צדק ומשפט- לימוד ולאחריו שיחה עם פרופ' יובל אלבשן

בב

לאחר נפילת ברקאי במבצע "צוק איתן" בחרנו, חבריו של ברקאי, להקים את בית המדרש החברתי. הפועל בסיוע של עמותת כל ישראל חברים (כי"ח).
בית המדרש מגלם את הערכים בהם האמין ברקאי ואשר לאורם פעל בדבקות – חיבור בין קבוצות שונות בחברה הישראלית, שיח מכבד במאור פנים ובאהבה, לימוד תורה ועשייה חברתית. ערכים אלו באו לידי ביטוי באופן משמעותי בכל בחירה ומעשה של ברקאי.

כל מפגש החל בלימוד משותף של דף מקורות ולאחריו שיעור. דף המקורות שלפניכם מוקדש לדיון באספקטים שונים של צדק.

מאיר אריאל, מתוך "צדק צדק תרדוף"

רודף צדק ג'ימי ודין רודף שלום
נפגשים להם בבאר האדום (...)

זורק דין שלום לג'ימי צדק
"אתה מודע לזה שצדק זה חרוז להדק?"
יורק ג'ימי צדק לדין שלום
"ממש כמו ששלום זה חרוז לחלום" (...)

ושוב שרים איש את שלו

צדק צדק תרדוף
בקש שלום ורדפהו
בקש שלום ורדפהו
צדק צדק תרדוף

שאלות העמקה

"צדק זה חרוז להדק" – איזו סכנה מציג "דין שלום" בחיים על פי הצדק? מה הבעיה ש"ג'ימי צדק" מציג בחיים ששואפים ל"שלום"?

מדוע השלום והצדק רודפים זה את זה בשיר? האם אלו ערכים שסותרים זה את זה בצורה מהותית?

סנהדרין ו׳ ב

ר"א בנו של רבי יוסי הגלילי אומר אסור לבצוע וכל הבוצע ה"ז חוטא וכל המברך את הבוצע הרי זה מנאץ ועל זה נאמר (תהלים י, ג) בוצע ברך נאץ ה' אלא יקוב הדין את ההר שנאמר (דברים א, יז) כי המשפט לאלהים הוא...

רבי יהושע בן קרחה אומר מצוה לבצוע שנאמר (זכריה ח, טז) אמת ומשפט שלום שפטו בשעריכם והלא במקום שיש משפט אין שלום ובמקום שיש שלום אין משפט אלא איזהו משפט שיש בו שלום הוי אומר זה ביצוע

דן את הדין זיכה את הזכאי וחייב את החייב וראה שנתחייב עני ממון ושלם לו מתוך ביתו זה משפט וצדקה משפט לזה וצדקה לזה משפט לזה שהחזיר לו ממון וצדקה לזה ששילם לו מתוך ביתו...

אע"פ שלא שילם מתוך ביתו זהו משפט וצדקה משפט לזה וצדקה לזה משפט לזה שהחזיר לו ממונו וצדקה לזה שהוציא גזילה מתחת ידו.

Sanhedrin 6b

Once the verdict of the judgment has been issued, it is not permitted for you to mediate a dispute. The Gemara presents a mnemonic device alluding to the names of tanna’im in the coming discussion: Samekh, reish, mem, shin; beit, nun, kuf, shin. The Tosefta cites several statements of tanna’im related to compromise and the term botze’a. Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, says: It is prohibited to mediate a dispute; and anyone who mediates [habotze’a] a dispute is a sinner; and anyone who blesses the mediator is cursing God. And of this, it is stated: “And the covetous [botze’a] blesses himself, though he despises the Lord” (Psalms 10:3). Rather, the judge must assure that the true judgment will prevail at all costs and metaphorically pierce the mountain, as it is stated: “For the judgment is God’s” (Deuteronomy 1:17). And similarly, Moses would say: Let the judgment pierce the mountain. But by contrast, Aaron, whose role was not that of a judge, was a lover of peace and a pursuer of peace, and he would apply peace between one person and the other, as it is stated: “The law of truth was in his mouth, and unrighteousness was not found in his lips; he walked with Me in peace and uprightness, and turned many away from iniquity” (Malachi 2:6). The Tosefta cites several other interpretations of the above-mentioned verse from Psalms. Rabbi Eliezer says: If one stole a se’a of wheat and ground it and baked it and separated ḥalla from it, i.e., separated the portion of the dough that must be given to the priests, how can he possibly recite the blessing on the mitzva of ḥalla? He is not blessing; rather, he is cursing God. And of this offense it is stated: “And the covetous [uvotze’a] blesses himself, though he despises the Lord,” interpreted homiletically as: And whoever blesses upon breaking [botze’a] the bread despises the Lord. Rabbi Meir says: The term botze’a employed in that verse was stated only with regard to Judah, as it is stated: “And Judah said to his brothers: What profit [betza] is it if we slay our brother and conceal his blood? Come, and let us sell him to the Ishmaelites” (Genesis 37:26–27). And consequently, anyone who blesses Judah for this act is cursing God, and of this it is stated: “And the covetous [uvotze’a] blesses himself, though he despises the Lord,” interpreted homiletically as: “And whoever blesses the profiteer [botze’a] despises the Lord.” Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: It is a mitzva to mediate a dispute, as it is stated: “Execute the judgment of truth and peace in your gates” (Zechariah 8:16). Is it not that in the place where there is strict judgment there is no true peace, and in a place where there is true peace, there is no strict judgment? Rather, which is the judgment that has peace within it? You must say: This is mediation, as both sides are satisfied with the result. And similarly, with regard to David, it says: “And David executed justice and charity to all his people” (II Samuel 8:15). And is it not that wherever there is strict justice, there is no charity, and wherever there is charity, there is no strict justice? Rather, which is the justice that has within it charity? You must say: This is mediation. The Gemara cites an alternative interpretation of David’s method of judgment, in which we come to the opinion of the first tanna, i.e., Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who says that it is prohibited to mediate a dispute: If a judge adjudicated a case of monetary law, and he correctly exonerated the party who was exempt from payment and deemed liable the party who was liable to pay, if he then saw that due to his ruling a poor person became liable to pay an amount of money that is beyond his means and therefore the judge himself paid for him from his own house, this is justice and also charity. The Gemara continues: It is justice for this one and charity for that one: It is justice for this one, because the judge restored his money to him; and it is charity for that poor person, because the judge paid for him from his own house. And similarly, with regard to David, it says: “And David executed justice and charity to all his people” (II Samuel 8:15). He executed justice for this one, because he restored his money to him, and charity for that one, because he paid for him from his own house. This interpretation of the verse is difficult for Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. If the word “charity” is meant to demonstrate that David supported the poor defendants, this term: “To all his people,” is incorrect. If the interpretation is correct, it should have stated: Charity to the poor people. Rather, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Although he did not pay from his own house, it is still justice and charity. It is justice for this one and charity for that one. It is justice for this one, because the judge restored his money to him, and charity for that one, because the judge removed the stolen item from his possession. By adjudicating the case correctly and compelling the liable party to pay his debt, the judge thereby ensures that the liable party does not illegitimately maintain property to which he is not entitled. Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: If two litigants come before you for a judgment, before you hear their respective statements and claims; or after you hear their statements but you do not yet know where the judgment is leaning, meaning that it is not yet clear to the judge which party is in the right, you are permitted to say to them: Go out and mediate. But after you hear their statements and you know where the judgment is leaning, you are not permitted to say to them: Go out and mediate, as it is stated: “The beginning of strife is as when one releases water; therefore leave off contention before the quarrel breaks out” (Proverbs 17:14). Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya interprets the verse to mean: Before the resolution of the contention is revealed, you can cast it off. Once the resolution of the contention is revealed, you cannot cast it off. And Reish Lakish says: If two litigants come for a judgment, and one is flexible and agreeable and one is rigid and contentious, before you hear their respective statements, or after you hear their statements but you do not yet know where the judgment is leaning, it is permitted for you to say to them: I will not submit to your request to judge you. The judge may refuse the case out of fear that perhaps the strong and contentious one will be found liable, and it will turn out that the strong one will pursue the judge with intent to harm him. But once you hear their statements and you know where the judgment is leaning, you may not say to them: I will not submit to your request to judge you, as it is stated: “You shall not be afraid before any man” (Deuteronomy 1:17). Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: From where is it derived that a student who is sitting before his teacher and he sees a point of merit for a poor person or liability for a wealthy person, from where is it derived that he should not be silent? As it is stated: “You shall not be afraid before any man”; he should fear neither his teacher nor the wealthy litigant. Rabbi Ḥanin says: The verse intimates: Do not suppress your statement before any man. And the witnesses should know about whom they are testifying, and before Whom they are testifying, and Who will ultimately exact payment from them, as it is stated: “Then both the men, between whom the controversy is, shall stand before the Lord” (Deuteronomy 19:17). And the judges should know whom they are judging, and before Whom they are judging, and Who will ultimately exact payment from them, as it is stated: “God stands in the congregation of God” (Psalms 82:1). And similarly, with regard to Jehoshaphat it says: “And he said to the judges: Consider what you do; for you judge not for man, but for the Lord” (II Chronicles 19:6). And lest the judge say: What value is there for me with this suffering? Why should I engage in such a burdensome and difficult task? The verse states: “He is with you in giving judgment,” from which it is derived that in rendering his decision, a judge has only that which his eyes see. He is enjoined to render the best judgment possible based on the information he has available, and he is not accountable for anything else. Earlier, the Tosefta stated that once the verdict has been issued, it is not permitted for the judge to arrange a compromise. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of a verdict, i.e., what is the formal action that signifies the conclusion of the case? Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: It is when the judge says: So-and-so, you are liable; so-and-so, you are exonerated. Rav says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, who said it is a mitzva to mediate a dispute. The Gemara asks: Is that so? And was it not that Rav Huna was a student of Rav, and when litigants would come before Rav Huna he would say to them: Do you want a strict judgment, or do you want a compromise? Evidently, Rav’s student Rav Huna did not hold that it is a mitzva to specifically arrange a compromise. The Gemara clarifies: What does Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa mean that he says it is a mitzva?

שאלות הבנה

מה יחסו רבי אליעזר לפשרה, ומה יחסו של ר' יהושע בן קרחה אליה?

כיצד כל אחת משלוש הדעות בגמרא פותרת את המתח שבין המשפט לבין הצדקה/השלום?

שאלות העמקה

במה חולקים ר' אליעזר ור' יהושע בן קרחה? האם הם חולקים בשאלה מה יותר חשוב, האמת או השלום?

מהי ה"צדקה" ומהו ה"משפט" לפי כל אחת מהדעות?

מה היחס בין האמת לבין השלום לפי כל אחת מהדעות? האם הערכים הללו מצויים בסתירה או בהשלמה? (להרחבה עיינו גם במקור 1 בדף ההרחבות)

לפי הדעה השניה, איזה ערך אמור להוביל את מערכת בית המשפט, ואיזה ערך אמור להוביל את השופט כאדם פרטי? ולפי הדעות האחרות?

שאלות לדיון

עם איזו עמדה מבין השלוש אתם מסכימים? מה היחס הנכון בין השלום לאמת לדעתכם?

האם בית המשפט צריך לקדם את הצדק והאמת יותר מאשר ערכים אחרים, כדוגמת השלום? (להרחבה עיינו גם דבריו של אהרון ברק, מקור 2 בדף ההרחבות)

האם צריך להיות הבדל בין מערכת הערכים של בית המשפט לבין זו של האדם הפרטי? (להרחבה עיינו במקור 4 בדף ההרחבות)

בבא מציעא ל׳ ב

אשר יעשון זו לפנים משורת הדין דאמר ר' יוחנן לא חרבה ירושלים אלא על שדנו בה דין תורה אלא דיני דמגיזתא לדיינו אלא אימא שהעמידו דיניהם על דין תורה ולא עבדו לפנים משורת הדין:

Bava Metzia 30b

there shall be no needy among you” (Deuteronomy 15:4). This verse can be understood as a command, indicating that it is incumbent upon each individual to ensure that he will not become needy. Therefore, your assets take precedence over the assets of any other person. The Gemara concludes: Rather, the verse is necessary to derive the exemption from returning the lost item in the case where he was an elderly person and it is not in keeping with his dignity to tend to the item. Rabba says: If there was a lost animal and the elderly person began the process of returning it, e.g., if he struck it even once to guide it in a certain direction, he is obligated to tend to it and return it. The Gemara relates: Abaye was sitting before Rabba and saw these goats standing nearby. He picked up a clod of dirt and threw it at them, causing them to move. Rabba said to him: You have thereby obligated yourself to return them. Arise and return them to their owner. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: In a case of a person for whom it is his typical manner to return an item of that type in the field, where there are fewer onlookers, but it is not his typical manner to return an item of that type in the city, what is the halakha? Do we say that for one to be obligated to return a lost item we need an unequivocal obligation to return it that applies in all cases, and since it is not his typical manner to return an item of that sort in the city, let him not be obligated to return such an item at all? Or perhaps, he is obligated in any event to return the item in the field, and once he is obligated to return it in the field, he is also obligated in the city. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved. Rava says: In any case where he would recover his own item and would consider it to be in keeping with his dignity, he is also obligated to return another’s item. And any case where he unloads and loads his own animal’s burden, he is also obligated to unload and load the burden of another’s animal. The Gemara relates: Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, was walking on the road. A certain man encountered him, and that man was carrying a burden that consisted of sticks of wood. He set down the wood and was resting. The man said to him: Lift them for me and place them upon me. Since it was not in keeping with the dignity of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, to lift the wood, Rabbi Yishmael said to him: How much are they worth? The man said to him: A half-dinar. Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, gave him a half-dinar, took possession of the wood, and declared the wood ownerless. The man then reacquired the wood and again requested that Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, lift the wood for him. Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, again gave him a half-dinar, again took possession of the wood, and again declared the wood ownerless. He then saw that the man desired to reacquire the sticks of wood. Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said to him: I declared the sticks of wood ownerless with regard to everyone else, but I did not declare them ownerless with regard to you. The Gemara asks: But is property rendered ownerless in a case like this? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Pe’a 6:1) that Beit Shammai say: Property declared ownerless for the poor is thereby rendered ownerless. And Beit Hillel say: It is not ownerless, until the property will be ownerless for the poor and for the rich, like produce during the Sabbatical Year, which is available for all. As the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, how could Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, declare the wood ownerless selectively, excluding the prior owner of the wood? Rather, Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, actually declared the wood ownerless to everyone without exception, and it was with a mere statement that he prevented him from reacquiring the wood, i.e., he told the man not to reacquire the wood even though there was no legal impediment to that reacquisition. The Gemara asks: But wasn’t Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, an elderly person and it was not in keeping with his dignity to tend to the item? Why did he purchase the wood and render it ownerless in order to absolve himself of the obligation to lift the burden if he had no obligation to do so in the first place? The Gemara answers: In the case of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, he conducted himself beyond the letter of the law, and he could have simply refused the request for help. The Gemara cites a source for going beyond the letter of the law in the performance of mitzvot. As Rav Yosef taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “And you shall teach them the statutes and the laws, and shall show them the path wherein they shall walk and the action that they must perform” (Exodus 18:20). The baraita parses the various directives in the verse. “And you shall teach them,” that is referring to the structure of their livelihood, i.e., teach the Jewish people trades so that they may earn a living; “the path,” that is referring to acts of kindness; “they shall walk,” that is referring to visiting the ill; “wherein,” that is referring to burial; “and the action,” that is referring to acting in accordance with the letter of the law; “that they must perform,” that is referring to acting beyond the letter of the law. The Gemara analyzes the baraita. The Master said: With regard to the phrase “they shall walk,” that is referring to visiting the ill. The Gemara asks: That is a detail of acts of kindness; why does the baraita list it separately? The Gemara answers: The reference to visiting the ill is necessary only for the contemporary of the ill person, as the Master said: When one who is a contemporary of an ill person visits him, he takes one-sixtieth of his illness. Since visiting an ill contemporary involves contracting a bit of his illness, a special derivation is necessary to teach that even so, he is required to go and visit him. It was taught in the baraita: With regard to the phrase “wherein,” that is referring to burial. The Gemara asks: That is a detail of acts of kindness; why does the baraita list it separately? The Gemara answers: The reference to burial is necessary only to teach the halakha of an elderly person, and it is in a circumstance where it is not in keeping with his dignity to bury the dead. Therefore, a special derivation is necessary to teach that even so, he is required to participate in the burial. It was taught in the baraita: “That they must perform”; that is referring to acting beyond the letter of the law, as Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Jerusalem was destroyed only for the fact that they adjudicated cases on the basis of Torah law in the city. The Gemara asks: Rather, what else should they have done? Should they rather have adjudicated cases on the basis of arbitrary decisions [demagizeta]? Rather, say: That they established their rulings on the basis of Torah law and did not go beyond the letter of the law. MISHNA: Which is the item that is considered lost property? If one found a donkey or a cow grazing on the path, that is not lost property, as presumably the owners are nearby and are aware of the animals’ whereabouts. If one found a donkey with its accoutrements overturned, or a cow that ran through the vineyards, that is lost property. In a case where one returned the lost animal and it fled, and he again returned it and it fled, even if this scenario repeats itself four or five times, he is obligated to return it each time, as it is stated: “You shall not see your brother’s ox or his sheep wandering and disregard them; you shall return them to your brother” (Deuteronomy 22:1). If in the course of tending to and returning the lost item, the finder was idle from labor that would have earned him a sela, he shall not say to the owner of the item: Give me a sela to compensate me for my lost income. Rather, the owner gives him his wage as if he were a laborer, a payment that is considerably smaller. If there are three men there who can convene as a court, he may stipulate before the court that he will undertake to return the item provided that he receives full compensation for lost income. If there is no court there before whom can he stipulate his condition, his financial interests take precedence and he need not return the lost item. GEMARA: With regard to the question in the mishna: Which is the item that is considered lost property, the Gemara asks: Is that to say that all those other cases that we stated in this chapter are not lost property? Rav Yehuda said that this is what the tanna is saying: What is the principle employed in defining a lost item that one is obligated to return? The mishna cites examples to illustrate the principle: If one found a donkey or a cow grazing on the path, that is not lost property, and he is not obligated to return it. But if one found a donkey with its accoutrements overturned, or a cow that was running through the vineyards, that is lost property, and he is obligated to return it. With regard to the ruling in the mishna that a donkey and cow grazing on the path are not considered lost property, the Gemara asks: And is that the case even if they graze there untended forever? Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Until three days pass they are not lost. Thereafter, they are considered lost. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If the animal is found grazing at night, even if it is untended for even one hour it can be presumed to be lost, as an owner never grazes his animals untended at night. If the animal is found grazing during the day, even if it is untended for more than three days, it is also not presumed to be lost. The Gemara answers: No, the measure of three days is necessary only in a case where one saw the animal grazing in the early hours in the morning and in the dark of nightfall. For the first three days, we say: It happened that the animal went out a bit earlier or a bit later than usual, but nevertheless, it was with the owner’s knowledge. Once this is observed for more than three days, it is certainly a lost item. This is also taught in a baraita: If one found a cloak or an ax

משנה כתובות ט׳:ב׳

(ב) מִי שֶׁמֵּת וְהִנִּיחַ אִשָּׁה וּבַעַל חוֹב וְיוֹרְשִׁין, וְהָיָה לוֹ פִקָּדוֹן אוֹ מִלְוֶה בְּיַד אֲחֵרִים, רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן אוֹמֵר, יִנָּתְנוּ לַכּוֹשֵׁל שֶׁבָּהֶן. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר, אֵין מְרַחֲמִין בַּדִּין, אֶלָּא יִנָּתְנוּ לַיּוֹרְשִׁין, שֶׁכֻּלָּן צְרִיכִין שְׁבוּעָה וְאֵין הַיּוֹרְשִׁין צְרִיכִין שְׁבוּעָה:

Mishnah Ketubot 9:2

(2) With regard to one who died and left behind a wife, and a creditor to whom he owed money, and heirs, all of whom claim payment from his property, and he had a deposit or a loan in the possession of others, Rabbi Tarfon says: The deposit or the loan will be given to the weakest one of them, i.e., the one most in need of the money. Rabbi Akiva says: One is not merciful in judgment. If the halakha is that it belongs to one party, one follows the halakha and leaves aside considerations of mercy. Rather, the halakha is that the money will be given to the heirs, as all people who wish to exact payment from orphans require an oath before they collect their debt, but the heirs do not require an oath. They therefore have a more absolute right than the others to their father’s property.

שאלות הבנה

מה היתה הסיבה לחורבן הבית על פי ר' יוחנן? כיצד היו אמורים לדון, וכיצד דנו בפועל?

מה הכוונה "לפנים משורת הדין"?

למי צריכים ללכת כספי הנפטר לפי ר' טרפון, ולמי לפי ר' עקיבא? מה הטעם של כל אחד?

שאלות העמקה

מה אמור להוביל את השופט לפסוק "לפנים משורת הדין"? איזה ערך נפגע מכך?

מה דעתו של ר' עקיבא על מקומם של הרחמים וההתחשבות בחלשים בבית המשפט? (להרחבה עיינו בפסיקתו של השופט נועם סולברג, מקור 3 בדף ההרחבות)

האם הפסוק "ודל לא תהדר בריבו", שעל פיו הולך ר' עקיבא, סותר את העיקרון של הליכה "לפנים משורת הדין"? (להרחבה עיינו במקורות 4-5 בדף ההרחבות)

שאלות העמקה

על פי התמונה שמציג יורן, האם הכסף הוא אמצעי או מטרה? מה הופך אותו לכזה? (להרחבה מומלץ לעיין במקורות 3-4 בדף ההרחבות)

ביהמ"ש המחוזי , ע"א 3340/01, בנק המזרחי נ' בת לי אפללו ויקטוריה

"לעיתים נוטה בית המשפט במקרים מיוחדים לסטות מהפורמליזם המשפטי ולפסוק על הבסיס של 'לפנים משורת הדין', כפי שאירע במקרה זה. בנסיבות מיוחדות שנפרשו בפני השופטת המלומדת, ניתן להבין לליבה ולהימנע מהתערבות בשיקוליה. לא בכדי, הדבר הראשון שמבקש שלמה המלך מאלוהיו כשהוא מתבשר שעליו למלא תפקיד של שופט ולשפוט את העם הוא 'ונתת לעבדך לב שומע, לשפוט את עמך, להבין בין טוב לרע, כי מי יוכל לשפוט את עמך הכבד הזה', ואם מוצא שופט לנכון לפעול לפי תחושת הלב, מה לנו כי נתערב בכך?"

שאלות לדיון

האם עושר הוא דבר בעל ערך בעיניכם? האם יש ערך בעושר מעבר לאפשרויות שהוא נותן? (להרחבה עיינו במקורות 5-8 בדף ההרחבות)

מדרש אגדה, שמות מ׳:י״ח:א׳

ויקם משה את המשכן. מכאן אמרו שאין השכינה שורה אלא על חכם גבור ועשיר:

Midrash Aggadah, Exodus 40:18:1

...

שיטה מקובצת, נדרים לח ע"ב

שיהיה שלם מכל דבר ולא יצטרך לאחר זולתו.

דרשות הר"ן ה׳:ג׳

אבל במה שהצריך לנביא להיות גיבור ועשיר צריך טעם. וקצת המפרשים (רמב"ם, בפ"ז מיסה"ת ה"א, ובשמונה פרקיו פ"ז) פירשו שרצה באמרו גיבור, שמגביר שכלו על תאותו, ועשיר, שתהיה לו מדת ההסתפקות. השוו עשיר וגיבור שאמר רבי (יונתן) [יוחנן], לאותם המוזכרים בדברי בן זומא באבות (פ"ד מ"א). ואין דבריהם נכונים, שאם כן אחר שהזכיר עניו, לא היה צריך להזכיר גבור ועשיר, שכבר אמרו רבותינו ז"ל בפרק קמא דעבודת אלילים (ע"ז כ, ב) ענוה גדולה מכולן. הנה ביארו כי מי שהשיג הענוה, אי אפשר מבלי שיקדמו לו טהרה וקדושה ויראת חטא ויתר המעלות המוזכרות שם, וכיון שכן מן הידוע שהוא מושל על יצרו ושהגיע אל מדת ההסתפקות, שאם יצרו מושל עליו וידאג תמיד למה שלא השיג, אי אפשר לו שישיג אותן המעלות.

Derashot HaRan 5:3

What demands explanation, however, is why a prophet must also be strong and wealthy. Some interpret "strong" in this connection as asserting one's intellect over one's lusts, and "wealthy," as possessing the quality of contentment, likening R. Yonathan's categories to those mentioned by Ben Zoma (Avoth 4:1). They are obviously mistaken, however, for once "humble" is included it is no longer necessary to mention "strong" and "wealthy" [in the aforementioned sense], for our sages of blessed memory have said (Avodah Zarah 20b): "Humility is greater than all of the other traits." They explain that it is impossible to attain humility without having previously attained purity, holiness, fear of sin, and the other qualities mentioned there. This being so, it is obvious that the humble man rules his evil inclination and that he has achieved contentment; for if his inclination rules him and he is constantly anxious over what he has not acquired, it is impossible for him to have achieved the other qualities.

שאלות הבנה

מדוע הנביא צריך להיות עשיר לפי כל אחד מהפירושים?

מדוע הנביא צריך להיות "נבחר ונרצה" על כת אוהבי העושר לפי הר"ן?

שאלות העמקה

מה ערכו של העושר על פי כל אחת מהאפשרויות העולות?

האם לפי הר"ן הנביא צריך להיות עשיר רק בשביל שהעשירים יקשיבו לדבריו?

האם יש עניין בעצם זה ש"איש ציבור" יהיה עשיר?

מוזמנים לצפות בסיכום המפגש ובהרצאה של פרופסור יובל אלבשן

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