מגמת תלמוד -עירוני ב' תשפ"א

§ In connection to the principle stated in the mishna, that if the animal derives benefit the owner of the animal pays for the benefit that it derived, the Gemara relates: Rav Ḥisda said to Rami bar Ḥama: You were not with us at night within our boundary when we raised dilemmas concerning exceptional matters. Rami bar Ḥama said to him: What are the exceptional matters you discussed? Rav Ḥisda said to him: With regard to one who resides in another’s courtyard without his knowledge or permission, must he pay him rent for living there or does he not need to pay him rent? The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this question? If we say that the case concerns a courtyard that does not stand to be rented out, i.e., if the squatter would not have lived there the owner would have kept it vacant, and the man squatting there is someone who would not have rented other living quarters because he has other lodgings available to him for free, then it is a case where this one, the squatter, does not derive benefit, and that one, the owner, does not suffer a loss; in that case certainly no payment is necessary. Rather, say that the discussion concerns a case of a courtyard that stands to be rented out, and the man squatting there would have rented other living quarters. If so, then this is a case where this one derives benefit and that one suffers a loss, and in that case he certainly must make payment. The dilemma was not with regard to either of these circumstances. The Gemara explains: No, it is necessary to raise the dilemma in the case of a courtyard that does not stand to be rented out, but the man squatting there would have rented other living quarters had he not squatted in this property. What is the halakha in this case? Is the squatter legally able to say to the owner of the courtyard: What loss have I caused you, as you would not have rented it out anyway? Or perhaps the owner of the courtyard is legally able to say to the squatter: