The Mishnah (Avodah Zarah 2:6) records that Chazal forbade the consumption of milk from a kosher animal that was milked by a non-Jew1For a discussion of whether a non-observant Jew is included in this category, see Teshuvot Igrot Moshe (Y.D. 1:46), the views of Rav Yosef Shalom Eliashiv and Rav Shmuel Wosner cited in Bin’tiv Hechalav (p. 32 and p. 35), and Encyclopedia Talmudit (15:174). without Jewish supervision (chalav akum, as opposed to chalav yisrael, milk that was supervised). The Gemara explains that this was enacted out of concern that the non-Jew may have mixed non-kosher milk with the kosher milk. In recent times, the limited likelihood of this risk has sparked much debate within the Orthodox community as to how applicable this restriction is today. We shall present both sides of the question, starting with the view of Rav Yosef Dov Soloveitchik.
It is vitally important to note that we will address the issue as it pertains to the current realities in the United States. In other countries, however, it may be forbidden to consume unsupervised milk according to all authorities.
Rav Soloveitchik’s Three Considerations for Leniency
It is well known among Rav Soloveitchik’s students that when he resided in the United States, he drank packaged milk that did not have any special rabbinic supervision. Rav Menachem Genack related (in a shiur at Yeshiva University) that Rav Soloveitchik delineated three considerations to be lenient. First, some authorities rule leniently if there are no non-kosher animals in the herd that is being milked (ein b’edro tamei). Second, we may rely on the government (USDA) supervision and inspections to ensure that the milk we consume is in fact from cows. Finally, the rabbinic edict forbidding the consumption of milk from an animal that was milked by a non-Jew technically does not apply today, since the cows are milked by machines.
Ein B’edro Tamei
The Rishonim and Acharonim debate whether the prohibition against chalav akum applies even if the non-Jew has no non-kosher animals in his herd (see Mordechai, Avodah Zarah 826, Teshuvot Radbaz 4:1147, and Semak 223). Some authorities dismiss this exception entirely, while others are lenient only if no non-kosher animals are milked in an entire locale. The later Acharonim are divided as to how to resolve this issue. The Pri Chadash (Y.D. 115:6) and the Chazon Ish (Y.D. 41:4) rule leniently, 2See, though, our discussion of the Chazon Ish’s opinion that appears later in this section. whereas the Aruch Hashulchan (Y.D. 115:5),3The Aruch Hashulchan (Y.D. 115:6) relates:
To emphasize our point (of not following the Pri Chadash’s leniency), I will present what someone once shared with me with a broken heart when I served as a Rav in a certain locale. One of the prominent community members of that locale adopted the lenient approach when traveling to the country’s largest city. He always frequented [a particular inn], and he and other guests, when they would drink their hot drinks every morning, would purchase a “fatty milk” from a non-Jewish merchant whose store was located near the inn. Once, they began to wonder how this very small store got such a large supply of fatty milk, and they went to the merchant to inquire about this matter. The merchant responded that he would purchase large quantities of animal brains from the [non-kosher] butcher, grind [and mix] them together with large quantities of milk, and then cook them together. Upon hearing this, they all fell on their faces upon realizing their great sin of consuming non-kosher meat as well as forbidden mixtures of milk and meat. The community member shared this with me and cried aloud “How great are the words of our sages.” the Chochmat Adam (67:1), and the Chatam Sofer (Y.D. 107, cited in the Pitchei Teshuvah Y.D. 115:3) rule strictly. The latter three authorities note that the custom among Eastern and Central European Jews was to follow the stringent opinion. The Darchei Teshuvah (115:6) reports that this also was the custom in Eretz Yisrael. The Pri Chadash, though, records that Amsterdam’s custom was to be lenient, and the Darchei Teshuvah (ibid.) writes the same about a number of communities.4For further sources on this hotly debated issue, see Sdei Chemed 8:45.
The Beit Meir (cited in the Darchei Teshuvah) argues that even according to the lenient opinion, there is virtually no locale that has no non-kosher animals, so this line of leniency is hardly ever relevant. On the other hand, the Pri Chadash and his supporters believe that ein b’edro tamei means that no non-kosher animals are milked in the area. An animal in the zoo or a pet does not appear to impinge on the applicability of this rule according to the Pri Chadash.
Even if the strict ruling is adopted, the lenient opinions might still be used as a legitimate snif l’hakel (adjunct consideration) to a lenient ruling. One example of this usage is the responsum of Rav David Tzvi Hoffman (Teshuvot Melamed L’ho’il 2:33) in which he relies on the lenient opinion as one consideration to permit a sick individual, for medicinal purposes, to drink buttermilk that was not supervised. As non-kosher milk is not commercially available in the United States,5Rav Avrohom Gordimer of the Orthodox Union confirmed that non-kosher milk is not commercially available in the United States, at least not in normative shopping venues that service the masses. Rav Soloveitchik applies these lenient opinions as one consideration to rule leniently.
We must clarify, though, that these lenient opinions do not apply in Israel. Rav Zev Weitman, the Rav of the Israeli dairy giant Tnuva, reports (Techumin 22:459) that camel milk is (regrettably) commercially available in Israel and actually is used as an ingredient in ice cream for sale in southern portions of Eretz Yisrael. This is one of the reasons that the Israeli Chief Rabbinate is not lenient regarding chalav akum.6See Rav Eliyahu Bakshi-Doron’s essay in Techumin (23:463-472).
Nonetheless, Rav Weitman (Bin’tiv Hechalav p. 40) contends that since the price of non-kosher milk is tens of times greater than that of kosher milk, we need not be concerned that the former was introduced into the latter. He argues for extending the Pri Chadash’s interpretation of ein b’edro tamei to allow chalav akum even where non-kosher animals are milked as long as a large price difference discourages mixing the milks. The basis for this approach is the Gemara’s assertion (Avodah Zarah 34b) that although the Mishnah (Avodah Zarah 2:4) prohibits non-Jews’ muryas (oil from pickled fish, which sometimes contained wine) due to concern that non-kosher wine was added, the prohibition does not apply when wine is far more expensive than pure muryas.
Government Inspection
Although the custom in most of Europe was to follow the strict view of the Chatam Sofer, as we cited above, the practice of most observant Jews in the United States during the early part of the twentieth century was to follow the lenient opinion. Those who followed the Chatam Sofer constituted the exception rather than the rule. Rav Melech Schachter related to me that knowledgable American Jews assumed that they were following the lenient approach of the Pri Chadash. Rav Moshe Feinstein (Teshuvot Igrot Moshe Y.D. 1:46-48), however, presents two different arguments to defend the lenient practice.7In fact, Rav Moshe writes (Teshuvot Igrot Moshe Y.D. 1:46) that the custom of Ashkenazic Jews is not to follow the Pri Chadash. Hence, he forbids purchasing milk directly from a non-Jewish farmer whose milking process is completely unsupervised. One argument is that in America, where the government supervises the milking process to ensure that only cow’s milk is being sold, even the Chatam Sofer would permit consuming chalav akum. This is because Halachah, in the context of the laws of testimony, equates clear and certain knowledge of an event with seeing an event (see Shevuot 34a). Our knowledge that the government monitors the milk in this country is the equivalent, argues Rav Moshe, of watching the milking process ourselves.
Rav Moshe’s second argument is based on the Gemara (Avodah Zarah 39b) that states that the Jewish supervisor need not constantly watch the milking, for as long as he has easy access to view the milking, the milk is acceptable. This is because the non-Jew milking the cow is afraid (mirtat) to introduce non-kosher milk, lest the Jew see him. It seems clear that as long as the non-Jew is afraid to put non-kosher milk into the kosher milk, one is permitted to consume the non-Jew’s milk. Hence, Rav Moshe asserts (Teshuvot Igrot Moshe Y.D. 1:46), “In any case in which there is fear of government penalty, this rabbinic prohibition does not apply.”
Many of the great twentieth-century authorities consider reliable government supervision as a factor in their rulings. These authorities include the Chazon Ish (Y. D. 41:4, though see below), Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank (Teshuvot Har Tzvi Y.D. 103, discussing powdered milk),8Rav Frank wrote his responsum in the summer of 1944, a very trying period in Eretz Yisrael. He does not specify, though, whether his ruling applies only in such a case of great need or in all cases. Additionally, Rav Frank rules leniently because powdered milk, unlike regular milk, was never included in any prohibition. He does not address the permissibility of regular milk, as that issue was not presented to him. Rav Yosef Eliyahu Henkin (Teshuvot Ivra 43), and Rav Yaakov Kaminetzsky (Emet L’yaakov Al Shulchan Aruch p. 308).9Rav Kaminetzky does not explain the basis for his ruling (which he limits to cases of great need); he merely makes reference to the lenient position of the Chazon Ish.
A Critique of Rav Moshe’s Leniency
Rav Moshe’s argument is somewhat debatable. The point of the Chatam Sofer (in rejecting the Pri Chadash) appears to be that even though we are certain that no non-kosher milk was introduced into the milk, a Jew still must supervise the milking process. Thus, the Chatam Sofer seems not to accept the argument that knowledge is equivalent to vision in the context of this Halachah. Even in the aforementioned Gemara, the Jew who is not constantly watching at least is minimally involved with the milking process, as he is seated outside the barn. In the case of government supervision, in contrast, no Jew is involved at all in supervising the milking.10Those who adopt the strict approach to the chalav yisrael issue discuss whether supervision by video cameras and computers suffices even according to the Chatam Sofer. Rav Zev Weitman (Techumin 22:466-468) and Rav Mordechai Gross (Bin’tiv Hechalav pp. 54-56) address this issue at length. In these situations, a Jew is involved in the supervision process, apparently making them more analogous to the situation described in the aforementioned Gemara than to non-Jewish government supervision. Rav Weitman reports that Rav Yosef Shalom Eliashiv and Rav Shmuel Wosner ruled (in a ruling issued to the rabbinic supervisors of the mehadrin division of Tnuva) that supervision of the milking process by video cameras suffices to satisfy the opinion of the Chatam Sofer and to categorize the milk as chalav yisrael.
On the other hand, the Pri Chadash (and, correspondingly, the Chatam Sofer) addresses a situation in which there is no external supervision of the milking process, and hence no mirtat on the part of the non-Jews milking the cows. Rather, the Pri Chadash relies solely on the reasoning that the likelihood that the non-Jews would be practically able to introduce non-kosher milk into their product is minute. Thus, it is debatable whether government supervision is closer to the case in the aforementioned Gemara or to that of the Pri Chadash.
The Chazon Ish (Y.D. 41:4) associates the idea of relying on government supervision with the reasoning of the Pri Chadash. According to the Chazon Ish, then, the Chatam Sofer rejects relying on government supervision in this context. We must clarify, though, that the Chazon Ish himself is quite inclined toward the view of the Pri Chadash, although he does not rule explicitly in accordance with it. The Chazon Ish’s brother-in-law, Rav Yaakov Kanievsky, clarifies (Krayna D’igrata 2:123) that the Chazon Ish relied on the Pri Chadash to permit frail individuals to drink powdered milk in difficult wartime years when milk was not readily available in Eretz Yisrael. Thus, the Chazon Ish essentially accepts the view of the Pri Chadash, although he does so only in a case of great need.11For further discussion of the Chazon Ish’s view on this issue, see Bin’tiv Hechalav p. 31.
Many other Acharonim also adopt the approach that government supervision is inadequate to satisfy the view of the Chatam Sofer. These authorities include Rav Yaakov Breisch (Teshuvot Chelkat Yaakov 3:37-38), Rav Yitzchak Yaakov Weisz (Teshuvot Minchat Yitzchak 9:81), and Rav Shmuel Wosner (Teshuvot Sheivet Halevi 4:87).12Rav Wosner records a remarkable conversation he had with the Chazon Ish about this matter.
Moreover, Rav Ovadia Yosef (Teshuvot Yechaveh Da’at 4:42) rules in accordance with the strict view despite the fact that the two primary advocates of the lenient view, the Radbaz and the Pri Chadash, are among the most authoritative Sephardic halachic authorities. Rav Ovadia bases his ruling on the Chida (Shiyurei Berachah 115:1), who records that the custom in Eretz Yisrael and its environs was to follow the strict opinion (as we quoted above from the Darchei Teshuvah).13The Shiyurei Berachah adds that if a community does not have an established practice, it should adopt the stringent position. Indeed, Rav Mordechai Eliyahu writes (Kol Tzofayich 145) that even those who observe only the standard level of kashrut (not mehadrin)14The Israeli Chief Rabbinate maintains two levels of kashrut certification: basic kosher and mehadrin, the latter being for those who wish to abide by stricter halachic standards. should scrupulously avoid relying on the lenient opinion in this matter. Even Rav Moshe Feinstein writes in his many responsa on this topic that a ba’al nefesh (someone who is very meticulous in his halachic observance) should follow the strict opinion on this issue, as we shall discuss.15Rav Moshe writes (Teshuvot Igrot Moshe Y.D. 1:47), though, that one who adopts the stricter approach because he believes that government-supervised milk is even possibly forbidden is mistaken, and does not require hatarat nedarim (annulment of vows) should he choose to discontinue his strict practice. Rav Hershel Schachter stated (at a convention of the Rabinical Council of America) that one who heeds Rav Moshe’s recommendation to be strict need not follow his stringency when visiting others who are not strict about chalav yisrael (and no hatarat nedarim is required). He based this argument on the Dagul Meir’vavah (Y.D. 114:1), who rules that one who adopts a chumra (stringency) does so with the implicit intention that he does not accept it in circumstances where it would be very difficult to observe. We should note, however, that this applies only if one adopts Rav Moshe’s approach that government supervised milk is essentially permitted, not if one follows those poskim who rule that such milk is essentially forbidden.
Davar Sheb’minyan
Despite Rav Moshe Feinstein’s lenient ruling, it is well known that he encouraged people, both in writing (Teshuvot Igrot Moshe Y.D. 1:47) and orally, to drink only chalav yisrael milk.16See Teshuvot Igrot Moshe (Y.D. 2:35), where Rav Moshe strongly urges Yeshivot to serve only chalav yisrael milk despite the expense and economic difficulty involved in doing so, since “This also is part of a Jewish education - to teach that it is proper for bnei torah (those exceptionally dedicated to Torah life) to be strict even when there is only a mere concern for violating a prohibition, since from this they will realize how one must fear violating Torah prohibitions.” The primary reason for this is the Gemara’s principle (Beitzah 5a), “Davar sheb’minyan tzarich minyan acheir l’hatiro,” which means, effectively, that a rabbinic edict applies even if its reason no longer applies. This point is strongly emphasized by the Chatam Sofer in his aforementioned responsum concerning chalav yisrael. Although the Pri Chadash argues that the decree against chalav akum was not a davar sheb’minyan (i.e. there was no formal prohibition in situations in which there was no practical concern for a mixture of non-kosher milk), the custom in most pre-war communities in Europe was not to rely on the Pri Chadash.
However, Rav Soloveitchik’s third reason to rule leniently might overcome this obstacle. He argues that the edict applies only if a non-Jew milks the animal, but not if a machine milks it.17Actions performed by a machine are not directly attributed to the individual who activated the machine (except for the very first action the machine performs). See Chullin 16a, which discusses indirect shechitah; Teshuvot Yechaveh Da’at (1:14), which summarizes the rich debate regarding machine-baked matzah); and Chazon Ish (O.C. 6) and Teshuvot Har Tzvi (O.C. 1:10), who discuss machines spinning wool for tzitzit. According to this approach, the rabbinic edict technically does not apply to the milk we currently drink even if one assumes that chalav akum was prohibited by Chazal as a full-fledged davar sheb’minyan.18One might then ask why wine produced by a non-Jew should be a problem today, when the wine is produced entirely by machinery without any direct contact between the producer and the product. The answer is that regarding wine, the Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 125:2) states explicitly that if it is produced by non-Jews, it is prohibited even if they produced it indirectly and never touched it. In the Halachot of milk production, by contrast, the Shulchan Aruch includes no such proviso, leaving open the possibility that indirectly produced milk is permissible. Moreover, Rav Soloveitchik’s approach stems from the Mishnah’s formulation of the prohibition of chalav akum as “milk that was milked by a non-Jew,” which might imply that the enactment technically does not apply to milk that was not directly milked by a non-Jew. The prohibition to consume wine produced by a non-Jew is not formulated in this way, but rather as simply “[non-Jewish] wine.”
None of the other twentieth-century poskim propose Rav Soloveitchik’s argument. Perhaps they believe that since the enactment against chalav akum stems from concern that non-kosher milk was introduced into the product, a concern that is relevant even if the milk was produced by machine, the enactment still applies in such circumstances.
Following Different Opinions
Those who follow the strict opinion should certainly not regard those who rule leniently as being unobservant of kashrut laws, since they are following eminent halachic authorities such as Rav Feinstein and Rav Soloveitchik. Rav Yaakov Kaminetzky (Emet L’yaakov Al Shulchan Aruch p. 308) rules that those who follow the strict opinion regarding chalav yisrael are even permitted to eat using the dishes and utensils of those who follow the lenient view. As a precedent, he cites the ruling of the Rama (Y.D. 64:9) regarding a certain fat whose kashrut was subject to halachic dispute, with different communities following different opinions. The Rama rules that those who adopt the strict view are permitted to eat from the dishes and utensils of those who adopt the lenient view. He rules similarly (Y.D. 115:1) regarding the dispute about butter produced by a non-Jew (which we shall discuss below), regarding which there are different practices among different communities.19For an explanation of these rulings of the Rama, see Gray Matter 1 p. 247 note 2. Rav Kaminetzky also rules that one who adopts the strict view is permitted to give non-chalav yisrael products to those who are lenient about this issue, and does not thereby violate the prohibition against causing others to sin.20For an explanation of this ruling, see Gray Matter 1 p. 171.
It is also important for one who is lenient to take care to serve only chalav yisrael to those who adopt the strict opinion (see Rama Y.D. 119:7).
Other Potentially Relevant Issues
One concern of those who rule strictly is that if chalav yisrael is not observed, this law will be forgotten by Am Yisrael (see Teshuvot Chelkat Yaakov 3:37). We may come to forget this Halachah and not know to apply it even when its reason is applicable, such as in countries or circumstances in which the lenient considerations are not relevant. Accordingly, those who adopt the strict position remind those who are lenient that sometimes milk can be considered non-kosher.
In addition, Rav Zev Weitman observes (Techumin 22:460-463) that today, a significant number of cows throughout the world undergo a surgical procedure that renders them (and the milk they produce) tereifot.21The third chapter of Masechet Chullin outlines eighteen defects in an animal from which one could expect that the animal will die within a year, rendering it forbidden to eat due to the prohibition to eat a tereifah (Shemot 22:30). A perforation in an animal’s stomach is one of these eighteen defects, and a contemporary surgical procedure involves making a hole in the animal’s stomach, albeit for therapeutic purposes. Rabbinic monitoring of the situation is necessary to ascertain that this procedure does not become common enough to render generic milk as non-kosher.22Rav Weitman believes that this would cause all milk to become problematic because the lenient approaches outlined above all rely on the assumption that the milk supply is uncontaminated with non-kosher milk. Since milk from treifot is not kosher (following the rule “yotzei min hatamei tamei,” “that which emerges from a non-kosher source is not kosher;” see Bechorot 5b), the original reasons that prompted Chazal to prohibit chalav akum would again apply. One could argue, though, that the enactment stems only due to concern for milk from a non-kosher animal, not milk from an animal defined as a tereifah. The Orthodox Union (see Mesorah 10:62-68), though, follows the rulings of Rav Yisroel Belsky and Rav Moshe Heinemann that this currently is not a problem in the United States, but one may not assume that this is not a problem in other parts of the world without consulting a competent Rav.23See Rav Michoel Zylberman’s essay in the Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society (54:93-113) for a presentation of the lenient considerations and opinions regarding the concern that most dairy cows today are treifot. See also Rav J. David Bleich’s essay on this topic in Tradition (41:1:55-70).
Rav Moshe Feinstein (Teshuvot Igrot Moshe Y.D. 1:47) writes: “Most observant Jews and also many rabbanim (rabbis) are lenient regarding this matter, and God forbid that one should declare that they are acting improperly.” Indeed, many of Rav Soloveitchik’s students follow their Rav’s example and adopt the lenient approach to this issue. We should note, though, that today, a much greater percentage of the observant community adopts the strict approach than when Rav Moshe wrote his teshuvah in 1954.
The lenient position appears to be especially cogent given that there is no concern for violating a Torah prohibition. The Shach (Y.D. 118:8) points out that we are not concerned that the non-Jew added a large amount of non-kosher milk, because then the adulteration would be obvious, since, as the Gemara (Avodah Zarah 35b) notes, non-kosher milk looks different from kosher milk. Since the concern is only that a small amount of non-kosher milk was added, there always is a significant majority of kosher milk, and min b’mino (two like items, in this case the kosher and non-kosher milk)24The Pitchei Teshuvah (Y.D. 118:1) questions the reasoning of this Shach based on the difference in taste between the two types of milk, which should therefore be considered min b’she’eino mino (two different items). In such a case, the kosher item must be more than sixty times as plentiful as the non-kosher item in order to nullify it even on a biblical level. Nonetheless, the Chazon Ish (Y.D. 41:1) maintains that the prohibition against unsupervised milk cannot be on a biblical level in any case, since the chance of a mixture of non-kosher milk is so small. is nullified on a biblical level as long as there is a majority of the kosher product (Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 98:2). Thus, there is no biblical-level concern, and it certainly seems reasonable to rely on the well-founded lenient opinions regarding such a rabbinic prohibition.
The Policy of the Israeli Chief Rabbinate
Rav Eliyahu Bakshi-Doron writes (Techumin 23:463) that the policy of the Israeli Chief Rabbinate is not to rely on Rav Moshe Feinstein’s leniency even for its regular (non-mehadrin) kashrut standards. He explains that even Rav Moshe permitted government-supervised milk only in a case of need, but that in Israel there is no need, as Israel is a land flowing with chalav yisrael milk. It has no pressing need to import government-supervised milk or dairy products produced by non-Jews.
Of course, the Chief Rabbinate’s policy supports the dairy industry of Medinat Yisrael, thereby facilitating the fulfillment of yishuv Eretz Yisrael. The availability of more jobs in Eretz Yisrael allows more Jews to live there and brings more tax revenue to the Israeli government, which it can then use to fulfill its role of facilitating Jews living securely in Eretz Yisrael. Those who advocate the purchase of chalav yisrael milk in the United States argue, similarly, that this practice economically supports our fellow Jews. The Torah indeed advocates purchasing a product from Jews if possible.25See Rashi to Vayikra 25:14 s.v. V’chi, Teshuvot Rama (10), Ahavat Chessed (1:5:6-7). See Rav Doniel Neustadt’s The Monthly Halachah Discussion (pp. 50-51) for a summary of the parameters of this mitzvah.
Rav Bakshi-Doron writes that a major motivation behind the stringent ruling of the Chatam Sofer was distancing us socially from nochrim. He argues that Chazal enacted the prohibition of chalav akum not only because of kashrut concerns, but also to protect us from assimilation. He cites the Aruch Hashulchan’s comment (Y.D. 115:6) that Chazal have covert as well as overt reasons for their enactments. The covert reason for chalav yisrael, Rav Bakshi-Doron argues, is to prevent assimilation. Indeed, observing the strict position requires one to live in an area blessed with a heavy concentration of observant Jews where there is sufficient consumer demand for chalav yisrael products.
Another reason that Rav Bakshi-Doron advances to adopt the strict approach today is the extreme complexity of contemporary food production. He is concerned that the milk producers might add non-kosher ingredients that government supervisors do not find objectionable. According to this reasoning, unsupervised milk would be forbidden today even according to the most lenient approach of the Pri Chadash! However, American rabbinical kashrut professionals do not share this concern.26Rav Avrohom Gordimer outlined the policy of the Orthodox Union in this regard:
Fresh milk (unflavored, normal refrigerated milk – as opposed to long shelf-life boxed milk) in the United States has no kashrus concerns. The only concern is the use of non-kosher vitamins, which are batel (nullified) anyway, as well as the slight possibility of pasteurization on non-kosher equipment. Although the vitamins are always batel, the Orthodox Union will not certify milk without supervising that kosher vitamins are used. Additionally, the use of shared equipment for milk and non-kosher beverages (e.g. non-kosher grape juice blends) is not common and equipment sanitization between products on an “ikkar hadin” (essential Halacha) level will prevent such equipment from imparting ta’am issur (non-kosher taste particles) to fresh milk. All OU certified milk is made on mashgiach-verified kosher-dedicated equipment. The OU does not certify milk (or any products) based on these types of rationales (such as nullification and equipment sanitization), even though they may be relied upon.
Traveling Between Countries
Halachah (see Pesachim 50a and Shulchan Aruch O.C. 468:4) requires a traveler to follow the stringencies of both the place he left and his destination. Accordingly, it would seem that visitors from Israel to the United States should maintain the stringent standard regarding chalav yisrael, since their practice at home is to be strict about this matter. For some reason, this does not seem to be the common practice among many Israeli travelers to America.
Rav Yaakov Borow told me, however, that the regular kosher (non-mehadrin) dairy products made in Israel often include dried chalav akum additives.27Rav Borow informs me that there are general kashrut concerns with dried milk. For example, animal fats are sometimes dried on equipment that is also used for drying milk. As such, the practice in Israel is not to be strict as far as dried milk is concerned. In addition, Rav Moshe Bleich suggests that Rav Moshe Feinstein’s lenient ruling is intended for situations in which chalav yisrael is not readily available. Since Israel is flowing with chalav yisrael milk, there is no pressing need to rely on Rav Moshe’s leniency.28Rav Borow informs me that much of the Israeli milk industry uses foreign workers to do the actual milking, and there also are some farms owned by non-Jews. Thus, the Israeli Chief Rabbinate does at times have to take measures (i.e. require supervision) to ensure that the Israeli milk supply is chalav yisrael. Thus, it is possible that even Israelis who drink only chalav yisrael milk may drink non-chalav yisrael milk when traveling in America if chalav yisrael is not readily available. However, since this question remains unresolved, a resident of Eretz Yisrael should consult his Rav regarding whether he may drink non-chalav yisrael fresh milk (or products made from liquid milk) when he travels outside of Israel. A resident of Eretz Yisrael also should ask his Rav if he is permitted to eat products imported from outside of Israel that are made from liquid milk even if the item is ceritified kosher by a reliable North American or European kashrut agency.29Conversely, Rav Hershel Schachter told me it is forbidden for residents of the United States to consume products that contain gelatin made from non-kosher sources even if they bear a reliable Israeli rabbinical certification, since the practice of Jews in the United States is to follow the ruling of Rav Moshe Feinstein (Teshuvot Igrot Moshe Y.D. 1:37 and 2:27) and Rav Aharon Kotler (Mishnat Rabi Aharon 1:16-17) forbidding such gelatin.
Chem’at Akum
There is much controversy about the applicability of the prohibition of chalav akum to processed dairy products, centering on the question of chem’at akum (unsupervised butter produced by non-Jews). Although the Gemara does not discuss this issue, the Rambam (Hilchot Ma’achalot Asurot 3:15) cites unresolved arguments among the Geonim about it.
The Rambam explains the reasoning behind these two opinions. The lenient view argues that Chazal never banned consuming the butter of non-Jews, as we can be certain that the butter comes from a kosher animal because the milk of a non-kosher animal cannot be made into butter. The stringent view is concerned that there may remain leftover pockets of non-kosher milk that were in the product from which the butter was made.30For an enlightening analysis of the two views, see the Bei’ur Hagra (Y.D. 115:17).
This issue remains unresolved, as the Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 115:3) notes that different communities maintain different practices. Rav Zev Weitman records (Bin’tiv Hechalav p. 41) that the policy of the Israeli Chief Rabbinate is to be lenient regarding chem’at akum for standard kashrut certifications and to be strict for mehadrin certifications.
We should clarify that the lenient approach does not imply that one may eat butter that is not certified as kosher by a reliable kashrut agency. Rather, it implies that butter does not require the type of constant supervision that the Chatam Sofer demands for milk. The kashrut agency still must verify and monitor the product to ensure that all of its ingredients are kosher. What is not required, according to the lenient view, is supervision of the entire butter production process - occasional inspections suffice. The Chochmat Adam (67:9) notes that common practice is to be lenient about this issue, and Rav Mordechai Willig (1981 SOY Guide to Kashrut p. 75) similarly writes that “The custom today is to be lenient and to permit butter produced by a Gentile.” This is why butter produced by large non-Jewish companies commonly receives kashrut certification, unlike comparably produced wine and cheese.
Powdered Milk – Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank vs. the Chazon Ish
As we mentioned previously, Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank rules that it is permissible to drink powdered milk that is imported to Eretz Yisrael from the United States. He compares powdered milk to chem’at akum, applying the same logic that would permit butter to permit powdered milk. The lenient opinion regarding butter, he contends, believes that Chazal imposed their decree only on plain milk, not on all milk products. Once the form of the milk has changed, the decree no longer applies.
The Chazon Ish (Y.D. 41:4) vehemently disagrees with Rav Frank. He completely rejects the comparison of powdered milk to butter, since the basis for leniency regarding butter is the fact that butter cannot be produced from the milk of a non-kosher animal. Powdered milk, on the other hand, can be produced from non-kosher milk as well. Hence, the Chazon Ish concludes that there is no distinction between fresh milk and powdered milk regarding chalav yisrael.31Rav Zvi Sobolofsky observed in a shiur that this dispute is characteristic of many halachic disputes that have emerged in the modern age concerning the status of items that have been dried to a powder. Examples include the dispute about the use of reconstituted grape juice for kiddush (see Teshuvot Minchat Shlomo 1:4 and the essay about this topic available at www.koltorah.org) and the berachah on Pringles, which are made from dried potatoes. Part of the question is whether we view the dried food that was reconstituted as a new entity or as the same entity that it was previously. The Chazon Ish seems to assume that drying an item to a powder does not create a new entity.
This dispute has never been resolved. Rav Bakshi-Doron (Techumin 23:464-465) records that the Israeli Chief Rabbinate historically relied upon Rav Frank’s leniency because of the shortage of chalav yisrael powdered milk in Israel until recent years. Currently, the Chief Rabbinate relies on Rav Frank’s leniency for its standard kashrut certifications but not for its mehadrin certifications. Its policy is to require any product that relies on Rav Frank’s leniency to include a disclaimer on the package stating that it contains powdered milk from chalav akum. Rav Bakshi-Doron explains that the Chief Rabbinate seeks thereby to discourage reliance on Rav Frank’s leniency and eventually to discontinue relying on it entirely, since powdered milk from chalav yisrael sources is readily available in Israel today.32Rav Borow informs me that some dairy ingredients, such as certain types of milk protein, are not made in Israel, and many companies continue to use these chalav akum ingredients in powdered products that receive standard kosher (non-mehadrin) certifications.
Rav Bakshi-Doron also notes that the kashrut status of chalav akum milk proteins that are transformed into powder, such as casein and whey, hinges on this dispute between the Chazon Ish and Rav Frank. Hence, for mehadrin certifications, the Chief Rabbinate insists that milk proteins be derived only from chalav yisrael milk.
Compromise Opinions
I have heard that some people in America adopt a compromise position regarding chalav yisrael. They insist on chalav yisrael for actual milk, but they rely on Rav Frank’s leniency regarding powdered milk. The appeal of this compromise is that business people can take non-chalav yisrael powdered milk with them on their travels to places where chalav yisrael is not available. In addition, milk chocolates and ice creams made from powdered milk still can be consumed.33Rav Hershel Schachter told me that as a youngster, when he would study at the Mirrer Yeshiva in Brooklyn, New York during summer vacations, the Yeshiva served regular powdered milk when chalav yisrael milk was unavailable.
Another compromise that some American kashrut organizations once embraced was to permit the use of chalav akum in the production of cheese, even though they would not certify a product containing non-chalav yisrael milk. Their position was based on the Rama’s ruling (Y.D. 115:2) that cheese that was made with chalav akum is acceptable b’dieved (post facto), since cheese cannot be produced from milk from a non-kosher animal. These kashrut agencies reasoned that since at worst a minimally acceptable product would be produced, they could rely on Rav Moshe’s leniency l’chatchilah (ideally), even though they normally would not rely on it, to permit the production of cheese from chalav akum. Indeed, Rav Moshe (Teshuvot Igrot Moshe Y.D. 3:16) rules that even ba’alei nefesh (those who are exceptionally scrupulous in their observance of Halachah) need not be strict about cheese made from milk that did not have supervision.34Rav David Tzvi Hoffman’s lenient approach (outlined in Teshuvot Melamed L’ho’il 2:36) also serves as a basis for this compromise. Rav Borow told me, though, that changes in the North American cheese industry have made it more difficult to rely on giving a chalav yisrael certification to a product that started with non-chalav yisrael milk.
Conclusion
We have outlined the variety of stances that poskim adopt toward chalav yisrael in the modern context. Each opinion has a strong basis both in traditional sources and among contemporary authorities. Accordingly, it is entirely inappropriate to dismiss any of these legitimate approaches – “Eilu v’eilu divrei elokim chaim” (these and these are the words of the Living God; Eruvin 13b).