Different practices have emerged in the observant Jewish community regarding closing websites for Shabbat and Yom Tov. Many businesses do close their websites for Shabbat,101I have been informed that the necessary programs are readily available and are relatively easy to implement. while others do not close their websites for Shabbat. In this essay, we will survey six issues involved in this controversy.
Shevitat Keilim
The Mishnayot (Shabbat 1:5-6) record a debate between Beit Hillel and Beit Shamai regarding the scope of the prohibition of melachah on Shabbat. The Torah (Shemot 20:10) commands that our children, our slaves, and even our animals must rest on Shabbat. Beit Shamai argue that this prohibition extends even to one’s utensils. Thus, according to Beit Shamai, one cannot, for example, set a trap before Shabbat in order that an animal be caught on Shabbat, as this constitutes his utensil performing melachah on Shabbat.
The Halachah (Shulchan Aruch O.C. 244:1), however, is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel that one’s utensils are not included in the prohibition to engage in melachah on Shabbat. Thus, the prohibition to work on Shabbat does not preclude one from allowing his website to continue to function on Shabbat even though various electronic systems will perform the melachot involved in daily business operations.
Gezeirat Mekach U’Memkar
Chazal (Beitzah 37a) forbade engaging in business on Shabbat (gezeirat mekach u’memkar). Rashi (ad. loc. s.v. Mishum Mekach Umemkar) explains that this is prohibited both due to concern that one may come to write on Shabbat and also because of Yeshayahu’s exhortation (58:13) to refrain from “mimtzo cheftzecha v’dabeir davar,” pursuing one’s business or discussing it on Shabbat.
It would seem, at first glance, that permitting one’s website to continue to function on Shabbat does not violate this prohibition, since the website owner is not actively involved in the sales and marketing of his items. However, in a celebrated ruling, Rav Akiva Eiger (Teshuvot Rabi Akiva Eiger 159) forbids one to arrange a conditional transaction that will take effect on Shabbat, as he believes that this is included in the gezeirat mekach u’memkar despite the fact that no action related to the transaction occurs on Shabbat itself. This would seem to preclude operation of business websites on Shabbat, as one may be acquiring money from his internet customers on Shabbat and Yom Tov. Even though the Maharam Schick (Teshuvot Maharam Schick O.C. 131) disputes this ruling of Rav Akiva Eiger, Rav Moshe Feinstein (Teshuvot Igrot Moshe 3:44) rules that this issue is difficult to resolve and that in practice, we should be strict out of doubt in deference to the great Rav Akiva Eiger.
However, the Teshuvot Chelkat Yaakov (O.C. 67), Rav Shlomo Dichovsky (Techumin 22:330), and Rav Doniel Neustadt (The Daily Halachah Discussion pp. 26-27 in the Hebrew section) all agree that Rav Akiva Eiger’s ruling applies only if one specifically stipulated that the transaction take effect on Shabbat. They marshal evidence to this assertion from the Shulchan Aruch’s permission (O.C. 307:4) to ask a non-Jew before Shabbat to purchase an item when he has the opportunity to do so. Even though the non-Jew might purchase the item on Shabbat, it is permissible as long as one does not specifically mention Shabbat as the day he wants the purchase to take place. Accordingly, we see that acquiring title to an item on Shabbat (such as the item a non-Jew purchases on one’s behalf on Shabbat) is not per se included in the gezeirat mekach u’memkar. Thus, even Rav Akiva Eiger would not object to one’s website facilitating acquiring title to money from purchases that occurred on Shabbat, since one did not specifically stipulate that he wishes for the transaction to take effect on Shabbat.
Sechar Shabbat
Chazal (Ketubot 64a) forbade earnings even from permitted activities on Shabbat (sechar Shabbat). This applies, as indicated by the case described by the Gemara, even to passive income such as that accrued from a rental that is calculated daily (Mishnah Berurah 306:19). Thus, it would seem that earnings from items sold on Shabbat and Yom Tov on one’s website should be forbidden.
However, Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (cited in Shemirat Shabbat Kehilchatah ch.29 n. 70) and Dayan Weisz (Teshuvot Minchat Yitzchak 3:38 permit leaving one’s automated machines in operation during Shabbat. Sechar Shabbat is not a concern since Rav Yechezkel Landau (Teshuvot Noda Biy’hudah 2:26) rules that sechar Shabbat applies only to payment for services rendered such as babysitting or tutoring but does not apply to paying for goods provided on Shabbat.
Thus, Rav Landau permits a mikvah to collect payment after Shabbat from ladies who immersed there on Friday evening. Indeed, the Mishnah (Beitzah 29b) permits obtaining an item from an observant storeowner on Yom Tov (in certain limited circumstances) even though payment will be made for that item after Yom Tov. Thus sechar Shabbat does not apply to payment for goods sold on the internet.
Lifnei Iveir Lo Titein Michshol
The Torah (Vayikra 19:14) prohibits causing another to sin - lifnei iveir lo titein michshol. Perhaps a website runs afoul of this prohibition, since non-observant Jews might access the website and order an item on Shabbat. Dayan Weisz (Teshuvot Minchat Yitzchak 5:14), in the context of permitting a telephone answering machine that was not set specifically for Shabbat, rules that this does not pose a problem. One consideration is the fact that it is possible that no Jew will not visit the site on Shabbat, and some opinions believe that lifnei iveir lo titein michshol does not apply in case of only possible infraction.
Another consideration is that the Gemara (Avodah Zarah 6b) teaches that lifnei iveir lo titein michshol applies only if the violator would have had considerable difficulty sinning without the facilitator’s assistance (trei avrei d’nahara, literally, where one brings the forbidden item to another from one side of a river to another). Posting a website is hardly a case of trei avrei d’nahara, as there is no shortage of competitors for each website and the non-observant Jew not has easy access to any number of similar websites.
Even though some opinions (such as Tosafot Shabbat 3a s.v. Bava) rule that even in such a case there is a rabbinic obligation to separate one’s fellow Jew from sinning (l’afrushei mei’issura), Dayan Weisz rules that this does not apply when there is only a possibility that a Jew may sin. Rav Neustadt notes that Rav Shlomo Kluger (Teshuvot Tuv Ta’am Vada’at 3:2:50) also rules thusly. Moreover, many poskim rule that the obligation l’afrushei mei’issura applies only in case where the sin occurs at the time of one’s action (such as handing a non-observant Jew something he immediately will carry outside of the eiruv).102See Teshuvot Binyan Tzion (15), Teshuvot Meishiv Davar (2:31), Teshuvot Maharsham (2:97), and Teshuvot Igrot Moshe (Y.D. 1:72). Thus, since the website is posted before Shabbat, the issue of l’afrushei mei’issura does not apply.
Rav Neustadt (ad. loc. p. 30) adds another lenient consideration by citing the Shach (Y.D. 151:6) and Dagul Meir’vavah (ad loc.), who rule that the rabbinic obligation l’afrushei mei’issura does not apply to those who routinely and deliberately violate Torah law. Moreover, he notes that Rav Moshe Feinstein in many of his responsa rules that the Shach and Dagul Meir’vavah’s ruling applies even to Jews who were raised in an environment devoid of Torah (Tinok Shenishbah).103For more discussion of the halachic status of those raised in a non-Torah environment, see Gray Matter 1:78-82. Rav Neudstadt notes that even though the Mishnah Berurah (347:7) rules in accordance with the Magen Avraham (347:4), who does not subscribe to the view of the Shach and Dagul Meir’vavah, Rav Feinstein (Teshuvot Igrot Moshe E.H. 4:61) rules that the basic Halachah follows the Shach and Dagul Meir’vavah.
Marit Ayin
The Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 243:1) forbids renting one’s bathhouse to a non-Jew who will operate it on Shabbat if it is known that the establishment belongs to a Jew due to concern for marit ayin (literally, sight of the eye). If a Jewish business remains open on Shabbat, onlookers will conclude that the Jew actually is operating the bathhouse on Shabbat or that the non-Jew is operating it at the Jew’s behest. Rav Shlomo Dichovsky, notes that this is not a concern regarding a website, since there is no marit ayin when it is well-known that the activity is conducted entirely by automation. Indeed, the Mishnah Berurah (467:33) and the Aruch Hashulchan (Y.D. 298:4) rule that marit ayin does not apply when permissible ways to perform the action in question are known.
Zilzul Shabbat – A Degradation of Shabbat
Thus far, we have not found a “technical” reason to prohibit allowing one’s business website to be functional on Shabbat. However, there is concern that perhaps this constitutes a degradation of the holy Shabbat day. Indeed, poskim of the past half-century have struggled with defining the precise parameters of which automated activity is prohibited. The poskim have raised this issue regarding automatic food dispensers, laundry machines, answering machines, fax machines, and timers. We shall now discuss these rulings and their application to allowing one’s website to remain operational on Shabbat.
Automatic Timers
Rav Moshe Feinstein (Teshuvot Igrot Moshe O.C. 4:60) was asked if an automatic timer could be set before Shabbat to turn the oven on during Shabbat so that the food for the Shabbat afternoon meal could be freshly cooked. Although Rav Moshe does not believe that doing so entails any technical prohibition,104This is in contrast to the opinion of the Chazon Ish (O.C. 2:2), who believes that this involves technical violations of Shabbat, he nonetheless strongly objects to the idea on the grounds that it is a degradation of Shabbat. In fact, Rav Moshe prohibits the use of all timers except for turning lights on and off, which already had become accepted practice. Rav Moshe writes:
In my humble opinion, it is obvious that it is forbidden to permit this, because through the use of such automation, one can perform all of the forbidden labor of Shabbat and operate every factory, and there is no greater degradation to Shabbat than this. It is obvious that had this existed in Talmudic times, they would have forbidden this in the same manner that they forbade asking a non-Jew to perform work on one’s behalf on Shabbat.
It is very reasonable to assert that Rav Moshe would forbid allowing one’s website to operate on Shabbat for the same reason. However, one might respond, as Rav J. David Bleich observes (Tradition 35:2:50), that Rav Moshe’s ruling “has not been widely accepted among Halachic decisors.” Indeed, many poskim allow the use of timers for usage other than lighting, including the Chazon Ish (O.C. 38:3-4), Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Teshuvot Minchat Shlomo 1:66), Rav Yaakov Breisch (Teshuvot Chelkat Yaakov O.C. 71), Rav Eliezer Waldenberg (Teshuvot Tzitz Eliezer 1:20:9), and Rav Ovadia Yosef (Teshuvot Yechaveh Da’at 2:57).
One could argue, though, that Rav Breisch notes (ad. loc. O.C. 70) that he permits automation only for the enhancement of the honor and enjoyment (kavod and oneg) of Shabbat, not for other purposes.
On the other hand, the Chazon Ish does permit automation for the purpose of milking cows on Shabbat.105See Gray Matter 1:210. Thus, as Rav Shlomo Dichovsky (Techumin 22:331) notes, halachic authorities of the modern age, “have not formulated clear guidelines and distinctions between areas where the practice has emerged to be lenient [to set timers for Shabbat use], such as between lighting and extinguishing lights for Shabbat and cooking using a timer.”
Automated Food Dispensers
Rav Doniel Neustadt (The Daily Halachah Discussion p. 31 in the Hebrew section) argues that allowing a website to function on Shabbat is identical to the issue of allowing one’s automated food dispensers to operate on Shabbat. He notes the consensus of halachic authorities is that it is permitted to allow such machines to operate on Shabbat. These authorities include Rav Yaakov Breisch (Teshuvot Chelkat Yaakov O.C. 1:67), Dayan Weisz (Teshuvot Minchat Yitzchak 3:38), and Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (cited in Shemirat Shabbat Kehilchatah 29:28).106Rav Shmuel Wosner (Teshuvot Sheivet Halevi 5:28), though forbids this. A simple proof to these rulings is the fact that Halachah (Shulchan Aruch O.C. 244:1, cited above) follows the opinion of Beit Hillel, who permit allowing one’s utensils to perform melachah on Shabbat. Indeed, Rav Hershel Schachter told me that business websites are identical to vending machines and there is no halachic obligation to close websites for Shabbat.
However, one may argue that business websites and automated food dispensers are not identical. Rav Breisch and Dayan Weisz specifically note that their permission extends only if the Jews’ name is not associated with the machine and that the business is not conducted on the Jew’s property (as indicated in Shulchan Aruch O.C. 245:4). If either of these conditions is met, though, this presumably is regarded as allowing one’s store to remain open on Shabbat, which the Chatam Sofer (Teshuvot Chatam Sofer 195 in the addendum) and Rav Chaim Ozer Grodzinsky (Teshuvot Achiezer 3:25) regard as a Torah-level violation of the obligation to create “Shabbaton,” a positive Shabbat atmosphere.107This obligation is formulated and elaborated upon by the Ramban in his commentary to Vayikra 23:24.
In fact, it for this reason that Dayan Weisz (Teshuvot Minchat Yitzchak 9:24) forbids allowing one’s store in which customers operate laundry machines by themselves to remain open on Shabbat. He argues that since the business is operating on the Jew’s property, its operation is a violation of shabbaton. A business website certainly has the business name posted, and therefore it differs dramatically from anonymous automated food dispensers. Hence business websites far more resemble a traditional store than do automated machines.
Facsimile Machines and Voice Mail
Defining the boundaries as to when an automated process crosses the line from a permissible automation such as the classical trap to capture animals to a full-blown store is not a simple process. Poskim grapple with the permissibility of leaving one’s facsimile and voice mail108E-mail would seem to be the identical issue. in operation at one’s business during Shabbat and Yom Tov in order to retrieve messages afterward. As Rav J. David Bleich (Tradition 35:2:45) notes, the weight of rabbinic opinion favors a permissible ruling and this has become the accepted practice throughout the observant Jewish community. Although Rav Meir Bransdorfer (Mevakshei Torah 2:8) compares this practice to allowing one’s store to operate on Shabbat and forbids it, Rav Breisch (ad. loc. 70) and Dayan Weisz (ad. loc. 5:14) permit these machines to be left operational provided that they were not specifically set for Shabbat (as was necessary in the early stages of the developments of these products). Rav Mendel Zilber also permits the operation of such devices on Shabbat (Teshuvot Moznai Tzedek 2:14-15 and 3:24). One could argue that similarly, a website also should be permitted to function on Shabbat.
However, Rav Breisch (ad. loc.), in the course of his responsum regarding answering machines,109Rav Breisch wrote this in 1961, and his foresight is remarkable; we cite his comments in their entirety because his words are highly instructive. raises the following issue:
At a time when technology is quickly progressing forward, it is possible that in the near future, [it will be feasible] to organize a large store through automation where the store will open by itself at the appropriate time without anyone present and the customers will arrive even though no individual is tending the store. All of this will be accomplished by automation, where the merchandise will be purchased by the customers in exchange for the money they leave. If we degrade Shabbat by permitting business to be conducted through automation, this will create an enormous desecration of Shabbat. An individual will sit in the Beit Midrash on Shabbat or at his table singing Shabbat Zemirot and his business will operate on Shabbat on his behalf as it does during a weekday. I am uncertain as to whether this is similar to the Ramban’s assertion (Vayikra 23:24) that business conducted as usual, even if a Jew does not engage in any of the forbidden labors, constitutes a Torah prohibition. Even though truthfully there is a great difference between the situations, as the Ramban addresses a situation where the business owner is actively involved in running the store (but takes care not to perform any forbidden labor), as opposed to a situation where the individual is entirely passive and all work is performed by a machine that is set before Shabbat.
Nonetheless, since his business operates in public on Shabbat on his behalf, this is not “Shabbaton.” This constitutes a problem of Uvdin D’chol (engaging in a weekday type activity) and [violates] the obligation that one’s actions on Shabbat differ from one’s weekday activities (see Rambam Hilchot Shabbat 24:1 and 12). It is not comparable to the permission to allow one’s automated machines to operate in a public place where it is not known to whom the machine belongs.
Indeed, Rav Mordechai Willig and Rav Zvi Sobolofsky have told me that they strongly oppose allowing one’s website to operate on Shabbat and Yom Tov, as they compare operating a website to allowing one’s store to function on Shabbat. Rav Aharon Lichtenstein also told me that he is "strongly opposed" to maintaining a business website in operation on Shabbat and Yom Tov. He believes it is analogous to Rav Yosef (Shabbat 18a) forbidding setting a mill in a public area before Shabbat so that it will grind through Shabbat, since the public can access the website. We should note, though that if a business website is analogous to a mill then since the Rama (O.C. 252:5) rules that one may follow Rabbah, who disagrees with Rav Yosef, to avoid a considerable financial loss, it follows that one may allow one’s business website to function on Shabbat in case of concern for major financial loss. Mishnah Berurah (252:49) adds that in case of great financial loss one should sell the mill to a non-Jew for Shabbat.
Criticism of Rav Breisch
Rav Shlomo Dichovsky (Techumin 22:331) cites Rav Moshe Stern (Teshuvot Be’er Moshe 6:60 in his discussion of matters pertaining to electricity), who criticizes Rav Breisch’s approach:
He has issued a new gezeirah (decree), which no contemporary Rav, no matter his stature, is permitted to issue (see Rosh, Shabbat 2:15 and Maggid Mishneh to Hilchot Chametz U’matzah 5:20). Certainly, if the leading rabbis of our generation will jointly issue a prohibition, I will certainly join their call, but an individual Rav is not authorized to make such a decree, and we certainly will not accept his decree.
Rav Doniel Neustadt (ad. loc.) essentially adopts this same approach, arguing that it is essentially permitted to leave one’s website operational on Shabbat, though he defers to the leading rabbinic figures of our generation to decide if allowing a business website to function constitutes a breach of Shabbat observance.
Conclusion
Rav Dichovsky (ad. loc.) summarizes this issue as follows: “One cannot forbid allowing one’s business website to remain operational on Shabbat. However, this certainly involves a violation of the spirit of Shabbat.” Rav Dichovsky offers two exceptions to this rule. He writes that “there is room to permit” a website that is necessary for national security to remain operational even if the need for the website is only indirect. He also permits creating a partnership with a non-Jew in which the profits earned on Shabbat will accrue to the non-Jew (in accordance with the provisions set forth in Shulchan Aruch O.C. ch. 245) and there is adequate publicity of this fact on the website.