As stated in the Preface the fragments from the De Providentia recorded by Eusebius stand on a different footing from the extracts from the Hypothetica, in that not only they but the whole treatise of which they are a part exist in an Armenian version. It consists of two books, both cast at any rate originally in the form of a dialogue between Philo who maintains the belief that the world is governed by Providence and one Alexander who puts forth his doubts and difficulties. This Alexander may be taken with fair certainty to be Philo’s nephew Alexander Tiberius, who afterwards apostatized from Judaism.
As Eusebius’s extracts are all drawn from the second book we need not trouble with the much shorter first book. It will be enough to record Wendland’s verdict without necessarily accepting it entirely. It amounts to this. It has been worked over by a clumsy hand which has destroyed the interlocutory setting, and torn the thoughts away from their essential order; it includes two large Christian interpolations, but otherwise is genuinely Philonic. The second book, which is twice the length, has no such difficulties. The dialogue is clearly maintained throughout. There is nothing which suggests interpolation and the parallelism both of thought and language, at any rate in the part of which the original is preserved by Eusebius, gives overwhelming evidence of its genuineness. This is particularly true of the first part of the second fragment. It is very remarkable therefore that it is more devoid of traces of Judaism than even the Quod Omn. Prob. and the De Aet. There are no allusions to the O.T., and no mention of Moses; the one and only fact which suggests that the writer is a Jew is the personal allusion to his visit to Jerusalem via Ascalon (§ 64). This has naturally raised doubts in the minds of critics who have not made themselves thoroughly familiar with Philo’s thoughts and diction, but Wendland’s searching analysis and collection of the parallels can hardly fail to carry conviction to the most sceptical, and even without this any fairly careful reader of Philo will constantly feel, as he goes through the Greek of the De Providentia, that he has seen something like this before though he cannot exactly say where it is to be found.
Eusebius has recorded something like two-thirds of Philo’s answers to Alexander’s argument but of the argument itself only the first section of this text, and even this he represents as if it were a statement by Philo himself of the objections which opponents might adduce—there are occasional uses of a second person singular but otherwise there is hardly anything to suggest a dialogue.
The omission of the opponent’s case is not seriously felt either in the short extract given here as Fragment (1), or in the long answer to the argument that Providence, if it exists, treats the good too badly and the bad too well. For this is a difficulty felt in every age and probably found in every literature from Job and Asaph onwards. Philo was able to manipulate, even if he did not entirely invent, the part which Alexander plays, and he does not seem to have treated his opponent fairly in making him quote as examples of the good fortune of the wicked Polycrates, who was finally impaled, and Dionysius, whose life of perpetual anxiety was proverbial. In the second part of this extract things are rather different and the suppression of Alexander’s difficulties makes the discourse seem disjointed. The references for instance to the country of the Cyclopes, to the habits of swallows, snakes and crocodiles seem a chaotic ramble until we turn to the argumentation to which they are an answer.
For the full understanding of this part of the extract the earlier part of the Armenian version is invaluable. What is its value in the part where the Greek and Armenian stand side by side? As a translation, not much, nor would it be very much, even if Aucher’s Latin was always intelligible, or if we were sure that he had always rendered the Armenian accurately. But in deciding the text it has a value which seems to have been ignored by the editors of the Praeparatio. Where the Latin corresponds closely to the Greek there is often some word or phrase which clearly points to a variant from the text of all or most of the mss. of Eusebius and constitutes an important independent authority. Several examples of this will be found in the notes.
What was said in the introduction to Quod Omn. Prob., that it may probably be ascribed to an earlier stage in Philo’s spiritual life when his mind was more occupied with Greek philosophy and he had not yet settled down to his great task of interpreting the Pentateuch in the light of that philosophy, may be said of this treatise and also of the De Aet. if that is his work.
The following is an analysis of the extracts:
First fragment—The Divine artist in creating the Cosmos may be held to have accomplished what human artists aim at, namely, to use exactly the right amount of matter.
Second fragment—Alexander says that the wicked as a rule fare best and the good fare worst and that this shows that human life is not governed by Providence (1). Philo replies that if God does not at once punish the wicked it is on the same principle as that a father does not at once cast off a profligate son (2–6). Also that the wicked are never really happy (7–8). The external goods valued by men are not valued by God or by the wise (9–10). Gold and silver are but lumps of earth though we fight for their possession (10–12). So with clothes, so with reputation (13). Bodily strength (14). Beauty (15). All these the true philosopher despises (16). The physician who is called in to attend a king does not waste time in admiring the royal trappings but goes straight to his patient (17). So, too, the physician of the soul should treat spiritual maladies and not be dazzled by external things or misled by the judgement of the evil world (18–20). It is no wonder therefore that the sages defied poverty (21) and the ill-treatment they receive is a necessary consequence of the moral atmosphere around them, even as the rain falls upon the just and the unjust (22–23). Alexander has cited the cases of Polycrates and the elder Dionysius. Polycrates’ ultimate fate and his life of anxiety is an answer to this (24–25). And so too with Dionysius—witness the stories of his suspicions of his wife (26–28) and of Damocles (29–30). This is followed by general reflections on the mental sufferings sustained by such as these (30–32). The fate of the Phocian leaders who robbed the temple at Delphi shows that Heaven sometimes sends an immediate punishment for sin (33–34). And if tyrants sometimes remain unpunished we must remember first that God’s judgement of their deserts are surer than ours (35–36) and also that they may be ministers sent to purge a sinful land, just as he sends pestilence and the like for the same purpose (37–42).
In the second part of this discourse he deals first with the disasters caused by natural phenomena, such as storms. All these are explained on the theory of “attendant circumstances” on the primary works of nature which are rightly regarded as providential (43–46). At the same time these attendant circumstances may be indirectly useful and illustrations of this are given (47–50). Phenomena which we do not understand, at any rate give an opportunity for research which is in itself valuable (51–52). The same applies to earthquakes and pestilences which are not to be regarded as Divine judgement (this seems to contradict 41). And that some even of the just should suffer from them is as inevitable as their participation in the dangers of a storm (53–55). Other points which Alexander has raised are then dealt with. The existence of savage beasts is no reflection on Providence. Hunting them develops courage and the less courageous can easily guard against them if they are reasonably careful (56–58). Reptiles if generated from putrefaction may be classed as “attendant circumstances” (59), if generated in the ordinary way they may be accounted for on the grounds that their poisons are useful in compounding drugs and also it is suggested that they are sent as ministers of punishment (60–61). Alexander had also made a point of their hiding in houses, which Philo denies. At any rate if they sometimes do so it is the accumulation of rubbish which brings them (62). He also asked why Providence made the swallow frequent houses while the birds which we eat keep away. Philo replies that the swallows know that men will not hurt them, and illustrates this by the habits of the pigeons at Ascalon where they may not be eaten, and the crocodiles in parts where they are held in honour by the Egyptians (63–65). Alexander contrasted the fertility according to Homer of the land of the unjust Cyclopes with the barrenness of Greece, the country of the wise. The story of the Cyclopes, says Philo, is a fable and the dry climate of Greece though bad for the vegetation is good for intellect (66–68). Again he asks, why should Providence create animals and scents, both of which pander to luxury? Philo replies that we need not eat animal flesh and that scents of flowers have other uses (69–71). He concludes by saying that he thinks he has given a satisfactory answer to Alexander’s difficulties.