One who is faced with the possibility of having to report a fellow Jew to the civil government authorities is faced with a difficult dilemma. On one hand, such an action might very well constitute mesirah, a very severe violation of Halachah. On the other hand, violators of just laws must be punished appropriately, and the community must be protected from their dangerous deeds.
The Severe Sin of Mesirah
The Shulchan Aruch (C.M. 388:9) states quite emphatically, “One is forbidden to hand a Jew to a non-Jew, be it [the Jew’s] person or his money, even if the Jew is a rasha (evildoer) and ba’al aveirot (a sinnner), and even if the Jew is harassing him.” The consequences of mesirah are unusually severe. The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) notes that the moser has no share in Olam Haba; the Gemara (Rosh Hashanah 17a) lists mesirah among the sins with punishments that last forever. A moser is even classified as a nochri in regard to shechitah (Rama Y.D. 2:9) and writing a Sefer Torah (Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 281:3).
The Shulchan Aruch (C.M. 388:10) states, “It is permitted to kill a moser even nowadays (in the absence of a Sanhedrin).” This is not meant to apply only in theory. The Margali’ot HaYam (Sanhedrin 46a) relates a bone-chilling episode that his father related to him as a child (the Margali’ot HaYam was written in the mid-twentieth century). In his hometown of Greiding, Poland, there was a violent and brazen moser who entered the shul one year immediately before the onset of Yom Kippur. The moser stood wrapped in his tallit near the Rav by the eastern wall. A few men approached the moser, grabbed him, and used his tallit to close his mouth. They brought him to the river located near the shul and deposited him in the river. The Margaliot HaYam notes that not one of those present at the shul revealed what had happened when the local authorities investigated the cause of death.
This harsh approach to mesirah is quite understandable when one considers the history of mesirah. Classic examples include the Jews who informed Paroh of Moshe Rabbenu’s killing the Mitzri (see Rashi to Shemot 2:15 s.v. VaYishma Paroh) and the Jew who informed the Roman government of Rabi Shimon Bar Yochai’s mild criticism of the Roman government (see Shabbat 33b). Both Moshe Rabbeinu and Rabi Shimon bar Yochai were forced into hiding for very long periods of time to save their lives. The long and damaging history of Jewish informers through the twentieth century is chronicled in the Encyclopedia Judaica’s entry on “Informers.” Informers have done incalculable damage to individuals Jews as well as Jewish communities during the past two thousand years. They have cost lives and caused irreparable harm to countless individuals and communities. The moser is treated so harshly, explain the Gra (Bei’ur Hagra, C.M. 388:59) and the Sema (388:29), since he is classified as a rodeif (one who attempts to kill another).
The Aruch Hashulchan’s Approach
This harsh approach is most understandable when the moser reports a Jew’s entirely defensible action to an evil, oppressive government. Does the same apply to governments that treat Jews relatively fairly and have relatively fair systems of justice? The Aruch Hashulchan (C.M. 388:7) writes that the rules of moser apply only to an unjust government. Rav Eliezer Waldenberg (Teshuvot Tzitz Eliezer 19:52) deduces from the fact that the Aruch Hashulchan praises not only the Russian czar (for ruling justly) but also the British government that the Aruch Hashulchan made this point not only due to his concern for government censors.
Rav Hershel Schachter adopts a similar approach (The Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society 1:118):
A ‘moser’ is one who aids a pirate, a crooked government official, or a tyrant-king to obtain money illegally from his fellow Jew. Even if the Jew has actually done something wrong, but if the secular government or the ruler would exact a punishment far beyond that which the crime should require, then it is likewise forbidden to report him. If, however, the government is entitled to its taxes, or is permitted to punish criminals as offenders, there is no problem of mesirah in telling the government information needed for them to collect their taxes or to apprehend their man.
Nonetheless, no contemporary halachic authority regards the rules of moser as entirely null and void in Western democracies, even in those countries, such as the United States, that have often shown incredible kindness to Jews. Even Rav Schachter (in a brief essay titled “Regarding Mesirah”, 2007, available at www.torahweb.org) voices concern that a Jew would unduly suffer from other inmates in certain prisons (Rav Schachter distinguishes between federal and state prisons) or that lingering anti-Semitic attitudes would cause an offender to receive a punishment beyond what he deserves. Rav Schachter writes that if such concerns are indeed relevant, then turning in such an offender would be considered mesirah.
Furthermore, Rav Schachter notes (The Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society ad. loc.):
One critical point should however be added: There is no problem of mesirah in informing the government of a Jewish criminal, even if they penalize the criminal with a punishment more severe than the Torah requires, because even a non-Jewish government is authorized to punish and penalize above and beyond the law, shelo min hadin, for the purpose of maintaining law and order. However, this only applies in the situation when the Jewish offender or criminal has at least violated some Torah law. But if he did absolutely nothing wrong in the eyes of the Torah, then giving him over to the government would constitute a violation of mesirah.
Similarly, Rav Waldenberg does not simply cite the Aruch Hashulchan in his responsum (Teshuvot Tzitz Eliezer 19:52) regarding a physician’s informing the police about child abuse. The Aruch Hashulchan’s position is but one consideration in his discussion of mesirah. A review of the rulings of other contemporary poskim clearly indicates that the prohibition of mesirah does indeed apply in certain situations even in contemporary Western democracies. For example, see Teshuvot Igrot Moshe C.M. 1:8, Teshuvot V’hanhagot 1:807 and Pitchei Choshen volume five, chapter four.
Accordingly, while the severity of the prohibition of mesirah has been considerably reduced in our times (see Teshuvot Beit Yitzchak Y.D. 2:49:12 and Pitchei Choshen ad. loc. n. 1), the prohibition nonetheless remains in effect. Thus, one must consult a Rav before informing government authorities of suspected criminal acts committed by a fellow Jew.
Solving the Dilemma
Unlike previous generations’ communities, our current Jewish communities do not have the means to properly investigate and enforce criminal law, as noted by Rav Waldenberg in his aforementioned responsum. Indeed, the Beth Din of America does not adjudicate any matters of a criminal nature. Rav Schachter (in a lecture delivered in Teaneck, New Jersey, accessible at www.torahweb.org under the title, “Should I Call the Police? Clarifying the Isurim of Mesirah and Chilul Hashem”) bemoans the fact that criminals are pressured to leave their own communities but subsequently perpetrate their nefarious deeds in the communities to which they move. Thus, there is a need, at least in some cases, to inform the government of the criminal activities of fellow Jews. While it is difficult to set clear guidelines as to the application of the mesirah rules in Western democracies, an overall picture and impression can be gleaned from a review of a number of rulings of the great poskim of the past fifty years regarding the application of the prohibition of mesirah in the contemporary circumstance.
Kashrut Fraud
Rav Moshe Feinstein (ad. loc.) was consulted by the Vaad Harabanim (rabbinic board) of Baltimore regarding a case in which an individual forged kashrut seals and affixed them to non-kosher meat. Rav Moshe writes that there is “concern” for mesirah if the Vaad Harabanim would report the offender to the government, since he would be fined and incarcerated. Rav Moshe believes that these are inappropriate punishments, as the proper consequence according to Jewish law is simply to disqualify this individual from selling kosher products. Rav Moshe does, however, permit informing government officials if the rabbis determine that they are otherwise incapable of stopping the offender from continuing to sell kosher products. Rav Moshe, nonetheless, requires that the rabbis first warn the wrongdoer that they will press charges against him in civil court if he does not abide by the rabbis’ ruling. This ruling is an excellent example of how to balance being fair to the offender and honoring the prohibition of mesirah on the one hand, yet protecting the community on the other hand.
Serving as an Internal Revenue Service Auditor
In another teshuvah, Rav Moshe (ad loc. no. 92) permits serving as a tax auditor for the United States Internal Revenue Service. He reasons that if one does not accept this job, someone else will; thus, violators would be discovered in any event. He adds that one may assume that most of an auditor’s job does not involve discovering tax fraud, since most returns are filed in an honest manner.
This ruling again serves as an example of the application of the mesirah rules in the current environment. It is hard to imagine that Rav Moshe would permit a Jew to serve as a tax auditor for a corrupt government such as the Roman government in the time of the Gemara or the Egyptian government in Sefer Shemot. An IRS auditor is highly distinguishable from a “mocheis,” an unjust tax collector strongly condemned by Chazal (for example, Bava Kama 113a) since the IRS essentially acts in a fair and just manner. Nonetheless, Rav Moshe presents two reasons to justify such employment and does not respond simply that the mesirah prohibition does not apply in the current environment.
An Epileptic Driver
Rav Ovadia Yosef (Teshuvot Yechave Da’at 4:60) was asked if it is permissible for a physician to reveal to government officials in charge of issuing drivers’ licenses that a particular candidate for a license is hiding the fact that he suffers from uncontrolled and unpredictable episodes of epilepsy. Rav Yosef responded that one is not only permitted to reveal this information, but one must reveal such information. He rules that a doctor should even violate his Hippocratic Oath not to reveal confidential information in this instance, since such a person driving a vehicle constitutes a danger to life and property. Rav Yosef stresses in this teshuvah that although it is most often forbidden to speak lashon hara, it is occasionally a mitzvah to tell lashon hara in order to save others from serious harm.
Rav Yosef, in this teshuvah, does not even raise the issue of mesirah. This might be for a number of reasons, including the fact that the physician would not be causing the potential driver to be imprisoned or to suffer any direct loss, financial or otherwise. He is merely ensuring that the individual does not receive that to which he is not entitled.
Theft
Rav Sinai Adler, the Rav of Ashdod, posed the following question to Rav Yosef Shalom Eliashiv (Kovetz Teshuvot 1:198). There was an incident in which cash was stolen from a tzedakah box, and all indications pointed to one individual. The situation was quite serious, since the suspected offender had a large family and was a Torah professional. In response, Rav Eliashiv cited Rav Meir Eisenstadt (Teshuvot Panim Me’irot 2:155), who ruled that, in a case with raglayim ladavar, ample evidence, that a certain individual stole money, that individual should be punished. However, he refrained from permitting the handing over of the suspect to the local authorities, due to concern that they would kill the offender (see Bava Kama 117a, which cites Yeshayahu 51:20). Rav Eliashiv adds that since this concern is currently not relevant, it is essentially permitted to report the offender to the police.148Similarly, in Teshuvot Yabia Omer C.M. 10:7, Rav Ovadia Yosef permits handing over a Jewish murderer to a non-Jewish government that will incarcerate him for life, but not to a government that will execute him. Nonetheless, Rav Eliashiv expressed concern for chillul Hashem due to the suspect’s employment in a Torah field; therefore, he left the decision to the discretion of Rav Sinai Adler to assess whether the damage caused by the report to the police would be worse than the theft. Since the local Rav was intimately familiar with all the details of the situation, he was the most qualified to make the final decision in this case.
Service as an Assistant District Attorney
An Orthodox woman who was serving as an assistant district attorney (ADA) in an American city was assigned the task of prosecuting an Orthodox man accused of severe child abuse. She asked me if Halachah permitted her to do so, and I consulted Rav Hershel Schachter. Rav Schachter responded that she may prosecute him, as batei din today lack any jurisdiction over criminal matters, so the accused would otherwise not be punished and would repeat his heinous crime.
Rav Schachter explained that this ruling was based on Rashi (Gittin 9b s.v. K’sheirin and s.v. Chutz) and Teshuvot Maraham Schick (C.M. 50). Rashi presents the universal obligation of dinim, to insure a just society, as the source for the rule of dina d’malchuta dina, our obligation to honor civil laws. According to Rashi’s approach, the non-Jews’ obligation of dinim impacts on Jews as well to the extent that we must follow the laws they have promulgated to establish a proper society. Thus, a non-Jewish government is halachically empowered to punish Jewish criminals when Jews are unable to do so. Moreover, Jews are permitted to assist a fair non-Jewish government’s just prosecution of a Jewish criminal.
Rabi Elazar son of Rabi Shimon met a police officer. Rabi Elazar said to him, “How can you detect the thieves … ? Perhaps you take the innocent and leave behind the guilty!” The officer replied, “And what shall I do? It is the king’s command.” [Rabbi Elazar then advised this policeman how to determine who was a thief and who was not.] … The royal court heard a report of this incident and decreed, “Let the reader of the letter become the messenger.” Rabi Elazar son of Rabi Shimon was brought to the court, and he proceeded to apprehend thieves. Rabi Yehoshua son of Karchah sent word to him, “Vinegar, son of wine (i.e., inferior son of a superior father)! How long will you deliver the people of our God for slaughter?” Rabi Elazar sent the reply, “I eradicate thorns from the vineyard.” Rabi Yehoshua responded, “Let the Owner of the vineyard come and eradicate His thorns.” … A similar incident befell Rabi Yishmael the son of Rabi Yosi. The prophet Elijah appeared to him and rebuked him. … “What can I do? It is the royal decree,” responded Rabi Yishmael. Elijah retorted, “Your father fled to Assia, you flee to Laodica (i.e., you should flee and not obey).”
The Maharam Schick applied this to a dreadful question that was posed to him. An individual’s brother died unexpectedly, and the widow was suspected of having poisoned him. There were numerous indications and somewhat of an admission that she had committed the crime. At first, the Maharam Schick thought that the crime should not be reported to the civil authorities (of late nineteenth century Hungary), since they judge and execute based on self-incrimination. However, he concluded that it is permissible to report the crime based on Rabi Elazar son of Rabi Shimon’s behavior. He also notes that the Rashba (in a teshuvah presented by the Beit Yosef C.M. 388) cites this passage from the Gemara and applies it in practice. The Maharam Schick, however (following the aforementioned teshuvah of the Rashba), notes that we deduce from Eliyahu HaNavi’s reprimands that it is not midat chassidut (pious behavior) to report such behavior to the authorities. Thus, Maharam Schick concludes that Gedolei Yisrael (leading Torah authorities) should refrain from such reporting, but it is entirely permissible for ordinary Jews to report the crime to the authorities.
Similarly, Rav Schachter permitted the young woman to prosecute the Jewish man accused of severe child abuse. Rav Schachter added that the Jewish community is unable to solve the problem by itself, as the offender will simply move to another community and create the same problem elsewhere. Thus, we are reliant on the local authorities for our protection, so a Jew may pursue the civil prosecution.
Moreover, the Ritva (Bava Metzia 83b s.v. Amar Lahem) provides justification for assisting the government’s carrying out harsh penalties that are not completely in accordance with Jewish law. He asks how Rabi Elazar convicted offenders without hearing testimony from valid witnesses who issued a hatra’ah (warning), especially since the Sanhedrin was no longer functioning. He responds that it is the responsibility of the government to execute even without witnesses and hatra’ah in order to instill discipline, as King David did when he executed the young Amalekite who reported that he killed King Sha’ul (Shmuel II 1:13-16). In fact, Rav Eliashiv (ad. loc. 3:231) applies this principle to the United States government in a teshuvah written in 2004. Thus, the woman’s prosecution of the man accused of child abuse would be permitted, since it helps the government fulfill its duties of instilling discipline in society.
It seems that on the basis of this ruling (as well as Rav Moshe’s aforementioned ruling regarding service as a tax auditor for the Internal Revenue Service), it is permitted to serve as a Hebrew translator for the United States Federal Bureau of Investigations. Even though a Hebrew translator may help the government discover and prosecute Jewish criminals, the Halachah permits a Jew to help just government prosecution of the criminals under its jurisdiction.
Child Abuse
Rav Waldenburg (Teshuvot Tzitz Eliezer 19:52) permits a physician to report situations of child abuse to government authorities.149Rav Waldenberg was asked about cases in which it is likely that, if the physician reports the abuse to the government, the child will be transferred from a religious family to a non-Jewish or non-religious home. Rav Waldenberg permits reporting such cases only if there is legitimate concern for the life of the child. However, if the concern for the child’s education were not to exist, Rav Waldenberg would permit reporting any case of child abuse. For additional discussion of the issue of transferring a child to a non-observant home, see Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach’s position cited in Nishmat Avraham 4:208. Rav Waldenburg makes a critically important interpretation of Shulchan Aruch C.M. 388:9, which states that mesirah is forbidden even if the Jew being reported is “an evildoer and sinner.” Rav Waldenburg explains that the Shulchan Aruch is not speaking of a case in which the mesirah is to prevent the evildoer from continuing to violate a sin. Rather, the Shulchan Aruch states that the fact that someone is a sinner does not justify a mesirah for an unrelated cause. However, according to Rav Waldenberg, the Shulchan Aruch allows informing the government authorities of a man’s crimes if the government will prevent the evildoer from continuing to perpetrate these crimes.
Even though the Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) forbids mesirah if only an individual is being victimized, this applies if the wrongdoer engages merely in verbal abuse (see Rama ad. loc., Shach ad. loc. number 45 and Bei’ur Hagra ad. loc. no. 59). If, however, there is substantial abuse, the victim is permitted to save himself, and, as Rav Waldenburg notes, the community is obligated to protect the welfare of its children and report suspected abuse to the civil authorities.
We should clarify that verbal abuse does not justify mesirah only in a situation such as the one described by the Gemara (Gittin 7a) in which local ruffians where taunting Mar Ukvah (see Bei’ur Hagra ad. loc. no. 57). These individuals constituted a nuisance to the rabbi but did not cause substantial harm. However, an individual in a position of power, such as a parent or teacher, who verbally abuses those in his care, does indeed cause substantial harm. Therefore, it is permitted to report such a person’s abusive behavior. A school bully taunting weaker students may also be considered to be causing substantial harm.
An additional factor in favor of reporting child abuse is that civil law in many locales mandates clergy and educators to report child abusers to the local police. Thus, the “royal decree” principle, articulated in the aforementioned Gemara (Bava Metzia 83b-84a) might serve as another justification for reporting suspected child abusers to the civil authorities.
Rav Schachter (in his aforementioned Teaneck address) stressed that parents and educators should teach children to report to their parents about situations of abuse. He noted that most cases of abuse have been unreported, in part because the victims were not trained or prepared to report such behavior. Once parents and educators encourage youngsters to report to them, the incidence of unreported abuse should subside.
Rav Schachter cautions, though, that sometimes these reports are of highly questionable veracity. Therefore, Rav Schachter advises rabbanim to consult competent professionals who can determine the legitimacy of the claims of abuse. This concern also stresses the need for each case to be presented to a competent halachic authority for adjudication before it is reported to government authority. Rav Eliashiv (Kovetz Teshuvot 3:231) expresses similar concern. An example of a Rav who makes such determinations is Rav David Cohen, who serves as the posek for Ohel, a New York social service organization. Rav Cohen is regularly consulted about such situations. Indeed, the example of Potiphar’s wife’s unfounded slander against Yosef HaTzaddik compels us to exercise caution and to do our best to ensure that innocent individuals are not maligned by either malicious or disturbed individuals.
Testifying in Civil Court
In ordinary cases, the Rama (Teshuvot 52) prohibits testifying in a secular court when all litigants are Jewish, and both the Shulchan Aruch (C.M. 28:3) and the Rama (ibid.) prohibit testifying in a secular court if court will take money away from a Jew in violation of Halachah (e.g., one is forbidden to serve as the lone witness to testify that a Jew owes money to a non-Jew, since the court might force the Jew to pay based on one witness’s testimony, whereas a beit din requires two witnesses’ testimonies). However, Rav Schachter notes (in the aforementioned Torah Web article):
If the non-Jewish governmental authorities know that one Jew is concealing information about another Jew in order to save him from punishment, the Shulchan Aruch (C.M. 28:3) considers this a situation of chilul Hashem. Similarly, for many generations it was the practice that if a gneiva (theft) had occurred, and suspicion had fallen on the Jewish community, rather than allow that suspicion to hover over the entire community, the roshei hakehol (lay community leaders), with the permission of the rabbonim, would inform the non-Jewish authorities who might possibly be the real ganav (Be’er Hagola, C.M. 388:12).
Jury Duty
Rav Menashe Klein (Teshuvot Mishneh Halachot 4:213) prohibits serving on a jury, especially when the case includes a Jewish litigant, because performing jury duty glorifies a non-Torah legal system150This is the same reasoning that is applied to the prohibition of adjudicating a dispute between two Jews in a civil court (see Gittin 88b and Rambam Hilchot Sanhedrin 26:7). and also gives the false impression that Jews are allowed to use civil courts to adjudicate disputes among themselves. Rav Hershel Schachter told Rav Ezra Frazer (recorded in my Gray Matter 2:173) that he strongly disagrees with this ruling. He explained that the Halachah requires non-Jews to establish legal systems, so a Jew does nothing wrong by participating as a juror in civil courts,151Rav Klein (ibid.) raises this line of thought as a possibility but rejects it, claiming that a part of this Halachah requires non-Jews to appoint only non-Jewish judges (and therefore jurors) in their legal systems. unless both litigants are Jewish (in which case facilitating their trial supports a sin152It is forbidden for Jews to adjudicate a monetary dispute in a civil court. See Shulchan Aruch C.M. 26 and Gray Matter 2:164-178.). Regarding capital trials, Rav Schachter argues that a just and legitimate government has the right to punish criminals within reason. For example, if a Jew murdered, a non-Jewish government may legitimately execute him. Accordingly, Jewish jurors may vote to convict a Jewish defendant if solid evidence convinces them that he committed murder. Rav Yitzchak Isaac Liebes (Teshuvot Beit Avi 2:144) also permits Jews to perform jury duty in both civil and capital cases.
Broken Sidewalks
Rav Schachter was asked (at the aforementioned Teaneck lecture) whether it is permissible to report to the local municipality a Jewish neighbor’s failure to maintain his sidewalk. Rav Schachter replied that the neighbor’s actions constitute a failure to execute his halachic obligations toward his community. The Halachah (Bava Batra 7b and Shulchan Aruch C.M. 163:1) requires all residents of a town to contribute to the construction of a protective wall around the town. The Rama (ibid.) rules that even a minority of the residents may insist that a levy be imposed upon all townspeople in order to raise funds for such purposes. The Rama adds that this rule applies to any communal need. In addition, he rules that townspeople may compel one another to contribute to a fund to provide for the needs of strangers in their midst and to provide charity for the poor. Accordingly, everyone is required to take the necessary steps, even if it involves financial expenditure, to ensure the safety and security of the members of his community. Thus, if one does not properly maintain his property, and his negligence presents a danger to his neighbors, there is cause for a Din Torah.
Rav Schachter stated that the proper course of action is for one to summon his Jewish neighbor to the local beit din to seek the beit din’s help in ensuring the neighbor’s compliance with his both halachic and civic duties in repairing the sidewalk. Rav Schachter explained that it is forbidden to present this issue to the civil authorities, for this matter is like any other financial dispute with another Jew, which Halachah requires that we present to beit din, not the civil authorities, for adjudication (Shulchan Aruch 26:1; note the especially harsh language the Shulchan Aruch uses regarding those who choose to present their claims to civil court instead of beit din). Rav Schachter concluded that if the neighbor either refuses to attend the beit din hearing or refuses to follow the beit din’s order, the beit din will likely grant the plaintiff permission to seek relief from the civil authorities (heteir arka’ot), in accordance with the Halachah set forth in Shulchan Aruch (ad. loc. no. 2).
The State of Israel
Rav Yitzchak Herzog (Techukah Leyisrael Al Pi Hatorah 1:173) notes that rabbis in Israel acknowledged their inability to punish criminals, and they consequently chose to abdicate responsibility for criminal matters:
In a rabbinic convention held in Tel Aviv [immediately before the establishment of the State of Israel], the rabbis unanimously voiced their opinion that they wish to give up control of any jurisdiction over criminal matters. They noted that even in Eastern Europe, the rabbinate ceded jurisdiction on the matters to the non-rabbinic authorities, such as the famous Vaad Arba Aratzot [Council of Four Lands], who acted as the equivalent of the Talmudic shivah tovei ha’ir – seven recognized community leaders – and had exclusive control of imposition of taxes and punishing rebels.
Rabbeinu Nissim (Derashot Haran, Derosh 11) explains that the Torah’s ideal system for enforcing criminal law requires the Sanhedrin and the king to work in tandem. In the modern State of Israel, the batei din and the government do not enjoy a close enough relationship to facilitate this type of collaboration. Thus, the batei din could not uphold the Torah’s criminal legal system, so they relinquished their jurisdiction over criminal law (see Techumin 24:313 note 1).
Rav Itamar Warhaftig (Techumin 10:190) argues:
The rabbis themselves did not wish to deal with [criminal law]; they were prepared for civil courts to adjudicate this area. Hence, it is unthinkable that rabbis should not recognize an arrangement that they [or their predecessors] themselves desired!
By this argument, reporting a criminal matter to Israeli government officials does not constitute a violation of mesirah. Accordingly, Rav Naftali Bar-Ilan (Techumin 10:190) permits testifying in Israeli civil court if one witnessed a fatal automobile accident. He notes, however, that if monetary disputes arise from the accident, these should be submitted to a beit din.
Rav Waldenburg (ad. loc.) similarly distinguishes between mesirah to a Jewish government and mesirah to a non-Jewish government. Nonetheless, Rav Eliashiv (ad. loc. 1:198) does not appear to make such a distinction. Thus, even in Israel, one should consult a competent halachic authority before reporting a suspected criminal to the civil authorities.
Lobbying Against the Israeli Government
Those who are members of and support organizations which lobby the American government to pressure the Israeli government to act against what it perceives as its own security interests should consider the historical and halachic implications of such actions. Although such support is motivated by what is perceived as acting in the best interests of the State of Israel, one should consider that the democratically elected government of Israel is authorized by the people of Israel to determine their security needs. A review of the damage done by Jews throughout history to other Jews should motivate one to seek the guidance of his Rav regarding the halachic propriety of his actions. Similarly, a Rav should at least consult leading halachic authorities before he criticizes the State of Israel in the general media. Even sincere motivations do not justify harming the security of the nearly six million Jews who reside in Medinat Yisrael. The unusual severity of the punishments for mesirah behooves one to exercise great caution and engage in proper halachic consultation before speaking out against the Jewish State in the general media.
Conclusion
It is difficult to achieve a balance between the prohibition of mesirah and the need to protect ourselves and our communities. One cannot outline all-encompassing and clear-cut rules that will apply to every situation. Nonetheless, the cases we have discussed illuminate how halachic authorities strive to achieve such a balance and emphasize the need to consult a competent halachic authority for both his halachic insight and his overall wisdom as to how to treat any situation which potentially requires reporting an individual to the civil authorities. We should caution, however, that one who reasonably perceives that he is in imminent danger that does not allow for rabbinic consultation should call the police and ensure that he receives the protection he needs. May we merit serving as both devoted servants of Hashem and law-abiding citizens of the countries in which we reside, and may we thus relegate the Halachah of mesirah to purely theoretical study.
Postscript – Rabbinical Council of America Press Release of July 26, 2011
RCA Reaffirms Importance of Referring Suspected Child Abuse or Endangerment to the Authorities Without Delay
The Rabbinical Council of America has today reaffirmed its position that those with reasonable suspicion or first hand knowledge of abuse or endangerment have a religious obligation to report that abuse to the secular legal authorities without delay. One of the unique features of Jewish law is that it imposes upon every member of the community an obligation to help others avoid danger. The biblical verse "do not stand by while your neighbor's blood is shed" is understood by Jewish Law to mandate that one must do all in one's power to prevent harm to others - even if monetary harm, but certainly physical harm.
Consistent with that Torah obligation, if one becomes aware of an instance of child abuse or endangerment, one is obligated to refer the matter to the secular authorities immediately, as the prohibition of mesirah (i.e., referring an allegation against a fellow Jew to government authority) does not apply in such a case.
As always where the facts are uncertain one should use common sense and consultations with experts, both lay and rabbinic, to determine how and when to report such matters to the authorities. False accusations are harmful to those falsely accused - but unreported abuse or endangerment can be life-threatening, as we have recently been tragically reminded.
In addition and as a separate matter, those within the Jewish community whom secular law deems to be "mandated reporters," must certainly obey the particular reporting requirements, which vary from state to state in the United States. A person covered by mandatory reporter laws must comply with those laws, even in a case in which Jewish law might otherwise not require a person to report such child abuse or endangerment.