APPENDIX TO DE FUGA ET INVENTIONE
§ 8. There are people who fashion, etc. Has Philo in mind Phaedo 96 B ff., where Socrates contrasts, or seems to contrast, the views of earlier philosophers, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Heracleitus, etc., with the higher thought suggested to him by Anaxagoras’s dictum? Certainly there is no close resemblance between these theories, as noted there, and the views mentioned by Philo here, but he might perhaps without much difficulty have regarded the negation of a final cause implied in the former as the deification of some original ὕλη.
§§ 11–13. Jacob’s expostulation with Laban is interpreted as an argument against the earlier philosophers who assumed an evolution in creation. On the contrary, he asserts, everything was made as it was to be, and had its ποιόν from the first. The counterpart of this in the story is the protest of Jacob in Gen. 30:25-end, which results in his claiming the marked (ἐπίσημα) animals for himself, and leaving the ἄσημα to Laban. (In E.V. these are respectively the stronger and the feebler.)
For the Stoic equation of ποιόν with εἶδος and the maintenance of its identity throughout cf. S. V.F. ii. 395.
§ 16. Names. Mangey, who suggested, not very helpfully, γένεσι, pointed out that there is nothing in the actual names of Leah and Rachel which suggests freedom. Possibly the thought may be that ἀσκητικαὶ δυνάμεις, with stress on ἀσκ., are essentially free, but this seems strained. Mr. Whitaker had put “their standing,” probably supposing that the allusion is to the freedom they have gained from Laban’s control, as expressed in their speech. Possibly again “in the terms they use,” or “their language,” ὀνόματα being sometimes used for “words” in general as well as for “names,” and this would at least give a good antithesis to ἐνθυμήμασι. But both these postulate an unnatural meaning for the word. If we suppose a corruption ταῖς ὀρμαῖς would be a possible correction.
§§ 25 ff. Fleeing from Esau.—Philo’s views on this are perplexing. We shall perhaps best understand them by remembering that he keeps passing from the internal to the external danger, from the Esau within us to the Esau without. In §24 Esau is definitely the inward enemy. In §§25 ff. he may be either or both, but the temptation to make this topic an occasion for one of those “diatribes” or “commonplaces” which he enjoys so much, though to us they may seem to be unworthy interruptions of the argument, carries him away till by § 28 it is clearly the outward φαῦλος. This enemy is to be met by a judicious and benevolent use of the good things of life, and after exhausting this subject Philo returns quite clearly in § 39 to the inward conflict. The advice of Patience for this, though given in a very different style, is practically the same. He who is not yet fitted for the highest life must accommodate himself to the lower conditions and make the best possible use of them.
In De Mig. 210–212 the danger is at the start said to be “either in thyself or in another person.” We then pass on to language which if literally taken seems to leave “thyself” out of the question and to inculcate a degrading subservience to another. But as stated in the footnote to that passage, I believe that the thought is really the same as here, and that the principle of accommodation to the facts of life is parabolically compared to the insincere subservience of the worldly-wise. The long diatribe in De Som. ii. 80–92 must no doubt be reckoned with. But here Philo is dealing with a very different subject, εὐλάβεια, and his advice can hardly be said to contain anything degrading, unless it is the description of Abraham’s dealings with the children of Heth, §§ 89–90. But is not this also a parable of the same kind as I have supposed in De Mig.? Both parables may in a sense be compared to that of the Unjust Judge.
§ 26. τῶν εἰρημένων. The translation suggested in the footnote seems preferable, not only because τῶν εἰρ. more naturally refers to something further back, though it is perhaps sometimes used of something in the immediate neighbourhood, but because Philo frequently uses τὰ ποιητικὰ ἧς ἡδονῆς. See e.g. Leg. All. ii. 107 τὰ ποιητικὰ αὐτῆς (i.e. ἡδονῆς), χρυσὸς ἄργυρος δόξα τιμαί ἀρχαὶ, where, however, δόξα and τιμαί are ranked as ποιητικά, not as here as products. See also index to S. V. F. on ποιητικά and τελικά.
§ 31. δεξιότης. L. & S. 1927 have added “kindliness, courtesy,” to their earlier “cleverness,” etc., and refer to Philo ii. 30, i.e. De Abr. 208. There and in the other two of the four passages where I have noted the word this is suitable. But here the usage is somewhat wider. Philo’s use of the word seems to extend to gentlemanly behaviour of any kind.
§ 42. πεῖσμα. Wendland suspects this word. But its use in this sense, though perhaps not common, is well supported. Here Philo is evidently led to it by the desire to accumulate names in -μα in antithesis to ἀνάθημα, and having once used it here was perhaps encouraged to use it again in § 114, where it seems to have the same meaning. Elsewhere it has the commoner sense of “cable.”
§ 45. δόγμασιν * * * οὗτος. Wendland, after giving Mangey’s note in which, reading ἐπιμένοντα. For -τι, he suggested the insertion of προτρέπουσι or some similar word to complete the sense, adds “sed plura desunt”; i.e. he considered that not only was something needed to shew what happens to the Lover of Discipline, but also an explanation of the Brother of Rebecca to lead up to οὗτος. This is perhaps the most probable view, but I do not think it is certain that there is any lacuna, or indeed any correction needed at all. If οὗτος is referred to βίος, the statement that while the resources of ordinary life are a danger to the fool, this ordinary life is to the man of discipline the testing-ground and therefore the brother of persistence, makes good enough sense. We have to set against it the distance of βίον from οὗτος, and that we should rather have expected ταῦτα.
Mangey’s suggestion implies that the Lover of Discipline, who presumably is the person sent to the Brother of Persistence, is here identified with that Brother. This also, though confusing, is perhaps not impossible. But if so, the simplest emendation would be οὔχ, ὅς for οὗτος, i.e. the resources of life are a danger to the fool, but not so to the Man of Persistence, who is the Brother of Rebecca. Or perhaps οὔ, τῷ οὗ νοῦς, i.e. while the mind of the fool is the Syrian, the mind of the Lover of Discipline is the other Laban, which is not unduly elated.
§ 62. Removed … from the Divine Company. Wendland notes this and the similar phrase in § 74 as alluding to Phaedrus 247 A φθόνος γὰρ ἔξω θείου χοροῦ ἵσταται. The same thought has already appeared in Leg. All. i. 61, iii. 7. Philo, however, does not use it here in the sense of the original, which means that the Divine Company cannot feel envy. In Spec. Leg. ii. 249 he definitely quotes it and with the proper meaning. So also Quod Omnis Prob. 13.
§ 75. Space entirely filled by a body. This is in accordance with the Stoic definition. A τόπος must be completely filled by σῶμα; if partially filled it remains a χώρα. See S. V. F. ii. 504 f.
§ 82. This quotation from the Theaetetus follows almost immediately on the passage cited in § 68. Each of them is, I think, considerably longer than any citation from Plato to be found elsewhere, and the former is the only passage in this series of treatises in which he gives a reference to the dialogue quoted. The curious way in which in this second passage he disguises the fact that he is practically continuing an earlier quotation might suggest that he took both passages from some collection and did not know the reference for the latter, but probably it may be regarded as merely one of his mannerisms.
§ 101. Placed nearest, etc. Or “set up,” ἀφιδρυμένος, in accordance with the common use of ἀφίδρυμα for an image, carrying on the thought of εἰκών. Drummond translates ἐγγ. ἀφ. by “the nearest model to,” but if by this is meant the “closest reproduction of,” the phraseology of μηδενὸς ὄντος μεθορίου διαστήματος seems strange. Wendland’s ἐφιδρυμένος seems to me pointless.
§ 114. ἄθεον. To expunge this word as inappropriate seems to me rather hypercritical; that polytheism is essentially atheism is a natural remark. In fact Philo has made a very similar if not identical observation in De Ebr. 110, where the MSS. have τὸ γὰρ πολύθεον ἐν ταῖς τῶν ἀφρόνων ψυχαῖς ἀθεότητα, after which Wendland supplies κατασκευάζει, but Mangey’s ἀθεότης is quite possible.
§ 134. “Breath” or “spirit.” It seems impossible to get any satisfactory equivalent for the Stoic πνεῦμα, “a stuff or body akin to the element of air, but associated with warmth and elasticity” (Arnold); see note on Quis Rerum 242. For the term as applied to νοῦς cf. De Som. i. 30. I have not seen other examples in Philo or elsewhere, but it is very commonly applied to ψυχή, e.g. Diog. Laert. vii. 157, where Zeno is said to define ψυχή as πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον. For the idea that πνεῦμα is ὑγρότερον καὶ ψυχρότερον in plants, ξηρότερον καὶ θερμότερον in animals, see S. V. F. ii. 787 ff.
§ 150. In the shorter form of the allegory in De Mut. 134 f. the pledges are given a different meaning. This is natural because there Judah is no longer the human soul wooing virtue, but God Himself impregnating the soul. Consequently the pledges are not the attributes which constitute human virtue, but those which belong to God’s working in the universe.
§ 177. The reasoning habit. Or “the acquisition of the reasoning faculty.” Since in the section where Philo deals with πηγή in the sense of παιδεία this phrase does not recur, it would seem that he regards the two as more or less synonymous. This agrees with his use of λογικὴ ἕξις in Leg. All. i. 10 where it is applied to the mental condition of children when they first begin to reason. The use of it in Leg. All. iii. 210 is somewhat similar.
§ 191. ῥύσις or ῥυείς. The chief objection to ῥυείς is that it involves referring οὗτος in the next sentence to προφορικὸς λόγος, whereas it is clear that the “great deluge” is the ῥύσις of all the senses (and the mind). If ῥύσις is read, γοῦν would be taken, as not unfrequently, as transitional to the development of the ῥύσις is of the text, which up to now has only been treated incidentally. It would be better perhaps in this case, though not necessary, to read ἀκώλυτος.
§ 200. This defective sentence seems to need something which will give a forcible contrast to the actual unretentiveness described in the next sentence. I suggest κεί φρενὶ … ταμιεύεσθαι ἔστι, i.e. they require the inpouring even if they can hold it (which they can’t). Variants of this might be κἂν … ᾗ or εἰ εἴη, in the latter case the εἰ clause being the protasis to ἣ γένοιτʼ ἂν … in the sense of “which would (rather than “must”) be the result, if only …” Dr. Rouse suggests ἃ δεῖ for καί, which will give much the same sense, but would, I think, require the omission of τά before παραδοθέντα.