APPENDIX TO DE EBRIETATE
§ 2. Sometimes he gives opposite orders. In Numb. 6:3 the Nazarite during the period of his vow is forbidden wine. In v. 20 the LXX has “he shall drink it,” which Philo takes for a command.
§ 4. The MS. text, as Adler points out, gives better sense than Wendland’s correction (following Mangey). It is difficult to give any meaning to “the gladness which embraces the rest,” and below ἐπιθυμία is the cause of ἀπληστία, not, as Wendland would make it, a synonym.
§ 12. For the reading ἐκδιδοῦσαι see Adler, Wiener Studien 44, p. 220. Apart from its superior MS. authority, it makes better sense; ἀπαιδευσία is not the source of all actions, as the other reading implies.
§ 14. Riotous liver. The odd word συμβολοκοπῶ, which is apparently only found in the LXX and Apocrypha, is rightly enough traced by Philo to the συμβολαί or contributions which the feaster paid. The origin of the depreciatory suffix -κοπ … is obscure. Philo attempts to account for it after his usual manner in 23. Other similar formations are φαντασιοκοπεῖν, δωροκοπεῖν, πορνοκοπεῖν.
§ 21. Complete irregularity of life. Philo several times uses ἐκδιαίτησις and its verb for the rejecting of what is required by the moral sense of the community. Thus the setting up of the golden calf is felt by the tribe of Levi to be an ἐκδιαίτησις, De Spec. Leg. iii. 126, and violation of the Sabbath may become ἀρχὴ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐκδιαιτήσεως, De Som. ii. 123. The verb has occurred in De Gig. 21.
§ 30. “Father and mother,” etc. I.e. the terms may be used in the figurative sense given in this section, or in the other figurative sense given in 33, as well as literally. Or possibly the meaning of the sentence may be that, while in the text from Deuteronomy the father and mother are grouped together, as acting in concert, their functions are really different.
§ 31. Obtained. The LXX has ἔκτισε instead of ἐκτήσατο. Ryle (Philo and Holy Scripture, p. 296) points out that Philo’s word is a more accurate translation of the Hebrew and is actually used by Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotion. He suggests that ἔκτισε may have resulted from a corrupt ἐκτίσατο.
§ 33. The disciples, who have followed in their company. The parable implied is that God and His wisdom are in the truest sense the parents of mankind (as included in the All). Reason and convention have been trained by the divine Pair to be the educators of mankind and thus stand to them in a sense as parents also.
§§ 36–64. The depreciation of the “feminine” element of convention in these sections cannot altogether be reconciled with the high estimate of it in 80–92. The best we can say for it is that Philo regards this “maternal” influence as good or bad, according as it is supported and regulated, or not, by the “paternal.”
§ 42. Is not the Maker, etc. The argument is “God should be known to us from the beginning” (1) because He is the father of all, (2) because He presides at (belongs to) the beginning. It would be stated more logically if we transposed ἀρχηγέτης and ὁ κτίστης, “Is not the Maker of the Universe its ἀρχηγέτης and Father?” Indeed this meaning might be got, though somewhat unnaturally, out of the text as it stands, if we take καὶ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ with ἀρχηγέτης as predicate instead of coupling it with ὁ κτίστης.
§ 48. The timeless also exists in nature. Literally “there are also timeless natures.” Philo is here as often (e.g. De Plant. 120) contrasting the “physical” (in his sense) with the ethical. But the thought is obscure. Perhaps it is something as follows. The dealings of God (here identified with nature) are timeless and therefore the “Practiser” will neglect time-order and look to order in value and thus desire to pass from the lower to the higher (νεώτερος and πρεσβύτερος passing as often from the sense of precedence in time to that of precedence in value).
Ibid. The laws of human character. Or the department of thought which deals with human conduct; ἠθοποιός, literally “forming conduct” seems here to be used for ἠθικός. Cf. ἠθοποιίαν 92. Wendland wished to read ἠθικός, but the usage, though perhaps rare, is natural enough, as Greek philosophy holds that right conduct must be based on ethics, and conversely that a knowledge of ethics will produce right conduct.
§ 51. This section seems to mean that Philo was familiar with cases where those whose education in the Encyclia had been neglected were at pains to repair the loss in later life. This is perhaps not surprising. The Encyclia, or at least its most important elements γραμματική and rhetoric, were more studied by adults and entered more into the life of the upper classes than our school subjects do with us, and a man might well feel at a loss in good society without them. That Philo regards such a return to the Encyclia as a retrograde step follows from his peculiar view of them. Taken at the proper time, i.e. in boyhood, they are almost indispensable as an introduction to philosophy. Taken later, they are mere vanity and thus at the end of 52 they are equated with “external goods.”
Ibid. Left the right path. Or “missed their way,” “gone where no road is.” The phrase ἀνοδίᾳ χρῆσθαι has occurred in De Agr. 101.
§ 56. Discoursing with herself. Rachel’s answer to Laban is regarded as symbolizing the admission which every reflecting soul must make to itself of its inability to rise up against the “outward goods” which Laban represents. In using διαλόγοις thus, Philo may have been influenced by Plato, Soph. 263 F ὀ μὲν ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν διάλογος ἀνεὺ φωνῆς γιγνόμενος τοῦτʼ αὐτὸ ἡμῖν ἐπωνομάσθη διάνοια.
§ 70. The uttered word. For the Stoic distinction between λόγος προφορικός (speech) and λόγος ἐνδιάθετος (thought) see note on De Gig. 52. The latter, not the former, distinguishes men from animals, for ravens and parrots speak (S.V.F. ii. 135); still speech is nearer to the mind than the senses are.
§ 73. The treatment of the story differs considerably from that in Leg. All. iii. 242, De Post. 183, De Mut. 108. There the woman is pleasure or passion and the man is ignored; and the piercing through the “mother-part” is to prevent her engendering further evil. Here the woman is the belief which ascribes causation to creation itself, the man the ideas or reasonings based on this belief, and the piercing through the womb is to show that no real power of bearing belongs to creation. Philo is of course assisted by δόξα being feminine, and λογισμός masculine.
§ 74. Adler aptly supports the MS. reading by τοῖς κοίνοις ἀνθρώπων ἔθεσιν ἁλίσκονται 68. But it must be admitted that this use of πρός for “belonging to” “like” is strange, if not, as Wendland says, impossible. Such phrases as πρὸς γυναῖκός ἐστι (regularly followed by the verb “to be,” expressed or understood) are hardly parallel.
§ 84. For if you have learnt … mother. Adler points out that these words also as well as the quotation which follows are reminiscent of Proverbs. Cf. 1:8, “My son, hear the instructions of thy father and forsake not the laws (LXX μὴ ἀπώσῃ θεσμούς) of thy mother.”
§ 88. Art of arts. So ἀρετή is a τέχνη περὶ ὅλου τοῦ βίου (S.V.F. iii. 560, where we have the Stoic doctrine that the wise man does all things which he undertakes well).
§ 95. Aggressor in wickedness. The exact meaning of προσεπιβαίνειν is doubtful; clearly it is an antithesis to imitating their virtue. Perhaps “to go further and trample on them.” Mangey translated it by “praevaricari.”
Ibid. Vanity most honoured among the Egyptians. I.e. Apis, which Philo identifies with the Calf of Ex. 32. He is also thinking of Aaron’s words in v. 4. The phrase “vanity of the Egyptians” recurs several times in Philo, generally with allusion to this incident.
§ 96. And he said. I.e. Moses, as the interpretation shows; see next note.
§ 98. Personal experience … the one who watches the course of events. In this interpretation Joshua and Moses apparently represent two aspects of the man’s self. He feels the inward tumult, and then the reasoning side of his nature (the Moses in us) interprets the true cause. This reasoning side is identified with the Holy Word in 104.
§ 113. The full text of Numb. 21:17–18 should be compared with Philo’s interpretation. ἐξάρχετε αὐτῳ φρέαρ· ὤρυξαν αὐτὸ ἄρχοντες, ἐξελατόμησαν αὐτὸ βασιλεῖς ἐθνῶν ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ αὐτῶν, ἐν τῷ κυριεῦσαι αὐτῶν. The ἐξάρχετε of this is reproduced by ἐξάρχει in the previous section, and a comparison with De Vita Mosis i. 256 suggests that he interprets ὤρυξαν by searching for or finding wisdom (ἀναζητῆσαι, in V.M. εὕρεσις) and ἐλατόμησαν by building it up (κατεργάσασθαι, in V.M. κατασκευή), while “conquered” represents ἐν τῷ κυριεῦσαι αὐτῶν.
§§ 114–118. In the original the captains have made the roll-call of their men and no one has failed to answer (διαπεφώνηκεν). In the allegory the aspirants to spiritual power (this is based on the description of them as καθεσταμένοι εἰς τὰς χιλιαρχίας τῆς δυνάμεως, v. 48) make themselves masters (εἰλήφασι) of the opposing forces of false courage. These, under the influence of the higher nature, are reduced to the mean, i.e. true courage, and thus none “is at discord.” This, which, though not the meaning of the LXX, is the natural meaning of the word, serves to connect the passage with the other songs of victory. Cf. De Conf. 55.
This rendering assumes the “captains” to be the antecedent of οὕς. It would make better sense to make λόγους the antecedent, for then πολεμικούς would be equated with the πολεμιστῶν of Numbers. We should have, however, then to take δυσὶν ἀντιτεταγμένους τέλεσιν as “arranged in two battalions”—an unnatural use of the dative.
§ 115. Two battalions. Combined with this military sense of τέλος there is perhaps the thought of the philosophical sense “purposes,” “motives.”
§ 132. Copies. It will be observed that εἰκόνες is used in a different sense to that of 134. The literal tabernacle and altar are both εἰκόνες (or symbols) of their spiritual counterparts. The spiritual altar is an εἰκών of the spiritual temple in the philosophical sense of the theory of ideas. But perhaps ταῦτα stands for the phenomenal world in general, in which case we have the philosophical use or something like it.
§ 134. This section seems to the translator to raise difficult questions which he is unable to answer with any confidence, and leaves to some more accomplished Platonist. The tabernacle is generic virtue, the altar is the particular virtues, which one would naturally suppose to be the ordinary four, justice, temperance, etc. In what sense are these (a) perceptible by the senses yet (b) never actually perceived by them? The answer to (a) may perhaps be that by the particular virtues he does not mean the specific virtues in the abstract, but the manifestations of them in particular persons. This will agree with De Cher. 5, where the particular and specific virtues (ἐν μέρει καὶ κατʼ εἶδος) are contrasted with generic virtue, and then these particular virtues are defined as “virtues in the I,” and therefore perishable, because the “I” is perishable! If this is so, what is the answer to (b)? Is it that while these virtues are conceivable in the individual, they are never realized? This hardly seems satisfactory.
The question between ἰδέας acc. plur. (Wendland and Cohn) and ἰδέας gen. sing. (Adler) may be argued as follows. For the acc. it may be said that Philo uses the word in a loose sense for the νοητὰ θεωρήματα of 132. Both generic and specific virtues belong to a different order of things from the material altar and tabernacle. Or again, if Philo means the specific virtues in the abstract, are not these also ἴδεαι, as well as the generic, which is their ἰδέα? On the other hand, the genitive is strongly suggested by the antithesis to αἰσθητὴ εἰκών and the similar antithesis in 137.
§ 142. Right reason which is identical with law. This glorification of νόμος is definitely Stoic; see S.V.F. iii. 613.
§ 146. παρακινεῖν. As Adler points out, Philo is thinking of Phaedrus 249 D, where the truly inspired (ἐνθουσιάζων) is reproved by the many as παρακινῶν.
§ 150. Hard day. Adler’s suggestion that ἡμέρα means “(and at the same time) easy” finds some support in the quotation from Hesiod. But there is no such suggestion in the varlet’s words. It must be remembered that Philo found the phrase in the LXX and did not invent it. We need not suppose that he gave ἡμέρα any definite meaning, or again he may have interpreted it as “a day’s journey.” And if he really found in it any such edifying suggestion, as Adler supposes, he would surely have enlarged upon it.
§ 157. Reason … unreason. The translator is baffled, as often, by the way in which Philo combines and intertwines λόγος as “reason” or “thought” with λόγος as “speech.” He is working out the idea of soul-sight (intuition) and soul-hearing (learning by instruction). The latter may be equated with λόγος “reason,” but as we learn through words it may also be equated with λόγος “word” and this is indicated by the antithesis of τοῖς λεγομένοις and τὰ ὄντα in § 158.
§ 158. Mis-seeing or mis-hearing. Cf. S.V.F. iii. 548 ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ παρορᾶν οὐδὲ παρακούειν νομίζουσι τὸν σοφόν.
§ 170. There are many reasons for this. Here begins Philo’s version of the “tropes of Aenesidemus,” see Anal. Intr. pp. 314 f. It should be noted that Philo omits two of the ten tropes, as they are stated by Sextus Empiricus (Pyrrh. Hyp. i. 36 f.) and Diogenes Laertius ix. 79–88. These two are (a) the differences in the sensations produced by different senses in the same individual, e.g. honey is pleasant to the taste, but unpleasant to the eye, (b) the different feelings produced by the same recurrence according to its rarity or frequency, e.g. when earthquakes are common they do not cause any excitement.
Ibid. In the first place. The first trope is called by Sextus (Pyrrh. Hyp. i. 36) “that of the variety in animals” (ὁ παρὰ τὴν τῶν ζῴων ἐξαλλαγήν), the argument being that, as animals are constructed so differently, we must suppose that the impressions which the same object gives them are different.
§ 172. Those who form judgements. The tropes were classified according as the difference of impressions arises from something in the subject who forms the impression (τὸ κρῖνον) or from the object which creates the impression (τὸ κρινόμενον), or from both combined (Sextus, ibid. 38). The first, second, and third as given by Philo belong to the first class, the fifth to the second, and the other four to the third.
§§ 172–174. The introduction of these examples, which have no parallel in Sextus or Diogenes, is quite illogical. Clearly there is no suggestion that the polypus, chameleon, and elk receive different impressions. If germane at all they should come under the trope of “position” etc. (181) But with the exception of the dove’s neck, the examples have no bearing on the argument, since these changes of “camouflage” are supposed to be actual changes. Philo, or the source from which he drew, was attracted by the interest of these supposed changes in the animal world and could not refrain from noticing them in a passage which deals with animals. That the illogicality did not altogether escape him is shown by his remarking that they belong to the κρινόμενα, not to the κρίνοντα.
§ 173. The dove’s neck. A common example with the “bent oar” of an illusion (see Reid on Acad. ii. 79). Sextus (ibid. 120) and Diogenes ix. 86 rightly give it under “position,” but ascribe the change to the way the neck is turned (Lucr. ii. 801, like Philo, to the sun’s ray).
§ 175. Impossibility of apprehension. This leading term of the Sceptics, properly speaking, applies to the object which cannot be apprehended, but came to signify their general doctrine. Hicks (Diog. Laert. ix. 61) translates it “agnosticism.”
Ibid. Secondly. The second trope, called by Sextus ὁ παρὰ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφοράν (ibid. 79). While the variety in animals was a prima facie ground for thinking that the animal man was liable to a similar instability of impressions, this is supposed to need special proof, which this trope gives.
Ibid. Not only do their judgements. I.e. of the same people. Wendland’s proposed insertion of οἱ αὐτοὶ in contrast to ἕτεροι is unnecessary, though “the same” is implied. The changes in animals just mentioned being all in the same animal, suggest that there are analogous mental changes in individual men. This, however, belongs to the third trope and is only mentioned in passing, before we pass to the subject of the second trope.
§ 176. ἑπισπασάμενοι seems elsewhere, as in De Gig. 44, to suggest using influence or force to attract. Adler’s ἀσπασάμενοι would be more natural; but there is hardly sufficient reason for the change. Perhaps ἐπασπασάμενοι. The word is only quoted from the 6th century A.D., but there are such things as ἅπαξ εἰρημένα in Philo.
§ 178. The third trope (Sextus’s fourth), called by him ὁ παρὰ τὰς περιστάσεις, ibid. 100.
§ 181. The fourth trope (fifth in Sextus, who uses the same phrase as here, ὁ παρὰ τὰς θέσεις καὶ τὰ διαστήματα καὶ τοὺς τόπους), ibid. 119. For positions or attitudes (θέσεις), i.e. of the object itself, Sextus gives the dove’s bent neck, and Philo’s swimming fish perhaps come under this head. For surroundings (τόποι), Sextus gives the bent oar and also the faintness of candle-light in the sun. For distances from the observer (διαστήματα), Sextus gives the varying appearance of a ship at sea.
§ 184. The fifth trope (Sextus’s seventh, ibid. 129, his sixth being taken by Philo in 190). Sextus calls it ὁ παρὰ τὰς ποσότητας καὶ σκευασίας τῶν ὑποκειμένων. It would perhaps be better to translate ἐν τοῖς σκευαζομένοις by “preparations” simply and to omit “relative” and “in the various ingredients” in what follows; also to render συνθέσεσι by “aggregations” rather than “compounds.” Sextus explains that by σκενασίας he means συνθέσεις in general and the examples show that these need not be of more than one substance.
§ 186. The sixth trope (Sextus’s eighth, ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρός τι), ibid. 135.
§ 190. The seventh trope (Sextus’s sixth, ὁ παρὰ τὰς ἐπιμιξίας), ibid. 124.
Ibid. Those which are in accord with nature, etc. I.e. apparently, pleasant or unpleasant. Cf. the definition of pleasure and pain in Timaeus 64 D. But the epithet would naturally be applied to the χυλοί in the sense of flavours, as in 191, rather than to the “juices of the mouth.” The following point may perhaps be worth consideration. In the parallel in Sextus these mouth-juices are ὕλαι ἐν τοῖς γεύσεως τόποις ὑποκείμεναι. If we read here ἐνστομίων <ὑλῶν> χυλῶν ὅσοι κτλ., i.e. “can we, without the substances in the mouth, tell what flavours are natural and what unnatural?” we should have a text which would easily lend itself to corruption.
§ 193. The eighth and last trope (Sextus’s tenth, stated by him as ὁ παρὰ τὰς ἀγωγὰς καὶ τὰ ἔθη καὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰς μυθικὰς πίστεις καὶ τὰς δογματικὰς ὑπολήψεις), ibid. 145. The first two of them are repeated by Philo in the same words, and the δογματικαὶ ὑπολήψεις appear in 198 ff. But there is nothing corresponding to the μυθικαὶ πίστεις, i.e. the popular superstitions which with the scientific theories of the philosophers are represented by the Sceptics as having such a total want of agreement as to put the coping-stone on the accumulation of evidence for human ἀκαταληψία.
Ibid. Ways of life. We might take ἀγωγαὶ αἱ ἐκ παίδων to mean “systems of education,” but Sextus explains it as αἱρέσεις βίου ἢ πραγμάτων περὶ ἕνα ἢ πολλούς, illustrating it by Diogenes’ asceticism and Spartan discipline.
§ 198. Here begin the δογματικαὶ ὑπολήψεις. The first part of the section bears a considerable resemblance to “Longinus,” De Sublimitate xliv. 3, 4, describing the tyranny of custom, from the cradle (ἐνεσπαργανωμένοι) and the buffeted (κεκονδυλισμένον) condition of the multitude.
§ 199. The opinions here mentioned may be roughly classified as following:
Infinite (Epicurean)—Finite (Stoic).
Created (Stoics and Epicureans)—Uncreated (Peripatetic).
No providence (Epicurean)—Providence (Stoic).
One “good” (Stoic)—Three “goods” (Peripatetic).
§ 206. Gluttony. This represents the ἀπληστία of 4 and 6.
§ 208. Cup of reconciliation. The phrase ἐπὶ σπονδαῖς combines the idea of pouring wine as cup-bearer (Gen. 40:21) and the common meaning of “on the conditions of a truce.”
§ 213. Lost the organs of generation. For the literal meaning see A.V. ἐκτετμημένῳ πίστιν interprets ἀποκεκομμένος, and παρακαταθήκην etc. interprets θλαδίας.
§ 218. Fine bouquet. The adj. ἄνθιμος or ἄνθινος is explained by Hesychius and the Scholiast as meaning (a) flavoured with herbs or flowers, (b) smelling like flowers. The latter is more suitable here.
§ 221. Cavities, or “stomachs,” a use of ὄγκος not given in the dictionaries, but found in Plutarch, Mor. 652 E and elsewhere (see Wyttenbach’s index).