רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר, שְׁלשָׁה שֶׁאָכְלוּ עַל שֻׁלְחָן אֶחָד וְלֹא אָמְרוּ עָלָיו דִּבְרֵי תוֹרָה, כְּאִלּוּ אָכְלוּ מִזִּבְחֵי מֵתִים, ... אֲבָל שְׁלשָׁה שֶׁאָכְלוּ עַל שֻׁלְחָן אֶחָד וְאָמְרוּ עָלָיו דִּבְרֵי תוֹרָה, כְּאִלּוּ אָכְלוּ מִשֻּׁלְחָנוֹ שֶׁל מָקוֹם בָּרוּךְ הוּא, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (יחזקאל מא) וַיְדַבֵּר אֵלַי זֶה הַשֻּׁלְחָן אֲשֶׁר לִפְנֵי ה':
(3) Rabbi Shimon said: if three have eaten at one table and have not spoken there words of Torah, [it is] as if they had eaten sacrifices [offered] to the dead, as it is said, “for all tables are full of filthy vomit, when the All-Present is absent” (Isaiah 28:8). But, if three have eaten at one table, and have spoken there words of Torah, [it is] as if they had eaten at the table of the All-Present, blessed be He, as it is said, “And He said unto me, ‘this is the table before the Lord’” (Ezekiel 41:22).
גָּלְתָה סַנְהֶדְרִין מִלִּשְׁכַּת הַגָּזִית לַחֲנוּת. וּמֵחֲנוּת לִירוּשָׁלַיִם, וּמִירוּשָׁלַיִם לְיַבְנֶה, וּמִיַּבְנֶה לְאוּשָׁא, וּמֵאוּשָׁא לְיַבְנֶה, וּמִיַּבְנֶה לְאוּשָׁא, וּמֵאוּשָׁא לִשְׁפַרְעָם, וּמִשְּׁפַרְעָם לְבֵית שְׁעָרִים, וּמִבֵּית שְׁעָרִים לְצִפּוֹרִי, וּמִצִּפּוֹרִי לִטְבֶרְיָא, וּטְבֶרְיָא עֲמוּקָּה מִכּוּלָּן
The Gemara rejects this argument. It is different there, as in any case “Sing aloud” is the psalm of the day, either because it was an ordinary Thursday or because it was Rosh HaShana. However, there is no proof from here that in all uncertain cases they would recite the psalm for an ordinary weekday, as it is possible that they did not recite any psalm at all. § The Gemara expands on the topic of the daily psalms recited by the Levites. It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda said in the name of Rabbi Akiva: On the first day of the week, Sunday, what psalm would the Levites recite? The psalm beginning with the phrase: “The earth is the Lord’s, and its fullness” (Psalms 24:1), in commemoration of the first day of Creation, because on that day He acquired the world and transferred it to man, and He was the only ruler in His world, as the angels were not created until the second day. On the second day of the week what psalm would the Levites recite? The psalm that begins: “Great is the Lord, and highly to be praised in the city of our God, His sacred mountain” (Psalms 48:2). This is because on the second day of Creation He separated His works, dividing between the upper waters and the lower waters, and ruled over them as King; and this psalm speaks of Jerusalem as “The city of a great King” (Psalms 48:3). On the third day of the week they would recite the psalm beginning: “God stands in the congregation of God” (Psalms 82:1), because on the third day of Creation He revealed the land in His wisdom and thereby prepared the world for His assembly that could now live on the dry land. On the fourth day of the week they would recite the psalm beginning: “O Lord God, to Whom vengeance belongs” (Psalms 94:1), because on the fourth day of Creation He created the sun and the moon, and in the future He will punish and take vengeance upon those who worship them. On the fifth day of the week the Levites would recite the psalm beginning: “Sing aloud to God our strength” (Psalms 81:2), because on the fifth day of Creation He created birds and fish to praise His name. On the sixth day of the week they would recite the psalm beginning: “The Lord reigns, He is clothed with majesty” (Psalms 93:1), because on that day He completed His labor and ruled over all of creation in full glory. On the seventh day of the week, Shabbat, they would recite the psalm beginning: “A psalm, a song for the day of Shabbat” (Psalms 92:1), as the future world will be a day that is all Shabbat. Rabbi Neḥemya said: What did the Sages see that led them to distinguish between these chapters, as they interpret the psalms recited on the six weekdays as referring to the past, whereas the psalm recited on Shabbat is referring to the future. Rather, all of the psalms refer to the past. The first six are as explained above: On the first day, the reason is that He acquired the world and transferred it to man, and He was the only ruler in His world; on the second day, the reason is that He separated His works and ruled over them as King; on the third day, the reason is that He revealed the land in His wisdom and thereby prepared the world for His assembly. On the fourth day, the reason is that He created the sun and the moon, and in the future He will punish those who worship them; on the fifth day, the reason is that He created birds and fish to praise His name; on the sixth day, the reason is that He completed His labor and ruled over all of creation. However, on the seventh day, the reason is that He rested from His work, as the phrase “A psalm, a song for the day of Shabbat” is referring to the first Shabbat of Creation. The Gemara comments: And these tanna’im disagree with regard to a statement of Rav Ketina, as Rav Ketina said: The world will exist for six thousand years, and for one thousand years it will be destroyed, as it is stated: “And the Lord alone shall be exalted on that day” (Isaiah 2:11), and one day for God is a thousand years, as indicated in the verse: “For a thousand years in Your sight are but as yesterday when it is past” (Psalms 90:4). Rav Ketina’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. Conversely, Abaye said: The world will be destroyed for two thousand years, as it is stated: “After two days He will revive us” (Hosea 6:2). According to the opinion of Abaye that the destruction will be for two days, there is no connection between the future world and the day of Shabbat, which is only one day. § The Gemara further asks: When it came to the additional offerings of Shabbat, what would the Levites recite? Rav Anan bar Rava said that Rav said: They would recite in accordance with the mnemonic hei, zayin, yod, vav, lamed, kaf. They would divide the song of Ha’azinu into six sections, each of which began with a letter of the mnemonic: “Give ear [ha’azinu], you heavens” (Deuteronomy 32:1); “Remember [zekhor] the days of old” (Deuteronomy 32:7); “He made him ride [yarkivehu] on the high places of the earth” (Deuteronomy 32:13); “The Lord saw it [vayar] and spurned” (Deuteronomy 32:19); “Were it not [lulei] that I dread the enemy’s provocation” (Deuteronomy 32:27); “For [ki] the Lord will judge His people” (Deuteronomy 32:36). And Rav Ḥanan bar Rava said that Rav said: In the manner that the verses of the song of Ha’azinu are divided here for the recitation of the additional offerings of Shabbat in the Temple, so too are they divided when they are read in the synagogue on Shabbat. The Gemara asks another question: When it came to the daily afternoon offering on Shabbat, what would the Levites recite? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: “Then sang Moses” (Exodus 15:1), and: “Who is like You” (Exodus 15:11), the two halves of the Song of the Sea, and: “Then Israel sang this song” (Numbers 21:17), the entire Song of the Well. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Does one recite all these sections of the song of Ha’azinu on each Shabbat, or perhaps on each and every Shabbat they would recite one section? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei said: By the time that those who recite the first set, i.e., the verses for the additional offerings brought on Shabbat, recite it once, those who recite the second set, for the daily afternoon offering, would repeat their cycle twice, as the first set was comprised of six sections, whereas the second set included only three sections. Learn from here that each and every Shabbat they would recite only one section. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from here that this is correct. § Rav Yehuda bar Idi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The Divine Presence traveled ten journeys, i.e., it left the Temple and Eretz Yisrael in ten stages at the time of the destruction of the First Temple, as derived from verses. And corresponding to them the Sanhedrin was exiled in ten stages at the end of the Second Temple period and after the destruction of the Temple, and this is known from tradition. The Gemara elaborates. The Divine Presence traveled ten journeys, as derived from verses. The ten journeys are: From the Ark cover to the cherub; and from one cherub to the other cherub; and from the second cherub to the threshold of the Sanctuary; and from the threshold to the courtyard; and from the courtyard to the altar; and from the altar to the roof; and from the roof to the wall of the Temple Mount; and from the wall to the city; and from the city to a mountain close to Jerusalem; and from that mountain to the wilderness; and from the wilderness it ascended and rested in its place in Heaven, isolated from humanity, as it is stated: “I will go and return to My place” (Hosea 5:15). The Gemara cites the sources for each of these stages: From the Ark cover the Divine Presence traveled to the cherub, and from one cherub to the other cherub, and from the second cherub to the threshold, as it is written with regard to Moses in the Tabernacle: “And there I will meet with you, and I will speak to you from above the Ark cover, from between the two cherubs” (Exodus 25:22). And it is written: “And He rode upon a cherub, and flew” (II Samuel 22:11), which indicates that the glory of the Divine Presence can rest upon one cherub. And it is written: “And the glory of the God of Israel had ascended from the cherub, on which it was, to the threshold of the House” (Ezekiel 9:3), i.e., the Divine Presence moved from the cherub to the threshold. And from the threshold of the Sanctuary the Divine Presence went to the courtyard, as it is written: “And the House was filled with the cloud and the courtyard was full of the brightness of the Lord’s glory” (Ezekiel 10:4). From the courtyard to the altar, as it is written: “I saw the Lord standing on the altar” (Amos 9:1). And from the altar to the roof, as it is written: “It is better to dwell in a corner of the roof than in a house together with a contentious woman” (Proverbs 21:9). From the roof to the wall, as it is written: “And behold, the Lord stood upon a wall made by a plumb line” (Amos 7:7). From the wall to the city, as it is written: “The Lord’s voice cries to the city” (Micah 6:9). And from the city the Divine Presence arose to the mountain nearest the Sanctuary, i.e., the Mount of Olives, as it is written: “And the glory of the Lord went up from the midst of the city, and stood upon the mountain, which is on the east side of the city” (Ezekiel 11:23). And from the mountain to the wilderness, as it is written: “It is better to live in the wilderness than with a contentious and fretful woman” (Proverbs 21:19). And from the wilderness it ascended and rested in its place in Heaven, as it is written: “I will go and return to My place until they acknowledge their guilt” (Hosea 5:15). Rabbi Yoḥanan said: For six months the Divine Presence lingered in the wilderness, waiting for the Jewish people, hoping that perhaps they would repent and it would be able to return to its place. When they did not repent, the Divine Presence said: Let them despair and be lost, as it is stated: “But the eyes of the wicked shall fail, and they shall have no way to flee, and their hope shall be the drooping of the soul” (Job 11:20). This concludes the discussion of the ten stages of the exile of the Divine Presence from the Holy of Holies. And corresponding to these ten stages, the Sanhedrin was exiled in ten stages at the end of the Second Temple period and after the destruction of the Temple, and this is known from tradition: From the Chamber of Hewn Stone, its fixed seat in the Temple, to Ḥanut, literally, shop, a designated spot on the Temple Mount outside the Temple proper; and from Ḥanut to Jerusalem; and from Jerusalem to Yavne; and from Yavne to Usha; and from Usha it returned to Yavne; and from Yavne it went back to Usha; and from Usha to Shefaram; and from Shefaram to Beit She’arim; and from Beit She’arim to Tzippori; and from Tzippori to Tiberias. And Tiberias is lower than all of them, as it is in the Jordan Valley. A verse alludes to these movements, as it is stated: “And brought down, you shall speak out of the ground” (Isaiah 29:4). Rabbi Elazar says: There are six exiles, if you count only the places, not the number of journeys, and a different verse alludes to this, as it is stated: “For He has brought down those who dwell high, the lofty city laying it low, laying it low, to the ground, bringing it to the dust” (Isaiah 26:5). This verse mentions six expressions of lowering: Brought down, laying it low, laying it low, to the ground, bringing it, and to the dust. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: And from there, i.e., from their lowest place of descent, they are destined to be redeemed in the future, as it is stated: “Shake yourself from the dust, arise, sit, Jerusalem” (Isaiah 52:2). MISHNA: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa said: And this, too, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted, that even if the head of the court of seventy-one is in any other place, not where the Great Sanhedrin is in session, the witnesses should nevertheless go only to the place where the Great Sanhedrin gathers to deliver testimony to determine the start of the month. Although the date of the month is dependent on the head of the Great Sanhedrin, as it is he who declares that the month is sanctified (see 24a), nevertheless, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted that the members of the Great Sanhedrin may sanctify the month in the absence of the head of the court. GEMARA: The Gemara relates: There was a certain woman who was called to judgment before Ameimar in Neharde’a. Ameimar temporarily went to Meḥoza, and she did not follow him to be judged there. He wrote a document of excommunication [petiḥa] concerning her, for disobeying the court. Rav Ashi said to Ameimar: Didn’t we learn in the mishna: Even if the head of the court of seventy-one is in any other place, the witnesses should go only to the place where the Great Sanhedrin gathers? This shows that one must appear in the court itself, rather than follow the head of the court. Ameimar said to him: This applies only to testimony to determine the start of the month, for which it is necessary to have a fixed place. The reason is that if so, if the witnesses come to court when the head of the court is absent and they will have to go to another place, consequently you will be obstructing them for future occasions, as they will consider it too much trouble and perhaps they will not come the next time. Therefore, the Sages said that these witnesses should go to the regular place where the Great Sanehdrin meets. However, here, with regard to monetary claims, the verse states: “The borrower is servant to the lender” (Proverbs 22:7), i.e., the defendant must act as is convenient to the claimant and the court. § The Sages taught in a baraita: Priests are not allowed to ascend with their sandals to the platform to recite the Priestly Blessing in the synagogue. And this is one of the nine ordinances that Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted. Six are mentioned in this chapter: Sounding the shofar on Shabbat in Yavne, taking the lulav all seven days, the prohibition against eating new grain the entire day of waving, accepting testimony to determine the start of the month all day, having the witnesses to the New Moon go to the place of meeting, and reciting the Priestly Blessing without sandals. And one is stated in the first chapter, that the witnesses to the New Moon may desecrate Shabbat only for the months of Tishrei and Nisan. And the other, as it is taught in a baraita: A convert who converts nowadays is required to set aside a quarter-shekel for his nest, i.e., his pair of doves. By Torah law a convert must bring two burnt-offerings of birds, in addition to his immersion and circumcision. After the destruction, it was instituted that he must set aside the value of two young pigeons in anticipation of the rebuilding of the Temple. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said: Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai already assembled a majority who voted and rescinded the ordinance due to a potential mishap. If a convert is obligated to set aside money, someone might unwittingly use this money, thereby violating the prohibition against misuse of consecrated property. And the other ordinance, the ninth, is the subject of a dispute between Rav Pappa and Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak. Rav Pappa said: The ordinance concerned the fruit of a fourth-year grapevine. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: It was with regard to the strip of crimson wool. The Gemara elaborates: Rav Pappa said that the ordinance is referring to the fruit of a fourth-year grapevine, as it is taught in a mishna (Beitza 5a): The fruit of a fourth-year grapevine has the status of second-tithe fruits, and therefore their owner would ascend to Jerusalem and eat the grapes there. If he is unable to do so, due to the distance involved or the weight of the load, he may redeem the fruits with money where he is, and later redeem that money for other fruits in Jerusalem. However, the Sages decreed that fruit from the environs of Jerusalem should not be redeemed; rather, the owners should bring the fruit itself to Jerusalem. The environs of Jerusalem for this purpose were defined as a day’s walk in each direction. And this is its boundary: Eilat to the north, Akrabat to the south, Lod to the west, and the Jordan river to the east. And Ulla said, and some say Rabba bar Ulla said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: For what reason did the Sages institute this ordinance, that one who lives near Jerusalem must bring his fruit there? In order to adorn the markets of Jerusalem with fruit, as this decree ensures that there is always an abundance of fruit in Jerusalem. And it was further taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer ben Hyrcanus, a student of Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai, had a fourth-year grapevine located between Lod and Jerusalem, to the east of Lod alongside the village of Tavi. The vine was within the boundaries of Jerusalem for the purpose of this halakha. Rabbi Eliezer could not bring the fruit to the Temple, as the Temple had been destroyed, and Rabbi Eliezer sought to render the fruit ownerless in favor of the poor, for whom it would be worth the effort to bring the fruit to Jerusalem. His students said to him: Our teacher, there is no need to do so, as your colleagues have already voted on the matter and permitted it, as after the destruction of the Temple there is no need to adorn the markets of Jerusalem. The Gemara explains: Who are: Your colleagues? This is referring to Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: The ordinance was with regard to the strip of crimson wool used on Yom Kippur. As it is taught in a baraita: At first they would tie a strip of crimson wool to the opening of the Entrance Hall of the Temple on the outside. If, after the sacrificing of the offerings and the sending of the scapegoat, the strip turned white, the people would rejoice, as this indicated that their sins had been atoned for. If it did not turn white they would be sad. When the Sages saw that people were overly distressed on Yom Kippur, they instituted that they should tie the strip of crimson wool to the opening of the Entrance Hall on the inside, where only a few could enter to see it. But people would still peek and see it, and once again, if it turned white they would rejoice, and if it did not turn white they would be sad. Therefore, the Sages instituted that they should tie half of the strip to a rock near the place where the one who sent the scapegoat stood and half of it between the horns of the scapegoat, so that the people would not know what happened to the strip until after the conclusion of Yom Kippur. This ordinance was instituted by Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai. The Gemara explains this dispute: What is the reason that Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak did not state his opinion with regard to the ordinance in accordance with the opinion of Rav Pappa? He could have said to you: If it enters your mind to say that Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai rescinded the ordinance of the fruit of fourth-year grapevines, was he one of Rabbi Eliezer’s colleagues, that the students would have referred to him in this manner? He was his teacher. Therefore, Rabbi Yoḥanan cannot be the one who instituted this ordinance. And the other, Rav Pappa, what would he respond to this? He would say that since they were Rabbi Eliezer’s students it is not proper conduct for one to say to his teacher: Your teacher. Therefore, they referred to Rabbi Yoḥanan as Rabbi Eliezer’s colleague. The Gemara asks: And what is the reason that Rav Pappa did not state his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak? Rav Pappa could have said to you: If it enters your mind to say that this ordinance for Yom Kippur was instituted by Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai, in the days of Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai was there in fact a strip of crimson wool? Isn’t it taught in a baraita: All the years of Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai’s life were 120 years: Forty years he was involved in business so that he could achieve financial independence and study Torah, forty years he studied Torah, and forty years he taught Torah. And it is taught in a baraita: During the forty years before the Second Temple was destroyed the strip of crimson wool would not turn white; rather, it would turn a deeper shade of red. And we learned in the mishna: When the Temple was destroyed Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted his ordinances. This shows that Rabban Yoḥanan lived and taught Torah after the destruction. Therefore the ordinance of the crimson wool must have been made while Rabban Yoḥanan was still studying Torah, before he instituted any ordinances. The Gemara asks: And the other Sage, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak, what would he answer? According to him, that ordinance was instituted during those forty years that he studied Torah. He was then a student sitting before his teacher, and he said a matter, i.e., he suggested this ordinance, and his reasoning made sense to the Sages,
תְּפִלַּת עַרְבִית: רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר חוֹבָהּ, רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמֵר רְשׁוּת. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: מַעֲשֶׂה בְּתַלְמִיד אֶחָד שֶׁבָּא לִפְנֵי רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ. אָמַר לוֹ: תְּפִלַּת עַרְבִית רְשׁוּת אוֹ חוֹבָה? אָמַר לֵיהּ: רְשׁוּת. בָּא לִפְנֵי רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, אָמַר לוֹ: תְּפִלַּת עַרְבִית רְשׁוּת אוֹ חוֹבָה? ..... וְאוֹתוֹ תַּלְמִיד רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יוֹחַאי הֲוָה
directly next to his rabbi, presumptuously indicating that he is his rabbi’s equal, and behind his rabbi as it creates the impression that he is bowing to him (Tosafot)? And it was taught in a baraita, in a more extreme manner, as Rabbi Eliezer says: One who prays behind his rabbi and one who greets his rabbi without waiting for his rabbi to greet him first, one who returns his rabbi’s greeting without saying: Greetings to you, rabbi, one who rivals his rabbi’s yeshiva, i.e., establishes a yeshiva of his own and teaches during his rabbi’s lifetime without his consent (Rambam), and one who says something in the name of his rabbi which he did not hear directly from his rabbi, causes the Divine Presence to withdraw from Israel. With regard to Rabbi Yirmeya’s conduct, the Gemara explains that Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba is different, as he was not a mere student of Rav. Rather, he was a disciple-colleague and was, therefore, permitted to act that way. And that is why on one occasion, when Rav prayed the Shabbat prayer early, Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba asked him: Did you distance yourself from labor and accept the sanctity of Shabbat? Rav said to him: Yes, I distanced myself. And Rabbi Yirmeya did not say to him: Did the Master distance himself, as would have been appropriate had he merely been Rav’s student. Although Rav replied that he distanced himself from labor, did he indeed need to distance himself from labor? Didn’t Rabbi Avin say: Once Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi prayed the Shabbat prayer on the eve of Shabbat before nightfall. He then entered the bathhouse and emerged and taught us our chapters that we had learned, and it was not yet dark. Rava said: That is a case where he had entered the bathhouse to perspire, and it was before the Sages issued a decree prohibiting perspiring in a bathhouse on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: Is that so, that he was required to refrain from labor? Didn’t Abaye permit Rav Dimi bar Liva’ei to fumigate baskets with sulfur even though he had already recited the Shabbat prayer, indicating that it is permitted to perform labor even after the Shabbat prayer? The Gemara responds: That was an error, as Rav Dimi did not intend to begin Shabbat early. It was a cloudy day and he mistakenly thought that the sun had set and that was why he prayed. Consequently, even though he prayed, the Shabbat prayer did not obligate him to conduct himself in accordance with the sanctity of Shabbat and he was allowed to perform labor even after his prayer. The Gemara goes on to ask: Can a mistake be reversed, enabling one to conduct himself as if he had not prayed? Didn’t Avidan, a student of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, say: Once the sky became overcast, leading the people to think that it was the dark of night; they entered the synagogue and recited the evening prayer of the conclusion of Shabbat on Shabbat. And later, the clouds cleared and the sun shone, indicating that it was still day. And they came and asked Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi what they should do, and he said: Since they have prayed, they have prayed, and they need not pray again. Although they prayed erroneously, their mistake is not reversible and what was done remains. The Gemara responds: A community is different in that we do not burden them to pray again. The Gemara continues to discuss the possibility of reciting the evening prayer early, even on Shabbat. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin said: Rav prayed the Shabbat prayer on the eve of Shabbat before nightfall. Rabbi Yoshiya would pray the evening prayer of the conclusion of Shabbat on Shabbat. With regard to the fact that Rav prayed the Shabbat prayer on the eve of Shabbat before nightfall, the dilemma is raised: In those cases, did he recite kiddush over the cup of wine, or did he not recite kiddush over the cup of wine before the stars emerged? Come and hear a resolution to this, as Rav Naḥman said that Shmuel said: One prays the Shabbat prayer on the eve of Shabbat before nightfall and recites kiddush over the cup of wine. And the halakha is in accordance with his ruling. A similar dilemma was raised concerning the fact that Rabbi Yoshiya would pray the evening prayer of the conclusion of Shabbat on Shabbat: After praying, while it is still Shabbat, does he recite havdala over the cup of wine or does one not recite havdala over the cup of wine? Come and hear a resolution to this, as Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: One prays the evening prayer of the conclusion of Shabbat on Shabbat and recites havdala over the cup of wine. Rabbi Zeira said that Rabbi Asi said that Rabbi Elazar said that Rabbi Ḥanina said that Rav said: Alongside this specific pillar before me, Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, prayed the Shabbat prayer on the eve of Shabbat before nightfall. But when Ulla came from the Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he related a different version of this story. He said that he had heard: This transpired beside a palm tree, not beside a pillar, and it was not Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, but it was Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, and it was not the Shabbat prayer on Shabbat eve before nightfall, rather it was the prayer of the conclusion of Shabbat on Shabbat. We learned in the mishna: The evening prayer may be recited throughout the night and is not fixed to a specific hour. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of is not fixed? If you say that if one wishes, he may pray throughout the night, then let the mishna teach: The evening prayer may be recited throughout the night. Rather, what is the meaning of not fixed? It is in accordance with the opinion of the one who said: The evening prayer is optional. As Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said with regard to the evening prayer. Rabban Gamliel says: It is obligatory. Rabbi Yehoshua says: It is optional. Abaye said: The halakha is in accordance with the statement of the one who said: The evening prayer is obligatory. Rava said: The halakha is in accordance with the statement of the one who said: The evening prayer is optional. The Sages taught: There was an incident involving a student, who came before Rabbi Yehoshua. The student said to him: Is the evening prayer optional or obligatory? Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: Optional. The same student came before Rabban Gamliel and said to him: Is the evening prayer optional or obligatory? Rabban Gamliel said to him: Obligatory. The student said to Rabban Gamliel: But didn’t Rabbi Yehoshua tell me that the evening prayer is optional? Rabban Gamliel said to the student: Wait until the “masters of the shields,” a reference to the Torah scholars who battle in the war of Torah, enter the study hall, at which point we will discuss this issue. When the masters of the shields entered, the questioner stood before everyone present and asked: Is the evening prayer optional or obligatory? Rabban Gamliel said to him: Obligatory. In order to ascertain whether or not Rabbi Yehoshua still maintained his opinion, Rabban Gamliel said to the Sages: Is there any person who disputes this matter? Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: No, no one disagrees. In deference to the Nasi, he did not wish to argue with him publicly (Tziyyun LeNefesh Ḥayya). Rabban Gamliel said to Rabbi Yehoshua: But was it not in your name that they told me that the evening prayer is optional? Rabban Gamliel said to Rabbi Yehoshua: Yehoshua, stand on your feet and they will testify against you. Rabbi Yehoshua stood on his feet and said: If I were alive and the student were dead, the living can contradict the dead, and I could deny issuing that ruling. Now that I am alive and he is alive, how can the living contradict the living? I have no choice but to admit that I said it. In the meantime, Rabban Gamliel, as the Nasi, was sitting and lecturing, and Rabbi Yehoshua all the while was standing on his feet, because Rabban Gamliel did not instruct him to sit. He remained standing in deference to the Nasi. This continued for some time, until it aroused great resentment against Rabban Gamliel, and all of the people assembled began murmuring and said to Ḥutzpit the disseminator: Stop conveying Rabban Gamliel’s lecture. And he stopped. The Gemara relates that in their murmuring they said: How long will Rabban Gamliel continue afflicting him? Last year on Rosh HaShana, he afflicted him; Rabban Gamliel ordered Rabbi Yehoshua to come to him carrying his staff and bag, on the day on which Yom Kippur occurred, according to Rabbi Yehoshua’s calculations. Regarding the firstborn, in the incident involving the question of Rabbi Tzadok, he afflicted him just as he did now, and forced him to remain standing as punishment for his failure to defend his differing opinion. Here too, he is afflicting him. Let us remove him from his position as Nasi. It was so agreed, but the question arose: Who shall we establish in his place? Shall we establish Rabbi Yehoshua in his place? The Sages rejected that option because Rabbi Yehoshua was party to the incident for which Rabban Gamliel was deposed. Appointing him would be extremely upsetting for Rabban Gamliel. Shall we establish Rabbi Akiva in his place? The Sages rejected that option because Rabbi Akiva, who descended from a family of converts, would be vulnerable. Perhaps due to Rabban Gamliel’s resentment he would cause him to be divinely punished as he lacks the merit of his ancestors to protect him. Rather, suggested the Sages, let us establish Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya in his place, his outstanding characteristics set him apart from the other candidates. He is wise, rich, and a tenth generation descendant of Ezra. The Gemara explains: He is wise, so if Rabban Gamliel raises a challenge in matters of Torah, he will answer it and not be embarrassed. And he is rich, so if the need arises to pay homage to the Caesar’s court and serve as a representative of Israel to lobby and negotiate, he has sufficient wealth to cover the costs of the long journeys, taxes, and gifts, so he too is able to go and pay homage. And he is a tenth generation descendant of Ezra, so he has the merit of his ancestors, and Rabban Gamliel will be unable to cause him to be punished. They came and said to him: Would the Master consent to being the Head of the Yeshiva? He said to them: I will go and consult with my household. He went and consulted with his wife. She said to him:
דְּתַנְיָא,רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: גּוֹרֵר אָדָם מִטָּה כִּסֵּא וְסַפְסָל — וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יִתְכַּוֵּין לַעֲשׂוֹת חָרִיץ.
A Hanukkah lamp that one placed above twenty cubits is invalid, just as a sukka whose roofing is more than twenty cubits high, and just as an alleyway whose beam, its symbolic fourth partition in order to place an eiruv, is more than twenty cubits high, are invalid. The reason is the same in all three cases: People do not usually raise their heads and see objects at a height above twenty cubits. As there is a requirement to see all of these, they are deemed invalid when placed above that height. And the Gemara cites another statement that Rav Kahana said that Rav Natan bar Manyumi taught in the name of Rav Tanḥum: What is the meaning of the verse that is written with regard to Joseph: “And they took him, and cast him into the pit; and the pit was empty, there was no water in it” (Genesis 37:24)? By inference from that which is stated: And the pit was empty, don’t I know that there was no water in it? Rather, why does the verse say: There was no water in it? The verse comes to emphasize and teach that there was no water in it, but there were snakes and scorpions in it. Rabba said: It is a mitzva to place the Hanukkah lamp within the handbreadth adjacent to the entrance. The Gemara asks: And where, on which side, does he place it? There is a difference of opinion: Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said: On the right side of the entrance. Rav Shmuel from Difti said: On the left. And the halakha is to place it on the left so that the Hanukkah lamp will be on the left and the mezuza on the right. One who enters the house will be surrounded by mitzvot (ge’onim). Rav Yehuda said that Rav Asi said that Rav said: It is prohibited to count money opposite a Hanukkah light. Rav Yehuda relates: When I said this halakha before Shmuel, he said to me: Does the Hanukkah light have sanctity that would prohibit one from using its light? Rav Yosef strongly objected to this question: What kind of question is that; does the blood of a slaughtered undomesticated animal or fowl have sanctity? As it was taught in a baraita that the Sages interpreted the verse: “He shall spill its blood and cover it with dust” (Leviticus 17:13): With that which he spilled, he shall cover. Just as a person spills the blood of a slaughtered animal with his hand, so too, he is obligated to cover the blood with this hand and not cover it with his foot. The reason is so that mitzvot will not be contemptible to him. Here too, one should treat the Hanukkah lights as if they were sacred and refrain from utilizing them for other purposes, so that mitzvot will not be contemptible to him. The Gemara relates that they raised a dilemma before Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi: What is the halakha with regard to using decorations of a sukka all seven days of the festival of Sukkot? He said to them: They already said in a similar vein that it is prohibited to count money opposite the Hanukkah light, which proves that one may not use the object of a mitzva for another purpose. Rav Yosef replied in surprise: Master of Abraham! He makes that which was taught dependent upon that which was not taught. As, with regard to sukka, the prohibition to enjoy use of its decorations was taught in a baraita, and the prohibition to enjoy use of the Hanukkah lights was not taught in a baraita at all. As it was taught in a Tosefta in tractate Sukka: With regard to one who roofed the sukka in accordance with its halakhic requirements, and decorated it with colorful curtains and sheets, and hung in it ornamental nuts, peaches, almonds, and pomegranates, and grape branches [parkilei], and wreaths of stalks of grain, wines, oils, and vessels full of flour, it is prohibited to use them until the conclusion of the last day of the Festival. And, if before he hung the decorations he stipulated with regard to them that he will be permitted to use them even during the Festival, everything is according to his stipulation, and he is permitted to use them. In any case, since the prohibition to benefit from the Hanukkah light is not explicitly taught, a proof should not be cited from there to resolve the dilemma with regard to sukka decorations. Rather, Rav Yosef said: There is no need to bring a proof for the halakhot of sukka from the Hanukkah light. Rather, the paradigm of them all is blood. The verse with regard to the covering of the blood of slaughter is the original source from which the prohibition to treat mitzvot with contempt is derived. It was stated in a dispute between amora’im that Rav said: One may not light from one Hanukkah lamp to another lamp. And Shmuel said: One may light in that manner. The Gemara cites additional disputes between Rav and Shmuel. Rav said: One may not untie ritual fringes from one garment in order to affix them to another garment. And Shmuel said: One may untie them from one garment and affix them to another garment. And Rav said: The halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in the case of dragging, as Rabbi Shimon permitted dragging objects on Shabbat, even if, as a result, a furrow would be dug in the ground, as it was not the person’s intent to dig that hole. Shmuel said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in the case of dragging. Abaye said: In all halakhic matters of the Master, Rabba, he conducted himself in accordance with the opinion of Rav, except these three where he conducted himself in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. He ruled: One may light from one Hanukkah lamp to another lamp, and one may untie ritual fringes from garment to garment, and the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in the case of dragging. As it was taught in a baraita, Rabbi Shimon says: A person may drag a bed, chair, and bench on the ground, as long as he does not intend to make a furrow in the ground. Even if a furrow is formed inadvertently, one need not be concerned. One of the Sages sat before Rav Adda bar Ahava, and he sat and said: The reason for the opinion of Rav, who prohibited lighting from one Hanukkah lamp to another, is due to contempt for the mitzva. Using the light for a purpose other than illumination demeans the mitzva of Hanukkah lights. Rav Adda bar Ahava said to his students: Do not listen to him, as the reason for Rav’s opinion is due to the fact that he thereby weakens the mitzva. By lighting from lamp to lamp he slightly diminishes the oil and wick designated for the purpose of the mitzva. The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between them? The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is in a case where he lights directly from lamp to lamp, without using a wood chip or another lamp to light the second lamp. According to the one who said that Rav’s reason is due to contempt for the mitzva, directly from lamp to lamp he may even light ab initio, as, by lighting another Hanukkah lamp, he does not thereby demean the sanctity of the mitzva because the second lamp is also a mitzva. According to the one who said that Rav’s reason is because he weakens the mitzva, lighting directly from lamp to lamp is also prohibited, as ultimately, he utilizes the mitzva lamp for a task that he could have accomplished with a non-sacred lamp. Rav Avya raised an objection from that which was taught in a Tosefta: A sela of the second tithe, one may not weigh gold dinars with it in order to determine their precise weight. And doing so is prohibited even if he is weighing the coin in order to redeem other second-tithe produce with it, as one may not derive benefit from tithe money. The Gemara discusses this matter: Granted, if you say that when Rav and Shmuel disagree it is with regard to a case when one lights from lamp to lamp, but with a wood chip, Shmuel prohibits lighting, this will not be a conclusive refutation of Shmuel’s opinion. But if you say that he permits lighting from lamp to lamp with a wood chip as well, this would be a conclusive refutation of his opinion, as the Sages did not permit use of and benefit from a sacred object even for the purpose of a similar sacred need. Rabba said: This is not difficult, as in the case of weighing tithe money the Sages prohibited doing so as a decree lest the weights not be precisely equal. One will discover that the weight of the gold dinars is not equal to the weight of the sela that he used to weigh them, and he will reconsider and render them unsanctified, i.e., they will maintain their original, non-sacred status. In that case, he will have used the tithe money for an unsanctified purpose. However, when one lights even a wood chip for the purpose of Hanukkah lights, it is clear that it is for the purpose of performing a mitzva, and there is no reason to issue a decree. Rav Sheshet raised an objection from that which was taught in a baraita. With regard to the Temple candelabrum, it is stated: “Outside the veil of the testimony, in the Tent of Meeting, shall Aaron order it from evening to morning before the Lord continually; it shall be a statute forever throughout your generations” (Leviticus 24:3). It must be understood: And does God require its light for illumination at night? Didn’t the children of Israel, all forty years that they walked in the wilderness, walk exclusively by His light, the pillar of fire? Rather, the lighting of the candelabrum is testimony to mankind that the Divine Presence rests among Israel. The Gemara asks: What is this testimony? Rav said: That is the westernmost lamp in the candelabrum in which the measure of oil placed was the same measure of oil as was placed in the other lamps, and nevertheless he would light the others from it each day and with it he would conclude, i.e., the westernmost lamp would continue burning throughout the day after all the others were extinguished. The rest of the lamps burned only at night, and each night he would relight the rest of the lamps from the westernmost lamp. But isn’t it true that here, in the Temple, since the lamps were fixed in the candelabrum, it was impossible to light directly from lamp to lamp? There was no alternative to taking a wood chip and lighting the rest of the lamps from the westernmost lamp. Consequently, it is difficult both according to the one who said that one may not light from lamp to lamp due to contempt for the mitzva and according to the one who said that one may not light from lamp to lamp due to weakening the mitzva. Rav Pappa explained that it need not necessarily be understood that way. Rather, there were long wicks in the candelabrum, which made it possible to reach and light directly from one lamp to another. However, ultimately, according to the one who said that one may not light from lamp to lamp due to weakening the mitzva, it is difficult. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, the question remains difficult. In summary, the Gemara asks: What is the halakhic conclusion reached about this matter in terms of lighting from lamp to lamp? Rav Huna, son of Rabbi Yehoshua, said: We see; if the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the one who said that kindling the Hanukkah light accomplishes the mitzva and the rest is secondary, one may light from lamp to lamp. The lighting itself is the essence of the mitzva of Hanukkah lights. And if the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the one who said that placing the lit lamp in a suitable place accomplishes the mitzva, then one may not light from lamp to lamp. According to that opinion, lighting is simply an auxiliary action that facilitates the fulfillment of the essence of the mitzva, which is placing the lamp in a place where its light can be seen by the public. Since lighting is merely a preparatory action, one may not demean the mitzva by lighting from lamp to lamp. After the issue of whether lighting accomplishes the mitzva or placing accomplishes the mitzva was raised in the context of the previous discussion, the Gemara cites the discussion in its entirety. As a dilemma was raised before the Sages: In the case of the Hanukkah light, does lighting accomplish the mitzva, and placing the lit lamp is simply a continuation of that action, or does placing the kindled lamp accomplish the mitzva, and lighting is simply a practical necessity that facilitates placing the lamp? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a solution to this dilemma from that which Rava said: One who was holding a burning Hanukkah lamp in his hand and standing, he did nothing in terms of fulfilling the mitzva. Conclude from this that placing accomplishes the mitzva. Until he sets the lamp down in its appropriate place, he did not fulfill the mitzva. The Gemara rejects this: There, they said that he did not fulfill his obligation for a different reason. One who sees it will say that he is not holding the lamp in order to fulfill the mitzva, but he is holding it for his own needs. Since holding the lamp can mislead onlookers, he does not fulfill the mitzva in that manner. Come and hear another resolution for this dilemma from that which Rava said: One who lights the Hanukkah lamp inside the house and then takes it out and places it at the entrance to his house did nothing in terms of fulfilling the mitzva. Granted, if you say that lighting accomplishes the mitzva it is understandable, as lighting in its place is required. That is why Rava ruled that he did nothing in terms of fulfilling the mitzva. However, if you say that placing accomplishes the mitzva, why did Rava rule that he did nothing? Didn’t he set it down in its appropriate place? The Gemara answers: There too, even though he subsequently brought it outside, one who sees him lighting inside will say to himself that he is lighting the lamp for his own needs and not in fulfillment of the mitzva. Come and hear another resolution from that which Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said:
ר' שמעון אומר אפילו נתכוון להרוג את זה והרג את זה פטור: גמ׳..... תא שמע דתניא ר"ש אומר עד שיאמר לפלוני אני מתכוון מאי טעמא דר"ש אמר קרא (דברים יט, יא) וארב לו וקם עליו עד שיתכוון לו
and the blow was powerful enough to kill him were it to land on his chest over his heart, and instead the blow landed on his loins, and it was not powerful enough to kill him when it landed on his loins, and nevertheless the victim died, the assailant is exempt. Although the assailant intended to kill the victim, the blow was not powerful enough to kill. Ostensibly, his death was not a result of the blow. If one intended to kill an adult and the blow was not powerful enough to kill the adult, and instead the blow landed on a minor, and the blow was powerful enough to kill the minor and the minor died, the assailant is exempt. If one intended to kill a minor and the blow was powerful enough to kill a minor, and the blow landed on an adult and the blow was not powerful enough to kill the adult, and nevertheless, the adult died, the assailant is exempt. But if one intended to strike another on his loins, and the blow was powerful enough to kill him were it to land on his loins, and instead the blow landed on his chest over his heart, and he died, the assailant is liable, since in any event, his intent was to kill the victim and the blow was powerful enough to kill him wherever it struck him. If one intended to strike an adult and the blow was powerful enough to kill the adult, and the blow landed on a minor and he died, the assailant is liable. Rabbi Shimon says: Even if one intended to kill this one and he killed that one, although he would be liable for killing either, he is exempt, because one is executed only if his action completely corresponded with his intent. GEMARA: The Gemara asks: With regard to which clause of the mishna does Rabbi Shimon disagree? If we say that he disagrees with the latter clause of the mishna, concerning one who intended to kill an adult and killed a minor, the mishna should have employed the formulation: Rabbi Shimon exempts him, not the extended statement of: Even if one intended to kill this one and he killed that one, he is exempt. Rather, he disagrees with the first clause of the mishna, which states: If one intended to kill an animal, and he killed a person, or he intended to kill a gentile and he killed a Jew, or he intended to kill non-viable newborns and he killed a viable person, the assailant is exempt from execution; and from which it may be inferred: But if one intended to kill this one and he killed that one, the assailant is liable. Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says: Even if one intended to kill this one and he killed that one, he is exempt. The Gemara comments: If Reuven and Shimon were standing, and before throwing the stone or shooting the arrow, the assailant said: I intend to kill Reuven, and I do not intend to kill Shimon, it is obvious that this is the dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon. If the assailant said: I intend to kill one of them, and he did not specify whether it is Reuven or Shimon, what is the halakha? Alternatively, in a case where he intended to kill one whom he thought was Reuven and he killed him and he was found to be Shimon, what is the ruling? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution of this matter, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon says: He is not liable until he says: I intend to kill so-and-so, and he then kills him. The Gemara seeks to clarify the rationale underlying the opinions of the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon, and asks: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? The verse states: “But if there will be a man who hates his neighbor, and he lies in wait for him and rises up against him, and strikes him mortally and he dies” (Deuteronomy 19:11). Based on the repeated use of pronouns in the phrase: “And lies in wait for him and rises up against him,” Rabbi Shimon derives: One is not liable to be executed until he intends to kill specifically him, the actual victim. The Gemara asks: And the Rabbis, what do they derive from the repetitive pronouns in that phrase? The Gemara answers: The Sages of the school of Rabbi Yannai say that one derives: This is to the exclusion of one who casts a stone into the midst of a group of people and one of them is killed. Since he did not intend to kill any specific individual, he is not executed. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If we say that it is a case where there are nine gentiles and one Jew among them, there is no need for a derivation; derive that he is exempt from the fact that they are a majority of gentiles, and based on that majority, the probability is that the stone will strike a gentile. Alternatively, if the group of people comprises half gentiles and half Jews, the principle is that the ruling in a case of uncertainty with regard to cases of capital law is to be lenient, and therefore the one who threw the stone will be exempt from punishment. The Gemara explains: No, it is necessary to have this derivation only in a case where there are nine Jews and one gentile among them, as this is a case where the gentile is a fixed presence in the group, and the principle is: The legal status of any item fixed in its place is like that of an uncertainty that is equally balanced, and one does not follow the majority. This is what the Rabbis derive from the phrase: “And he lies in wait for him” (Deuteronomy 19:11). The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the Rabbis, who say that if one intended to kill this individual and he killed that individual he is liable, there is support for their opinion from that which is written: “If men struggle and they hurt a pregnant woman so that her child departs from her, and there is no tragedy, he shall be punished, as the husband of the woman shall impose upon him, and he shall give as the judges determine” (Exodus 21:22). It can be inferred form the verse that if there is a tragedy, i.e., if the woman dies, there is no payment of restitution. And Rabbi Elazar says: It is with regard to a quarrel that involves the intent of each to cause the death of the other that the verse is speaking, as it is written: “But if there shall be a tragedy then you shall give a life for a life” (Exodus 21:23). This is proof that in a case where one intended to kill one individual and he killed a pregnant woman instead, he is liable to be executed, which is why he does not pay restitution. But according to Rabbi Shimon, this verse: “Then you shall give a life for a life,” what does he do with it? According to his opinion, the party to the quarrel is exempt from the punishment of execution in this case. The Gemara answers: According to Rabbi Shimon, “a life for a life” is not referring to execution; rather, the reference is to monetary restitution. And this understanding is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says that the phrase “then you shall give a life for a life” does not mean execution, but rather monetary restitution for the life that he took. Do you say that it means monetary restitution, or does it mean only the taking of an actual life? Based on the language employed in the verse, it can be determined that the reference is to monetary payment. In these verses, a term of giving is stated below: “And you shall give a life for a life” (Exodus 21:23). And additionally, a term is stated of giving above: “He shall be punished, as the husband of the woman shall impose upon him, and he shall give as the judges determine” (Exodus 21:22). Just as there, in the phrase: “Give as the judges determine,” the reference is to monetary restitution, so too here, in the phrase: “Give a life for a life,” the reference is to monetary restitution. Rava says: That which the school of Ḥizkiyya taught diverges from the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and diverges from the statement of the Rabbis. The school of Ḥizkiyya holds that in the case where one intended to kill one individual and killed another individual, he is exempt from both liability to be executed, counter to the opinion of the Rabbis, and from the obligation to pay monetary restitution. As the school of Ḥizkiyya taught: The verse states: “And he who kills an animal shall pay for it, and he who kills a man shall be put to death” (Leviticus 24:21), indicating that one who kills a man and one who kills an animal are comparable. This teaches that just as with regard to one who kills an animal, the Torah did not differentiate between whether he does so unwittingly or intentionally, whether he acts with intent or with no intent, or whether he strikes in the course of a downward motion or in the course of an upward motion, and this is not to exempt him from paying monetary restitution in all these cases but rather to render him liable to pay monetary restitution, as one who kills an animal is liable in any event; similarly, with regard to one who kills a person, do not differentiate concerning him whether he does so unwittingly or unintentionally, whether he acts with intent or with no intent, or whether he strikes in the course of a downward motion or in the course of an upward motion, and this is not to render him liable to pay monetary restitution for the damage he causes in the process of killing him but rather to exempt him from paying monetary restitution in any event. Accordingly, it is derived from here that one who commits a transgression carrying the death penalty is exempt from paying damages for his action, even if he is not given the death penalty in practice. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of with no intent? If we say that it means that he had no intent to kill at all and he happened to kill a person, that is unwitting murder that is mentioned explicitly in the baraita. Rather, it is obvious that the reference in the baraita is to one who does not intend to kill this individual, but does intend to kill that individual. And it is taught: This is not to render him liable to pay monetary restitution for the damage he causes in the process of killing him but rather to exempt him from paying monetary restitution. And if according to the school of Ḥizkiyya he is liable to be executed, for what reason was it necessary to exempt him from monetary restitution? Clearly the halakha is that one who is executed is exempt from payment. Rather, must one not conclude from it that he is neither liable to be executed, nor is he liable to pay monetary restitution. With regard to liability to be executed in a case where one intended to kill one individual and he killed another, the school of Ḥizkiyya holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon that he is exempt from the death penalty, and holds that he is exempt from paying monetary restitution as well. MISHNA: With regard to a murderer who was intermingled with others and it is not possible to identify the murderer, all of them are exempt from liability to be executed. Rabbi Yehuda says: The court gathers them into the vaulted chamber [lakippa] where they will eventually die. With regard to all those liable to be executed with different court-imposed death penalties who became intermingled with each other and it cannot be determined which individual was sentenced to which death, they are all sentenced to the most lenient form of execution to which any of them was sentenced. In a case where those who are liable to be stoned were intermingled with those who are liable to be burned, Rabbi Shimon says: They are all sentenced to be executed by stoning, as burning is a more severe form of execution than stoning. And the Rabbis say: They are all sentenced to be executed by burning, as stoning is a more severe form of execution than burning. Rabbi Shimon said to the Rabbis: If burning were not more severe than stoning, it would not have been administered to a priest’s daughter who committed adultery. A betrothed daughter of an Israelite who committed adultery is executed by stoning. If burning were not a more severe form of execution than stoning, it would not have been administered to the daughter of a priest who committed adultery, who would presumably receive a more severe punishment. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Shimon: If stoning were not more severe than burning it would not have been the death penalty administered to a blasphemer and to an idol worshipper, as their actions violate the very core of the Jewish faith. There is a parallel dispute: In a case where those who are liable to be killed by beheading were intermingled with those who are liable to be strangled, Rabbi Shimon says: They are all sentenced to be beheaded with a sword, as strangulation is a more severe form of execution than beheading. And the Rabbis say: They are all sentenced to be executed by strangulation, as beheading is a more severe form of execution than strangulation. GEMARA: The mishna teaches the halakha of a murderer who was intermingled with others. The Gemara asks: Who are the others with whom he was intermingled? If we say that the others are upstanding individuals, it is obvious that they are exempt; why would they all be punished for the transgression of one who happened to be among them? And furthermore, shall Rabbi Yehuda say in that case: The court gathers them into the vaulted chamber where they will eventually die? Can innocent people be left to die in this manner? The Gemara cites a mnemonic, beit, shin, reish, kuf, for the Sages who address the above question: Rabbi Abbahu citing Shmuel, Rava, and Reish Lakish. Rabbi Abbahu says that Shmuel says: Here we are dealing with a murderer about whom witnesses testified and the judges deliberated, but his verdict was not yet finalized; and he was incarcerated until the end of his trial, and he was intermingled with other murderers whose verdicts were already finalized. It cannot be determined which of them is the murderer whose verdict was not yet finalized so that he may be brought to court for the verdict. The reason for the dispute is: The Rabbis hold that a court finalizes a person’s verdict only in his presence. Since the identity of the one whose verdict was not finalized is unknown, he cannot be sentenced to death. Since one of them cannot be executed, none of them can be executed; therefore, they are all exempt. And Rabbi Yehuda holds: Completely exempting them is also not possible, since they are murderers. Therefore, the court gathers them into the vaulted chamber. Reish Lakish says: In the case where a person who was accused of killing another was intermingled with others, everyone agrees that they are all exempt, because one is not punished for a murder committed by others. But here, it is with regard to an ox whose verdict for goring a person to death was not yet finalized, that was intermingled with other oxen whose verdict was already finalized, that they disagree. The Rabbis hold that based on the juxtaposition between them (see Exodus 21:29), the halakha is that like the death of the owner, so is the death of the ox, and just as a court finalizes an individual’s verdict only in his presence, a court finalizes the verdict of an ox only in its presence. Therefore, all the oxen are exempt. And Rabbi Yehuda holds that the court gathers them into the vaulted chamber. Since it is an ox that gored, and the other oxen were sentenced to be stoned, they are incarcerated until they die. Rava says:
ת"ר... דר' יהודה לא דריש טעמא דקרא ור"ש דריש טעמא דקרא.
why does one go back and take the collateral again, as the creditor must anyway restore it to the debtor the following day? The Gemara replies: Any loan that is secured by collateral is not canceled by the Sabbatical Year, in contrast to other debts, which are canceled. Therefore, this ensures that the Sabbatical Year should not cancel it. And an additional reason is so that the collateral should not become movable property in the possession of his children, as one generally cannot claim such items from orphans to pay for their father’s debt. The Gemara infers: The reason these exceptions apply is that he goes back and takes it as collateral; but if he did not go back and take it as collateral, these exceptions do not apply. This baraita therefore contradicts the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who held that the initial seizing of collateral is sufficient to grant the creditor full rights to it. Rav Adda bar Mattana said: And did you not resolve this baraita once already by adjusting its wording slightly? Answer it by changing its formulation again in this manner: And since one must return the collateral, why does one take collateral at the outset? It is done so that the Sabbatical Year should not cancel the debt, and so that it should not become movable property in the possession of his children. This version is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, as it teaches that one who has taken collateral even on a single occasion may confiscate it from the debtor’s heirs. § The Sages taught: The verse states: “When you lend your neighbor any manner of loan, you shall not go into his house to take his collateral” (Deuteronomy 24:10). This verse indicates that you may not enter his house, but you may enter the house of a guarantor to take collateral from him. And similarly it states: “Take his garment that is a surety for a stranger” (Proverbs 20:16). And it further states with regard to the same issue: “My son, if you are a guarantor for your neighbor, if you have struck your hands for a stranger, you are ensnared by the words of your mouth; you are caught by the words of your mouth. Do this, now, my son, and deliver yourself, when you have come into the hand of your friend; go humble yourself and strengthen your friend” (Proverbs 6:1–3). This passage in Proverbs is interpreted as follows: The phrase “You are snared by the words of your mouth” is referring to a guarantor who obligated himself to pay or one who upset his friend with his comments. In such a case, one should do the following: If he has money in your hand, “go humble yourself [hitrapes],” which is expounded as: Release for him the palm of your hand [hatter lo pissat yad] to give him his money. And if it is not money that you owe him, but rather you have “become ensnared by the words of your mouth” and owe him an apology for a personal slight, gather together many neighbors through which to seek his forgiveness. The verse “When you lend your neighbor any manner of loan, you shall not go into his house to take his collateral” can be interpreted in a different direction, i.e., in another manner: You may not enter his house to take collateral for the loan, but if he owes wages, you may enter and take collateral for a porter’s wages, for a donkey driver’s wages, for an innkeeper’s payment, or for the wages for one who made drawings [diyokanaot] for him. One might have thought that this applies even if the one owed the money establishes it as a loan for the one who owes the money after he was already liable for such payment. Therefore, the verse states: “Any manner of loan” (Deuteronomy 24:10), which demonstrates that once the debt has been converted into a loan, it is like any other loan, and therefore one may not take collateral against the debtor’s will. mishna With regard to a widow, whether she is poor or whether she is wealthy, one may not take collateral from her, as it is stated: “And you may not take the garment of a widow as collateral” (Deuteronomy 24:17). gemara The Sages taught: With regard to a widow, whether she is poor or whether she is wealthy, one may not take collateral from her. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Shimon says: With regard to a wealthy widow, one may take collateral from her. But with regard to a poor widow, one may not take collateral from her, because you are obligated to return it to her, in accordance with the halakha that the collateral of a poor person must be returned to him whenever he needs it. And since you will be entering every day to return the collateral to her, you will thereby give her a bad name among her neighbors, as they will suspect her of developing an inappropriate relationship with you. By contrast, in the case of a wealthy widow, since there is no obligation to return her collateral, it is permitted to take collateral from her. The Gemara asks: Is this to say that Rabbi Yehuda does not interpret the rationale behind the mitzva in the verse and draw halakhic conclusions based on that interpretation, and Rabbi Shimon does interpret the rationale behind the mitzva in the verse? But haven’t we heard them holding the reverse opinions elsewhere? As it is taught in a mishna (Sanhedrin 21a) concerning the mitzvot of a king: “And he should not multiply wives for himself, that his heart not turn away” (Deuteronomy 17:17). Rabbi Yehuda says: He may accumulate many wives for himself, provided that they are not like those who turn his heart from reverence for God. Rabbi Shimon says: Even one who turns his heart away, he should not marry her. If so, why is it stated: “He shall not multiply wives for himself”? This teaches that even with regard to wives like Abigail, who was righteous and prevented David from sin (see I Samuel chapter 25), he is forbidden to have many. In this case, Rabbi Shimon does not interpret the rationale of the verse, while Rabbi Yehuda does interpret its rationale. The Gemara answers: Actually, Rabbi Yehuda does not generally interpret the rationale of the verse, and it is different here, with regard to a king, as the verse itself specifies the reason: “And he should not multiply wives for himself, that his heart not turn away.” What is the reason that he may not multiply wives for himself? It is because he must ensure that his heart will not turn away. And Rabbi Shimon maintains: Since we generally interpret the rationale in the verse, there is no need for the verse itself to supply the rationale for the prohibition. Let the Merciful One state: “He may not multiply,” and we do not need the Torah to add “that his heart not turn away,” and I would already know the answer to the question: What is the reason that he may not accumulate many wives? It is because of the concern that his heart not turn away. If so, why do I need the phrase “His heart not turn away” that the Merciful One writes? It must certainly be necessary in order to increase the scope of the prohibition: Even if there is one woman who turns his heart away, he may not marry her. Therefore, the verse includes two halakhot: A general stricture against a king’s marrying too many women, and a further halakha that a king may not marry even one woman who will lead him astray. MISHNA: One who takes a millstone as collateral violates a prohibition, and he is liable for taking two vessels, i.e., both millstones in the pair, as it is stated: “He shall not take the lower or upper millstone as collateral” (Deuteronomy 24:6). The tanna adds: Not only did the Sages say that it is prohibited to take the lower or upper millstone as collateral, but they also said that one may not take anything that people use in the preparation of food [okhel nefesh], as it is stated: “For he takes a man’s life [nefesh] as collateral” (Deuteronomy 24:6). GEMARA: Rav Huna says: One who took a lower millstone as collateral is flogged with two sets of lashes: One set is due to violating the prohibition of taking the lower millstone as collateral, and the second is due to: “For he takes a man’s life as collateral,” since he took an item used in the preparation of food. If he took the lower and upper millstone, he is flogged with three sets of lashes: Two sets are due to violating the prohibitions of taking a lower millstone and an upper millstone as collateral, and the third is due to violating the prohibition: “For he takes a man’s life as collateral.” And Rav Yehuda says: If he took a lower millstone as collateral he is flogged with one set of lashes, if he took an upper millstone he is flogged with one set of lashes, and if he took both the lower and upper millstones together as collateral he is flogged with two sets of lashes. With regard to the verse: “For he takes a man’s life as collateral,” it comes to teach about the prohibition against taking as collateral other items used in the preparation of food. § The Gemara suggests: Shall we say that Abaye and Rava, in another dispute, disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of this dispute between Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda concerning the collateral? The Torah commands with regard to the preparation of the Paschal offering: “Do not eat of it raw, nor cooked in water, but roasted with fire, its head with its legs and with the innards thereof” (Exodus 12:9). Abaye and Rava engage in a dispute concerning the case of one who ate the meat when it was not properly roasted. As Rava says: If he ate an olive-bulk of it raw, he is flogged with two sets of lashes. One set of lashes is due to the prohibition: “Do not eat of it raw,” and the other is due to the prohibition: “But roasted with fire.” If he ate an olive-bulk of a Paschal offering that had been cooked, he also is flogged with two sets of lashes: One set of lashes is due to the prohibition against it being cooked in water, and the second is due to the injunction: “But roasted with fire.” If he ate an olive-bulk of both raw meat and cooked meat, he is flogged with three sets of lashes: One set of lashes is due to the prohibition against it being raw, and the second is due to the prohibition against it being cooked, and the third is due to the prohibition: “Do not eat of it…but roasted with fire.” Conversely, Abaye says: The prohibition “Do not eat of it…but roasted with fire” is not referring exclusively to this issue, but includes many cases, and one is not flogged for violating a general prohibition. In this case, Abaye and Rava apparently disagree over the same matter as do Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda. Shall we say that Abaye states his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yehuda, and Rava states his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rav Huna? The Gemara responds: Rava could have said to you: I state my opinion even in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yehuda, as there is a difference between the two cases: Rav Yehuda states his opinion only there, with regard to collateral, because the phrase: “For he takes a man’s life as collateral” (Deuteronomy 24:6), does not itself indicate that the verse is referring to the lower and upper millstones. Rather, it is a general statement, and therefore it comes to teach about the prohibition against taking as collateral other items used in the preparation of food, not to add a prohibition to take as collateral the lower and upper millstones. But here, the phrase “but roasted with fire” comes for what purpose? It excludes only raw or cooked meat, which were already mentioned. Therefore, learn from it that it comes to include another prohibition in addition to those specific directives referring to raw and cooked meat. And Abaye could have said to you: I state my opinion even in accordance with the opinion of Rav Huna. This is because Rav Huna states his opinion only there, with regard to collateral, because the prohibition “For he takes a man’s life as collateral”
פָּתַח רַבִּי יְהוּדָה וְאָמַר: כַּמָּה נָאִים מַעֲשֵׂיהֶן שֶׁל אוּמָּה זוֹ: תִּקְּנוּ שְׁווֹקִים, תִּקְּנוּ גְּשָׁרִים, תִּקְנוּ מֶרְחֲצָאוֹת. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי שָׁתַק. נַעֲנָה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יוֹחַאי וְאָמַר: כׇּל מַה שֶּׁתִּקְּנוּ, לֹא תִּקְּנוּ אֶלָּא לְצוֹרֶךְ עַצְמָן. תִּקְּנוּ שְׁווֹקִין — לְהוֹשִׁיב בָּהֶן זוֹנוֹת, מֶרְחֲצָאוֹת — לְעַדֵּן בָּהֶן עַצְמָן, גְּשָׁרִים — לִיטּוֹל מֵהֶן מֶכֶס. הָלַךְ יְהוּדָה בֶּן גֵּרִים וְסִיפֵּר דִּבְרֵיהֶם, וְנִשְׁמְעוּ לַמַּלְכוּת. אָמְרוּ: יְהוּדָה שֶׁעִילָּה — יִתְעַלֶּה. יוֹסֵי שֶׁשָּׁתַק — יִגְלֶה לְצִיפּוֹרִי. שִׁמְעוֹן שֶׁגִּינָּה — יֵהָרֵג. אֲזַל הוּא וּבְרֵיהּ..... אֲתָא אֵלִיָּהוּ וְקָם אַפִּיתְחָא דִמְעָרְתָּא, אֲמַר: מַאן לוֹדְעֵיהּ לְבַר יוֹחַי דְּמִית קֵיסָר וּבְטִיל גְּזֵירְתֵיהּ. נְפַקוּ, חֲזוֹ אִינָשֵׁי דְּקָא כָּרְבִי וְזָרְעִי, אָמְרִין: מַנִּיחִין חַיֵּי עוֹלָם וְעוֹסְקִין בְּחַיֵּי שָׁעָה. כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁנּוֹתְנִין עֵינֵיהֶן מִיָּד נִשְׂרָף. יָצְתָה בַּת קוֹל וְאָמְרָה לָהֶם: לְהַחֲרִיב עוֹלָמִי יְצָאתֶם?! חִיזְרוּ לִמְעָרַתְכֶם! הֲדוּר אֲזוּל אִיתִּיבוּ תְּרֵיסַר יַרְחֵי שַׁתָּא. אָמְרִי: מִשְׁפַּט רְשָׁעִים בְּגֵיהִנָּם שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר חֹדֶשׁ. יָצְתָה בַּת קוֹל וְאָמְרָה: צְאוּ מִמְּעָרַתְכֶם! נְפַקוּ....
בַּהֲדֵי פַּנְיָא דְּמַעֲלֵי שַׁבְּתָא חֲזוֹ הָהוּא סָבָא דַּהֲוָה נָקֵיט תְּרֵי מַדָּאנֵי אָסָא וְרָהֵיט בֵּין הַשְּׁמָשׁוֹת. אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ: הָנֵי לְמָה לָךְ? אֲמַר לְהוּ: לִכְבוֹד שַׁבָּת. וְתִיסְגֵּי לָךְ בְּחַד! — חַד כְּנֶגֶד ״זָכוֹר״ וְחַד כְּנֶגֶד ״שָׁמוֹר״. אֲמַר לֵיהּ לִבְרֵיהּ: חֲזִי כַּמָּה חֲבִיבִין מִצְוֹת עַל יִשְׂרָאֵל. אִיְּתִיבָה דַּעְתַּיְיהוּ.
who eat and do nothing to support themselves, and cause their husbands to commit the sin of theft. And it is written: “I have smitten you with blight and mildew; the multitude of your gardens and your vineyards and your fig trees and your olive trees has the palmerworm devoured” (Amos 4:9). And it is written: “That which the palmerworm has left the locust has eaten; and that which the locust has left the cankerworm has eaten; and that which the cankerworm has left the caterpillar has eaten” (Joel 1:4). And it is written: “And one snatches on the right hand, and is hungry; and he eats on the left hand, and is not satisfied; they eat every man the flesh of his own arm [besar zero’o]” (Isaiah 9:19). Do not read it: The flesh of his own arm [besar zero’o]; rather, the flesh of his own offspring [besar zaro]. All the punishments for theft listed above were explicitly mentioned in the verses. Furthermore, the Sages said that due to the sin of delay of justice, i.e., judges delay issuing their rulings due to personal considerations, and for distortion of justice, i.e., judges intentionally distort their verdicts, and for miscarriage of justice that results from negligence, and for dereliction in the study of Torah, violence and looting abound in the world, and pestilence and famine come, and people eat and are not sated, and they eat their bread measured by weight. As it is written: “And I will bring a sword upon you, that shall execute the vengeance of the covenant; and you shall be gathered together within your cities; and I will send the pestilence among you; and you shall be delivered into the hand of the enemy” (Leviticus 26:25). And covenant means nothing other than Torah, as it is stated: “If My covenant be not with day and night, if I have not appointed the ordinances of heaven and earth” (Jeremiah 33:25). The study of Torah is the mitzva practiced both day and night. And it is written with regard to this punishment: “When I break your staff of bread, ten women shall bake your bread in one oven, and they shall deliver your bread again by weight; and ye shall eat, and not be satisfied” (Leviticus 26:26). And it is written: “Even because they rejected My ordinances, and their soul abhorred My statutes” (Leviticus 26:43). All of these punishments result from breaching the covenant of the Torah and the perversion of justice. Due to the sin of an oath taken in vain and a false oath, and desecration of God’s name, and desecration of Shabbat, wild beasts abound in the world, and domesticated animals cease to exist, and human beings decrease in number, and the roads become desolate, as it is stated: “And if in spite of these [be’eleh] things you will not be corrected unto Me, but will walk contrary unto Me casually” (Leviticus 26:23). Do not read of these [be’eleh]; rather, due to a vain oath [be’ala]. And it is written that the punishment for this is: “And I will send the beast of the field among you, which shall rob you of your children, and destroy your cattle, and make you few in number; and your ways shall become desolate” (Leviticus 26:22). And it is written with regard to a false oath: “And you shall not swear by My name falsely, so that you desecrate [veḥillalta] the name of your God: I am the Lord” (Leviticus 19:12). And it is written with regard to desecrating the name of God: “And you shall not desecrate [teḥallelu] My Holy Name” (Leviticus 22:32). And it is written with regard to desecrating Shabbat: “Every one that desecrates it [meḥaleleha] shall surely be put to death” (Exodus 31:14). And derive by means of a verbal analogy [gezera shava] desecration [ḥillul] of Shabbat from desecration [ḥillul] of a false oath. Just as punishment for a false oath is desolation and wild beasts, one receives the same punishment for desecrating Shabbat and the name of God. Due to the sin of bloodshed, the Holy Temple is destroyed, and the Divine Presence leaves Israel, as it says: “So you shall not pollute the land wherein you are; for blood, it pollutes the land; and no expiation can be made for the land for the blood that is shed therein, but by the blood of him that shed it. And you shall not defile the land which you inhabit, in the midst of which I dwell; for I the Lord dwell in the midst of the children of Israel” (Numbers 35:33–34). However, if you defile the land, you will not inhabit it, and I will not dwell in it. Due to the sin of prohibited sexual relations, and idol worship, and failure to let the land lie fallow during the Sabbatical and Jubilee Years, exile comes to the world and they exile the Jewish people from their land, and others come and settle in their place. As it is stated with regard to illicit sexual relations: “For all these abominations have the men of the land done, that were before you, and the land is defiled; that the land expel not you also, when you defile it, as it expelled the nation that was before you” (Leviticus 18:27–28). And it is written: “And the land was defiled, therefore I did visit the iniquity thereof upon it, and the land expelled her inhabitants” (Leviticus 18:25). And it is written: “That the land expel not you also, when you defile it, as it expelled the nation that was before you.” And with regard to idol worship it is written: “And I will cast your carcasses upon the carcasses of your idols” (Leviticus 26:30). And it is written: “And I will bring your sanctuaries unto desolation, and I will not smell the savor of your sweet odors” (Leviticus 26:31). “And you will I scatter among the nations, and I will draw out the sword after you; and your land shall be a desolation, and your cities shall be a waste” (Leviticus 26:33). With regard to the sin of failure to observe the Sabbatical and Jubilee Years it is written: “Then shall the land be paid her Sabbaths, as long as it lies desolate, and you are in your enemies’ land; even then shall the land rest, and repay her Sabbaths” (Leviticus 26:34). And it is written: “As long as it lies desolate it shall have rest; even the rest which it had not in your Sabbaths, when you dwelt upon it” (Leviticus 26: 35). Due to the sin of vulgar speech, troubles abound, and harsh decrees are renewed, and the youth among the enemies of Israel, a euphemistic reference to Israel, die, and orphans and widows cry out for help and are not answered, as it is stated: “Therefore the Lord shall have no joy in their young men, neither shall He have compassion on their fatherless and widows; for everyone is ungodly and an evildoer, and every mouth speaks wantonness. For all this His anger is not turned away, but His hand is stretched out still” (Isaiah 9:16). The Gemara explains: What is the meaning of the phrase: But His hand is stretched out still? Rabbi Ḥanan bar Rava said: Everybody knows why the bride enters the wedding canopy. There is no secret revealed. Nevertheless, anyone who speaks vulgarly about it, even if they, on High, sealed for him a decree of seventy years of good fortune, they will reverse it to bad fortune because of this sin. And Rabba bar Sheila said that Rav Ḥisda said: Anyone who speaks vulgarly, they deepen Gehenna for him, as it is stated: “The mouth that speaks perversity is a deep pit: he that is abhorred of the Lord shall fall therein” (Proverbs 22:14), i.e., Gehenna is deepened for one who speaks vulgarly. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Even one who hears vulgar speech and is silent is punished, as it is stated: “He that is abhorred of the Lord shall fall therein,” even if he himself does not speak at all. And in a similar vein, Rav Oshaya said: Anyone who prepares himself to commit a sin, wounds and bruises emerge on him, as it is stated: “Sharp wounds for one devoted to evil; so do stripes that reach the inward parts” (Proverbs 20:30). And not only that, but he is sentenced to suffer from the disease of edema [hidrokan], as it is stated: So do stripes that reach the inward parts. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: A sign indicating one who committed a sin is the disease hidrokan, which afflicts the inner parts. The Sages taught in a baraita: There are three types of hidrokan: The one that comes as punishment for sin is thick; and that which is the result of hunger is swollen, but not as thick; and the one caused by witchcraft is thin, and the flesh of the sick person becomes thin in other places. The Gemara relates: Shmuel HaKatan fell ill with hidrokan. He said: Master of the Universe, who will draw lots, meaning, who will be able to determine that this hidrokan is not the consequence of sin? He was cured. Abaye also fell ill with hidrokan. Rava testified and said about him: I know about Naḥmani, Abaye, that he starves himself and that his hidrokan is the result of hunger. The Gemara relates that Rava fell ill with hidrokan, and they asked: But Rava did not starve himself, and there is no reason to suspect him of sin, and we cannot say that he contracted hidrokan because he did not relieve himself on time. Rava knew to relieve himself, as it is he who said: More have been killed due to the chamber pot, because they were not careful about relieving themselves in a timely manner, than those swollen due to starvation. The Gemara answers: Rava is different because the Sages compel him to remain in place against his will while he lectures. Since he could not relieve himself, he became sick with hidrokan. On a related note, the Sages taught in a baraita that there are four signs: A sign of sin is hidrokan, a sign of gratuitous hatred is jaundice, a sign of arrogance is poverty, and a sign of slander is askara. The Sages taught: Askara comes to the world as punishment for neglecting to separate tithes. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, says: Askara comes as punishment for slander. Rava said, and some say that it was Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi who said it: What is the verse that alludes to this? “But the king shall rejoice in God; every one that swears by Him shall glory; for the mouth of them that speak lies shall be stopped” (Psalms 63:12). The punishment for lying is that the mouth will be stopped. Askara affects the mouth along with other parts of the body. A dilemma was raised before those who were sitting in the study hall: Did Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, say that askara comes as punishment only for slander, or perhaps he said it was also for slander? Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from that which was taught in a baraita: When our Sages entered the vineyard in Yavne, Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, and Rabbi Shimon were there, and a question was asked before them with regard to this plague of askara: Why does it begin in the intestines and end in the mouth? Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ila’i, who was the head of the speakers in every place, responded and said: Even though the kidneys advise, and the heart understands, and the tongue shapes the voice that emerges from the mouth, still, the mouth completes the formation of the voice. Therefore, the disease begins in the same place that slander begins and it ends in the mouth. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, responded and said: This disease ends in the mouth because one eats with it non-kosher things. They immediately wondered about this: Does it enter your mind to say that askara is caused by eating non-kosher food? Are those who eat non-kosher food so numerous? Rather, it comes as a punishment for eating foods that were not ritually prepared, i.e., were not tithed. Rabbi Shimon responded and said: This disease comes as a punishment for the sin of dereliction in the study of Torah. They said to him: Women will prove that dereliction in the study of Torah is not the cause, as they are not obligated to study Torah and, nevertheless, they contract askara. He answered them: They are punished because they cause their husbands to be idle from the study of Torah. They said to him: Gentiles will prove that this is not the cause, as they also contract askara even though they are not obligated to study Torah. He answered them: They are also punished because they cause Israel to be idle from the study of Torah. They said to him: Children will prove that this is not the cause, for they are not at all obligated to study Torah and they also suffer from askara. He answered them: They are punished because they cause their fathers to be idle from the study of Torah. They said to him: School children will prove that this is not the cause, as they study Torah and, nevertheless, they suffer from askara. The Gemara answers: There, it must be understood in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Guryon, as Rabbi Guryon said, and some say that it was Rav Yosef, son of Rabbi Shemaya, who said it: At a time when there are righteous people in the generation, the righteous are seized, i.e., they die or suffer, for the sins of the generation. If there are no righteous people in the generation, school children, who are also without sin, are seized for the sins of the generation. Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Ze’iri said, and some say that Rabbi Shimon ben Nezira said: What is the verse that alludes to this? “If you know not, you fairest among women, go your way forth by the footsteps of the flock and feed your kids, beside the shepherds’ tents [mishkenot]” (Song of Songs 1:8). And we say in explanation of this verse: They are the lambs that are taken as collateral [hamemushkanin], which is etymologically similar to the word mishkenot, in place of the shepherds. If the shepherds and leaders of the generation corrupt the multitudes, young children die because of their sins. With regard to the dilemma, conclude from it that Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, said that the illness of askara also results from slander, as the baraita provides an additional cause of the illness. The Gemara comments: Indeed, conclude from it. In this baraita Rabbi Yehuda is described as head of the speakers in every place. The Gemara asks: And why did they call him head of the speakers in every place? The Gemara relates that this resulted due to an incident that took place when Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon were sitting, and Yehuda, son of converts, sat beside them. Rabbi Yehuda opened and said: How pleasant are the actions of this nation, the Romans, as they established marketplaces, established bridges, and established bathhouses. Rabbi Yosei was silent. Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai responded and said: Everything that they established, they established only for their own purposes. They established marketplaces, to place prostitutes in them; bathhouses, to pamper themselves; and bridges, to collect taxes from all who pass over them. Yehuda, son of converts, went and related their statements to his household, and those statements continued to spread until they were heard by the monarchy. They ruled and said: Yehuda, who elevated the Roman regime, shall be elevated and appointed as head of the Sages, the head of the speakers in every place. Yosei, who remained silent, shall be exiled from his home in Judea as punishment, and sent to the city of Tzippori in the Galilee. And Shimon, who denounced the government, shall be killed. Rabbi Shimon bar Yoḥai and his son, Rabbi Elazar, went and hid in the study hall. Every day Rabbi Shimon’s wife would bring them bread and a jug of water and they would eat. When the decree intensified, Rabbi Shimon said to his son: Women are easily impressionable and, therefore, there is room for concern lest the authorities torture her and she reveal our whereabouts. They went and they hid in a cave. A miracle occurred and a carob tree was created for them as well as a spring of water. They would remove their clothes and sit covered in sand up to their necks. They would study Torah all day in that manner. At the time of prayer, they would dress, cover themselves, and pray, and they would again remove their clothes afterward so that they would not become tattered. They sat in the cave for twelve years. Elijah the Prophet came and stood at the entrance to the cave and said: Who will inform bar Yoḥai that the emperor died and his decree has been abrogated? They emerged from the cave, and saw people who were plowing and sowing. Rabbi Shimon bar Yoḥai said: These people abandon eternal life of Torah study and engage in temporal life for their own sustenance. The Gemara relates that every place that Rabbi Shimon and his son Rabbi Elazar directed their eyes was immediately burned. A Divine Voice emerged and said to them: Did you emerge from the cave in order to destroy My world? Return to your cave. They again went and sat there for twelve months. They said: The judgment of the wicked in Gehenna lasts for twelve months. Surely their sin was atoned in that time. A Divine Voice emerged and said to them: Emerge from your cave. They emerged. Everywhere that Rabbi Elazar would strike, Rabbi Shimon would heal. Rabbi Shimon said to Rabbi Elazar: My son, you and I suffice for the entire world, as the two of us are engaged in the proper study of Torah. As the sun was setting on Shabbat eve, they saw an elderly man who was holding two bundles of myrtle branches and running at twilight. They said to him: Why do you have these? He said to them: In honor of Shabbat. They said to him: And let one suffice. He answered them: One is corresponding to: “Remember the Shabbat day, to keep it holy” (Exodus 20:8), and one is corresponding to: “Observe the Shabbat day, to keep it holy” (Deuteronomy 5:12). Rabbi Shimon said to his son: See how beloved the mitzvot are to Israel. Their minds were put at ease and they were no longer as upset that people were not engaged in Torah study. Rabbi Pineḥas ben Ya’ir, Rabbi Shimon’s son-in-law, heard and went out to greet him. He brought him into the bathhouse and began tending to his flesh. He saw that Rabbi Shimon had cracks in the skin on his body. He was crying, and the tears fell from his eyes and caused Rabbi Shimon pain. Rabbi Pineḥas said to Rabbi Shimon, his father-in-law: Woe is me, that I have seen you like this. Rabbi Shimon said to him: Happy are you that you have seen me like this, as had you not seen me like this, you would not have found in me this prominence in Torah, as the Gemara relates: At first, when Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai would raise a difficulty, Rabbi Pineḥas ben Ya’ir would respond to his question with twelve answers. Ultimately, when Rabbi Pineḥas ben Ya’ir would raise a difficulty, Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai would respond with twenty-four answers. Rabbi Shimon said: Since a miracle transpired for me, I will go and repair something for the sake of others in gratitude for God’s kindness, as it is written: “And Jacob came whole to the city of Shechem, which is in the land of Canaan, when he came from Paddan-aram; and he graced the countenance of the city” (Genesis 33:18). Rav said, the meaning of: And Jacob came whole, is: Whole in his body, whole in his money, whole in his Torah. And what did he do? And he graced the countenance of the city; he performed gracious acts to benefit the city. Rav said: Jacob established a currency for them. And Shmuel said: He established marketplaces for them. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: He established bathhouses for them. In any event, clearly one for whom a miracle transpires should perform an act of kindness for his neighbors as a sign of gratitude. He said: Is there something that needs repair? They said to him: There is a place where there is uncertainty with regard to ritual impurity
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״וְאָסַפְתָּ דְגָנֶךָ״ מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר? — לְפִי שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״לֹא יָמוּשׁ סֵפֶר הַתּוֹרָה הַזֶּה מִפִּיךָ״ — יָכוֹל דְּבָרִים כִּכְתָבָן, תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְאָסַפְתָּ דְגָנֶךָ״ — הַנְהֵג בָּהֶן מִנְהַג דֶּרֶךְ אֶרֶץ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יוֹחַאי אוֹמֵר: אֶפְשָׁר אָדָם חוֹרֵשׁ בִּשְׁעַת חֲרִישָׁה, וְזוֹרֵעַ בִּשְׁעַת זְרִיעָה, וְקוֹצֵר בִּשְׁעַת קְצִירָה, וְדָשׁ בִּשְׁעַת דִּישָׁה, וְזוֹרֶה בִּשְׁעַת הָרוּחַ, תּוֹרָה מַה תְּהֵא עָלֶיהָ? אֶלָּא בִּזְמַן שֶׁיִּשְׂרָאֵל עוֹשִׂין רְצוֹנוֹ שֶׁל מָקוֹם — מְלַאכְתָּן נַעֲשֵׂית עַל יְדֵי אֲחֵרִים, ... וּבִזְמַן שֶׁאֵין יִשְׂרָאֵל עוֹשִׂין רְצוֹנוֹ שֶׁל מָקוֹם — מְלַאכְתָּן נַעֲשֵׂית עַל יְדֵי עַצְמָן, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְאָסַפְתָּ דְגָנֶךָ״... אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הַרְבֵּה עָשׂוּ כְּרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, וְעָלְתָה בְּיָדָן. כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יוֹחַי, וְלֹא עָלְתָה בְּיָדָן.
MISHNA: This mishna discusses the blessings recited over various foods. How does one recite a blessing over fruits? Over different fruits that grow on a tree one recites: Who creates fruit of the tree, with the exception of wine. Although wine is produced from fruit of the tree, due to its significance, its blessing differs from other fruits of the tree. Over wine one recites: Who creates fruit of the vine. Over fruits that grow from the earth, one recites: Who creates fruit of the ground, with the exception of bread. Bread, too, is significant and its blessing differs from other fruits of the ground, as over bread one recites: Who brings forth bread from the earth. Over herbs and leafy vegetables one recites: Who creates fruit of the ground. Rabbi Yehuda says that there is room to distinguish between fruits that grow from the earth, herbs, and leafy vegetables. Although they are all fruit of the ground, since they have different qualities, the blessing on the latter is: Who creates various kinds of herbs. GEMARA: Concerning the fundamental basis for blessings, the Gemara asks: From where are these matters, the obligation to recite a blessing before eating, derived? The Gemara answers: As the Sages taught in the Sifra: With regard to saplings, it is stated that in their fourth year their fruit will be: “…sanctified for praises before the Lord” (Leviticus 19:24). This verse teaches that they require praise of God in the form of a blessing both beforehand and thereafter, as the verse says praises in the plural. From here, Rabbi Akiva said: A person is forbidden to taste anything before he recites a blessing, as without reciting praise over food, it has the status of a consecrated item, from which one is forbidden to derive pleasure. The Gemara asks: And did this verse: “Sanctified for praises,” come for that purpose? This verse is necessary to derive other matters. One being that the Merciful One said: Redeem it and then eat it. This midrash interprets hillul, praise, as ḥillul, redemption. And the other matter derived from this verse is: An object which is offered upon the altar and requires a song of praise when it is offered, as is the case with the libation of wine, requires redemption. And that which does not require a song of praise, all other fruits, does not require redemption. And this is in accordance with the opinion that Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that Rabbi Yonatan said, as Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that Rabbi Yonatan said: From where is it derived that one only recites a song of praise in the Temple over the libation of wine on the altar? As it is stated: “And the vine replied: Should I leave my wine, which gladdens God and man, and go and wave above the trees?” (Judges 9:13). If wine gladdens people, in what way does it gladden God? Rather, derive from here that one only recites a song of praise over wine, as wine gladdens God when offered as part of the service in the Temple.In any case, other halakhot have been derived from this verse. From where, then, is the requirement to recite blessings derived? Indeed, this works out well according to the one who taught, as a rule: A fourth-year sapling in the mishnayot dealing with the prohibition to eat fruits produced during the first three years of a tree’s existence and the sanctity of the fruit produced in its fourth year; as, in his opinion, fourth-year fruits that grow on all trees must be redeemed. However, according to the one who taught, as a rule: A fourth-year grapevine, what can be said? Indeed, he derives the halakha that only wine that is accompanied by a song of praise requires redemption, from the interpretation of hillul as ḥillul. As it was stated: Rabbi Ḥiyya and Rabbi Shimon, son of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, one taught these mishnayot using the term: A fourth-year grapevine, and one taught using the term: A fourth-year sapling. And according to the one who taught: A fourth year grapevine, this works out well if he derives this matter from a verbal analogy [gezera shava], and therefore need not derive this halakha from the term hillulim. As it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: It is stated here with regard to the laws of the prohibition of fruit for the tree’s first three years: “But in the fifth year you may eat its fruit, so that it may increase your produce [tevuato]; I am the Lord your God” (Leviticus 19:25). And it is stated below, with regard to the laws of diverse kinds: “You shall not sow your vineyard with two kinds of seed, lest the growth of the seed that you have sown be forfeited with the produce [utevuat] of the vineyard” (Deuteronomy 22:9). Based on a verbal analogy, it can be derived: Just as below, with regard to the laws of diverse kinds, the produce is that which grows in vineyards; so too, here, with regard to the halakhot of the fruits of a sapling, the produce is that which grows in vineyards. Consequently, according to the one who holds this verbal analogy, one extra hillul remains from which to derive the blessing. Since he derives that the laws of fourth-year saplings apply only to grapes from the verbal analogy, he can derive the requirement to recite blessings before partaking of food from the word hillulim. And if he does not derive this halakha by means of a verbal analogy, he must derive this halakha from the term hillulim, in which case, from where does he derive the mitzva to recite a blessing before partaking of food? And even if he derives this halakha by means of a verbal analogy, we found a source for the obligation to recite a blessing after eating, similar to the obligation stated in the verse: “And you will eat and be satisfied and then you shall bless.” However, from where is it derived that there is an obligation to recite a blessing beforehand? From one hillul, the fundamental halakha of redemption of fourth-year saplings is derived. The Gemara answers this: This is not difficult, as it may be derived by means of an a fortiori inference: If when he is satiated, after eating, he is obligated to recite a blessing over food, when he is hungry, before eating, all the more so that he is obligated to recite a blessing over food. The Gemara comments: In that way, we found a source for the obligation to recite a blessing over the produce of vineyards, but from where is it derived with regard to other types of produce? The Gemara responds: It is derived by means of the hermeneutic principle: What do we find, from the produce of a vineyard: Just as the fruit of the vineyard is an item from which one derives benefit and it requires a blessing, so too, any item from which one derives benefit, requires a blessing. The Gemara rejects this proof: This derivation can be refuted, as a vineyard is unique: What is unique about a vineyard, that it is obligated in the mitzva requiring to give small, incomplete clusters of grapes [olelot] to the poor? That is a stringency that does not apply to other fruits. Perhaps the blessing is also a stringency that applies only to grapes. The Gemara answers: In that case, standing grain can prove that the halakha of olelot is not a factor in the obligation to recite a blessing. One is obligated by Torah law to recite a blessing after eating bread, even though the halakha of olelot does not apply to grain. The Gemara rejects this proof: What is unique about ripe grain, that it is obligated in the mitzva of separating ḥalla from the dough? That is a stringency that does not apply to other foods. Perhaps the blessing is also a stringency that applies only to grain. The Gemara responds: In that regard, vineyards can prove that the halakha of ḥalla is not a factor in the obligation to recite a blessing. In summary: And the derivation has reverted to its starting point. However, at this point the halakha is derived from a combination of the two sources: The aspect of this is not like the aspect of that, and the aspect of that is not like the aspect of this; the common denominator is: Both are items from which one derives benefit and each requires a blessing. A general principle may be derived: So too, any item from which one derives benefit, requires a blessing. Again, the Gemara objects: What is unique about the common denominator between grapes and grain that prevents utilizing it as a paradigm for other food items? Grapes and grain have an aspect of being offered upon the altar, and perhaps that is the reason that they require blessings. Based on that reasoning, although all other food items cannot be derived from the common denominator, an olive may also be derived as it too has an aspect of being offered upon the altar, as olive oil is one of the components of a meal offering. The Gemara questions this point: Is an olive derived from the fact that it has an aspect of being offered upon the altar? Isn’t it written explicitly with regard to the olive listed that the orchard in which it grows is called kerem; as it is written: “And burnt up from the shocks and the standing grain and the olive yards [kerem zayit]” (Judges 15:5)? Just as the orchard in which grapes grow is called kerem, and grapes require a blessing, the olive also grows in a kerem and should require a blessing. Rav Pappa said: Nevertheless, an analogy may not be drawn between the two; where the olive grows is called kerem zayit, it is not called kerem unmodified, which is a term reserved for grapevines. The Gemara returns to the issue at hand, noting that in any case, it is difficult: What is unique about the common denominator between grapes and grain? That they possess an aspect of being offered upon the altar. Rather, it is derived from the obligation to recite a blessing upon the seven species. After the verse speaks of the seven species, it states: “And you will eat and be satisfied and then you shall bless.” This is a paradigm for all other foods, that they too require a blessing: Just as the seven species are items from which one derives benefit and require a blessing, any item from which one derives benefit, requires a blessing. Again, the Gemara rejects this: What is unique about the seven species? That one is obligated in the mitzva of first fruits. However, other produce with regard to which one is not obligated in the mitzva of first fruits, from where is it derived that they require a blessing? Furthermore, even if the seven species can serve as a paradigm, this works out well with regard to the blessing thereafter; but from where is the obligation to recite a blessing beforehand derived? The Gemara responds to the question: This is not difficult, as it may be derived by means of an a fortiori inference: If when he is satiated, after eating, he is obligated to recite a blessing over food, when he is hungry, before eating, all the more so he is obligated to recite a blessing over food. In any case, this is not an absolute proof. Furthermore, even according to the one who taught: A fourth-year sapling in all the relevant mishnayot, it works out well with regard to everything that can be planted, that one is obligated to recite a blessing. However, with regard to items that cannot be planted, such as meat, eggs, and fish, from where does he derive the halakha that one is obligated to recite a blessing? Rather, all previous attempts at deriving this halakha are rejected. The fundamental obligation to recite a blessing over food is founded on reason: One is forbidden to derive benefit from this world without a blessing. The Sages taught in a Tosefta: One is forbidden to derive benefit from this world, which is the property of God, without reciting a blessing beforehand. And anyone who derives benefit from this world without a blessing, it is as if he is guilty of misuse of a consecrated object. The Gemara adds: What is his remedy? He should go to a Sage. The Gemara is puzzled: He should go to a Sage; what will he do to him? How can the Sage help after he has already violated a prohibition? Rather, Rava said, this is how it should be understood: He should go to a Sage initially, in his youth, and the Sage will teach him blessings, so that he will not come to be guilty of this type of misuse of a consecrated object in the future. Similarly, Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: One who derives benefit from this world without a blessing, it is as if he enjoyed objects consecrated to the heavens, as it is stated: “The earth and all it contains is the Lord’s, the world and all those who live in it” (Psalms 24:1). Rabbi Levi expressed this concept differently. Rabbi Levi raised a contradiction: It is written: “The earth and all it contains is the Lord’s,” and it is written elsewhere: “The heavens are the Lord’s and the earth He has given over to mankind” (Psalms 115:16). There is clearly a contradiction with regard to whom the earth belongs. He himself resolves the contradiction: This is not difficult. Here, the verse that says that the earth is the Lord’s refers to the situation before a blessing is recited, and here, where it says that He gave the earth to mankind refers to after a blessing is recited. Rabbi Ḥanina bar Pappa said: Anyone who derives benefit from this world without a blessing, it is as if he stole from God and the community of Israel, as it is stated: “Whoever robs his father and his mother and says: It is no transgression, he is the companion of a destroyer” (Proverbs 28:24). The phrase, his father, refers to none other than God, as it is stated: “Is He not your Father Who created you, Who made you and established you” (Deuteronomy 32:6). The phrase his mother refers to none other than the community of Israel, as it is stated: “Hear, my son, the discipline of your father, and do not forsake the Torah of your mother” (Proverbs 1:8). The mention of the Torah as emanating from the mouth of the mother, apparently means that your mother is the community of Israel. What is the meaning of the continuation of the verse: He is the companion of a destroyer? Rabbi Ḥanina bar Pappa said: He is a companion of Jeroboam ben Nevat, who corrupted Israel before their Father in heaven by sinning and causing others to sin. On a similar note, the Gemara cites that Rabbi Ḥanina bar Pappa raised a contradiction: It is written, “I will take back My grain at its time and wine in its season” (Hosea 2:11), and it is written: “And you shall gather your grain, your wine and your oil” (Deuteronomy 11:14). To whom does the grain belong: To God, or to the people? The Gemara responds: This is not difficult. Here, where God promises Israel that they will gather their grain, the verse refers to a time when they perform God’s will. Here, where the verse indicates that the grain belongs to God, it refers to a time when they do not perform God’s will, as then He will take back the grain, demonstrating that it belongs to Him. The Sages taught: What is the meaning of that which the verse states: “And you shall gather your grain”? Because it is stated: “This Torah shall not depart from your mouths, and you shall contemplate in it day and night” (Joshua 1:8), I might have thought that these matters are to be understood as they are written; one is to literally spend his days immersed exclusively in Torah study. Therefore, the verse states: “And you shall gather your grain, your wine and your oil,” assume in their regard, the way of the world; set aside time not only for Torah, but also for work. This is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai says: Is it possible that a person plows in the plowing season and sows in the sowing season and harvests in the harvest season and threshes in the threshing season and winnows in the windy season, as grain is separated from the chaff by means of the wind, and is constantly busy; what will become of Torah? Rather, one must dedicate himself exclusively to Torah at the expense of other endeavors; as when Israel performs God’s will, their work is performed by others, as it is stated: “And strangers will stand and feed your flocks, and foreigners will be your plowmen and your vinedressers” (Isaiah 61:5). When Israel does not perform God’s will, their work is performed by them themselves, as it is stated: “And you shall gather your grain.” Moreover, if Israel fails to perform God’s will, others’ work will be performed by them, as it is stated: “You shall serve your enemy whom God shall send against you, in hunger, in thirst, in nakedness and in want of all things” (Deuteronomy 28:48). Summing up this dispute, Abaye said: Although there is room for both opinions, many have acted in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, and combined working for a living and learning Torah, and although they engaged in activities other than the study of Torah, were successful in their Torah study. Many have acted in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai and were not successful in their Torah study. They were ultimately forced to abandon their Torah study altogether. Similarly, Rava said to the Sages who would attend his study hall: I implore you; during the months of Nisan and Tishrei, the crucial agricultural periods, do not appear before me. Engage in your agricultural work then so that you will not be preoccupied with your sustenance all year. Summarizing these statements, Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of the tanna Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi El’ai: Come and see that the latter generations are not like the earlier generations; rather they are their inferiors. The earlier generations made their Torah permanent and their work occasional, and this, Torah study, and that, their work, were successful for them. However, the latter generations who made their work permanent and their Torah occasional, neither this nor that was successful for them. Along these lines, Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi El’ai: Come and see that the latter generations are not like the earlier generations. In the earlier generations, people would bring their fruits into their courtyards through the main gate in order to obligate them in tithes. However, the latter generations bring their fruits through roofs, through courtyards and through enclosed courtyards, avoiding the main gate in order to exempt them from the mitzva of tithing. As Rabbi Yannai said: Untithed produce is not obligated in the mitzva of tithing until it sees the front of the house through which people enter and exit, and it is brought into the house that way as it is stated in the formula of the confession of the tithes: “I have removed the consecrated from the house” (Deuteronomy 26:13), as the obligation to tithe produce whose purpose has not yet been designated takes effect only when it is brought into the house. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even bringing it into the courtyard determines its status as having completed the production process and obligates the produce to be tithed, as it is written in the confession of the tithes: “And I have given to the Levite, the stranger, the orphan and the widow, and they shall eat in your gates and be satisfied” (Deuteronomy 26:12). We learned in our mishna: Over fruits that grow on a tree one recites: Who creates fruit of the tree, with the exception of wine that even though it originates from fruit of the tree, a separate blessing was established for it: Who creates the fruit of the vine. The Gemara asks: What is different about wine, that a separate blessing was established for it? If you say that because the fruit changed for the better into wine, therefore, the blessing changed. Olive oil changed for the better and nevertheless, its blessing did not change. As Rabbi Yehuda said that Shmuel said, and so too Rabbi Yitzḥak said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Over olive oil, one recites: Who creates fruit of the tree, just as he does over the fruit itself. The Sages said: There, in the case of oil, it is because it is impossible to find an appropriate blessing, as how shall we recite the blessing? If we recite the blessing: Who creates fruit of the olive, the fruit itself is called olive and that is what was created. The oil is a man-made product of that fruit, rendering that formula inappropriate. Similarly, reciting a formula parallel to the blessing on wine: Who creates the fruit of the vine, is inappropriate as the grapes themselves are the fruit that was created, as opposed to oil which was not. The Gemara challenges: Nevertheless, it is still possible to formulate a blessing, as we may recite the blessing: Who creates fruit of the olive tree, which would be parallel to the blessing recited over wine. Rather, Mar Zutra offered a different rationale: The reason that no separate blessing was established over oil is because, as opposed to wine that nourishes, oil does not nourish. The Gemara asks: And oil does not nourish? Didn’t we learn in a mishna: One who vows that nourishment is forbidden to him is permitted to eat water and salt, as they are not considered nourishment. And we discussed this halakha: By inference, water and salt are not considered nourishment, but all other edible items are considered nourishment. Let us say that this is a conclusive refutation of Rav and Shmuel, who said: One only recites: Who creates various kinds of nourishment, over the five species of grain alone, as they alone are considered nourishing. And Rav Huna said as a solution that this mishna referred to a case where he vows and says: Anything that nourishes is prohibited to me. That formula includes anything that is at all nourishing and therefore only water and salt are excluded. Olive oil is not excluded. Apparently, oil nourishes. Rather, there is another distinction between wine and oil: Wine satisfies, oil does not satisfy. Wine not only nourishes, but it is also filling. The Gemara asks: And does wine satisfy? Wouldn’t Rava drink wine all day on the eve of Passover in order to stimulate his heart, i.e., whet his appetite so that he might eat more matza at the seder? Wine does not satisfy, it whets the appetite. The Gemara answers: A lot of wine stimulates, a little satisfies. Again, the Gemara asks: Does wine satisfy at all? Isn’t it written: “Wine gladdens the heart of man, making the face brighter than oil, and bread fills man’s heart” (Psalms 104:15); bread is that which satisfies, wine does not satisfy. Rather, this verse is not a proof; wine has two advantages, it satisfies and gladdens. Bread, however, satisfies but does not gladden. Since wine possesses all of these virtues, the Gemara asks: If so, let us recite the three blessings of Grace after Meals over it after drinking, just as we do after eating bread. The Gemara answers: People do not base their meals on wine. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said to Rava: If one based his meal on it, what is the ruling? Must he recite the Grace after Meals as he does after bread? He replied: When Elijah comes and says whether or not it can serve as the basis for a meal, this will be resolved. Nevertheless, now, until then, his intention is rendered irrelevant by the opinions of all other men and he is not required to recite the complete Grace after Meals. Previously, the Gemara cited the halakha that one recites the blessing: Who creates fruit of the tree, over olive oil. The Gemara discusses the matter itself. Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said, and so too Rabbi Yitzḥak said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One recites the blessing: Who creates fruit of the tree, over olive oil just as he does over the fruit itself. What are the circumstances? If you say that he drank it plain, it causes damage to the drinker. As it was taught in a baraita: One who drinks oil of teruma, while unaware that it was teruma, pays the principal and does not pay the additional fifth which is the typical penalty for unintentional misuse of consecrated property, as in that case the individual is considered to have only damaged consecrated property without deriving benefit from it. One who anoints his body with the oil of teruma pays the principal and pays the fifth, as he derived benefit from it. Apparently, one who drinks oil derives no benefit and it even causes him damage. Rather, it is referring to a case where he eats the oil by dipping bread into it. If so, the bread is primary and the oil secondary, and we learned in a mishna: This is the principle: Any food that is primary, and is eaten with food that is secondary, one recites a blessing over the primary food, and that blessing exempts the secondary from the requirement to recite a blessing before eating it. A blessing need only be recited over the bread, not over the oil. Rather, it is referring to a case where he is drinking it by means of an anigeron, as Rabba bar Shmuel said: Anigeron is water in which a beet was boiled, ansigeron is the water