Introduction
In recent years, there has been much rancorous debate in the Jewish media regarding standards for Orthodox conversion (Geirut) both in Israel and North America.
Some of the debate was generated by the Rabbinical Council of America (RCA) and Beth Din of America issuing the Geirus Policies and Standards (GPS), which accept a conversion only if it is clear to the beit din that the convert will fully observe the laws of the Torah. We will attempt to demonstrate that the RCA guidelines represent the mainstream Halachic viewpoint.
A Bizarre Question
Some time ago, an acquaintance approached me with a highly unusual question. Unfortunately, this young man was dating a non-Jewish woman - but she had expressed willingness to convert to Judaism. She even was willing to observe the mitzvot of the Torah, as she found the observant Jewish lifestyle highly appealing. However, a serious impediment was the fact that she unabashedly denied the existence of a Creator. The acquaintance asked if she would be eligible for conversion.
I responded that such a conversion would be patently absurd. The essence of geirut is expressed by the quintessential convert, the biblical character Rut, who declared her commitment to Torah so magnificently and succinctly: “Ameich ami veilokaiyich Elokai,” “Your nation is my nation and your God is my God” (Rut 1:16). Indeed, Boaz (Rut 2:12) so beautifully describes Rut as “having come to seek shelter under the wings” of Hashem the God of Israel.
The Rambam (Hilchot Issurei Biah 13:4) employs similar terminology. He describes a convert as one who “wishes to enter the covenant, seek shelter beneath the wings of the Shechinah [the divine presence], and accept the yoke of Torah.” The Rambam continues that such as individual requires immersion (tevilah) in a mikveh and brit milah for a male.26In the times when the Beit Hamikdash stood, all converts were also required to bring a sacrifice at the time of their conversion.
Accordingly, an individual who harbors no ambition to establish a bond with Hashem is not a viable candidate for conversion. Certainly, one who is entrenched in denial of Hashem cannot be admitted by a beit din for conversion. Even if such an individual undergoes the process of conversion with all the necessary trappings, including immersion and acceptance of mitzvot before a beit din consisting of Orthodox rabbis, the conversion is invalid.
There is a fundamental distinction between geirut and other Jewish procedures such as kiddushin (Jewish marriage) and gittin (Jewish divorces). A Jewish marriage ceremony or divorce proceeding that is conducted in full conformity with halachic standards is completely valid even if either the man or woman is not committed to Torah observance and belief. Conversion rituals, on the other hand, are processes that must express a deep commitment to Hashem and His people in order to have any meaning.
A similar Halachah exists regarding tefillah. One who recites every word of tefillah perfectly and precisely but lacks kavanah (feeling or intention to connect with Hashem) does not fulfill the mitzvah of tefillah (Rambam Hilchot Tefillah 4:1 and Shulchan Aruch O.C. 101:1). Tefillah is the external manifestation of an internal worship of the heart (see Ta’anit 2a). Similarly, milah and tevilah are meaningless unless they are external expressions of a desire “to enter the covenant, seek shelter under the wings of the Shechinah and accept the yoke of Mitzvot.”
A Delicate Balance
A beit din that assumes the awesome responsibility to accept geirim (converts) is charged with the difficult mission of striking a very delicate balance between competing principles. On one hand, the Gemara (Yevamot 109b) makes a remarkable statement that “evil after evil will befall those who accept converts.” Tosafot (ad. loc. s.v. Ra’ah) limit the Gemara’s declaration to a beit din that either seeks to convince nochrim to convert or converts individuals indiscriminately or impulsively. If, Tosafot continue, the candidate is persistent in his desire to convert,27Tosafot here allude to Rut 1:18. we should accept him. Indeed, I heard Rav Yosef Dov Soloveitchik declare that a non-Jew who is sincerely committed to Torah enjoys the right to be converted.
Tosafot support their assertion by citing examples of outstanding batei din, such as those of Yehoshua28According to the Midrash (see also Megillah 14b), Yehoshua accepted Rachav as a convert. and Hillel (Shabbat 31a), who accepted sincere geirim. Although the individuals who came to him were hardly viable candidates for conversion at first – one of them denied the validity of the oral law - Hillel was confident that with patience and wisdom he would be able to shepherd them to full acceptance of Torah, an expectation that he fulfilled. Moreover, Tosafot cite the example of Timnah (Breishit 36:12) who, according to Chazal (Sanhedrin 99b), was unjustifiably denied conversion by our Avot (forefathers). Out of bitterness, she agreed to be a concubine to Eisav’s son Elifaz and bore Amaleik, who perpetually inflicts great pain upon Israel.
Accordingly, although batei din must exercise caution and not hastily or indiscriminately convert candidates for geirut, they also must not reject those with genuine commitment to become successful geirim who will lead fully observant lives.
Hillel’s non-Believing Convert – Rashi and the Maharsha
Accepting the yoke of Torah is an essential component of geirut. The Gemara (Bechorot 30b) states that even if a convert is willing to accept all of the Torah except for one rabbinic precept, we do not accept him as a candidate for conversion. A giyoret (female convert) who is a passionate vegan related to me that the beit din that converted her inquired whether she would be willing to partake of the Korban Pesach (Pesach sacrifice) when the Beit HaMikdash will be rebuilt despite her vegan convictions. She responded without hesitation that she would consume a kezayit (the minimum amount required) of the Korban Pesach. This answer reflected her recognition that divine commands take priority over one’s ethical intuitions (manifested in biblical examples such as by Akeidat Yitzchak, Isaac’s binding).
Accordingly, by what right did Hillel convert the gentleman who stated that he believed only in the divine authority of the Written Law and not of the Oral Law? After all, by rejecting the Oral Law, this candidate expressed his lack of acceptance of the vast majority of mitzvot, such as lighting Chanukah candles or the proper placement of tefillin. Rashi (ad. loc. s.v. Gayarei) explains that since the candidate “did not deny the authority of the Oral Law, he merely did not believe in its divine origin; Hillel was convinced that after he would teach him that he will rely on him” and grow to believe in the authority of the Oral Law as well.
Maharsha (ad. loc. s.v. Amar Lei) clarifies that Hillel did not convert this gentleman at the time that he did not yet believe in the Oral Law. Hillel merely accepted him as a viable candidate for conversion. Had Hillel not accepted him as a feasible candidate, it would have been forbidden to teach him Torah, as it is forbidden to teach Torah to a nochri (Chagigah 13b) unless he is doing so in contemplation of conversion29Unlike the Maharsha, Rav Akiva Eiger (Teshuvot no. 41) prohibits teaching Torah to even a viable candidate for conversion. Rav Moshe Feinstein (Teshuvot Igrot Moshe Y.D. 2:104), Rav Ovadia Yosef (Teshuvot Yabia Omer 2: Y.D. 17) and Dayan Weisz (Teshuvot Minchat Yitzchak 3:98) all rule in accordance with the Maharsha. Indeed, common practice follows the approach of the Maharsha. In fact, Rav Hershel Schachter told me that a viable candidate for conversion should be invited for Shabbat and Yom Tov meals in order for him to learn how to conduct himself as a proper Jew after conversion. . Maharsha explains that Hillel converted the gentleman only after he came to believe that even the Oral Law is from Hashem.
Hoda’at Mitzvot and Kabbalat Mitzvot – Rambam and Chemdat Shlomo
Rambam (ad. loc. 14:17) and Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 268:12) rule that if a convert is not informed of the mitzvot the conversion is nonetheless valid b’diavad (after the fact). This is based on the Gemara (Shabbat 68a) that discusses one who converted despite being unaware of the obligation to observe Shabbat. Tosafot (ad. loc. s.v. Geir) clarify that this individual certainly converted before a beit din, since the Gemara (Yevamot 47b) states a conversion is invalid if it is not conducted in the presence of a beit din. Tosafot explain that the beit din erred and did not inform the convert of the mitzvot, and as such he did not know about Shabbat.
This ruling of Rambam appears to contradict his aforementioned assertion that acceptance of the yoke of Torah represents the essence of the geirut. If hoda’at mitzvot (informing the convert about the mitzvot) is not essential, how can kabbalat mitzvot constitute the most important component of a conversion?
The Teshuvot Chemdat Shlomo (Y.D. 29-30, referenced in the Pitchei Teshuvah 268:9) draws a fundamental distinction between hoda’at mitzvot and kabbalat mitzvot. He argues that although hoda’at mitzvot is not essential, kabbalat mitzvot is crucial. The convert’s commitment to observe mitzvot signifies the core of the conversion. If in a peculiar case the beit din mistakenly failed to inform the convert of the Torah’s obligations, the geirut is acceptable b’diavad. However, if the convert is not committed to accept the Torah’s rules when he finds out what they are, the conversion is invalid.
The Chemdat Shlomo’s distinction has been accepted by the overwhelming majority of poskim. These authorities include Rav Yitzchak Shmelkes (Teshuvot Beit Yitzchak Y.D. 2:100), Rav Avraham Yitzchak HaKohen Kook (Teshuvot Da’at Kohen 147), Rav Avraham Kahana-Shapiro (Teshuvot Devar Avraham 3:28), Rav Chaim Ozer Grodzinsky (Teshuvot Achiezer 3:26 and 28), Rav Moshe Feinstein (Teshuvot Igrot Moshe Y.D. 1:157), Rav Yosef Dov Soloveitchik (citing his father in n. 22 to Kol Dodi Dofeik), Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Teshuvot Minchat Shlomo 1:35), and Rav Yosef Shalom Eliashiv (Kovetz Teshuvot 1:104). These authorities rule that if a covert did not commit to observing the Torah, the conversion is invalid. In accordance with the consensus opinion, the RCA’s GPS document (available at www.rabbis.org) sets forth systems and standards in which batei din can be reasonably assured that individuals approved for conversion are sincerely committed to Torah observance and belief.
Rav Uzziel vs. Rav Auerbach
There are, however, several poskim who support more lenient approaches. The primary advocate for leniency in regard to kabbalat mitzvot is Rav Ben-Zion Uzziel. His approach is summarized (Piskei Uzziel 65):
[Regarding] a non-Jew who has been circumcised and has immersed in a Mikvah for the purpose of conversion...we do not require that he observe the Mitzvot, and the Beit Din does not even need to know that he will observe Mitzvot, for otherwise converts will not be accepted in Israel, because who can guarantee that the nochri will be loyal to all of the Mitzvot of the Torah…the requirement to fulfill Mitzvot is not an indispensable component of the conversion even LeChatchilah (ideally)…it is permissible to accept male and female converts, even if it is known to us that they will not fulfill all of the Mitzvot, because eventually they will come to fulfill Mitzvot, and we are obligated to open this door for them. And if they do not fulfill Mitzvot, they will bear their sins and we are free from responsibility for this.
Rav Uzziel bases himself on Hillel’s acceptance of converts that were not yet committed to all of the Torah’s mitzvot and beliefs. Rav Uzziel understands that Hillel actually converted the man who came to him before they fully embraced Torah life. Rav Uzziel felt compelled to adopt such a lenient stance due to concern for intermarriage that would occur had lenient standards for conversion not been offered.
As noted, though, the overwhelming majority of poskim of the twentieth century view kabbalat mitzvot as the essence of geirut whose absence invalidates a conversion.
Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach’s words (Teshuvot Minchat Shlomo 1:35) contrast sharply with those of Rav Uzziel:
The class of converts…regarding whom we are almost certain that they are not committed at all to fulfill and observe the Mitzvot of Hashem, in such a situation, in my humble opinion, anyone who facilitates such a conversion, even if they mistakenly think that they are full-fledged converts, nonetheless even according to their approach those who convert them violate the prohibition of Lifnei Iveir [the prohibition to cause another to sin], since now the convert will violate prohibitions such as Shabbat and Kashrut that before the conversion did not constitute violation of God’s word.
Rav David Zvi Hoffman vs. Rav Herzog, Rav Feinstein, and Rav Yosef
Rav David Zvi Hoffman (Teshuvot Melamed Leho’il 3:8), the leading Rav in late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Germany, was faced with a difficult issue. A Kohen married a non-Jewish woman in a civil ceremony and bore him a son who received a brit milah. The son subsequently died, and the wife was distraught over the fact that as far as she understood, she was not of the same religion as her deceased child. In addition to the concern over the intermarriage, there was fear that the wife would be driven to insanity if she would not be allowed to convert. A chillul Hashem thereby would be created, as people would say that the Jews had no concern for the wellbeing of the wife.
However, among the halachic impediments to sanctioning such a conversion was the fact that the wife expected to remain married to her husband; a giyoret, however, is forbidden to marry a Kohen (Yechezkeil 44:22; see Kiddushin 78a). Accordingly, the conversion was cast in grave doubt in light of the Gemara (Bechorot 30b) that forbids admitting a convert who accepts all of the Torah except for even one rabbinic precept. In this situation, the wife implicitly did not accept the prohibition for a Kohen to marry a convert.
Rav Hoffman writes that the conversion should be discouraged by informing the wife that her son was not Jewish (as she herself was not Jewish). If, though, she would persist in her desire to convert and would express sincere belief in the God of Israel, the geirut may proceed. Rav Hoffman suggests two approaches to overcome the obstacle of her lack of acceptance of the prohibition to a Kohen. First, he argues that the Gemara forbids accepting a ger only if he explicitly states his rejection of a particular mitzvah. In the case in question, the woman did not make any such declaration.
Secondly, Rav Hoffman argues that the Gemara prohibits incomplete acceptance of mitzvot only when the conversion is conducted purely for for the sake of the convert. In such an instance, it is better that the convert not become Jewish than become Jewish and violate any part of Jewish law. However, if the geirut is performed for the sake of the Jewish mate, to avoid the severe sin for him to be with a nochrit, then the Gemara’s concern is not relevant, since the beit din acts in the interest of the convert’s partner. Rav Hoffman concludes that this reasoning applies only if the couple will observe the laws of niddah; otherwise, the conversion does not serve the spiritual interest of the husband.
Most poskim, however, do not accept Rav Hoffman’s ruling. Rav Moshe Feinstein (Teshuvot Igrot Moshe E.H. 2:4) writes, “In my humble opinion, I do not see any room to permit” such a conversion. Rav Yitzchak Herzog (Teshuvot Heichal Yitzchak E.H. 1:19) and Rav Ovadia Yosef (Teshuvot Yabia Omer Y.D. 2:3) also do not accept Rav Hoffman’s ruling. Among their concerns are that an impression would be created that rabbis have permitted a Kohen to marry a convert. When Rav Shlomo Goren relied upon Rav Hoffman’s ruling in a widely publicized case in 1970 (Techumin 23:180-184), his decision was criticized sharply by Rav Yosef Dov Soloveitchik (see Nora’ot HaRav 5:56-58).
Rav Moshe Feinstein’s “Bit of Limmud Zechut”
Rav Moshe Feinstein (Teshuvot Igrot Moshe Y.D. 1:157) clearly states that if a convert does not intend to observe mitzvot, his conversion is invalid. Rav Moshe does, however, offer “a bit of a Limmud Zechut” (defense) for those Orthodox rabbis who convert individuals who clearly have no intention of observing mitzvot in Teshuvot Igrot Moshe Y.D. 1:160. Rav Moshe suggests that in today’s circumstances, when most Jews do not observe the Torah, many converts perceive non-observance of Halachah to constitute mainstream Jewish practice. They perceive observance of mitzvot as a preferred manner of Jewish living, not as an absolute requirement.
In such a situation, the convert may be compared to the Gemara’s case of one who converted amongst non-Jews and was not informed about the mitzvot yet was considered to be a full-fledged Jew. In today’s environment, it is as if the convert was not informed of the mitzvot, since many converts do not accept what they are taught about the obligation of mitzvot.
Rav Moshe Feinstein does not endorse such conversions. Rather he presents this reasoning “so that they (the rabbis involved in such conversions) should not be considered worse than uneducated.” Interestingly, Rav Moshe Feinstein does not disqualify these rabbis from serving as dayanim due to their lenient approach to conversion. On the other hand, he does not endorse or recognize such lenient conversions. Similarly, I recall that Rav Yosef Dov Soloveitchik presented30In a shiur delivered at Yeshiva University. a bit of a limmud zechut for those who adopt the lenient approach to geirut, based on the aforementioned Rashi to Shabbat 31a. However, Rav Soloveitchik did not validate such conversions.
This contrasts sharply with the approach of Rav Moshe Shternbuch (Teshuvot V’hanhagot 4:230) who classifies rabbis who adopt the lenient approach to conversion as disqualified from dayanut. Rav Shternbuch goes as far to suggest that even if such rabbis conduct a conversion where the convert sincerely commits to Torah observance and belief, the conversion is invalid due to the disqualification of the rabbis. This approach, though, seems difficult, since those who follow the lenient approach do have a few poskim on whom to rely.
Conclusion
The consensus opinion amongst poskim is that kabbalat mitzvot is an indispensable component of geirut. Hence, the GPS document introduced by the RCA should not be considered as a “new stringency” but rather reflecting the mainstream halachic approach endorsed by the consensus of poskim of the past hundred years. The GPS simply creates a system that supports converts who are sincerely committed to Torah life in their quest to have their conversions recognized by mainstream Orthodox rabbis throughout the world.