APPENDIX TO DE DECALOGO

§ 1. For knowledge loves to learn, etc. As stated in the footnote, the phrasing seems almost impossible. I can find no case where ἐπιστήμη bears a sense which could be coupled with φιλομαθής, or where διάνοια means an understanding which is above knowledge. The translators appear to be at a loss. Treitel has “wegen der auf den tieferen Sinn gerichteten Schriftforschung.” But how can ἐπιστήμη = “Schriftforschung”? Mangey (perhaps translating the conjecture mentioned below) has “reconditae scientiae studio et curiosae.” Yonge (probably translating Mangey) “natural love of more recondite and laborious study.” The emendations mentioned are Mangey’s διʼ ὑπονοιῶν for πρὸς διάνοιαν, and Wendland’s ἐπιστάσεως for ἐπιστήμης. If ἐπίστασις can = “intentio,” this will give some sense, though it would be better if ὑπόνοιαν is accepted for διάνοιαν (ὑπόνοια sing. is used for “allegorizing” in Spec. Leg. ii. 257).

§ 21. The arithmetical, etc. This seems to be very loosely expressed. ἀναλογία does not carry with it the idea of a series like our “progression,” but of an equality of ratio, and indeed it can only be properly (κυρίως) applied, as Nicomachus says, to the geometrical. It certainly cannot itself be said to exceed or be exceeded. Philo has stated it quite clearly in De Op. 108, in much the same words as are used in the translation. Possibly here also we should read ᾗ <ὁ μέσος ὅρος> ὑπερέχει, κτλ.

§ 30. The categories. Philo follows with little variation the two lists given by Aristotle in Topica, i. 9 and Categoriae 4 of the 10 categories. But he carries them away into a very different region from Aristotle’s logical meaning of predicates or “classification of the manners in which assertions may be made of the subject.” His reason for asserting that he has οὐσία, and his view of time and place (in Aristotle πότε and ποῦ) as the indispensables for all existence are quite foreign to Aristotle’s thought, at any rate in drawing up this list.

§ 39. (Text of ὅτε δὲ προστάττων, etc.) Cohn deals with this passage in Hermes, 1903, pp. 502 f., but not very conclusively. The solution he would prefer is to omit ὅτε δὲ and to correct (with one MS.) ἰδίᾳ to ἰδίᾳ δʼ, a change which he bases largely on the improbability of such an hiatus as ἰδίᾳ ὡς. I do not feel competent to estimate the value of this last argument (see remarks on Spec. Leg. i. 90, App. p. 620). The omission of ὅτε δὲ has some support from one MS. (G), which has διαλέγεται ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ προστάττων, κτλ. Of the rest, one has ἑνί, ὅτε δὲ, the others an obvious corruption of this, ἐνίοτε δὲ. No doubt with Cohn’s changes the sentence is translatable. He, however, says that he cannot see the sense of τῶν ἐμφερομένων, which he justly remarks cannot mean, as Mangey takes it, “eorum qui adsunt.” I think the sense given in the translation, which will also fit in with the form suggested by Cohn, does not present much difficulty. In the kind of oration which Philo has in mind definite instruction as to the steps to be taken (τὰ πρακτέα) would be only part of the contents.

§ 54. They call air Hera. This is first suggested by Plato, Cratylus 404 c (ἀήρ being an anagram of ἥρα) and was adopted by the Stoics. See particularly Diog. Laert. vii. 147, where Hera is the name given to the divine power in virtue of its extension (διάτασις) to the air, as Athena, Poseidon, Hephaestus and Demeter represent its extension to aether, sea, fire and earth. For other references see Index to S. V. F. So also Philo, De Vit. Cont. 3, where the name is supposed to be derived παρὰ τὸ αἴρεσθαι καὶ μετεωρίζεσθαι εἰς τὸ ὕψος.

§ 56. Living on alternate days. Or perhaps as Philo understands it “living (and dying) alternately every day,” which is what the interpretation of the story by the hemispheres requires. So, too, in the other place where he alludes to the story, De Som. i. 150, since the antithesis there is between sleeping and waking. The only other passage where I have found this interpretation is in Sext. Emp. Adv. math. ix. 37 τὰ γὰρ δύο ἡμισφαίρια τό τε ὑπὲρ γῆς καὶ τὸ ὑπὸ γῆν Διοσκούρους οἱ σοφοὶ τῶν τότε ἀνθρώπων ἔλεγον.

§ 77. (Egyptian animal worship.) See Herodotus ii. 65–74. These chapters lay stress chiefly on cats (αἴλουροι) and crocodiles, but ibises and snakes are mentioned also. Juv. xv. 1–7 mentions crocodiles, ibises, apes, dogs and fishes. On these lines Mayor has collected a number of illustrations, among them Philo, Legatio 139, where he speaks very briefly in the same sense as here. Neither Herodotus nor Juvenal mentions wolves and lions, and I see no other allusion to them in Mayor’s quotations.

§ 88. ἐγὼ μέν γε. This is one of the small matters in which an earlier knowledge of the Palimpsest would apparently have led Cohn to alter his reading. His MSS. have μὲν, except M which has μὲν γὰρ, on the strength of which he printed μέν γε. The Palimpsest has μὲν οὖν, which he considers preferable. Unwilling or unable to judge, I have retained μέν γε with this warning.

§ 92. τὰ κενὰ τῶν. This emendation of μὲν αὐτῶν to κενὰ τῶν seems certain and will perhaps support my emendation of the same two words in De Mig. 164, where I have altered them to μελιττῶν.

§ 96. Once a month. The principal passages quoted in support of this are Herod, vi. 57, where he says that the Spartans made offerings to Apollo at every new moon and seventh day of the month, and Hes. Op. 770, where the seventh day is said to be sacred as Apollo’s birthday. Also there are inscriptions in various places where ἑβδομαῖος and ἑβδομαῖον appear as epithets of Apollo or indicating feasts held in his honour. See references in L. & S. (revised).

Ibid. (σελήνην or θεὸν.) Cohn writing in Hermes, 1903, p. 548, before the discovery of the Palimpsest, had declared for σελήνην. His explanation of the corruption to θεὸν is that it arises from the scribes mistaking the astronomical symbol of the moon for Θ̅Ν̅ = θεόν. (This would be convincing if this symbol were as he describes it. On my present information it is rather C, while Θ = the sun.) Prima facie it does not seem impossible that in a country where the opening of the sacred and lunar month has to be distinguished from the civil the phrase “according to the goddess” might have been in such common use that Philo might employ it without much thought or scruple. See note on Spec. Leg. iii. 171. But the discovery that the Palimpsest actually has σελήνην certainly weights the evidence strongly in favour of it.

§ 106. προστάττεται for πρὸς τὰ πέντε, which may be presumed from Cohn’s silence to be the reading of the Palimpsest as well as of the other MSS, is adopted by him on the grounds that ΤΤΕΤΑΙ might easily be corrupted to ΠΕΝΤΕ, and that the Armenian version gives a similar sense “ut videtur.” If this last is clearly established, the emendation may be accepted. Otherwise it is difficult to see why a word like προστάττειν, which perpetually recurs in these treatises, should be corrupted. The reading of G, ἑνοῖ (“unites”) πρὸς τὰ ἕτερα πέντε καὶ συνάπτει τῇ δευτέρᾳ, looks, as he says, like an unsuccessful attempt to emend the passage. Perhaps we might consider as an alternative προστεθέν τε, “last of the first pentad in which are the most sacred things and added to it,” i.e. “an appendage.” Philo often uses προσθήκη with a sense of inferiority, e.g. Spec. Leg. ii. 248, and it would fitly describe the relation of the fifth to the first four commandments.

§ 116. (Filial affection of storks.) The currency of this idea is best shewn by the existence of the verb ἀντιπελαργεῖν = “to return kindness.” Other mentions of it will be found in Aristotle, Hist. Anim. ix. 18, Aristophanes, Av. 1353 ff.; and the φρονιμώτατοι οἰωνοί of Sophocles, El. 1058, “who are careful to nourish those who gave them nurture,” are no doubt the same.

§ 120. Some bolder spirits. One such is Hierocles the Stoic quoted by Stobaeus (Meineke, iii. p. 96), οὓς (sc. γονεῖς) δευτέρους καὶ ἐπιγείους τινὰς θεοὺς οὐκ ἂν ἁμάρτοι τις, ἕνεκά γε τῆς ἐγγύτητος, εἰ θέμις εἰπεῖν, καὶ θεῶν ἡμῖν τιμιωτέρους. Heinemann quotes Dikaiogenes (Fr. 5 Nauck), θεὸς μέγιστος τοῖς φρονοῦσιν οἱ γονεῖς. The ordinary Stoic view is given by Diog. Laert. vii. 120, that parents, brothers and sisters are to be reverenced next to the gods.

§§ 142–146. This disquisition on the four passions is thoroughly Stoic in substance and much of its phraseology is found elsewhere. Thus any passion is a κίνησις ψυχῆς παρὰ φύσιν (S. V. F. iii. 389, and elsewhere). So, too, pleasure is ἔπαρσις ἄλογος (ibid. 391). A passage which closely resembles this is Cic. De Fin. ii. 13 (S. V. F. iii. 404) “(Voluptatem) Stoici … sic definiunt: sublationem animi sine ratione, opinantis se magno bono frui.” πτοία, which Philo associates with fear, is a characteristic of all four; (λέγουσι) πᾶσαν πτοίαν πάθος εἶναι καὶ πᾶν πάθος πτοίαν (ibid. 378), while ἀγωνία is a subdivision of φόβος, defined by Diog. Laert. vii. 112 as φόβος ἀδήλου πράγματος (ibid. 407). Also ἐπιθυμία is often an ὄρεξις, though none of the definitions quoted otherwise agree closely with Philo’s. I have not found any parallels to his idea that desire differs from the others in being more voluntary.

For a shorter definition of the four see Mos. ii. 139.

§ 147. (Text at end of section.) Cohn in his description of the Palimpsest has an interesting if not quite convincing theory about this. In place of ἀμαυροῦνται καὶ θροῦ the Palimpsest has in the main body of the text ὁμάδου τε καὶ θροῦ beginning the next sentence, while ἀμαυροῦνται is set in smaller writing on the margin. Cohn’s view is that ὁμάδου τε is the original text, and was corrupted in one or more MSS. to ἀμαυροῦνται, which was then set in others such as the Palimpsest as a marginal variant and finally ousted the real words. One may perhaps accept his theory about the corruption of ὁμάδου τε to ἀμαυροῦνται, which as he says is not indispensable to the construction, but his other argument that ὁμάδου τε is wanted to correspond to ὀφθαλμοί τε in the previous sentence seems questionable. “Both … and” are expressed by τε … καί, as well as by τε … τε.

§ 158. τὸ περὶ τῆς ἑβδομάδος. While there would be no great difficulty in this passage, where the virtues of the number are so prominent, in taking ἑβδομάς as = “the number seven,” there can be no doubt that Philo does sometimes use it for the seventh day See notes on Quis Rerum 170, where we have ἀπραξία ascribed to it, and Mos. i. 205, where οὐδὲν ἐφεῖται δρᾶν ἐν αὐτῇ, i.e. on ἱερὰ ἑβδομάς. So, too, Jos. Contra Apion. ii. 282 τῆς ἑβδομάδος ἣν ἀργοῦμεν ἡμεῖς. This use is ignored in L. & S. (revised), which indeed has expunged the entry of older editions, “The seventh day, Eccl.”

On the other hand, ἑβδόμη below appears to be used for ἑβδομάς, as also in Spec. Leg. ii. 40 τῆς ἐν ἀριθμοῖς ἑβδόμης, and there are other instances in earlier treatises, where clearly the number and not the seventh day is under consideration, e.g. De Op. 116, De Post. 64. I leave to experts to consider whether a confusion of the two words may have been produced by varying interpretations of ζʹ.

§ 159. ἱερομηνία. Except in Mos. ii. 23, where he is apparently referring to pagan use, Philo consistently uses this word to denote the first of Tishri or Feast of Trumpets (New Year’s day in the civil year). Whether this usage is in accordance with its regular meaning in classical Greek is not clear to me. The general opinion seems to be that there it indicates a period during which, as stated in the note on Mos. loc. cit., hostilities or legal proceedings are forbidden, not a particular day. See Dict. of Ant. and L. & S. (revised), where it is only given two meanings, “sacred month during which the great festivals were held and hostilities suspended,” and (in the plural) “sacrifices offered during the sacred month.” On the other hand Stephanus gives examples from Harpocration, Scholiasts, etc., which assert that it means a festal day, and that is what is suggested in Mos. loc. cit., where it is contrasted with the single day fast of the Jews.

A scholiast on Pind. Nem. iii. 2, who says that ἱερομηνία is an abbreviation κατὰ σύντμησιν of ἱερονουμηνία “because the beginnings of months are sacred to Apollo,” expresses, whatever his authority may be worth, the idea which had occurred to me in connexion with Spec. Leg. i. 180. I refer these points to the lexicographer. The entry in L. & S. is clearly inadequate.