of divorce, or performed ḥalitza, whatever they did is done and took effect. And if they engaged in intercourse with their yevama, they thereby acquired the yevama as their wife. However, it is forbidden to maintain them, i.e., allow them to continue to live as husband and wife, because it is stated: “One with crushed testicles or whose penis has been severed shall not enter into the assembly of the Lord” (Deuteronomy 23:2); they are prohibited from entering the congregation, i.e., marrying a Jew. And if it enters your mind that women who are forbidden, as he would be liable for the violation a prohibition, require ḥalitza by Torah law but do not require levirate marriage, then one could ask: if they engaged in intercourse why are they acquired as wives even though there would be no mitzva of levirate marriage because the men are prohibited from marrying them?
Rather, Rav’s opinion is rejected, and Rava said an alternative explanation: The reason why a High Priest does not take a widow from betrothal in levirate marriage is because that relationship is also a violation of both a positive mitzva and a prohibition and therefore a different positive mitzva does not override it. How so? As it is written: “They shall be sacred to their God” (Leviticus 21:6), which teaches that there is a positive mitzva of sanctity associated with all prohibitions applying to priests. Therefore, any such prohibition contains both a positive and a negative mitzva.
The Gemara asks: This resolves the issue of priestly prohibitions, but what is there to say about a daughter born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship [mamzeret] or a Gibeonite woman, who are prohibited from entering the congregation due to considerations of sanctity? They too may not enter into levirate marriage despite the positive mitzva, which would ordinarily override a prohibition. The Gemara answers: It is written with regard to all of the mitzvot: “Sanctify yourselves, therefore, and be sacred” (Leviticus 11:44). This teaches that in addition to the prohibition, there is the positive mitzva of sanctity.
The Gemara raises an objection: If so, then every single prohibition in the entire Torah contains both a positive mitzva and a prohibition, as it is written: “Sanctify yourselves” (Leviticus 11:44). Rather, this reasoning must be rejected, and Rava stated a different reason: While in essence the mitzva of levirate marriage does apply here, nevertheless, a widow from betrothal is prohibited from entering into levirate marriage with the High Priest by rabbinic decree, due to the case of a widow from marriage.
The Gemara asks: What is there to say about the case of a mamzeret or a Gibeonite woman? There appears to be no reason for a rabbinic decree in such cases. The Gemara answers: There, one must say that intercourse with a mamzeret even when the mitzva of levirate marriage applies was prohibited by rabbinic decree due to cases when the mitzva of levirate marriage does not apply. The decree was issued lest one come to think that since in the case of levirate marriage a mamzeret is permitted, even in cases when there is no levirate marriage a mamzeret is similarly permitted.
The Gemara asks: However, if that is so, and the levirate marriage is prohibited lest it become confused with another case, then the wife of a paternal brother should not enter into levirate marriage; i.e., by the same logic, although the Torah allowed it, the Sages should have established a rabbinic decree requiring that she perform ḥalitza due to the case of the wife of a maternal brother, who always remains prohibited as a brother’s wife. The Gemara answers: The Merciful One made levirate marriage dependent upon inheritance, and it is well known by everyone that only patrilineal relatives inherit, so there is no likelihood of confusion.
The Gemara objects further: Then a childless woman should not enter into levirate marriage even though the mitzva applies to her; there should be a rabbinic decree due to the case of a woman who has children. The Gemara answers: The Merciful One made levirate marriage dependent upon children; it is well known by everyone that the entire purpose of levirate marriage is to establish one’s brother’s name and that levirate marriage applies only when there are no children. Here, too, there is no likelihood of error.
The Gemara challenges further: The wife of a brother with whom one did coexist should not enter into levirate marriage; there should be a rabbinic decree due to the case of the wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist. The Gemara responds: The Merciful One made levirate marriage dependent upon a common dwelling together and coexistence of brothers, and this is well known by everyone since the matter is explicit in the Torah.
The Gemara continues to object: No woman should enter into levirate marriage; there should be a rabbinic decree due to the case of an aylonit. Since an aylonit may not enter into levirate marriage, all other women should be prohibited by rabbinic decree from doing so to avoid confusion. The Gemara answers: The case of an aylonit is not commonplace, and the Sages did not institute rabbinic decrees on matters that are not common. The Gemara asks: If so, neither a mamzeret nor a Gibeonite woman is commonplace either. Therefore, since the likelihood of taking a mamzeret in levirate marriage is so small, there is no danger that one might think it is permitted to marry a mamzeret even where the mitzva does not apply.
Rather, Rava said that it is necessary to reject the previous suggestion and to offer a different reason: The first act of intercourse is prohibited by rabbinic decree due to the likelihood of a second act of intercourse. Although intercourse the first time with the yevama is the fulfillment of a positive mitzva, which does override the prohibition, once the mitzva is fulfilled with that act there is no longer any positive mitzva involved. Afterward, this yevama becomes prohibited because there is no longer a positive mitzva to override the prohibition. Therefore, due to the possibility that one might engage in intercourse a second time with this woman, the Sages decreed that even the first act is prohibited.
The Gemara comments: This is also taught in a baraita: If one of those yevamin who may not marry their yevama due to a prohibition engaged in intercourse with her, he acquired her with the first act of intercourse; however, it is prohibited to retain her for a second act of intercourse.
The Gemara continues with a retraction from Rava: Rava then said, and some say it was actually Rav Ashi who said: That which I said, that the reason for the rabbinic decree was to prevent a second act of intercourse, is not correct, as there is a simpler explanation. As Reish Lakish said about the same matter: In every place that you find a positive mitzva and a prohibition applying to the same matter, if you can fulfill both of them together, this is best, and the positive mitzva does not override the prohibition. And if there is not any possibility of fulfilling both, then let the positive mitzva come and override the prohibition. Here, too, in the case of levirate marriage, it is possible, by way of ḥalitza, to fulfill the positive mitzva and not to transgress the prohibition prohibiting marriage to these women.
The Gemara raises an objection to this last statement by Rava from that which is taught in a baraita: And if one of those yevamin engaged in intercourse, he acquired her as a wife. This shows that although it is possible to perform the mitzva by way of ḥalitza, if he nevertheless performs levirate marriage then the positive mitzva overrides the prohibition and the yevama is thereby acquired as his wife. The Gemara concludes: This is a conclusive refutation, and Rava’s last explanation is rejected. The previous explanation is the correct one: The prohibition is due to rabbinic decree.
§ On the same subject, it was stated with regard to the case of a High Priest who engaged in intercourse with a widow who was his yevama requiring levirate marriage that the amora’im Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Elazar disputed the matter. One said that intercourse does not exempt her rival wife who had also been married to the High Priest’s brother, since the act was prohibited, and one said that it does exempt her rival wife, because although intercourse was forbidden, it is nevertheless a valid enactment of levirate marriage, and so her rival wife is thereby exempt.
As for a widow from marriage, everyone agrees that this does not exempt the rival wife, as a positive mitzva does not override a prohibition and a positive mitzva together. When they disagree, it is in the case of a widow from betrothal. The one who said that it exempts the rival wife holds that the positive mitzva of levirate marriage comes and overrides the prohibition against a High Priest marrying a widow. And the one who said that it does not exempt the rival wife held that a positive mitzva does not come and override a prohibition, since it is possible to perform ḥalitza.
The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion that the rival wife would not be exempt, from the previously cited baraita: If one of those yevamin engaged in intercourse, he acquired her as a wife. This shows that the act of levirate marriage is valid, even when prohibited. If so, in the case of the High Priest and a widow as well, her rival wife should be exempt. This is a conclusive refutation, and that opinion is rejected.
The Gemara asks: Shall we say that this is also a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Reish Lakish and therefore reject his principle? The Gemara answers: Reish Lakish could have said to you: When I say that in every place that you find a positive mitzva and a prohibition applying to the same matter, if you can fulfill both of them together without transgressing the prohibition, this is best, and the positive mitzva does not override the prohibition, this is applicable only when the mitzva is fulfilled properly; but here, ḥalitza in place of levirate marriage is not considered a proper fulfillment of the mitzva.
§ Rava said: Where is the prohibition against secondary forbidden relationships hinted at in the Torah? As it is stated at the end of the portion discussing forbidden incestuous relations: “For all these abominations have the men of the land done” (Leviticus 18:27). “These” must be understood to mean the harsh ones, i.e., the severe transgressions. This proves by inference that there are also lesser transgressions that are, as it were, soft ones. And what are those soft ones? They are secondary forbidden relationships.
The Gemara asks: From where may it be inferred that the word “these” [ha’el] is an expression meaning harsh? As it is written: “And the mighty [eilei] of the land he took away” (Ezekiel 17:13). The similarity of these words implies that “these” also has connotations of mighty or harsh.
The Gemara asks: Shall we say that this statement contradicts the opinion of Rabbi Levi? As Rabbi Levi said: The harshness of the punishment for using dishonest measures is more than the punishment for transgressing the prohibition of forbidden relationships, as with regard to this, forbidden relations, it is stated only: “These [el],” whereas with regard to that, dishonest measures, it is stated: “These [eleh]” with an additional letter heh as a suffix: “For all that do these [eleh] things, even all that do unrighteously, are an abomination unto the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 25:16). This implies that the word eleh indicates harshness and not the word el. The Gemara answers: This does not contradict his opinion. The word el has the connotation of harsh, but eleh has the connotation of even harsher than el.
The Gemara asks: With regard to forbidden relationships the word eleh is also written: “For whosoever shall do any of these [eleh] abominations, even the souls that do them shall be cut off from among their people” (Leviticus 18:29). If so, why is the punishment for using dishonest measures considered harsher? The Gemara answers: That expression meaning these [eleh] in the context of forbidden relations does not emphasize their severity; rather, it comes to exclude one who uses deception in measures from the penalty of karet.
The Gemara asks: Rather, in what way is deception in measurements more severe than forbidden relations? The Gemara answers: Those who engage in forbidden relations have the possibility of repentance. If one engaged in relations with a forbidden relative he can rectify the sin through repentance. In the case of those who deceive the public with dishonest measures, it is not possible to repent fully because, having deceived the general public, they have no way of returning the money. Whereas generally a thief can return stolen property to its rightful owner, one who used dishonest measures with multiple customers has no way to track them all down in order to return the money.
Rav Yehuda said that the prohibition of secondary forbidden relationships is learned from here: As it says with regard to King Solomon: “He weighed [izzen] and sought out, and set in order many proverbs” (Ecclesiastes 12:9), and Ulla said that Rabbi Elazar said: Before Solomon came, the Torah was like a basket [kefifa] without handles [oznayim], until Solomon came and made handles for it. By means of his explanation and proverbs he enabled each person to understand and take hold of the Torah, fulfill its mitzvot, and distance himself from transgressions.
Rabbi Oshaya said that the prohibition of secondary forbidden relationships is learned from here: “Avoid it, pass not by it; turn from it, and pass on” (Proverbs 4:15). One must distance oneself from any prohibited act and not pass near a place of forbidden objects or situations.
Rav Ashi said a parable: To what is this matter, the opinion of Rabbi Oshaya, comparable? It is comparable to a man guarding an orchard; if he guards it from the outside, all of it is guarded. But if he guards it from the inside, only that which is in front of him that he can see is guarded, while that which is behind him is unguarded. The Gemara comments: And this parable of Rav Ashi is a mistake [beduta] and is not accurate. There, in his metaphor, that which is in front of him at least is guarded; here, in the case of forbidden relationships, were it not for the rabbinic decree against secondary forbidden relationships one would eventually encounter and transgress the biblically forbidden relationship itself. Guarding from the outside is not only preferable, it is essential.
Rav Kahana said that the prohibition of secondary forbidden relationships is alluded to from here, in the verse stated at the conclusion of the verses discussing the halakhot of forbidden relationships: “Therefore shall you protect [ushmartem] My prized possession [mishmarti], that you do not any of these abominable customs” (Leviticus 18:30). This means: Establish a safeguard [mishmeret] for My prized possession.
Abaye said to Rav Yosef: If the prohibition against secondary forbidden relationships is learned from here then it would be by Torah law, yet the prohibition against secondary forbidden relationships is by rabbinic law. He answered him: The requirement to add an additional safeguard itself is in fact by Torah law, and the Sages interpreted and defined where and when to apply this law. Abaye objected: But isn’t all of the Torah also interpreted by the Sages and yet has the force of Torah law? In that case, why are these laws considered to be rabbinic? Rather, the prohibition of secondary forbidden relationships was decreed by rabbinic law, and the verse is a mere support but does not indicate a Torah law.
זוהר
רַבִּי יִצְחָק הַוָּה שְׁכִיחַ קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אָמַר לֵיהּ הַאי קְרָא (דְּקָאַמְרֵי) דִּכְתִיב וַתִּשָּׁחֵת הָאָרֶץ לִפְנֵי הָאֱלֹקִים אִי בְּנֵי נְשָׁא חַטָּאָן אַרְעָא בַּמֶּה אָמַר לֵיהּ בְּגִין דִּכְתִיב כִּי הִשְׁחִית כָּל בָּשָׂר אֶת דַּרְכּוֹ כְּמָה דְּאִתְמָר, כְּגַוְנָא דָּא (ויקרא י''ח) וַתִּטְמָא הָאָרֶץ וָאֶפְקוֹד עֲוֹנָהּ עָלֶיהָ, אֶלָּא בְּנֵי נְשָׁא חַטָּאָן וְאִי תֵּימָא אַרְעָא בַּמֶּה, אֶלָּא עִקָרָא דְּאַרְעָא בְּנֵי נְשָׁא אִנּוּן, וְאִנּוּן מְחַבְּלִין אַרְעָא וְהִיא אִתְחַבָּלַת, וּקְרָא אוֹכַח דִּכְתִיב וַיַּרְא אֱלֹהִים אֶת הָאָרֶץ וְהִנֵּה נִשְׁחָתָה כִּי הִשְׁחִית כָּל בָּשָׂר אֶת דַּרְכּוֹ עַל הָאָרֶץ תָּא חָזֵי כָּל חַטָּאוֹי דְּבַר נַשׁ כֻּלְּהוּ חַבָּלוּתָא דִּילֵיהּ תַּלְיָן בִּתְשׁוּבָה, וְחַטָּאָה דְּאוֹשִׁיד זַרְעָא עַל אַרְעָא וּמְחַבְּלָא אָרְחֵיהּ וְאַפִּיק זַרְעָא עַל אַרְעָא מְחַבִּיל לֵיהּ וּמְחַבִּיל אַרְעָא וַעֲלֵיהּ כְּתִיב (ירמיה ב') נִכְתַּם עֲוֹנֵךְ לְפָנַי וּכְתִיב בֵּיהּ (תהלים ה') כִּי לֹא אֵל חָפֵץ רֶשַׁע אַתָּה לֹא יְגוּרְךָ רָע בַּר בִּתְשׁוּבָה סַגִי וּכְתִיב (בראשית ל''ח) וַיְהִי עֵר בְּכוֹר יְהוּדָה רַע בְּעֵינֵי יְיָ וַיְמִיתֵהוּ יְיָ וְהָא אִתְמָר, אָמַר לֵיהּ אַמַּאי דָּאִין קֻדְשָׁא בְּרִיךְ הוּא עָלְמָא בְּמַיָּא וְלָא בְּאֶשָׁא וְלָא בְּמִלָּה אָחֳרָא, אָמַר לֵיהּ רָזָא הוּא דְּהָא אִנּוּן חַבִּילוּ אָרְחַיְהוּ בְּגִין דְּמַיָּן עִלָּאִין וּמַיָּן תַּתָּאִין לָא אִתְחַבָּרוּ דְּכָר וְנוּקְבָא כִּדְקָא יָאוּת מַאן אִנּוּן דְּחַבִּילוּ אָרְחַיְהוּ כְּגַוְנָא דָּא מַיָּן דְּכוּרִין וְנוּקְבֵי וְעַל דָּא אִתְדָנוּ בְּמַיָּא בַּמֶּה דְּאִנּוּן חָבוּ וּמַיָּן הֲווּ רְתִיחָן וּפָשְׁטוּ מָשְׁכָא מִנַּיְהוּ כְּמָה דְּחַבִּילוּ אָרְחַיְהוּ בְּמַיָּן רְתִיחָן דִּינָא לָקֳבֵל דִּינָא הֲדָא הוּא דִּכְתִיב נִבְקְעוּ כָּל מַעְיְנוֹת תְּהוֹם רַבָּה, הָא מַיִּן תַּתָּאִין, וַאֲרוּבּוֹת הַשָּׁמַיִם נִפְתָּחוּ דָּא מַיָּן עִלָּאִין מַיִּן עִלָּאִין וְתַתָּאִין:
Rabbi Yitzchak was visiting Rabbi Shimon, and he asked him about the verse that states: "And the earth was corrupt before the Elohim" (Gen. 6:11).
Now, if it was man who sinned and was corrupt, what was the earth's sin? Rabbi Shimon answered, as it is written: "for all flesh had corrupted his way upon the earth" (Ibid.) and, also, "And the land was defiled, therefore I do punish its iniquity upon it" (Vayikra 18:25). So it is mankind that sins. But if you ask what is the sin of the earth, you should know that mankind constitutes the essence of the earth. If mankind corrupts it, it becomes corrupted. This is proven by the verse: "And Elohim looked on the earth, and, beheld it was corrupt, for all flesh had corrupted its way upon the earth."
Come and behold: all of man's sins and corruption can be atoned for by repentance. But by the sin of spilling his seed on the earth, man corrupts himself and the earth as well. And of such a person, it is written: "The stain of your iniquity is before Me," (Yirmeyah 2:22) and "For You are not an El that has pleasure in wickedness, nor shall evil sojourn with You" (Tehilim 5:5). (For the sin of spilling seed, He does not accept his repentance) except after great penitence. It is also written that "Er, Judah's firstborn, was wicked in the sight of Hashem; and Hashem slew him" (Gen. 38:7), as was already explained elsewhere.
He asked him: Why did the Holy One, blessed be He, bring His Judgment on the world, punishing them with water and not with fire or something else? Rabbi Shimon replied that there is a secret behind this. As they corrupted their ways, the upper waters and the lower waters were unable to join as the male and the female ought. Anyone who corrupts his ways also corrupts the male and female waters. So, they were punished by water, just as they had sinned. These waters were boiling and they skinned them alive, just like they corrupted their ways in boiling water, one Judgment for another. "All the fountains of the great deep broke open" (Gen. 7:11), refers to the lower waters, while "and the windows of heaven were opened" refers to the upper waters. (They were punished by) both upper and lower waters.
רַבִּי יִצְחָק הָיָה מָצוּי לִפְנֵי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, אָמַר לוֹ, מִקְרָא זֶה שֶׁכָּתוּב, וַתִּשָּׁחֵת הָאָרֶץ לִפְנֵי הָאֱלֹקִים. אִם בְּנֵי אָדָם חוֹטְאִים הָאָרֶץ בַּמֶּה חָטְאָה. אָמַר לוֹ מִשּׁוּם שֶׁכָּתוּב כִּי הִשְׁחִית כָּל בָּשָׂר אֶת דַּרְכּוֹ, כְּמוֹ שֶׁכְּבָר אָמַרְנוּ. כְּעֵין זֶה (ויקרא י''ח) וַתִּטְמָא הָאָרֶץ וָאֶפְקוֹד עֲוֹנָהּ עָלֶיהָ. וְאִם תֹּאמַר, הָאָרֶץ בַּמֶּה חוֹטֵאת, אֶלָּא עִקָּר הָאָרֶץ הֵם בְּנֵי אָדָם, וְהֵם מַשְׁחִיתִים הָאָרֶץ וְהִיא נִשְׁחֶתֶת. וְהַמִּקְרָא מוֹכִיחַ שֶׁכָּתוּב וַיַּרְא אֱלֹקִים וְגוֹ'. בֹּא וּרְאֵה כָּל הַחַטָּאִים שֶׁל הָאָדָם, וְכָל הַהֲשְׁחָתָה שֶׁלּוֹ, תְּלוּיִם בִּתְשׁוּבָה. וְהַחֵטְא שֶׁל הַשּׁוֹפֵךְ זֶרַע עַל הָאָרֶץ, שֶׁמַּשְׁחִית דַּרְכּוֹ וּמוֹצִיא זֶרַע עַל הָאָרֶץ. מַשְׁחִית אֶת עַצְמוֹ וּמַשְׁחִית הָאָרֶץ, וְעָלָיו כָּתוּב, (ירמיה ב') נִכְתָּם עֲוֹנֵךְ לְפָנַי. וְכָתוּב בּוֹ (תהלים ה') כִּי לֹא אֵל חָפֵץ רֶשַׁע אַתָּה לֹא יְגוּרְךְ רָע, חוּץ בִּתְשׁוּבָה רַבָּה. וְכָתוּב וַיְהִי עֵר בְּכוֹר יְהוּדָה רַע בְּעֵינֵי ה' וַיְּמִיתֵהוּ ה', אָמַר לוֹ מִפְּנֵי מַה דָּן הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא אֶת הָעוֹלָם בַּמַּיִם וְלֹא בָּאֵשׁ וְלֹא בְּדָבָר אַחֵר. אָמַר לוֹ סוֹד הוּא, כִּי הֵם הִשְׁחִיתוּ דַּרְכָּם, בָּזֶה, שֶׁמַּיִם עֶלְיוֹנִים וּמַיִם תַּחְתּוֹנִים לֹא נִתְחַבְּרוּ זָכָר וּנְקֵבָה כָּרָאוּי. כִּי כָּל מִי שֶׁמַּשְׁחִית דַּרְכּוֹ, הוּא מַשְׁחִית כְּמוֹ זֶה מַיִם דְּכוּרִין וְנוּקְבִין וְעַל כֵּן נִדּוֹנוּ בַּמַּיִם. בַּמֶּה שֶׁהֵם חָטְאוּ. וְהַמַּיִם הָיוּ רוֹתְחִים וְהִפְשִׁיטוּ הָעוֹר מֵהֶם, כְּמוֹ שֶׁהִשְׁחִיתוּ דַּרְכָּם בְּמַיִם רוֹתְחִים, דִּין כְּנֶגֶד דִּין, וְזֶה שֶׁכָּתוּב נִבְקְעוּ כָּל מַעְיְנוֹת תְּהוֹם רַבָּה זֶה מַיִם תַּחְתּוֹנִים. וַאֲרוּבּוֹת הַשָּׁמַיִם נִפְתָּחוּ, זֶה מַיִם עֶלְיוֹנִים. מַיִם עֶלְיוֹנִים וְתַחְתּוֹנִים.
הלכה פסוקה
א. צָרִיךְ לְהִזָּהֵר בְּרִבִּית וְכַמָּה לַאוִין נֶאֶמְרוּ בּוֹ וַאֲפִילוּ הַלּוֶֹה הַנּוֹתְנוֹ וְהֶעָרֵב וְהָעֵדִים עוֹבְרִים. (הגה) וְאֵין חִילוּק בֵּין מַלְוֶה לֶעָנִי אוֹ לֶעָשִׁיר:
ב. כָּל הַנּוֹתֵן בְּרִבִּית נְכָסָיו מִתְמוֹטְטִים וּכְאִלוּ כּוֹפֵר בִּיצִיאַת מִצְרַיִם וּבֵאלֹהֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל:
ג. הַתּוֹלֶה מָעוֹתָיו לוֹמַר שֶׁהֵם שֶׁל נָכְרִי וּמַלְוֶה אוֹתָם בְּרִבִּית הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא יִפְרַע מִמֶּנּוּ:
ד. אֲפִילוּ אִם הַלוֶֹה נוֹתֵן לוֹ יוֹתֵר מִדַּעְתּוֹ בִּשְׁעַת הַפִּרָעוֹן שֶׁלֹּא הִתְנָה עִמּוֹ וְאֵינוֹ אוֹמֵר שֶׁנוֹתֵן לוֹ יוֹתֵר בִּשְׁבִיל רִבִּית אָסוּר:
ה. אֲפִילוּ לְבָנָיו וּבְנֵי בֵיתוֹ אָסוּר לְהַלְווֹת בְּרִבִּית אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ מַקְפִּיד עֲלֵיהֶם וּבְוַדַּאי נוֹתְנוֹ לָהֶם בְּמַתָּנָּה:
ו. יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁלָוָה מָעוֹת מֵהַנָּכְרִי בְרִבִּית אָסוּר לְיִשְׂרָאֵל אַחֵר לִהְיוֹת לוֹ עָרֵב וכו':
ז. נָכְרִי שֶׁלָוָה מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל בְּרִיבִּית אָסוּר לְיִשְׂרָאֵל לִהְיוֹת לוֹ עָרֵב:
מוסר
ספר תוצאות חיים
יֵדַע כָּל אָדָם כִּי בְּמַעֲשָׂיו הָרָעִים עוֹשֶׂה לְבוּשִׁים צוֹאִים לְהַלְבִּישׁ נִשְׁמָתוֹ בְגֵיהִנָם כִּדְפֵירְשׁוּ בְּפָסוּק (זכרי' ג') וִיהוֹשֻׁעַ הָיָה לָבוּשׁ בְּגָדִים צוֹאִים וְאָמְרוּ בְזוֹהַר יְהוֹשֻׁעַ כֹּהֵן גָּדוֹל הֲוָה מַה כְּתִיב בֵּיהּ וְהַשָׂטָן עוֹמֵד עַל יְמִינוֹ לְשִׂטְנוֹ וּמַה בְּהַאי כַּךְ שְׁאָר בְנֵי עַלְמָא עַל אַחַת כַּמָה וְכַמָה. עוֹד צָרִיךְ לָשׁוּב שֶׁלֹא תִהְיֶה נִשְׁמָתוֹ נִדַּחַת לַחוּץ בַּעֲלוֹתָהּ לְמַעְלָה בִּהְיוֹתָהּ נִפְטֶרֶת מֵהַגוּף וְדָוִד הָיָה מִתְפַּלֵל עַל זֶה שָׁמְרָה נַפְשִׁי אַל תִּמָּסֵר בִּידֵי הַמְקַטְרְגִים כָּל שֶׁכֵּן הַמָּלֵא עֲוֹנוֹת אֵין מִסְפָּר כַּמָּה תְשׁוּבָה וּתְפִלָּה צָרִיךְ. וּכְשֶׁיְצַיֵיר הָאָדָם בְּשִׂכְלוֹ דָבָר זֶה בְּהִתְוַדוֹתוֹ שֶׁנִשְׁמָתוֹ עוֹלָה דֶרֶךְ הַהֵיכָלוֹת וְנוֹתֶנֶת חֶשְׁבּוֹן וְדוֹחִין אוֹתָהּ לַחוּץ כַּמָה רָאוּי שֶׁיִּצְטָעֵר וְיִבְכֶּה וְאִם יִזְכֶּה הָאָדָם לַעֲשׂוֹת תְּשׁוּבָה שְׁלֵימָה שֶׁתְּהֵא מִיתָתוֹ בִּנְשִׁיקָה הוּא נִפְטָר מִכָּל דִינֵי חֶשְּׁבּוֹן וְאַשְׁרָיו: