APPENDIX TO DE SPECIALIBUS LEGIBUS, II
§ 4. For the elliptical oath cf. Plato, Gorgias 466 E, Aristoph. Frogs 1374. Commentators have ascribed the first example to piety, but this is incompatible with Plato’s use of the names of deities elsewhere and even in the same dialogue, and no such motive can be ascribed to Aristophanes. See Thompson’s note on Gorgias, loc. cit.
§ 46. Lightened by anticipation. On the value of πρόληψις (praemeditatio) as alleviating λύπη (aegritudo) see the discussion in Cic. Tusc. Disp. iii. 24–34 and 52 f., where the opinion is represented as Cyrenaic in opposition to the Epicurean that it was futile to dwell on evils beforehand. But it was also to some extent a Stoic view, see ibid. and S. V. F. iii. 482, where Poseidonius (or Chrysippus?) is quoted as saying προενδημεῖν δεῖν τοῖς πράγμασι μήπω τε παροῦσιν οἷον παροῦσι χρῆσθαι.
§ 56. Some give it the name of the “season.” For the Pythagorean application of καιρός to Seven see Aristotle, Met. i. 5, 985 b. They say ὅτι τὸ μὲν τοιονδὶ τῶν ἀρίθμων πάθος, τὸ δὲ τοιονδὶ ψυχὴ καὶ νοῦς, ἕτερον δὲ καιρός (quoted in Ritter and Preller, 65 d), and more explicitly Alexander Aphr. in Met. pp. 28, 29 καιρὸν δὲ πάλιν ἔλεγον τὸν ἑπτά. δοκεῖ γὰρ τὰ φυσικὰ τοὺς τελείους καιροὺς ἴσχειν καὶ γενέσεως καὶ τελειώσεως κατὰ ἑβδομάδας (quoted ibid. 78 c).
For Philo’s more or less mystical use of the word, apart from the number seven, see his comments on Num. 14:9 ἀφέστηκεν ὁ καιρὸς ἀπʼ αὐτῶν, ὁ δὲ κύριος ἐν ἡμῖν in De Post. 121 f., and De Mut. 265. In the first of these καιρός is the passing moment or opportunity which men impiously take for their God, in the second it is the God-sent opportunity which they fail to take.
§ 69. No man being naturally a slave. This is said to be a Stoic doctrine. But among the passages collected by Arnim, S. V. F. iii. 349–366, there is no other which lays down the principle so explicitly as this. The Stoic mind concentrates itself on the thought that only the wise are truly free and only the foolish or wicked truly slaves, and does not concern itself with the actual institution of slavery. That the rights of humanity do not extend to the unreasoning animals appears in Cic. De Fin. iii. 67 (quoting Chrysippus) “cetera nata esse hominum causa et deorum … ut bestiis homines uti ad utilitatem suam possint sine iniuria.”
§ 73. Since it is a general truth … sole good. I do not see any exact parallels in S. V. F. 327–332 (which Heinemann cites) to the doctrine implied here that ideally there is no such thing as a foreigner (ἀλλότριος), but it accords with De Ios. 29 that the Megalopolis, the world, has a single πολιτεία and a single law in the λόγος φύσεως.
For the Stoic canon (Στωικὸν δόγμα De Post. 133) that μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθόν see note on Quod Det. 9 (App.) where, however, the statement that “no Greek passage seems to reproduce the dogma exactly in this form” must have been written under a misapprehension. There are several passages in S. V. F. (see Index) which exhibit it or its Latin equivalent “solum bonum esse quod honestum sit.” Note particularly Diog. Laert. vii. 101 λέγουσι δὲ μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, καθά φησιν Ἑκάτων καὶ Χρύσιππος.
§ 82. Tribe (or deme?) and ward. “The full citizens in Alexandria were those enrolled in tribes and demes. The important and constant element was the deme rather than the tribe and during the Ptolemaic and earlier Roman period it was customary, since the deme-names of Alexandria and Ptolemais differed, to describe a citizen of either city by his deme only. The tribe-names were more fluid, thus we know that Claudius sanctioned a proposal to name a tribe in his honour,” Bell, Camb. Mod. Hist. x. p. 295. The evidence for this statement (from Papyri?) is not given, nor is it stated whether it applies equally to the πολίτευμα of the Jews. If nothing is known to the contrary, Philo’s words suggest that it does.
It should be noted, however, that Philo found δῆμος as well as φυλή in Num. 36 (see v. 6). Apparently, however, they are there convertible terms. E.V. has “the family of the tribe.”
§ 91. (Depreciation of athletes and athletic training.) This is not uncommon, especially in contrast with military training. Cf. Quintilian, x. 1. 33, where the athlete’s “tori” or fleshy protuberances are contrasted with the military “lacerti.” Several parallels are quoted by Peterson in his note on that passage, bringing out the idea that the athlete’s training did not fit him to endure the various hardships of the soldier’s life. Philo may have the same idea here, though he does not bring in the contrast with the soldier.
For πιαινομένων cf. Leg. All. i. 98, where the athlete’s diet is ἕνεκα τοῦ πιαίνεσθαι καὶ ῥώννυσθαι, and for πολυσαρκία see Lucian, Dial. Mort. x. 5 (quoted by Peterson), where an athlete πολύσαρκός τις ὤν nearly makes Charon’s boat sink.
§ 125. ἡ προεστῶσα ἀρχὴ κτλ. In making this statement, and indeed in the whole section, Philo has no biblical authority and is simply giving what he considers to be just, based apparently on Attic (or Alexandrian?) law. In Attic law the archon (who seems to be alluded to in ἡ προεστῶσα ἀρχή) had the general duty of caring for orphans and heiresses. See Lipsius, Att. Recht. p. 58, though this seems to mean only the obligation to see that the legitimate ἐπίτροποι performed their duty (ibid. p. 525). Philo’s words here would naturally imply something more definite than this and are not easy to reconcile with iii. 67, where proposals of marriage to orphan maidens are to be addressed “to the brothers or guardians or others who have charge of her.”
§ 133 and sequel to § 139. (The double portion of the first-born.) Goodenough, pp. 56 f., after giving evidence of the right of the eldest son to a double portion in Ptolemaic Egypt as well as in Greece, holds that Philo has no scriptural warrant for attesting this as a general Mosaic law, but quotes Deut. 21 as the nearest thing he can find in scripture to a law which had forced itself on Jewish practice. It seems to me that Philo could reasonably find an acknowledgement of the claims of primogeniture in v. 17, “for he is the beginning of his children (LXX) and to him belong the rights of the first-born (πρωτοτοκεῖα).” That is to say, what the law forbids in this passage is that the repudiation of the mother, who in Philo’s view is not only hated but discarded (ἀπηλλαγμένη § 139), should be allowed to cancel the acknowledged rights of her son.
There is more to be said for Heinemann’s contention that the arguments in §§ 132–139 imply that what was stated as a general law in § 133 only obtained in the particular case here discussed. The third reason in particular (§ 139) might be taken to mean that the duplication of the portion of the first-born was a compensation for the wrongs he had already suffered. But this is not necessarily so. Philo may mean, as indeed he implies in the last sentence, that the law wishes to protect the just rights of both families and shews its intention by asserting the special right of the first-born.
§ 145. The Crossing-feast. I have not found in any authority which I have seen any light thrown on Philo’s departure from the ordinary explanation of Passover. Josephus, Ant. ii. 313 explains πάσχα as meaning ὑπερβασία (so also later Aquila; see Driver on Ex. xii. 13). It must be remembered that the point is disguised in the LXX, which translates the noun pésah in 12:21 and 27 by πάσχα, but the verb pâsah in vv. 13 and 27 by σκεπάω and ἐσκέπασε, in v. 23 by παρελεύσεται. That Philo was not alone in his opinion is shewn by his statement that others allegorized in the same way, for such an allegory could only be founded on the “crossing” interpretation. That he believed διάβασις to be the correct translation appears in De Mig. 25 τὸ πάσχα, τὸ δέ ἐστιν ἑρμηνευθὲν διάβασις.
Ibid. From noon till eventide. See Ex. 12:6, Lev. 23:5, Num. 9:3, where the R.V. has “at even,” (margin) Hebrew “between the two evenings.” The LXX translates this in Ex. and Num. by πρὸς ἑσπέραν, but in Leviticus by ἀνάμεσον τῶν ἑσπερινῶν. “For this the traditional interpretation adopted by the Pharisees and Talmudists was that the ‘first’ evening was when the heat of the sun begins to decrease, about 3 P.M., and that the second evening began with sunset” (Driver on Ex. xii. 6), Philo’s interpretation is in accordance with another opinion quoted by Driver, “that the sacrifice if offered before noon was not valid.”
§ 162. Directly after the first day. The Hebrew “on the morrow after the Sabbath,” translated by the LXX in Lev. 23:11 by ἐπαύριον τῆς πρώτης though in v. 15 by ἐπαύριον τῶν σαββάτων, is said to have been diversely interpreted by the Pharisees and Sadducees (see Thackeray on Jos. Ant. iii. 250). The Pharisees, with whom Josephus as well as Philo agrees, understood it to mean the second day of Unleavened Bread. The Sadducees held it to be on the day after the Sabbath, which necessarily occurred at some time in the festal week.
§ 176. (Text of ἀπὸ … μονάδος.) M has ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐκείνης ἡμέρα πεντηκοστὴ καταριθμεῖται ἑβδόμη ἑβδομάς, ἐφʼ αἷς ἱερὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐπισφραγιζομένης μονάδος. Nicetas ἀπὸ γὰρ ἐκείνης τῆς ἡμέρας πεντηκοστὴ ἀριθμεῖται ἑπτὰ ἑβδομάδες ἱερὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐπισφραγιζομένης μονάδος. Nicetas’s text is followed by Mangey with the correction of ἑβδομάδες to -δων. Nicetas’s ἀπὸ is clearly right (see Lev. 23:15, for reckoning Pentecost from the Sheaf) and the question between his τῆς ἡμέρας … ἀριθμεῖται … and M’s ἡμέρα … καταριθμεῖται is unimportant, but his ἑβδομάδες is impossible; Cohn’s correction to ἑβδομάσι agrees, as he says, with the parallel in De Dec. 160, whereas Mangey’s ἑβδομάδων will make the sacred number 49 instead of 50. Cohn’s correction of ἐφʼ αἷς to ἀφέσεως seems to me much more doubtful. In De Cong. 109 which he cites, and a similar passage in De Mut. 228, an allegory is founded on the connexion of “release” with the Jubile of the fiftieth year. Here we are talking of a different feast which, except for the number 50, has no connexion with the Jubile, and there is no further allusion to the idea of release. The corruption of ἑβδόμη ἑβδομὰς ἐφʼ αἷς in M may have arisen (1) by an assimilation of ἑβδομάδες to the singular verb καταριθμεῖται, (2) by a variation of construction between a relative clause and a genitive absolute.
§ 185. Joy is the rational elevation or rising of the soul. This is the regular Stoic definition of χαρά, in contrast with ἡδονή. See S. V. F. iii. 431, 432. Each of the “good emotional states” (εὐπάθειαι) is distinguished from the corresponding πάθος by being εὔλογος. Thus εὐλάβεια (“cautiousness”) is opposed to φόβος as being εὔλογος ἔκκλισις, Diog. Laert. vii. 116.
§ 188. Rules of good economy. Lit. “laws of economic virtue.” According to the Stoics οἰκονομική or the knowledge of what is profitable to the household is an ἀρετή (S. V. F. iii. 267) and only the wise man is οἰκονομικός (ib. 567). So Philo, Quaestio in Gen. iv. 165 “urbanitas (i.e. πολιτική) et oeconomia cognatae sunt virtutes.” Cf. De Ebr. 91.
§ 212. In the scale of ascending powers. I have not found the compound παραύξησις (-άνω) in Plato or Nicomachus meaning “to raise to a higher power.” But the uncompounded verb or noun is common in this sense. So in Rep. 528 B the square is the δευτέρα αὔξη and the cube the τρίτη αὔξησις. In 587 D κατὰ δύναμιν καὶ τρίτην αὔξην seems to mean “by squaring and cubing.” In Nicomachus xi. 15, 9 being thrice 3 by another 3 αὔξεται ἐπʼ ἀλλὸ διάτημα and becomes 27.
§ 228. (Text of καὶ οὐ μόνον … παίδων.) The simplest suggestion I can make for this is to correct λογισμοὺς to λογισμοῖς καὶ. Translate “impressing them on the minds of the children both in the earlier and in the riper stage of youth.” This will make good sense, giving three stages of parental instruction—early childhood, boyhood, and later adolescence. But I lack authority for the antithesis implied between νεάζειν and ἀκμάζειν, and also while λογισμός = “reasoning faculty” or “mind” is quite common in Philo, I have not found it in the plural.
Another difficulty felt by Cohn, that οἱ μὲν just above has no following δὲ, which leads him to suggest that the end of the sentence has been lost, does not seem to be weighty. Philo begins no doubt with thinking of the parents as μέν and the children as δέ, but that he should forget to express the latter formally does not seem unlike him.
§ 232. (The disobedient son.) In Deut. 21 the incorrigible son is brought before the “elders,” after which (LXX) he is denounced to the “men of the city,” who thereupon stone him. Nothing is said of any right of either the “elders” or the “men of the city” to examine the accusation, but the account savours more of a judicial proceeding than Philo’s words suggest. And Heinemann (ad loc. and Bildung, pp. 251) and Goodenough, p. 69 ff., may be right in tracing here the influence of the Roman patria potestas, as also in the doctrine of parental δεσποτεία in the next sentence.
§ 239. Secondly, it would not he suitable … by kinship. Heinemann aptly quotes Seneca, De Beneficiis, iv. 17 “quomodo nulla lex amare parentes … iubet (supervacuum est enim, in quod imus, impelli).”
§ 244. (Penalty for striking a parent.) Heinemann quotes Seneca, Controv. ix. 4 “qui patrem pulsaverit manus ei praecidantur,” which he calls a Roman law and also declares it to come from the Twelve Tables. Goodenough, accepting the first part of this, bases on it an argument that the εὐπάρυφοι of § 244 are definitely Roman officials. Such a law is certainly not found among any of the fragments of the Twelve Tables known to us, but there is no reason to think that it is a Roman law at all. Seneca’s words are no evidence. The laws which form the basis of the several controversiae need not have and do not claim to have any foundation in fact. In this particular case the theme is as follows: The law is supposed to be as stated above. A “tyrant” has commanded two sons to strike their father. One commits suicide rather than do so; the other obeys the command. When the tyrant has fallen or in one version has been killed by the same son, the son is charged under this law and arguments are adduced by the debaters for and against exacting the penalty. The same law with practically the same theme is noted by a scholiast as used by the Greek rhetor Syrianus (Walz, Rhet. Graeci, iv. 467), and, with different themes attached, in the Declamations ascribed to Quintilian 358, 362, 372. Another of Seneca’s Controv. (viii. 2) starts with a law that amputation of the hands is the penalty for sacrilege. Whether these imaginary laws prescribing the mutilation of the offending member (cf. Deut. 25:11, 12, and iii. 175, below) are based on some old tradition, or are the product of the inventiveness of the rhetoricians, it is impossible to say. The only code known to us which assigns this punishment for striking a father is the Babylonian code of Hammurabi (about 2000 B.C.), and this is hardly likely to have influenced either the rhetor or Philo. The common assumption in the schools that such legislation existed or had existed somewhere would be enough to make him embark without further inquiry on a demonstration of its injustice.
§ 259. Each of the other virtues is its own reward. The sentiment is of course implicit in the common Stoic aphorism that virtue is αὐτὴ διʼ αὑτὴν αἱρετός and αὐταρκὴς πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν. The most exact parallel quoted is S. V. F. iii. 45, from Servius, “Stoici dicunt virtutem esse pro praemio si nulla sint praemia.”