מקורות פרק 3 - צדק צדק תרדוף​​​​​​​ שבילי תרבות לכיתה ח (מטח)

(יח) שֹׁפְטִ֣ים וְשֹֽׁטְרִ֗ים תִּֽתֶּן־לְךָ֙ בְּכָל־שְׁעָרֶ֔יךָ אֲשֶׁ֨ר ה' אֱלֹקֶ֛יךָ נֹתֵ֥ן לְךָ֖ לִשְׁבָטֶ֑יךָ וְשָׁפְט֥וּ אֶת־הָעָ֖ם מִשְׁפַּט־צֶֽדֶק׃ (יט) לֹא־תַטֶּ֣ה מִשְׁפָּ֔ט לֹ֥א תַכִּ֖יר פָּנִ֑ים וְלֹא־תִקַּ֣ח שֹׁ֔חַד כִּ֣י הַשֹּׁ֗חַד יְעַוֵּר֙ עֵינֵ֣י חֲכָמִ֔ים וִֽיסַלֵּ֖ף דִּבְרֵ֥י צַדִּיקִֽם׃ (כ) צֶ֥דֶק צֶ֖דֶק תִּרְדֹּ֑ף לְמַ֤עַן תִּֽחְיֶה֙ וְיָרַשְׁתָּ֣ אֶת־הָאָ֔רֶץ אֲשֶׁר־ה' אֱלֹקֶ֖יךָ נֹתֵ֥ן לָֽךְ׃

(1) Observe the month of Abib and offer a passover sacrifice to the LORD your God, for it was in the month of Abib, at night, that the LORD your God freed you from Egypt.

(2) You shall slaughter the passover sacrifice for the LORD your God, from the flock and the herd, in the place where the LORD will choose to establish His name.

(3) You shall not eat anything leavened with it; for seven days thereafter you shall eat unleavened bread, bread of distress—for you departed from the land of Egypt hurriedly—so that you may remember the day of your departure from the land of Egypt as long as you live.

(4) For seven days no leaven shall be found with you in all your territory, and none of the flesh of what you slaughter on the evening of the first day shall be left until morning.

(5) You are not permitted to slaughter the passover sacrifice in any of the settlements that the LORD your God is giving you;

(6) but at the place where the LORD your God will choose to establish His name, there alone shall you slaughter the passover sacrifice, in the evening, at sundown, the time of day when you departed from Egypt.

(7) You shall cook and eat it at the place that the LORD your God will choose; and in the morning you may start back on your journey home.

(8) After eating unleavened bread six days, you shall hold a solemn gathering for the LORD your God on the seventh day: you shall do no work.

(9) You shall count off seven weeks; start to count the seven weeks when the sickle is first put to the standing grain.

(10) Then you shall observe the Feast of Weeks for the LORD your God, offering your freewill contribution according as the LORD your God has blessed you.

(11) You shall rejoice before the LORD your God with your son and daughter, your male and female slave, the Levite in your communities, and the stranger, the fatherless, and the widow in your midst, at the place where the LORD your God will choose to establish His name.

(12) Bear in mind that you were slaves in Egypt, and take care to obey these laws.

(13) After the ingathering from your threshing floor and your vat, you shall hold the Feast of Booths for seven days.

(14) You shall rejoice in your festival, with your son and daughter, your male and female slave, the Levite, the stranger, the fatherless, and the widow in your communities.

(15) You shall hold a festival for the LORD your God seven days, in the place that the LORD will choose; for the LORD your God will bless all your crops and all your undertakings, and you shall have nothing but joy.

(16) Three times a year—on the Feast of Unleavened Bread, on the Feast of Weeks, and on the Feast of Booths—all your males shall appear before the LORD your God in the place that He will choose. They shall not appear before the LORD empty-handed,

(17) but each with his own gift, according to the blessing that the LORD your God has bestowed upon you.

(18) You shall appoint magistrates and officials for your tribes, in all the settlements that the LORD your God is giving you, and they shall govern the people with due justice.

(19) You shall not judge unfairly: you shall show no partiality; you shall not take bribes, for bribes blind the eyes of the discerning and upset the plea of the just.

(20) Justice, justice shall you pursue, that you may thrive and occupy the land that the LORD your God is giving you.

(21) You shall not set up a sacred post—any kind of pole beside the altar of the LORD your God that you may make—

(22) or erect a stone pillar; for such the LORD your God detests.

(א) אֶחָד דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת וְאֶחָד דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת בִּדְרִישָׁה וּבַחֲקִירָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (ויקרא כד) "מִשְׁפַּט אֶחָד יִהְיֶה לָכֶם".

מַה בֵּין דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת לְדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת?

  1. דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה, וְדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת בְּעֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה.
  2. דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת פּוֹתְחִין בֵּין לִזְכוּת בֵּין לְחוֹבָה, וְדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת פּוֹתְחִין לִזְכוּת וְאֵין פּוֹתְחִין לְחוֹבָה.
  3. דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת מַטִּין עַל פִּי אֶחָד בֵּין לִזְכוּת בֵּין לְחוֹבָה, וְדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת מַטִּין עַל פִּי אֶחָד לִזְכוּת וְעַל פִּי שְׁנַיִם לְחוֹבָה.
  4. דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת מַחֲזִירִין בֵּין לִזְכוּת בֵּין לְחוֹבָה, דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת מַחֲזִירִין לִזְכוּת וְאֵין מַחֲזִירִין לְחוֹבָה.
  5. דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת הַכֹּל מְלַמְּדִין זְכוּת וְחוֹבָה, דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת הַכֹּל מְלַמְּדִין זְכוּת וְאֵין הַכֹּל מְלַמְּדִין חוֹבָה.
  6. דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת הַמְלַמֵּד חוֹבָה מְלַמֵּד זְכוּת וְהַמְלַמֵּד זְכוּת מְלַמֵּד חוֹבָה, דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת הַמְלַמֵּד חוֹבָה מְלַמֵּד זְכוּת, אֲבָל הַמְלַמֵּד זְכוּת אֵין יָכוֹל לַחֲזֹר וּלְלַמֵּד חוֹבָה.
  7. דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת דָּנִין בַּיּוֹם וְגוֹמְרִין בַּלַּיְלָה, דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת דָּנִין בַּיּוֹם וְגוֹמְרִין בַּיּוֹם.
  8. דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת גּוֹמְרִין בּוֹ בַיּוֹם בֵּין לִזְכוּת בֵּין לְחוֹבָה, דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת גּוֹמְרִין בּוֹ בַיּוֹם לִזְכוּת וּבְיוֹם שֶׁלְּאַחֲרָיו לְחוֹבָה, לְפִיכָךְ אֵין דָּנִין לֹא בְעֶרֶב שַׁבָּת וְלֹא בְעֶרֶב יוֹם טוֹב:

(ב)

  1. דִּינֵי הַטֻּמְאוֹת וְהַטָּהֳרוֹת מַתְחִילִין מִן הַגָּדוֹל, דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת מַתְחִילִין מִן הַצָּד.
  2. הַכֹּל כְּשֵׁרִין לָדוּן דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת וְאֵין הַכֹּל כְּשֵׁרִין לָדוּן דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת, אֶלָּא כֹהֲנִים, לְוִיִּם, וְיִשְׂרְאֵלִים הַמַּשִּׂיאִין לַכְּהֻנָּה:

(ג) סַנְהֶדְרִין הָיְתָה כַּחֲצִי גֹרֶן עֲגֻלָּה, כְּדֵי שֶׁיְּהוּ רוֹאִין זֶה אֶת זֶה. וּשְׁנֵי סוֹפְרֵי הַדַּיָּנִין עוֹמְדִין לִפְנֵיהֶם, אֶחָד מִיָּמִין וְאֶחָד מִשְּׂמֹאל, וְכוֹתְבִין דִּבְרֵי הַמְזַכִּין וְדִבְרֵי הַמְחַיְּבִין.

רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: שְׁלֹשָׁה, אֶחָד כּוֹתֵב דִּבְרֵי הַמְזַכִּין, וְאֶחָד כּוֹתֵב דִּבְרֵי הַמְחַיְּבִין, וְהַשְּׁלִישִׁי כוֹתֵב דִּבְרֵי הַמְזַכִּין וְדִבְרֵי הַמְחַיְּבִין:

(ד) וְשָׁלֹשׁ שׁוּרוֹת שֶׁל תַּלְמִידֵי חֲכָמִים יוֹשְׁבִין לִפְנֵיהֶם, כָּל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד מַכִּיר אֶת מְקוֹמוֹ. הָיוּ צְרִיכִין לִסְמֹךְ, סוֹמְכִין מִן הָרִאשׁוֹנָה. אֶחָד מִן הַשְּׁנִיָּה בָּא לוֹ לָרִאשׁוֹנָה וְאֶחָד מִן הַשְּׁלִישִׁית בָּא לוֹ לַשְּׁנִיָּה, וּבוֹרְרִין לָהֶן עוֹד אֶחָד מִן הַקָּהָל וּמוֹשִׁיבִין אוֹתוֹ בַשְּׁלִישִׁית. וְלֹא הָיָה יוֹשֵׁב בִּמְקוֹמוֹ שֶׁל רִאשׁוֹן, אֶלָּא יוֹשֵׁב בְּמָקוֹם הָרָאוּי לוֹ:

(ה) כֵּיצַד מְאַיְּמִין (אֶת הָעֵדִים) עַל עֵדֵי נְפָשׁוֹת?

הָיוּ מַכְנִיסִין אוֹתָן וּמְאַיְּמִין עֲלֵיהֶן: שֶׁמָּא תֹאמְרוּ מֵאֹמֶד, וּמִשְּׁמוּעָה, עֵד מִפִּי עֵד וּמִפִּי אָדָם נֶאֱמָן שָׁמַעְנוּ, אוֹ שֶׁמָּא אִי אַתֶּם יוֹדְעִין שֶׁסּוֹפֵנוּ לִבְדֹּק אֶתְכֶם בִּדְרִישָׁה וּבַחֲקִירָה.

הֱווּ יוֹדְעִין שֶׁלֹּא כְדִינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת:

דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת - אָדָם נוֹתֵן מָמוֹן וּמִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ,

דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת - דָּמוֹ וְדַם זַרְעִיּוֹתָיו תְּלוּיִין בּוֹ עַד סוֹף הָעוֹלָם,

שֶׁכֵּן מָצִינוּ בְקַיִן שֶׁהָרַג אֶת אָחִיו, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (בראשית ד) "דְּמֵי אָחִיךָ צֹעֲקִים", אֵינוֹ אוֹמֵר "דַּם אָחִיךָ" אֶלָּא "דְּמֵי אָחִיךָ" - דָּמוֹ וְדַם זַרְעִיּוֹתָיו.

דָּבָר אַחֵר: "דְּמֵי אָחִיךָ" - שֶׁהָיָה דָמוֹ מֻשְׁלָךְ עַל הָעֵצִים וְעַל הָאֲבָנִים.

לְפִיכָךְ נִבְרָא אָדָם יְחִידִי, לְלַמֶּדְךָ, שֶׁכָּל הַמְאַבֵּד נֶפֶשׁ אַחַת (מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל), מַעֲלֶה עָלָיו הַכָּתוּב כְּאִלּוּ אִבֵּד עוֹלָם מָלֵא וְכָל הַמְקַיֵּם נֶפֶשׁ אַחַת (מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל), מַעֲלֶה עָלָיו הַכָּתוּב כְּאִלּוּ קִיֵּם עוֹלָם מָלֵא.

וּמִפְּנֵי שְׁלוֹם הַבְּרִיּוֹת, שֶׁלֹּא יֹאמַר אָדָם לַחֲבֵרוֹ אַבָּא גָדוֹל מֵאָבִיךָ.

וְשֶׁלֹּא יְהוּ מִינִין אוֹמְרִים, הַרְבֵּה רָשֻׁיּוֹת בַּשָּׁמָיִם.

וּלְהַגִּיד גְּדֻלָּתוֹ שֶׁל הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא, שֶׁאָדָם טוֹבֵעַ כַּמָּה מַטְבְּעוֹת בְּחוֹתָם אֶחָד וְכֻלָּן דּוֹמִין זֶה לָזֶה, וּמֶלֶךְ מַלְכֵי הַמְּלָכִים הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא טָבַע כָּל אָדָם בְּחוֹתָמוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם הָרִאשׁוֹן וְאֵין אֶחָד מֵהֶן דּוֹמֶה לַחֲבֵרוֹ.

לְפִיכָךְ כָּל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד חַיָּב לוֹמַר: בִּשְׁבִילִי נִבְרָא הָעוֹלָם.

וְשֶׁמָּא תֹאמְרוּ מַה לָּנוּ וְלַצָּרָה הַזֹּאת?

וַהֲלֹא כְבָר נֶאֱמַר (ויקרא ה) "וְהוּא עֵד אוֹ רָאָה אוֹ יָדָע אִם לוֹא יַגִּיד" וְגוֹ'.

וְשֶׁמָּא תֹאמְרוּ מַה לָּנוּ לָחוּב בְּדָמוֹ שֶׁל זֶה?

וַהֲלֹא כְבָר נֶאֱמַר (משלי יא) "וּבַאֲבֹד רְשָׁעִים רִנָּה":

(1) Both monetary and capital cases have examination and inquiry, as it is written (Leviticus 24:22) "You shall have one justice." What is the difference between monetary cases and capital cases: monetary cases[are tried] with three [judges], and capital cases, with twenty-three. Monetary cases are opened either [with arguments] to acquit or to convict, and capital cases open [with arguments] to acquit but do not open [with arguments] to convict. Monetary cases are decided by one either to acquit or to convict; capital cases are decided by one to acquit or by two to convict. In monetary cases, [the verdict] can change between acquittal and conviction; in capital cases [the verdict] can change to acquittal but cannot change to conviction. In monetary cases, all can rule for acquittal or conviction; in capital cases, all can rule for acquittal but all cannot rule for conviction. In monetary cases, one who convicts can acquit and one who acquits can convict; in capital cases, one who convicts can acquit, but one who acquits cannot turn and convict. Monetary cases can be tried in the day and can finish in the night; capital cases are tried in the day and must finish in the day. Monetary cases finish on the same day for either acquittal or conviction; capital cases finish on the same day for acquittal and the next day for conviction, therefore there cannot be trials on Friday evening or the evening before a holiday.

(2) Cases of impurity and purity begin from the greatest [judge], cases of life begin from [the judges on] the side. All are acceptable to judge in cases of money, but none are acceptable to judge in cases of life except for priests, Levites, and Israelites whose daughters can marry priests.

(3) The Sanhedrin [highest court, charged with deciding cases and appeals that had national significance. It was comprised of 71 scholars who had received the full traditional rabbinical ordination, and its decisions fixed Jewish practice for subsequent generations.]was [organized like] half of a round granary, so that each (judge) could see each [judge]. Two court scribes stood before them, one on the right and one on the left, and they wrote the words of the acquitting [defense] and the words of the convicting [prosecution]. Rabbi Yehudah says, (there were) three, one wrote the words of the acquitting and one wrote the words of the convicting, and the third wrote the words of the acquitting and the words of the convicting.

(4) And three rows of students sit before them, each one knows his [proper] place. [When] there was a need to appoint [a new judge], they appointed from the first [row]. One from the second [row] comes to the first, and one from the third [row] comes to the second, and they choose for them one more [student] from the community who is seated in the third [row]. He didn't sit in the place of the first [student], but rather he sits in the place seen for him.

(5) How do we press the witnesses in a capital case? We bring them in [to the court's chambers] and press them: "Perhaps what you say [isn't eyewitness testimony] is but your own assessment, or from rumors, or your witnessing an actual witness testify, or your reporting what a trustworthy said. Or perhaps you were unaware that by the end we'd interrogate you, with examination and inquiry. Know that capital cases are not like monetary ones. In monetary cases, [a false witness] can return the money and achieve atonement. But in capital cases, the blood of [the victim [and all his future offspring hang upon you until the end of time. For thus we find in regard to Cain, who killed his brother, "The bloods of your brother scream out!" (Genesis 4:10) - the verse does not say blood of your brother, but bloods of your brother, because it was his blood and also the blood of his future offspring [screaming out]! [Another explanation of the verse: for his blood was splattered over the trees and rocks [there was more than one pool of blood]. [The judges' speech continues] "It was for this reason that man was first created as one person [Adam], to teach you that anyone who destroys a life is considered by Scripture to have destroyed an entire world; and anyone who saves a life is as if he saved an entire world." And also, to promote peace among the creations, that no man would say to his friend, "My ancestors are greater than yours." And also, so that heretics will not say, "there are many rulers up in Heaven." And also, to express the grandeur of The Holy One [blessed be He]: For a man strikes many coins from the same die, and all the coins are alike. But the King, the King of Kings, The Holy One [blessed be He] strikes every man from the die of the First Man, and yet no man is quite like his friend. Therefore, every person must say, “For my sake ‎the world was created.”‎ [The judges' speech continues:] "Maybe you [the witnesses] will now say, 'What do we need this, and all this anxiety for [let's not come forward even with true testimony]!' But Scripture has already spoken: "If he be a witness - having seen or known - if he does not express it, he shall bear his sin." (Lev. 5:1) Maybe you will now say, 'What do we need this, to be responsible for another man's death?' But Scripture has already spoken: "When the wicked are destroyed there is rejoicing." (Prov. 11:10)"

(ג) וכשם שהדין בשלשה כך פשרה בשלשה.

נגמר הדין - אין רשאי לבצע.

רבי אליעזר בנו של רבי יוסי הגלילי אומר: כל המבצע הרי זה חוטא, המברך את המבצע הרי זה מנאץ לפני המקום, על זה נאמר (תהילים י) "ובוצע ברך נאץ ה'", אלא יקוב הדין את ההר! שכן משה אמר: יקוב הדין את ההר. אבל אהרן היה עושה שלום בין אדם לחבירו שנאמר (מלאכי ג) "בשלום ובמישור הלך אתי" וגו'

רבי אליעזר בן יעקב אומר: מה תלמוד לומר "ובוצע ברך נאץ ה'"?

משלו משל, למה הדבר דומה? לאחד שגנב סאה של חטים טחנן אפאן והפריש מהן חלה והאכיל לבניו, היאך זה מברך? אינו מברך אלא מנאץ! ועל זה נאמר "ובוצע ברך נאץ ה'".

רבי מאיר אומר: "ובוצע ברך" - אלו אחי יוסף שהיו אומרים (בראשית לו) "מה בצע" וגו'

רבי יהושע בן קרחה אומר: מצוה לבצע שנא' (זכריה ח) "אמת ומשפט שלום שפטו בשעריכם" - והלא כל מקום שיש משפט אמת אין שלום וכל מקום שיש שלום אין משפט אמת?! אלא איזהו משפט שיש שלום? הוי אומר זה ביצוע. וכן הוא אומר (שמואל ב ח) "ויהי דוד עושה משפט וצדקה לכל עמו" והלא כל מקום שיש משפט אין צדקה וכל מקום שיש צדקה אין משפט?! אלא איזהו משפט שיש בו צדקה? הוי אומר זה ביצוע.

דן את הדין, זיכה את הזכאי וחייב את החייב - אם חייב את העני מוציא ונותן לו משלו, נמצא עושה צדקה עם זה ודן את זה.

רבי אומר: דן את הדין וזיכה את הזכאי וחייב את החייב, נמצא עושה צדקה עם החייב, שמוציא גזילה מתחת ידו ודין עם הזכאי שמחזיר לו את שלו.

רבי שמעון בן מנסיא אומר: פעמים יבצע אדם, פעמים אל יבצע.

כיצד? שנים שבאו אצל אחד לדין, עד שלא שמע דבריהן או מששמע דבריהן ואין יודע להיכן הדין הוא נוטה - אתה רשאי שיאמר להן צאו ובצעו, אבל מששמע דבריהם ויודע להיכן הדין הוא נוטה - אין רשאי שיאמר להן צאו ובצעו.

כגון שהוא אומר (משלי יז) "פוטר מים ראשית מדון" וגו' - עד שלא נתגלה אתה רשאי לנטשו, משנתגלה הדין אי אתה רשאי לנטשו. ר' יהושע בן לקיש אומר שנים שבאו אצל אחד לדין אחד חזק ואחד רך עד שלא שמע דבריהן ואם מששמע דבריהן ואין יודע להיכן הדין הוא נוטה רשאי שיאמר להן איני נזקק לכם שמא נתחייב החזק ונמצא חזק אויבו מששמע דבריהן ויודע להיכן הדין הוא נוטה אין רשאי שיאמר להם איני נזקק לכם וכן הוא אומר (דברים א) לא תגורו מפני איש כי המשפט לאלקים הוא.

(ד) אמר ר' יהושע בן קרחה מנין שאם היה יושב לפני דיין ויודע אתה זכות לעני וחובה לעשיר אין אתה רשאי לשתוק? תלמוד לומר: "לא תגורו מפני איש" - אל תכניס דבריך מפני איש.

הדיינים יהיו יודעין את מי דנין ולפני מי הן דנין ועם מי הן דנין ומי הוא דן עמהן ויהיו עדים יודעין את מי הם מעידין ולפני מי הן מעידין ועם מי הן מעידין ומי הוא מעיד עמהם שנאמר (דברים יט) "ועמדו שני האנשים אשר להם הריב לפני ה'" ואומר (תהילים פב) "אלקים נצב בעדת אל בקרב אלקים ישפוט" וכן יהושפט אומר (דברי הימים ב יט) "ויאמר אל השופטים ראו מה אתם עושים כי לא לאדם תשפטו כי <אם> לה'".

ושמא יאמר הדיין, מה לי בצער הזה?

והלא כבר נאמר (שם) "ועמכם דבר המשפט" - אין לך אלא מה שעיניך רואות.

רבן שמעון בן גמליאל אומר: כשם שהדיין דן בשלשה כך פשרה בשלשה.

יפה כח פשרה מכח הדין.

כיצד? שנים שדנו יכולין לחזור בהן ושנים שפישרו אין יכולין לחזור בהן.

חכם בן ציון אלקלעי, כסאות למשפט, שער א פרק א

והענין הנכבד הזה בא בקיבוץ מדות היקרות שבמסכת אבות סוף פרק א':

תנן: רבן שמעון בן גמליאל אומר: על שלשה דברים העולם עומד - על הדין ועל האמת ועל השלום, שנאמר (זכריה ח'), "אמת ומשפט שלום שפטו בשעריכם".

הנה זכר התנא בזה שלשה עמודי עולם אשר קיומו וישובו נשען עליהם. תחילה אמר על הדין מפני שקדם ועלה במחשבה תחילה בבריאת העולם כמו שכתבו, "בראשית ברא אלקים". ואף על פי שנשתתפה עמו מדת הרחמים, נשאר הדין קיים ויסוד מוסד כמדובר. לכן גם התנא נתן לו דין קדימה ואמר על הדין תחילה.

ואחריו הזכיר עמוד האמת ואמר, "ועל האמת" בתוספת ו"ו לרומוז שבא בשיתוף עם הדין והיא הַפְּשָׁרָה הקרובה לַדִין. וקרא אותה "אמת", מפני שעל ידי הפשרה יוכר האמת יותר מן הדין, כי הדין אינו הולך אלא אחר הטענות והעדאת העדים וכמה פעמים יטענו טענות שקר והעדים ישגו ברואה ואז יהיה מוכרח הדיין לדון על פי הטענות והעדים ותהיה האמת נעדרת והדיין לא ידע מזה והוא חייב את הזכאי וכו'.

אמנם הפשרה אשר תֵעָשֶׂה על ידי אנשי אמת שידעו אֲמִתוּת הנדון ההוא, היא תִקָרֵא אמת באמתות שאין בה תערובת שקר ומרמה. ובכן יורם דגל האמת שכל אחד מבעלי הריב יקח את אשר לו [...]

אחר כך זָכַר [את] עמוד השלום וּסְמָכוֹ לעמוד האמת שהיא הפשרה הקרובה לדין, כי בעבור הפשרה יתכן להיות השלום בין איש לרעהו, כי לא נשארה אֵיבָה ביניהם אַחַר שלקח כל אחד מה שראוי לו.

גם ראוי לקרות הפשרה – מִדַּת הרחמים, לפי שהפשרנים מתמלאים רחמים על אנשי הריב וּמְפַשְׁרִים ביניהם ולא יָנִיחוּם להיות נֶעֱשָׁקִים בדין, ועל ידי כך בְּנָקֵל נַעֲשָׂה שלום ביניהם.

תלמוד בבלי

אמר ר' יוחנן: לא חרבה ירושלים אלא על שדנו בה דין תורה.

אלא דיני דמגיזתא לדיינו?

אלא אימא: שהעמידו דיניהם על דין תורה ולא עבדו לפנים משורת הדין.

there shall be no needy among you” (Deuteronomy 15:4). This verse can be understood as a command, indicating that it is incumbent upon each individual to ensure that he will not become needy. Therefore, your assets take precedence over the assets of any other person. The Gemara concludes: Rather, the verse is necessary to derive the exemption from returning the lost item in the case where he was an elderly person and it is not in keeping with his dignity to tend to the item. Rabba says: If there was a lost animal and the elderly person began the process of returning it, e.g., if he struck it even once to guide it in a certain direction, he is obligated to tend to it and return it. The Gemara relates: Abaye was sitting before Rabba and saw these goats standing nearby. He picked up a clod of dirt and threw it at them, causing them to move. Rabba said to him: You have thereby obligated yourself to return them. Arise and return them to their owner. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: In a case of a person for whom it is his typical manner to return an item of that type in the field, where there are fewer onlookers, but it is not his typical manner to return an item of that type in the city, what is the halakha? Do we say that for one to be obligated to return a lost item we need an unequivocal obligation to return it that applies in all cases, and since it is not his typical manner to return an item of that sort in the city, let him not be obligated to return such an item at all? Or perhaps, he is obligated in any event to return the item in the field, and once he is obligated to return it in the field, he is also obligated in the city. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved. Rava says: In any case where he would recover his own item and would consider it to be in keeping with his dignity, he is also obligated to return another’s item. And any case where he unloads and loads his own animal’s burden, he is also obligated to unload and load the burden of another’s animal. The Gemara relates: Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, was walking on the road. A certain man encountered him, and that man was carrying a burden that consisted of sticks of wood. He set down the wood and was resting. The man said to him: Lift them for me and place them upon me. Since it was not in keeping with the dignity of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, to lift the wood, Rabbi Yishmael said to him: How much are they worth? The man said to him: A half-dinar. Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, gave him a half-dinar, took possession of the wood, and declared the wood ownerless. The man then reacquired the wood and again requested that Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, lift the wood for him. Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, again gave him a half-dinar, again took possession of the wood, and again declared the wood ownerless. He then saw that the man desired to reacquire the sticks of wood. Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said to him: I declared the sticks of wood ownerless with regard to everyone else, but I did not declare them ownerless with regard to you. The Gemara asks: But is property rendered ownerless in a case like this? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Pe’a 6:1) that Beit Shammai say: Property declared ownerless for the poor is thereby rendered ownerless. And Beit Hillel say: It is not ownerless, until the property will be ownerless for the poor and for the rich, like produce during the Sabbatical Year, which is available for all. As the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, how could Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, declare the wood ownerless selectively, excluding the prior owner of the wood? Rather, Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, actually declared the wood ownerless to everyone without exception, and it was with a mere statement that he prevented him from reacquiring the wood, i.e., he told the man not to reacquire the wood even though there was no legal impediment to that reacquisition. The Gemara asks: But wasn’t Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, an elderly person and it was not in keeping with his dignity to tend to the item? Why did he purchase the wood and render it ownerless in order to absolve himself of the obligation to lift the burden if he had no obligation to do so in the first place? The Gemara answers: In the case of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, he conducted himself beyond the letter of the law, and he could have simply refused the request for help. The Gemara cites a source for going beyond the letter of the law in the performance of mitzvot. As Rav Yosef taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “And you shall teach them the statutes and the laws, and shall show them the path wherein they shall walk and the action that they must perform” (Exodus 18:20). The baraita parses the various directives in the verse. “And you shall teach them,” that is referring to the structure of their livelihood, i.e., teach the Jewish people trades so that they may earn a living; “the path,” that is referring to acts of kindness; “they shall walk,” that is referring to visiting the ill; “wherein,” that is referring to burial; “and the action,” that is referring to acting in accordance with the letter of the law; “that they must perform,” that is referring to acting beyond the letter of the law. The Gemara analyzes the baraita. The Master said: With regard to the phrase “they shall walk,” that is referring to visiting the ill. The Gemara asks: That is a detail of acts of kindness; why does the baraita list it separately? The Gemara answers: The reference to visiting the ill is necessary only for the contemporary of the ill person, as the Master said: When one who is a contemporary of an ill person visits him, he takes one-sixtieth of his illness. Since visiting an ill contemporary involves contracting a bit of his illness, a special derivation is necessary to teach that even so, he is required to go and visit him. It was taught in the baraita: With regard to the phrase “wherein,” that is referring to burial. The Gemara asks: That is a detail of acts of kindness; why does the baraita list it separately? The Gemara answers: The reference to burial is necessary only to teach the halakha of an elderly person, and it is in a circumstance where it is not in keeping with his dignity to bury the dead. Therefore, a special derivation is necessary to teach that even so, he is required to participate in the burial. It was taught in the baraita: “That they must perform”; that is referring to acting beyond the letter of the law, as Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Jerusalem was destroyed only for the fact that they adjudicated cases on the basis of Torah law in the city. The Gemara asks: Rather, what else should they have done? Should they rather have adjudicated cases on the basis of arbitrary decisions [demagizeta]? Rather, say: That they established their rulings on the basis of Torah law and did not go beyond the letter of the law. MISHNA: Which is the item that is considered lost property? If one found a donkey or a cow grazing on the path, that is not lost property, as presumably the owners are nearby and are aware of the animals’ whereabouts. If one found a donkey with its accoutrements overturned, or a cow that ran through the vineyards, that is lost property. In a case where one returned the lost animal and it fled, and he again returned it and it fled, even if this scenario repeats itself four or five times, he is obligated to return it each time, as it is stated: “You shall not see your brother’s ox or his sheep wandering and disregard them; you shall return them to your brother” (Deuteronomy 22:1). If in the course of tending to and returning the lost item, the finder was idle from labor that would have earned him a sela, he shall not say to the owner of the item: Give me a sela to compensate me for my lost income. Rather, the owner gives him his wage as if he were a laborer, a payment that is considerably smaller. If there are three men there who can convene as a court, he may stipulate before the court that he will undertake to return the item provided that he receives full compensation for lost income. If there is no court there before whom can he stipulate his condition, his financial interests take precedence and he need not return the lost item. GEMARA: With regard to the question in the mishna: Which is the item that is considered lost property, the Gemara asks: Is that to say that all those other cases that we stated in this chapter are not lost property? Rav Yehuda said that this is what the tanna is saying: What is the principle employed in defining a lost item that one is obligated to return? The mishna cites examples to illustrate the principle: If one found a donkey or a cow grazing on the path, that is not lost property, and he is not obligated to return it. But if one found a donkey with its accoutrements overturned, or a cow that was running through the vineyards, that is lost property, and he is obligated to return it. With regard to the ruling in the mishna that a donkey and cow grazing on the path are not considered lost property, the Gemara asks: And is that the case even if they graze there untended forever? Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Until three days pass they are not lost. Thereafter, they are considered lost. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If the animal is found grazing at night, even if it is untended for even one hour it can be presumed to be lost, as an owner never grazes his animals untended at night. If the animal is found grazing during the day, even if it is untended for more than three days, it is also not presumed to be lost. The Gemara answers: No, the measure of three days is necessary only in a case where one saw the animal grazing in the early hours in the morning and in the dark of nightfall. For the first three days, we say: It happened that the animal went out a bit earlier or a bit later than usual, but nevertheless, it was with the owner’s knowledge. Once this is observed for more than three days, it is certainly a lost item. This is also taught in a baraita: If one found a cloak or an ax
תלמוד בבלי

תנו רבנן: (ויקרא יט, טו) "בצדק תשפוט עמיתך" - שלא יהא אחד יושב ואחד עומד אחד מדבר כל צרכו ואחד אומר לו קצר דבריך.

דבר אחר: "בצדק תשפוט עמיתך" - הוי דן את חבירך לכף זכות.

MISHNA: The oath of testimony is practiced with regard to men but not with regard to women, with regard to non-relatives of the litigants but not with regard to relatives, with regard to those fit to testify but not with regard to those unfit to testify due to a transgression that they performed. And the oath of testimony is practiced only with regard to those fit to testify. The oath of testimony is practiced both in the presence of a court and not in the presence of a court, when the potential witness takes the oath on his own. But if the oath is administered by others and those denying that they witnessed the incident in question neither take an oath nor answer amen to the administered oath, they are not liable until they deny any knowledge of the incident in question in court. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Whether one of the witnesses takes the oath on his own or whether the oath is administered by others, the witnesses are not liable until they deny any knowledge of the incident in question before the litigants in court. And one is liable for the act of taking a false oath with intent and for an unwitting act of taking a false oath, i.e., he is unaware of the liability for taking a false oath, provided that he takes the oath with intent in terms of the testimony, i.e., he takes an oath that he has no knowledge of the matter even though he knows that he witnessed the incident. But witnesses are not liable for taking the oath if they were unwitting in terms of the testimony, i.e., they believe that they have no knowledge of the matter. And what are they liable for by taking a false oath with intent? They are liable to bring a sliding-scale offering. GEMARA: The mishna teaches that the oath of testimony is not practiced with regard to women because they are unfit to testify. The Gemara asks: From where is this matter, that women do not testify, derived? The Gemara answers: It is as the Sages taught in a baraita: When the verse states: “If an unrighteous witness rises up against any man…then the two men shall stand” (Deuteronomy 19:16–17), it is with regard to witnesses that the verse is speaking. Apparently, men, not women, may testify. The baraita continues: Do you say that it is with regard to witnesses, or perhaps it is only with regard to litigants that the verse is speaking? When it states: “Between whom the controversy is” (Deuteronomy 19:17), the litigants are already stated in the verse. How do I realize the meaning of the phrase “then the two men shall stand”? Apparently, it is with regard to witnesses that the verse is speaking. And if it is your wish to say that this is not a proof, another proof may be cited. It is stated here: “The two men,” and it is stated there: “On the basis of two witnesses” (Deuteronomy 19:15); just as there, it is with regard to witnesses that the verse speaks, so too here, it is with regard to witnesses that the verse speaks. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the statement of the baraita: And if it is your wish to say? Why is the initial proof inadequate? The Gemara answers: And if you would say that from the fact that the verse did not write: Then the two men and those between whom the controversy is shall stand, which would indicate that the verse changes its focus from the witnesses to the litigants, perhaps throughout the entire verse it is with regard to litigants that it is speaking. Therefore, the tanna cites an additional proof. It is stated here: “The two men,” and it is stated there: “On the basis of two witnesses”; just as there, it is with regard to witnesses that the verse speaks, so too here, it is with regard to witnesses that the verse speaks. It is taught in another baraita: When the verse states: “Then the two men shall stand,” it is with regard to witnesses that the verse is speaking. The baraita continues: Do you say that it is with regard to witnesses, or perhaps it is only with regard to litigants that the verse is speaking? The tanna asks: Did you say that? If the reference is to litigants, why does the verse mention two? Do two people come to court for judgment but three people do not come to court for judgment? And if it is your wish to say that this is not a proof, another proof may be cited. It is stated here: “The two men,” and it is stated there: “On the basis of two witnesses”; just as there, it is with regard to witnesses that the verse speaks, so too here, it is with regard to witnesses that the verse speaks. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: And if it is your wish to say? Why is the initial proof inadequate? The Gemara answers: And if you would say that even though there are cases where there are more than two litigants, it is with regard to a plaintiff and a defendant that the verse is speaking. Therefore, the tanna cites an additional proof. It is stated here: “The two men,” and it is stated there: “On the basis of two witnesses”; just as there, it is with regard to witnesses that the verse speaks, so too here, it is with regard to witnesses that the verse speaks. It is taught in another baraita: When the verse states: “Then the two men shall stand,” it is with regard to witnesses that the verse is speaking. The baraita continues: Do you say that it is with regard to witnesses, or perhaps it is only with regard to litigants that the verse is speaking? The tanna asks: Did you say that? If the reference is to litigants, why does the verse mention men? Do men come to court for judgment but women do not come to court for judgment? And if it is your wish to say that this is not a proof, another proof may be cited. It is stated here: “The two men,” and it is stated there: “On the basis of two witnesses”; just as there, it is with regard to witnesses that the verse speaks, so too here, it is with regard to witnesses that the verse speaks. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: And if it is your wish to say? Why is the initial proof inadequate? The Gemara answers that it means: And if you would say that with regard to a woman, it is not typical conduct for her to appear in court due to the verse that is stated with regard to women: “All the glory of the king’s daughter is within” (Psalms 45:14), and that is why the verse addressed a situation that is prevalent, i.e., a case where the litigants are men, and there is no proof that women are unfit for testimony. Therefore, the tanna cites an additional proof. It is stated here: “The two men,” and it is stated there: “On the basis of two witnesses”; just as there, it is with regard to witnesses that the verse speaks, so too here, it is with regard to witnesses that the verse speaks. § The Gemara cites another interpretation of the verse. The Sages taught: “Then the two men shall stand”; this indicates that there is a mitzva for the litigants to stand during the court proceedings. Rabbi Yehuda said: I heard that if the judges wished to seat both of the litigants, they may seat them. What, then, is prohibited for the judges? They must ensure that there will not be a situation where one litigant is standing and one litigant is sitting, or a situation where one litigant says everything that he needs to say to present his case and one litigant, the judge says to him: Curtail your statement. The Sages taught: The verse states: “But in righteousness shall you judge your colleague” (Leviticus 19:15), from which it is derived: The court must ensure that there will not be a situation where one litigant is sitting and one litigant is standing, or a situation where one litigant says everything that he needs to say to present his case and one litigant, the judge says to him: Curtail your statement. Alternatively, it is derived from the verse: “But in righteousness shall you judge your colleague,” that you should judge another favorably, and seek to find justification for his actions, even if when interpreted differently his actions could be judged unfavorably. Rav Yosef teaches that from the verse: “But in righteousness shall you judge your colleague [amitekha],” it is derived: With regard to one who is with you [im she’itekha] in observance of Torah and in fulfillment of mitzvot, try to judge him favorably, in the manner that the Gemara will now explain. The Gemara relates: Rav Ulla, son of Rav Ilai, had a trial pending before Rav Naḥman. Rav Yosef sent a message to Rav Naḥman: Ulla our friend is a colleague in Torah and mitzvot, with regard to whom the verse states that you should judge him favorably. Rav Naḥman said: For what purpose did he send this message to me? Does he expect me to grant him preferential treatment? Every judgment must be undertaken with righteousness. Rav Naḥman then said: Rav Yosef sent me the message to ensure I would open with Rav Ulla’s dispute in the event that other cases come before me for judgment, in deference to the Torah because he is a Torah scholar.

סַנְהֶדְרִין הַהוֹרֶגֶת אֶחָד בְּשָׁבוּעַ נִקְרֵאת חָבְלָנִית.

רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן עֲזַרְיָה אוֹמֵר: אֶחָד לְשִׁבְעִים שָׁנָה.

רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמְרִים: אִלּוּ הָיִינוּ בַסַּנְהֶדְרִין לֹא נֶהֱרַג אָדָם מֵעוֹלָם. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: אַף הֵן מַרְבִּין שׁוֹפְכֵי דָמִים בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל.

(10) If someone whose judgement was final [sentenced to death], and ran away but came back to the same Beit Din, we do not re-evaluate his old judgment. Any time that two witnesses came and say, "We testify that this person had a judgement passed against him in a certain court," so and so were the witnesses, we execute him [the defendant on this testimony]. A Sanhedrin [highest court, charged with deciding cases and appeals that had national significance. It was comprised of 71 scholars who had received the full traditional rabbinical ordination, and its decisions fixed Jewish practice for subsequent generations]that would execute somebody once in seven years would be considered destructive. Rabbi Elazar Ben Azariah says: "Once in seventy years." Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva said: "If we were on the Sanhedrin , nobody would have ever been executed." Rabban Shim'on Ben Gamliel said: "They too would have increased violence in Israel."

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