We have found that there have been two phases in the status of women in Jewish tradition. The nonpersonal one, essentially determined by the social and economic conditions of an early society, was not much different from what could be observed in the non-Jewish cultures of the time. It was a condition tolerated by the Torah, but not instituted by Torah teaching and Torah values.
The second phase, which we called the personal status of the woman, acknowledged the value and dignity of the female personality. It was taught and demanded by Torah ideals. It even led to halakhic innovations out of concern for the rights and welfare of women. Unfortunately, the second phase did not follow upon the first in historical development. Moreover, the personal status did not arise as a historical reality, especially in the area of religious ritual, after the overcoming of the mores deriving from the conditions that had determined women’s nonpersonal status. The two value systems existed side by side for many centuries, and to some extent even into our own time, without adequate realization that Torah teachings were not being given adequate realization in the daily life of the people.
Most revealing in this respect is the opinion of Rav. He taught: “Do not marry two women [polygamy was still practiced].” Explains Rashi: “Because they join to plot against you.” Rav continues: “However, if you did marry two, also marry a third one.” Once again Rashi explains: “The third one will reveal the plotting of the other two.”1Pesahim 113a.
Yet the same Rav also ruled that even though, according to biblical law, a man has the right to appoint a shaliah (representative) to espouse a wife on his behalf, he should not do so, because the Torah says, “And thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.” What Rav means is that if a man did not see the woman before she became his wife, he might turn out not to like her after the marriage, and then he would be in violation of the commandment to love his neighbor.
In these two sayings of Rav the two systems confirm each other. The Torah teaches: “thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.” But on the other hand, there were also the actual conditions of the lives of the people. The teaching demanding the acknowledgment of the woman’s personal status had not as yet overcome all the consequences of the early impersonal status.
Let us recall some of the examples. According to the Halakhah as stated in the Talmud, women are no less obligated than men to say grace after a meal. Accordingly, woman should have the right to say Birkat ha-Mazon even for men, who would fulfill their own obligation by listening to their reading it for them. Nothing in the Talmud contravenes such a ruling. Yet post-Talmudic codifiers of the Halakhah ruled that women could not act in this manner on behalf of men. As we saw, the reason for such exclusion appears in two forms. One held that women have no part in the obligations that follow from the principle that “all Jews are responsible for each other.” The second, based on the personal status of women (and thus even more objectionable), held that women do not have an adequately respected position to be authorized to perform the religious obligation of saying grace on behalf of men. Even more characteristic is the opinion of Rabbenu Nissim (Ran), who distinguishes between the inclusion of a woman in the required quorum for zimun (the saying of grace jointly, for which three persons are required) and the reading of the Megillah. Women are excluded from zimun, according to him, but he had to acknowledge not only that women have the authority to read the Megillah even for men, but that they may be included in the required quorum for public reading. And now comes the surprising distinction: the blessing before the reading requires no change in its formula, no matter how many people participate in it. Therefore, the text of the blessing will not attract attention to the female presence, whereas zimun in the required quorum of three is added to the regular text of the grace, and thus the presence of a woman would be noted.
In other words, women are excluded from zimun because one must not call attention to their presence. We also noted that notwithstanding the clear fact that on mishnaic authority it is stated that women are obligated to read the Megillah and are qualified to do so, a complicated discussion as to whether women are obligated to read the Megillah is conducted by later post-Talmudic authorities, arguing against the Mishnah’s position on the basis of a Tosefta whose opinion would not normally be accepted.
Finally, we find a compromise solution, not fully recognized in the Shulhan Arukh, that while women are not to read the Megillah themselves, they should listen to its reading. Another compromise solution is that women may read the Megillah to women. Equally remarkable and revealing is Rashi’s opinion that women may not participate in zimun, not even with their husbands, because “the association with them is improper.” Even more surprising is the ruling in the Shulhan Arukh about women putting on tefillin for prayer. The commandment of tefillin, as we have seen, is the foundation for the rule that women are not obligated to fulfill mizvot aseh she-ha-zeman geramah, positive commandments connected with the time of the day, the week, or the season. Yet it was also ruled that if women wish, they may obligate themselves concerning even those commandments. Now come some post-Talmudic authorities, basing themselves on a private post-Talmudic view that women should not be allowed to put on tefillin. And thus the ruling appears in the Shulham Arukh that women should not be permitted to put on tefillin because they are not sufficiently careful about their bodily hygiene.
One cannot help asking how such attitudes and rulings can be reconciled with Torah principles that a man should love his wife as himself and honor her more than himself, or the teaching that a house is blessed mainly because of the wife, and many others in the same spirit. There is only one explanation: in spite of the Torah ideals and teachings, the views about the female personality, and the social conditions that determined them, persisted from the phase of the nonpersonal status of women. If Rashi says that it was not proper to sit together with women to say grace, or the Shulhan Arukh rules, with reference to the menstrual period, that women do not take sufficient care to keep their bodies clean, these were indeed the conditions at those times. Because the mores of the nonpersonal phase persisted, it was indeed difficult to accept the idea that women could read the Megillah for men or were important enough to say grace, for this would have meant that men could fulfill their duties in cooperation with such incomplete personalities.
At the same time, we ought to understand that these and all similar rulings are not based on the plain and clear meaning of the classical halakhic text. In fact, they are often deviations from it, creating exceptions to normally valid principles. Often, we are confronted with original halakhic principles, but with rulings imposed upon Halakhah by the prevailing time-dependent culture that made it necessary to respect the existing male-female relationship.
The power of the influence of the nonpersonal status of women was indicated by the saying of Rabbi Eliezer, according to which a person who teaches his daughter Torah is as if he had taught her promiscuity. This in itself is sufficient to show the survival of the values of the nonpersonal status. But how much more powerful does such survival prove itself when one learns Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion about women from the text in the Jerusalem Talmud, which states, as we noted, “Let the Torah be burnt but not be handed to women.” Notwithstanding all this, Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling was generally followed, in most religious circles, up to our own days.
The most deplorable aspect of the present-day situation in matters of Halakhah and religious ritual is the fact that even though the personal status of women has been fully achieved in the social sphere, little attention has been given to the halakhic consequences. Many of the rulings discussed above, which in effect impose the surviving mores of the nonpersonal stage upon the Halakhah, have remained untouched. Unfortunately, ignoring current developments in this way reflects a nonhalakhic attitude. Instead of examining the basis of certain takkanot (rules and regulations) to see whether they still have meaning and purpose, the rabbinical establishment is afraid of any change and anything new. In certain areas, of course, life itself has taken over.
We noted that Maimonides, on the basis of a source in the Talmud, ruled that a husband should not allow his wife to leave their home more than once or twice a month. I strongly doubt that this law is still observed in religious circles. Are there still any families whose daughters behave in accordance with the biblical teaching that “the honor of a king’s daughter is inside a corner of her house”? But let us also realize that the contemporary practice is not a violation of the teaching of Maimonides. The Rambam was right. In the time of the Talmud and, obviously, in his own day too, such was proper behavior for Jewish women. It would be completely meaningless today.
At the same time, we cannot help noting the text-addicted inconsistent attitude of the religious establishment. Daughters of religious families and young wives study and learn all kinds of professions. They work in offices, business enterprises, and organizations together with men. Many of them earn the living for the family while their husbands study Torah in a kollel. Yet, at the same time, serious objections are raised against women being elected to public office. At the time of this writing the rabbinate in Israel strongly opposes the election of women to religious councils, because one of the responsibilities of such councils is the election of rabbis in their cities. As we have shown, there is no halakhic basis whatever for opposing women’s participation in public offices, councils, and representative bodies.
How far we have come from the ethics of authentic Halakhah is well illustrated by two examples. We have found that in recognition of the personal human dignity of women, major changes and innovations were introduced even into some biblical laws. For instance, Talmudic and post-Talmudic rulings and regulations ensured that women would be treated justly in matters of inheritance. This meant that the early laws were effectively abolished. As we have shown, those laws were valid in their own time but became severely discriminatory and intolerable once woman’s personal status had been acknowledged. And yet to this day, when a husband bequeaths his possessions to his wife in his last will and testament, the Israeli rabbinate will call the children and ask them whether they are willing to renounce their father’s inheritance to their mother. What could be more farcical than such a procedure!
One recalls that Rabbi Judah ha-Nasi called in his sons before his death and urged them to be extremely careful in all matters concerning respect for their mother. And before him, when Rabbi Joseph heard the footsteps of his mother coming, he would rise out of respect for the approaching divine presence.
But by far more objectionable is the utter disregard for the numerous halakhic innovations introduced by Talmudic teachers to protect the wife against the possible harmful consequences of the husband’s behavior in matters of divorce. These innovations would enable us to introduce appropriate tenaim (conditions) into the marriage contract (ketubah) that would solve the many problems arising from a brokendown marriage. But nothing is being done, and the result is the untold suffering of the many wives who are exposed to the willfulness of their husbands. The situation is especially serious in Israel, where marriages and divorces are under the authority of the rabbinate. The prevailing conditions are not due to Halakhah; on the contrary, they are in violation of fundamental principles of halakhic ethics.
Unfortunately, the problem that we are discussing is not limited to the subject of the status of women in Judaism. It is a problem that involves the entire area of present-day religious faith. The so-called drift to the right is a drift towards a naïve, unquestioning spirituality. In essence, it is a drift away from authentic Halakhah. Because of this it would be useless to place our hopes on the rabbinical establishment either in Israel or in the Diaspora. Just because of this we need rabbis who are talmidei hakhamim (Talmudic scholars) with an adequate worldly education, who are seriously concerned and troubled by the inadequate regard for the problems of contemporary Jewish religious life; whose sense of rabbinical responsibility will give them courage to speak out; and who, at least in the area of their influence, will introduce the halakhic changes that are required in recognition of the human dignity of the Jewish woman of today. Perhaps this will lead to a gradual halakhic renewal that will ultimately re-establish Judaism as Torat Hayyim – a Torah of Life.