In today’s socially integrated Am Yisrael, one of the most complex yet common dilemmas is that of conflicting minhagim (customs). Of course, children must generally attempt to follow their parents’ minhagim,1Refer to the beginning of our next chapter for a discussion of why children should keep their parents’ minhagim. but exactly what this entails can be difficult to determine, given different family circumstances. One such question was brought before Rav Yosef Shalom Eliashiv (Kovetz Teshuvot 1:12), whose teshuvah (responsum) on the parameters of following family traditions we shall discuss in this chapter.
The Case in Question
A man whose non-observant Sephardic parents raised him in an Ashkenazic environment approached Rav Eliashiv with the following dilemma. Despite his Sephardic background, his parents had sent him to Ashkenazic religious schools and synagogues, leading him to follow the Ashkenazic tradition in all matters. Then, when the son was approximately thirty-five years old, his father had returned to his roots and become a fully observant Jew in accordance with Sephardic tradition. The father had demanded that the son return to his Sephardic roots as well, but the son had found this very difficult after following Ashkenazic practice for so long. Now, as the son was planning a wedding for his eldest child, the father insisted that the wedding be conducted according to Sephardic practice, and he even threatened to boycott the wedding if it was not.
The son presented Rav Eliashiv with two questions. First, was he permitted to continue observing the Torah in accordance with Ashkenazic tradition? Second, would Halachah require him to obey his father’s demands under the mitzvot of kibbud and mora av (honoring and revering one’s father)?
Minhagim
Rav Eliashiv begins by emphasizing the importance of abiding by one’s family minhagim. The Gemara (Pesachim 50b) insists that one abide by his family customs even when it is difficult to do so. For example, Rav Eliashiv writes that an Ashkenazic Jew may not change his method of pronunciation to Sephardic or modern Israeli pronunciation; rather, he must recite his prayers using the pronunciation of his ancestors.2Not all authorities agree with Rav Eliashiv on this specific point. Rav Yehuda Amital reports that his wife’s grandfather, Rav Isser Zalman Meltzer, permitted changing to modern Israeli pronunciation. Common practice among Ashkenazic students of Yeshivot Hesder is to follow Rav Isser Zalman’s ruling. Rav Avraham Yitzchak Hakohen Kook (Teshuvot Orach Mishpat 17), though, disagrees with Rav Isser Zalman. For further discussion of this issue, see Teshuvot Mishpetei Uzziel (O.C. 1), Teshuvot Seridei Eish (2:5), Teshuvot Igrot Moshe (O.C. 3:5), and Rav Kook’s letter of approbation for Teshuvot Mishpetei Uzziel.
Rav Eliashiv continues, though, that the prohibition against changing minhagim is not without exception, as demonstrated by a ruling of the Chatam Sofer (Teshuvot Chatam Sofer C.M. 188). The Chatam Sofer was approached by members of a town where two kehillot (communities), one Sephardic and one Ashkenazic, formerly had functioned. However, a pogrom had caused most of the Jews to leave, and since the remaining populace could not sustain two separate minyanim, the two groups now had to combine into one functioning synagogue. The Chatam Sofer ruled that the remaining members of the community should choose which of the two synagogues would continue to function, whose minhagim they then would follow. Rav Ovadia Yosef (Teshuvot Yabia Omer 6 O.C. 10) cites numerous authorities who concur with the Chatam Sofer’s ruling.
The Chatam Sofer reasons that one may change from practicing all Ashkenazic traditions to practicing all Sephardic traditions and vice versa. Just as a non-Jew who converts to Judaism fully integrates into the Jewish community, so too may an Ashkenazic Jew fully integrate into a Sephardic community and vice versa. Rav Yosef Eliyahu Henkin (Eidut L’yisrael p. 162) similarly rules that if an Ashkenazic Jew decides to join a Sephardic community permanently, he may change his nusach hatefillah (liturgy) to the Sephardic one. He notes that historically, the entire Chassidic community changed from nusach Ashkenaz to nusach Sefard with the noble intention of praying in accordance with the mystical teachings of the Arizal.3See Teshuvot Yabia Omer (6 O.C. 10) for a summary of the rich teshuvah literature regarding the legitimacy of the Chassidim’s change of nusach. Some “mitnagdic” poskim, such as Teshuvot Sho’eil Umeishiv (3:1:247) and Teshuvot Maharam Schick (O.C. 43), wrote that the change was illegitimate and violates the obligation not to “abandon the teachings of [one’s] mother” (see Pesachim 50b). Other poskim (especially Chassidic poskim), such as Teshuvot Divrei Chaim (2 O.C. 8), defended the change, and as Rav Henkin notes, this opinion has emerged as the accepted view. Rav Henkin cautions, though, that it is forbidden to make such a change arbitrarily. Of course, one should consult with a Rav before deviating from any family practice, as great caution must be exercised before deviating from practices observed by one’s ancestors for generations.
This also explains the rulings of twentieth-century authorities (for example, Teshuvot Igrot Moshe O.C. 1:158 and Teshuvot Yabia Omer 5 O.C. 37) that Ashkenazic women who marry Sephardic men or vice versa, a relatively new phenomenon, should follow the husband’s traditional family practices.4This issue is discussed at greater length in our next chapter. Although doing so entails deviating from the wife’s family tradition, these poskim apparently believe, as the Chatam Sofer asserts, that a Jew may fully integrate into the practices of a different Jewish community.
Based on this, Rav Eliashiv rules regarding the case addressed to him that from the vantage point of minhag, the son may continue to practice Torah in accordance with Ashkenazic tradition despite his Sephardic ancestry. Rav Hershel Schachter similarly rules that if someone was raised in a non-Chassidic community, he need not practice Chassidic minhagim even if his paternal grandfather was Chassidic (see Beit Yitzchak 39:520). Indeed, many of us pronounce Hebrew differently from our fathers or paternal grandfathers.5Many of the communities in which we reside do not pronounce Hebrew in the Chassidic style. This is an example of community practice prevailing over family custom. For a discussion of how to resolve conflicts between community and family customs, see Rav Zalman Nechemia Goldberg’s Darchei Hapsak (p. 24 note 44).
We must emphasize that exceptional situations notwithstanding, it is imperative to follow the practices of one’s family and community (see, for example Shulchan Aruch O.C. 468:4 and Mishnah Berurah ibid. 14). In fact, Rav Ovadia Yosef would likely disagree with Rav Eliashiv’s ruling for this very reason, especially if the son lived in Eretz Yisrael. Rav Ovadia (Teshuvot Yabia Omer 6 O.C. 10:4 and Teshuvot Yechaveh Da’at 5:33; see also Teshuvot Yabia Omer 5 O.C. 37) laments the choice of Ashkenazic Jews in Israel to maintain their Ashkenazic practices instead of acknowledging that the Rambam and Rav Yosef Karo are the halachic authorities of Eretz Yisrael. Though he reluctantly yields to the Israeli Ashkenazim’s adherence to their traditional customs, he would probably instruct anyone of Sephardic origin who lives in Israel to follow Sephardic practice.6For a defense of the Ashkenazic Jews in Israel retaining their minhagim, see Chazon Ish (Shevi’it 23:5), Rav Yechiel Michel Tukachinsky’s Ir Hakodesh V’hamikdash (3:24), Pe’at Hashulchan (3:11), and Rav Elyakim (Getsel) Ellinson’s Ish V’ishto (pp. 24-25 note 31).
Kibbud and Mora Av
Rav Eliashiv proceeds to discuss whether the son must honor his father’s demand that he follow Sephardic practice. This question hinges on a classic debate concerning the character and scope of the mitzvah of kibbud av va’eim. The Ramban (Yevamot 6a s.v. Mah L’hanach), Rashba (ibid. s.v. Mah L’hanach), and Ritva (ibid. s.v. Yachol) define this mitzvah as providing service to one’s parents but do not necessarily include obeying the will of a parent under it. Thus, one is not obligated to obey a parent’s demand if the requested activity does not benefit the parent. The Vilna Gaon (Bei’ur Hagra Y.D. 240:36) notes that Tosafot (Yevamot 6a s.v. Shekein and Kiddushin 32a s.v. Rav Yehudah) agree with this definition of kibbud av va’eim. These Rishonim base their assertion on the description of the mitzvah that appears in the Gemara (Kiddushin 31b), which gives the examples of “providing food and drink, clothing them, and helping them enter and leave a building.” Accordingly, the mitzvah entails only providing service to the parent.
The Vilna Gaon (ad. loc.) believes that the Shulchan Aruch and Rama accept the aforementioned Rishonim’s definition of kibbud av va’eim. The Shulchan Aruch codifies a ruling of the Terumat Hadeshen (40) that if a son wishes to study in a particular Yeshiva, he does not have to honor a parent’s request that he not study at that Yeshiva because it is located in a dangerous area. The Rama, in turn, quotes a ruling of the Maharik (167) that a son is not required to honor a parent’s demand that he refrain from marrying a particular woman. The Vilna Gaon explains that these rulings are based on the definition of the mitzvah of honoring parents as servicing them but not necessarily obeying them.7See, however, Teshuvot Meishiv Davar (2:50), wherein the Netziv rules that this does not apply if it will cause disparagement to the parents. Rav Eliashiv notes that according to this approach, the son would not be obligated to accede to his father’s demand that he practice the Sephardic tradition.
The Sefer Hamakneh (Kiddushin 31b s.v. Tanu Rabbanan Eizehu), on the other hand, rules that the mitzvah of mora av va’eim (revering parents) requires one to obey a parent’s request even if it will not benefit the parent. Indeed, the Gemara (Kiddushin 31b) states that this mitzvah forbids a child to contradict his parents’ words, which, the Sefer Hamakneh believes, includes disobeying the parent’s orders. The Sefer Hamakneh also believes, contrary to the Vilna Gaon’s assertion, that the Rama actually supports this approach. The Rama presents a specific situation – when a parent demands the child not marry a specific woman – in which he rules that the child is not required to abide by the parent’s demand. Had the Rama agreed with the Ramban, Rashba, Ritva, and Tosafot, he should have presented a general rule that one need not obey a parent’s request if it is not intended to benefit the parent. Since he does not, his ruling must be specific to situations of marriage for the reasons that the Maharik outlines.8For example, the Maharik argues that this demand causes the child to neglect his obligation to marry and have children. According to the Sefer Hamakneh’s approach, it would seem that the son must obey his father’s demand that he abide by Sephardic tradition.
Rav Eliashiv notes, however, that even the Sefer Hamakneh does not require obedience when it would cause a loss to the child. Whereas ignoring a parent’s request without good reason constitutes a lack of reverence for the parent, ignoring the request out of concern for loss does not. Since, in the case Rav Eliashiv addresses, it would be very disruptive for the son’s family to change its halachic lifestyle so significantly, Rav Eliashiv rules that the son is not required to honor his father’s request that he do so.
Conclusion
The Rambam (Hilchot Mamrim 6:8), Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 240:19), Aruch Hashulchan (Y.D. 240:42), and Teshuvot Seridei Eish (3:95) urge the parents of grown children to refrain from imposing unnecessary and burdensome demands on their children. Parents should help their children by not making it excessively difficult for them to fulfill the mitzvot of kibbud and mora av va’eim.9For examples of when a child is permitted to disregard a parent’s order, see Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 240:25) and Aruch Hashulchan (Y.D. 240:36 and 45). On the other hand, children must do their utmost to properly fulfill these mitzvot, which the Rambam (ad. loc. 6:1) greatly extols and the Gemara (Kiddushin 30b) compares to honoring and revering Hashem. Given that the Torah, in a rare occurrence, states the reward for this mitzvah of honoring parents (Shemot 20:12), it is very advisable to consider what is at stake when dealing with these matters.