(א) בָּרוּךְ אַתָּה יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֵֽינוּ מֶֽלֶךְ הָעוֹלָם אֲשֶׁר קִדְּ֒שָֽׁנוּ בְּמִצְוֹתָיו וְצִוָּנוּ לַעֲסֹק בְּדִבְרֵי תוֹרָה:
(1) Blessed are You, Adonoy our God, King of the Universe, Who sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us to be engrossed in the words of Torah.
לֹֽא־יָקוּם֩ עֵ֨ד אֶחָ֜ד בְּאִ֗ישׁ לְכׇל־עָוֺן֙ וּלְכׇל־חַטָּ֔את בְּכׇל־חֵ֖טְא אֲשֶׁ֣ר יֶֽחֱטָ֑א עַל־פִּ֣י ׀ שְׁנֵ֣י עֵדִ֗ים א֛וֹ עַל־פִּ֥י שְׁלֹשָֽׁה־עֵדִ֖ים יָק֥וּם דָּבָֽר׃ כִּֽי־יָק֥וּם עֵד־חָמָ֖ס בְּאִ֑ישׁ לַעֲנ֥וֹת בּ֖וֹ סָרָֽה׃ וְעָמְד֧וּ שְׁנֵֽי־הָאֲנָשִׁ֛ים אֲשֶׁר־לָהֶ֥ם הָרִ֖יב לִפְנֵ֣י יְהֹוָ֑ה לִפְנֵ֤י הַכֹּֽהֲנִים֙ וְהַשֹּׁ֣פְטִ֔ים אֲשֶׁ֥ר יִהְי֖וּ בַּיָּמִ֥ים הָהֵֽם׃ וְדָרְשׁ֥וּ הַשֹּׁפְטִ֖ים הֵיטֵ֑ב וְהִנֵּ֤ה עֵֽד־שֶׁ֙קֶר֙ הָעֵ֔ד שֶׁ֖קֶר עָנָ֥ה בְאָחִֽיו׃ וַעֲשִׂ֣יתֶם ל֔וֹ כַּאֲשֶׁ֥ר זָמַ֖ם לַעֲשׂ֣וֹת לְאָחִ֑יו וּבִֽעַרְתָּ֥ הָרָ֖ע מִקִּרְבֶּֽךָ׃ וְהַנִּשְׁאָרִ֖ים יִשְׁמְע֣וּ וְיִרָ֑אוּ וְלֹֽא־יֹסִ֨פוּ לַעֲשׂ֜וֹת ע֗וֹד כַּדָּבָ֥ר הָרָ֛ע הַזֶּ֖ה בְּקִרְבֶּֽךָ׃ וְלֹ֥א תָח֖וֹס עֵינֶ֑ךָ נֶ֣פֶשׁ בְּנֶ֗פֶשׁ עַ֤יִן בְּעַ֙יִן֙ שֵׁ֣ן בְּשֵׁ֔ן יָ֥ד בְּיָ֖ד רֶ֥גֶל בְּרָֽגֶל׃ {ס}
A single witness may not validate against a person any guilt or blame for any offense that may be committed; a case can be valid only on the testimony of two witnesses or more. If a man appears against another to testify maliciously and gives false testimony against him, the two parties to the dispute shall appear before the LORD, before the priests or magistrates in authority at the time, and the magistrates shall make a thorough investigation. If the man who testified is a false witness, if he has testified falsely against his fellow, you shall do to him as he schemed to do to his fellow. Thus you will sweep out evil from your midst; others will hear and be afraid, and such evil things will not again be done in your midst. Nor must you show pity: life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot.
אֵין הָעֵדִים נַעֲשִׂים זוֹמְמִין עַד שֶׁיָּזוֹמוּ אֶת עַצְמָן. כֵּיצַד, אָמְרוּ מְעִידִין אָנוּ בְאִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי שֶׁהָרַג אֶת הַנֶּפֶשׁ, אָמְרוּ לָהֶן הֵיאַךְ אַתֶּם מְעִידִין, שֶׁהֲרֵי נֶהֱרָג זֶה אוֹ הַהוֹרֵג הָיָה עִמָּנוּ אוֹתוֹ הַיּוֹם בְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי, אֵין אֵלּוּ זוֹמְמִין. אֲבָל אָמְרוּ לָהֶם הֵיאַךְ אַתֶּם מְעִידִין, שֶׁהֲרֵי אַתֶּם הֱיִיתֶם עִמָּנוּ אוֹתוֹ הַיּוֹם בְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי, הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ זוֹמְמִין, וְנֶהֱרָגִין עַל פִּיהֶם:
Witnesses are not rendered conspiring witnesses until the witnesses who come to render them conspiring impeach the witnesses themselves and not merely their testimony. How so? A set of witnesses said: We testify with regard to a man called so-and-so that he killed a person, and they attested to the precise time and place that the murder took place. Then, a second set of witnesses came to court and said to them: How can you testify about this event? This person who was killed, or this person who killed, was with us, i.e., with the second set of witnesses, on that day in such and such place, which is not the location identified by the first set of witnesses. In that case, although the second set of witnesses contradicted the testimony of the first set, these first witnesses are not rendered conspiring witnesses. But if the second set of witnesses came to court and said to them: How can you testify about that event? You were with us on that day in such and such place. In this case, these first witnesses are rendered conspiring witnesses, and are executed on the basis of their, i.e., the second set’s, testimony.
כֵּיצַד הָעֵדִים נַעֲשִׂים זוֹמְמִין, מְעִידִין אָנוּ בְאִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי שֶׁהוּא בֶן גְּרוּשָׁה אוֹ בֶן חֲלוּצָה, אֵין אוֹמְרִים יֵעָשֶׂה זֶה בֶן גְּרוּשָׁה אוֹ בֶן חֲלוּצָה תַחְתָּיו, אֶלָּא לוֹקֶה אַרְבָּעִים. מְעִידִין אָנוּ בְאִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי שֶׁהוּא חַיָּב לִגְלוֹת, אֵין אוֹמְרִים יִגְלֶה זֶה תַחְתָּיו, אֶלָּא לוֹקֶה אַרְבָּעִים. מְעִידִין אָנוּ בְאִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי שֶׁגֵּרַשׁ אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ וְלֹא נָתַן לָהּ כְּתֻבָּתָהּ, וַהֲלֹא בֵּין הַיּוֹם וּבֵין לְמָחָר סוֹפוֹ לִתֵּן לָהּ כְּתֻבָּתָהּ, אוֹמְדִין כַּמָּה אָדָם רוֹצֶה לִתֵּן בִּכְתֻבָּתָהּ שֶׁל זוֹ, שֶׁאִם נִתְאַלְמְנָה אוֹ נִתְגָּרְשָׁה, וְאִם מֵתָה יִירָשֶׁנָּה בַעְלָהּ. מְעִידִין אָנוּ בְאִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי שֶׁהוּא חַיָּב לַחֲבֵרוֹ אֶלֶף זוּז עַל מְנָת לִתְּנָן לוֹ מִכָּאן וְעַד שְׁלשִׁים יוֹם, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר מִכָּאן וְעַד עֶשֶׂר שָׁנִים, אוֹמְדִין כַּמָּה אָדָם רוֹצֶה לִתֵּן וְיִהְיוּ בְיָדוֹ אֶלֶף זוּז, בֵּין נוֹתְנָן מִכָּאן וְעַד שְׁלשִׁים יוֹם, בֵּין נוֹתְנָן מִכָּאן וְעַד עֶשֶׂר שָׁנִים:
מְעִידִין אָנוּ בְאִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי שֶׁחַיָּב לַחֲבֵרוֹ מָאתַיִם זוּז, וְנִמְצְאוּ זוֹמְמִין, לוֹקִין וּמְשַׁלְּמִין, שֶׁלֹּא הַשֵּׁם הַמְבִיאוֹ לִידֵי מַכּוֹת, מְבִיאוֹ לִידֵי תַשְׁלוּמִין, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים, כָּל הַמְשַׁלֵּם אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה:
How are witnesses rendered conspiring witnesses? This applies in a case where two witnesses came before the court and said: We testify with regard to so-and-so, who is a priest, that he is the son of a divorced woman or the son of a ḥalutza, a yevama who performed the rite of ḥalitza to free herself from the levirate bond. Those testimonies render him a ḥalal (see Leviticus 21:6–7), one disqualified from the priesthood due to flawed lineage. If a second set of witnesses testifies in court and renders the first set conspiring witnesses, one does not say with regard to each of the conspiring witnesses: This witness shall be rendered the son of a divorced woman or the son of a ḥalutza in his stead. Rather, he receives forty lashes as punishment for his false testimony. Likewise, in a case where two witnesses came before the court and said: We testify with regard to so-and-so that he is liable to be exiled to a city of refuge for unwittingly killing another (see Numbers 35:11), and a second set of witnesses testifies in court and renders the first set conspiring witnesses, one does not say with regard to each of the conspiring witnesses: This witness shall be exiled in his stead. Rather, he receives forty lashes. In the case of witnesses who said: We testify with regard to a man called so-and-so that he divorced his wife and did not give her payment of her marriage contract, and they were then rendered conspiring witnesses, the question arises with regard to the manner in which the sum of their payment is calculated. It is not possible to render the witnesses liable to pay the entire sum of the marriage contract, as they can claim: But isn’t it so that either today or tomorrow, i.e., at some point in the future, he may divorce his wife or die and ultimately he will be liable to give her payment of her marriage contract? That being the case, the witnesses did not conspire to render him liable to pay a sum that he would otherwise not be liable to pay. The sum of their payment is calculated as follows: The court assesses how much money another person would be willing to give in order to purchase the rights to this woman’s marriage contract, cognizant of the uncertainty that if she was widowed or divorced the purchaser will receive payment of the marriage contract but if she dies, her husband will inherit from her, and the one who purchased her marriage contract will receive nothing. In the case of witnesses who said: We testify with regard to a man called so-and-so that he owes another person one thousand dinars that he borrowed on the condition that he is to give the money back to him from now until thirty days have passed, and the borrower says that he borrowed that sum but it was on the condition that he is to give the money back to him from now until ten years have passed, and they were rendered conspiring witnesses, here too, it is not possible to render the witnesses liable to pay the entire sum. Rather, the court estimates how much money a person would be willing to give so that he would keep a loan of one thousand dinars in his possession, and one calculates the difference between that sum in a situation where he would be required to give the money back from now until thirty days have passed, and that same sum in a situation where he would be required to give the money back from now until ten years have passed. That difference is the sum that the testimony of the conspiring witnesses sought to have the borrower lose; therefore, it is the sum that they must pay. If witnesses said: We testify with regard to a man called so-and-so that he is liable to pay another person two hundred dinars, and they were found to be conspiring witnesses, they are flogged, and they pay the money they sought to render him liable to pay. Why do they receive two punishments? It is due to the fact that the source that brings them to liability to receive lashes is not the source that brings them to liability for payment; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Anyone who pays as punishment for a transgression is not flogged for that same transgression.
אֵין הָעֵדִים זוֹמְמִין נֶהֱרָגִין, עַד שֶׁיִּגָּמֵר הַדִּין, שֶׁהֲרֵי הַצְּדוֹקִין אוֹמְרִים, עַד שֶׁיֵּהָרֵג, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר נֶפֶשׁ תַּחַת נָפֶשׁ. אָמְרוּ לָהֶם חֲכָמִים, וַהֲלֹא כְבָר נֶאֱמַר (דברים יט) וַעֲשִׂיתֶם לוֹ כַּאֲשֶׁר זָמַם לַעֲשׂוֹת לְאָחִיו, וַהֲרֵי אָחִיו קַיָּם. וְאִם כֵּן לָמָּה נֶאֱמַר נֶפֶשׁ תַּחַת נָפֶשׁ, יָכוֹל מִשָּׁעָה שֶׁקִּבְּלוּ עֵדוּתָן יֵהָרֵגוּ, תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר, נֶפֶשׁ תַּחַת נָפֶשׁ, הָא אֵינָן נֶהֱרָגִין עַד שֶׁיִּגָּמֵר הַדִּין:
The conspiring witnesses are executed only if they are rendered conspiring witnesses after the verdict of the accused is concluded. This is in contrast to the opinion of the Sadducees, as the Sadducees say: Conspiring witnesses are executed only if they are rendered conspiring witnesses after the accused is killed on the basis of their testimony, as it is stated: “A life for a life” (Exodus 21:23; see Deuteronomy 19:21). The Rabbis said to the Sadducees: But wasn’t it already stated: “And you shall do to him as he conspired to do to his brother” (Deuteronomy 19:19), and this latter verse indicates that his accused brother is alive? And if so, why is it stated: “A life for a life”? One might have thought that if they are rendered conspiring witnesses from the moment the judges accepted their testimony in court, they will be executed, even though no verdict was concluded. Therefore, the verse states: “A life for a life,” teaching that they are executed only if they are rendered conspiring witnesses after the verdict of the accused will be concluded, from the moment that the court is on the verge of taking his life.
מַאן תְּנָא לְהָא דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן טָבַאי אֶרְאֶה בְּנֶחָמָה אִם לֹא הָרַגְתִּי עֵד זוֹמֵם לְהוֹצִיא מִלִּבָּן שֶׁל צַדּוּקִין שֶׁהָיוּ אוֹמְרִים אֵין עֵדִים זוֹמְמִין נֶהֱרָגִין עַד שֶׁיֵּהָרֵג הַנִּידּוֹן אָמַר לוֹ שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן שָׁטַח אֶרְאֶה בְּנֶחָמָה אִם לֹא שָׁפַכְתָּ דָּם נָקִי שֶׁהֲרֵי אָמְרוּ חֲכָמִים אֵין עֵדִים זוֹמְמִין נֶהֱרָגִין עַד שֶׁיִּזּוֹמּוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם וְאֵין לוֹקִין עַד שֶׁיִּזּוֹמּוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם וְאֵין מְשַׁלְּמִין מָמוֹן עַד שֶׁיִּזּוֹמּוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם מִיָּד קִבֵּל עָלָיו יְהוּדָה בֶּן טָבַאי שֶׁאֵינוֹ מוֹרֶה הֲלָכָה אֶלָּא בִּפְנֵי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן שָׁטַח כׇּל יָמָיו שֶׁל יְהוּדָה בֶּן טָבַאי הָיָה מִשְׁתַּטֵּחַ עַל קִבְרוֹ שֶׁל אוֹתוֹ הָרוּג וְהָיָה קוֹלוֹ נִשְׁמָע כִּסְבוּרִין הָעָם לוֹמַר שֶׁקּוֹלוֹ שֶׁל הָרוּג הוּא אָמַר לָהֶם קוֹלִי הוּא תֵּדְעוּ שֶׁלְּמָחָר הוּא מֵת וְאֵין קוֹלוֹ נִשְׁמָע
The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who taught that which the Sages taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda ben Tabbai said: I swear that I will not see the consolation of Israel if I did not kill a conspiring witness. This means that Rabbi Yehuda ben Tabbai sentenced a conspiring witness to death, in order to counter the views of the Sadducees, who would say: Conspiring witnesses are not executed unless the sentenced one has been executed. Their views opposed the traditional view, which maintains that conspiring witnesses are executed only if the one sentenced by their testimony has not yet been executed. Shimon ben Shataḥ said to him: I swear that I will not see the consolation of Israel if you did not shed innocent blood, as the Sages said: Conspiring witnesses are not executed unless they are both found to be conspirators; if only one is found to be a conspirator, he is not executed. And they are not flogged if they are liable to such a penalty, unless they are both found to be conspirators. And if they testified falsely that someone owed money, they do not pay money unless they are both found to be conspirators. Hearing this, Yehuda ben Tabbai immediately accepted upon himself not to rule on any matter of law unless he was in the presence of Shimon ben Shataḥ, as he realized he could not rely on his own judgment. The baraita further relates: All of Yehuda ben Tabbai’s days, he would prostrate himself on the grave of that executed individual, to request forgiveness, and his voice was heard weeping. The people thought that it was the voice of that executed person, rising from his grave. Yehuda ben Tabbai said to them: It is my voice, and you shall know that it is so, for tomorrow, i.e., sometime in the future, he will die, and his voice will no longer be heard. Yehuda ben Tabbai was referring to himself, but he did not want to mention something negative about himself in direct terms.
"Parashat Shoftim" from Lincoln Square Synagogue at https://www.lss.org/beitmorasha?post_id=70183
According to Chazal the law of eidim zomemim only goes into effect if the subject of the first testimony has not yet been punished based on their testimony. If the punishment has been carried out and the accused put to death, then the eidim zomemim are not killed. The Sadducees disagreed with Chazal. They held that if the accused had been put to death on the basis of the first set's testimony then the eidim zomemim are killed in accordance with the law of "nefesh tachat nefesh," "a life for a life." But if the original judgment had not yet been carried out then they are not killed. (Mishnah Makot 1, 6)
These two opinions disagree about a very basic queestion: why are eidim zomemim punished? According to Chazal they are punished because of their intention, because they wanted to cause an innocent person harm. According to the Saducees they are punished because of the action that followed as a result of their testimony, because they did cause injury to an innocent person.
The two approaches also differntiate between different results. How many people are to die as a result of this conspiracy? According to the Sadducees both the innocent man and the people who conspired against him die. According to the Talmudic sages the witnesses only die if their plan does not succeed. Chazal's opinion makes sense if we understand that it flows from their mercy, they are trying to put an end to the bloodshed.
The Sadducees, on the other hand, seem to asssume that the foundation of this law is the concept of midah k'neged midah, measure for measure. They seek justice. If someone plotted to kill another but was not successful there is no justification for killing them. If we judge the witnesses' actions by the results we could say "no harm, no foul," they didn't actually do anything and so they do not deserve to be punished. Moreover, Torah law commands us to kill murderers, even though it causes more bloodshed...
...They disagree as to the level of responsibility the Beit Din bears. According to the Sadducees punishments can continue ad infinitum until all guilty parties are brought to justice. This approach believes that the wheels of justice must continue to turn, and punish those who started them rolling. The Beit Din in this case is an ax in the hands of the murderer; they are not guily, the people who abused the system are the guilty ones. Chazal, on the other hand, place the blame squarely on the shoulders of the Beit Din, which they do not think should be considered a tool in anyone's hands. After the first mistake is made and someone has already been punished the sages put an end to the process. They do not seek to pawn off the responsibility for the miscarriage of justice, instead the guilt lingers, hanging over the heads of the judges on the Beit Din and echoing through its chambers. The judges and the decision of the court are the guilty parties; it is their mistake that caused the death of an innocent person.
According to Chazal the law of eidim zomemim only goes into effect if the subject of the first testimony has not yet been punished based on their testimony. If the punishment has been carried out and the accused put to death, then the eidim zomemim are not killed. The Sadducees disagreed with Chazal. They held that if the accused had been put to death on the basis of the first set's testimony then the eidim zomemim are killed in accordance with the law of "nefesh tachat nefesh," "a life for a life." But if the original judgment had not yet been carried out then they are not killed. (Mishnah Makot 1, 6)
These two opinions disagree about a very basic queestion: why are eidim zomemim punished? According to Chazal they are punished because of their intention, because they wanted to cause an innocent person harm. According to the Saducees they are punished because of the action that followed as a result of their testimony, because they did cause injury to an innocent person.
The two approaches also differntiate between different results. How many people are to die as a result of this conspiracy? According to the Sadducees both the innocent man and the people who conspired against him die. According to the Talmudic sages the witnesses only die if their plan does not succeed. Chazal's opinion makes sense if we understand that it flows from their mercy, they are trying to put an end to the bloodshed.
The Sadducees, on the other hand, seem to asssume that the foundation of this law is the concept of midah k'neged midah, measure for measure. They seek justice. If someone plotted to kill another but was not successful there is no justification for killing them. If we judge the witnesses' actions by the results we could say "no harm, no foul," they didn't actually do anything and so they do not deserve to be punished. Moreover, Torah law commands us to kill murderers, even though it causes more bloodshed...
...They disagree as to the level of responsibility the Beit Din bears. According to the Sadducees punishments can continue ad infinitum until all guilty parties are brought to justice. This approach believes that the wheels of justice must continue to turn, and punish those who started them rolling. The Beit Din in this case is an ax in the hands of the murderer; they are not guily, the people who abused the system are the guilty ones. Chazal, on the other hand, place the blame squarely on the shoulders of the Beit Din, which they do not think should be considered a tool in anyone's hands. After the first mistake is made and someone has already been punished the sages put an end to the process. They do not seek to pawn off the responsibility for the miscarriage of justice, instead the guilt lingers, hanging over the heads of the judges on the Beit Din and echoing through its chambers. The judges and the decision of the court are the guilty parties; it is their mistake that caused the death of an innocent person.
Fron "Where are the Orphans, Widows and Strangers? by Rabbi Avital Hochstein at https://hadar.org/torah-resource/where-are-orphans-widows-and-strangers#source-6045
How are we to understand the absence of the stranger, the orphan and the widow from the description of the king’s and the judge’s realms of responsibility and from the descriptions of the Kohanim and the Levites? I would argue that the absences cry out from within the verses, seeking to draw our attention to those who are missing, thus leading us to notice that something in the description is incomplete. The administrative system is imperfect as long as it ignores those whose life circumstances have weakened them.
The places of the stranger, the orphan and the widow, the places of the poor and those in need of salvation, are taken up by a series of warnings. The chapter is full of warnings not to stray left or right from the Torah; the beit din system is described as a guardian of the borders rather than an institution which cares for those who are transparent in society and seeks justice; the king is to write Torah and keep it but there are no reminders of his broad responsibility towards those people over whom he rules, and so forth.
The absence of weakened members of society, alongside the persistent cautions regarding the need to stay on the path, are positioned as warning signs: When a society’s focus is on comparisons with the exterior and on fortifying borders, it is liable to replace concern for charity and justice, raising the danger of inner blindness which itself may lead off the path of righteousness.
How are we to understand the absence of the stranger, the orphan and the widow from the description of the king’s and the judge’s realms of responsibility and from the descriptions of the Kohanim and the Levites? I would argue that the absences cry out from within the verses, seeking to draw our attention to those who are missing, thus leading us to notice that something in the description is incomplete. The administrative system is imperfect as long as it ignores those whose life circumstances have weakened them.
The places of the stranger, the orphan and the widow, the places of the poor and those in need of salvation, are taken up by a series of warnings. The chapter is full of warnings not to stray left or right from the Torah; the beit din system is described as a guardian of the borders rather than an institution which cares for those who are transparent in society and seeks justice; the king is to write Torah and keep it but there are no reminders of his broad responsibility towards those people over whom he rules, and so forth.
The absence of weakened members of society, alongside the persistent cautions regarding the need to stay on the path, are positioned as warning signs: When a society’s focus is on comparisons with the exterior and on fortifying borders, it is liable to replace concern for charity and justice, raising the danger of inner blindness which itself may lead off the path of righteousness.