Occasionally, one hears about a story of a young man “marrying” a young woman in a frivolous wedding ceremony. Though these ceremonies may seem trivial, they can have horrific consequences, as Halachah might not regard them as invalid. Some cases might even necessitate a get, albeit sometimes merely as a precautionary measure.1The literature from poskim who have dealt with such regrettable situations in the past is summarized in the Pitchei Teshuvah (E.H. 42:5-6) and Otzar Haposkim (volume 13 pp. 11-26). Tragically, this probably would preclude the woman from marrying a kohen (see Rama E.H. 6:1).2The Rama writes that a divorced woman is forbidden to a kohen even if she received a get merely as a precautionary measure. For further discussion of this Rama and its application, see Teshuvot Yabia Omer (6 E.H. 1), Rav Melech Schachter’s essay in Beit Yitzchak (22:157-161), Teshuvot Atzei Besamim (11), and Rav Yirmiyahu Benyowitz’s Kovetz Al Yad (1:148).
In this chapter, we shall a present a case that was adjudicated by Rav Mendel Senderovic that appears in his collection of responsa (Teshuvot Atzei Besamim 22). A full presentation of this case and Rav Senderovic’s decision will elucidate many fundamental issues concerning both kiddushin in general and frivolous kiddushin in particular.
Needless to say, it is vital that youngsters never engage in such reckless behavior, the consequences of which can last a lifetime. If any situation does arise, the case must be presented to a Rav of eminent stature for a ruling.
The Case
Rav Senderovic’s case involved a group of three boys, all nearly fourteen years old, and two girls nearly thirteen years old. Two of the boys left the group, leaving the others standing together. One of the two girls said to the remaining boy that if he loved the second girl, he should marry her, and she handed him a bottle cap to use for the “ceremony.” The boy, following this suggestion, took the bottle cap and handed it to the second girl, who kept it without casting it away. Meanwhile, one of the other boys returned and saw the bottle cap in the second girl’s hand, but he was later unsure (at the time of testimony) whether he had heard the first girl suggest the “marriage” and whether he had witnessed the delivery of the bottle cap.
Lack of Intent
It is tempting to invalidate this ceremony due to the lack of da’at (intent) to marry. Da’at is a basic element of creating valid kiddushin, as is evident in many passages in Masechet Kiddushin (see, for example, Kiddushin 2b, 7b, and 10a).3Also see Chidushei Rabbeinu Chaim Halevi Soloveitchik to the Rambam (Hilchot Yibum V’chalitzah 4:16) for a full conceptual analysis of the requirement of da’at for kiddushin. Since this couple presumably lacked da’at to marry, the ceremony should be invalid and no get should be required.
However, Halachah does not make this assumption easily, as demonstrated by a ruling of the Maharam of Rothenberg (Teshuvot Maharam Mi’ruttenberg 993). In the case brought before him, a woman at first instructed a man to marry her, but when the man threw an item into her lap, she immediately tossed it away. Even though the woman explained that her words were intended as a mere joke, an intention that her actions seemed to confirm, the Maharam ruled that she was married and would require a get to marry another man. The Rama (E.H.HH 42:1) rules in accordance with the Maharam, and none of the commentaries to the Shulchan Aruch challenge this ruling.
Devarim Sheb’leiv and Umdana D’muchach
A bit of discussion is necessary to explain this ruling. The Gemara (Kiddushin 49b) presents a fundamental rule that applies to many areas of Halachah: “Devarim sheb’leiv einam devarim” (thoughts that are not articulated are immaterial). Tosafot (ad. loc. s.v. Devarim) add, though, that if his intent is so obvious that it is assumed even when not stated explicitly (umdana d’muchach), the stipulation need not be articulated to be meaningful.
As an example, Tosafot cite a case (from Bava Batra 132a) in which someone presumed that he had no children and therefore gave his entire estate to someone outside of his family but subsequently discovered that his child was alive. Even though the donor did not explicitly stipulate that his gift was to be valid only on condition that his child was actually dead, the gift is nullified when he discovers that his child is living, because it is glaringly obvious to us – there is an umdana d’muchach – that had he known that the child was living, he would never have gifted his entire estate to a non-family member.
In the case of the Maharam, the woman in question is considered to be married due to the rule of devarim sheb’leiv einam devarim. The woman did not, before she received the ring, issue a disclaimer (mesirat moda’ah) clarifying that she was merely joking and did not intend to be married. Based on two passages in the Gemara (Yevamot 118b and Bava Kama 111a), the Maharam explains that since some women are satisfied with marginal husbands,4For further explanation and discussion of this assertion, see my Gray Matter 1 p. 43. there is no umdana d’muchach that she was joking.
Umdana D’muchah for Marriage
In what appears to be a sweeping statement, the Rama adds to his confirmation of the Maharam that we do not consider umdenot (presumptions) and other evidence that would indicate that the couple did not intend to be married. The scope of this exclusion is somewhat unclear. The Aruch Hashulchan (E.H. 42:7-8) construes the Rama very broadly, interpreting that he completely negates the rules of umdana d’muchach in the context of marriage and divorce. He notes that the Rama does not say that a couple with an umdana that they were not serious is considered only possibly married (safeik kiddushin); they are considered married in all respects. He concludes that the Maharam and Rama are presenting an all-embracing rule: with regard to gittin and kiddushin, we always apply the principle of devarim sheb’leiv einam devarim.5We should note, however, that while the Aruch Hashulchan rules elsewhere based on this understanding (E.H. 145:30), he also seems to contradict it in a different place (E.H. 141:63-64).
The Chazon Ish (E.H. 52:3) adopts a very different approach. He argues that the Gemara never outright excludes gittin and kiddushin from the rules of umdana d’muchach, and we have no evidence that the Maharam and his beit din issued a new edict eliminating the umdana d’muchach exception for kiddushin. Rather, in the specific case addressed by the Maharam and the Rama, there simply was no umdana d’muchach that the couple did not intend to be married. Had there been an authentic umdana, however, the marriage would not have been valid.
An example of a case with such an umdana is addressed in a teshuvah by Rav Shmuel David (printed in Techumin 18:92-99). In Rav David’s situation, a non-observant Israeli couple was scheduled to be married, with a Rav from the Israeli rabbinate officiating at the wedding. The husband found himself unable to attend the wedding, so he asked a friend to substitute for him at the ceremony – not to act as an agent, but to present himself fraudulently to the Rav as the actual husband. The “real” husband subsequently lived with his “wife” and had children with her. One of the children later became observant and wanted to know if she was considered a mamzeret (illegitimate child), since her mother seemed to be married to the substitute husband, not her father.
Rav David cites Rav Eliyahu Bakshi-Doron, Rav Mordechai Eliyahu, and Rav Aharon Lichtenstein as ruling that the daughter was not a mamzeret since the “marriage” between her mother and the substitute husband was invalid. One of the considerations behind this assessment of the marriage was the umdana d’muchach that her mother and the substitute husband did not intend to be married to each other.6We should note, however, that there is more room for leniency in the case of mamzeirut, whose violation is a regular negative prohibition, than in the case of declaring that a get is unnecessary, which could result in violation of the capital crime of adultery and the death penalty associated with it. Moreover, the Torah-level prohibition of mamzeirut does not apply to one who is only a possible mamzeir (Kiddushin 73a).
In our case, however, Rav Senderovic did not feel that this was sufficient reason to rule leniently. Firstly, the dispute between the Aruch Hashulchan and the Chazon Ish seems to be unresolved, as the Otzar Haposkim (volume 13 pp. 11-26 in the 5740 edition) presents poskim who agree with each. Second, in the case that Rav Senderovic adjudicated, as in the case of the Maharam, there was no umdana d’muchach that the couple had no da’at to marry.7Rav Senderovic does not accept the argument of Rav Shmuel David (Techumin 23:149-157) that there is an umdana d’muchach that early teens in contemporary times have no intention to marry, since no one in this milieu gets married at this age. Rav Hershel Schachter (personal communication) and Rav Mordechai Willig (personal communication) also do not accept Rav David’s argument. As opposed to Rav David’s case, wherein the woman was ready to marry another man and obviously did not intend to marry the substitute, those in Rav Senderovic’s case may very well have intended to marry.
Rav Moshe Feinstein’s Compromise
We should note that while Rav Moshe Feinstein (Teshuvot Igrot Moshe E.H. 1:84) seems, for the most part, to adopt the Aruch Hashulchan’s broader reading, he nevertheless presents two limitations on the strict ruling of the Maharam and Rama. First, it appears (based on the Bei’ur Hagra, E.H. 42:4) that the Rama’s disqualification of umdenot regarding kiddushin is a stringency that is imposed only under rabbinic law (but not on a biblical level). Thus, he reasons that there is no reason to be strict in case where there was only one witness, in which the concern that the kiddushin is valid is itself a mere stringency.8This point will be discussed at greater length below. According to Rav Moshe, no get is required in such a case.
In addition, Rav Moshe (ad. loc. 1:82) advocates a suggestion of the Aruch Hashulchan (E.H. 42:12) that if the witnesses are fully aware that there is an umdana d’muchach regarding the couple’s lack of intent, the kiddushin is not valid. This is not due to lack of intent to be married (about which the Maharam and Rama rule that one cannot be lenient), but rather due to the lack of proper witnesses to the ceremony. Rav Moshe explains that one cannot be considered a witness to a kiddushin if he harbors serious doubts as to the efficacy of the ceremony. In other words, the Maharam and Rama are strict only if the witnesses do not realize that the ceremony was a joke. The Otzar Haposkim (ad. loc. pages 19-21) cites several prominent poskim (such as Teshuvot Atzei Halevanon 90 and Teshuvot Zekan Aharon 84) who agree with this assertion, but records that others (such as Rav Kook, Teshuvot Ezrat Kohen 48) disagree.
However, these two leniencies are not relevant to Rav Senderovic’s case, in which, as mentioned above, there was no umdana d’muchach that the couple did not intend to be married.
The Bottle Cap’s Lack of Value
At first glance, it seems that we should be able to invalidate the ceremony for a different reason: the bottle cap’s lack of monetary worth. A fundamental law of kiddushin is that the item used must be worth a perutah9Rav Yaakov Luban (in an essay available at www.ou.org) writes, based on the Chazon Ish (C.M. 16-30), that the value of a perutah is 1/1244 of a troy ounce (1/40 of a gram) of pure silver. Rav Hershel Schachter (personal communication; see B’ikvei Hatzon pp. 268-269) and Rav Mordechai Willig (personal communication) agree with this calculation of the value of a perutah. In 1993, a troy ounce of silver was worth approximately $3.75, making a perutah worth 3/10 of a cent. Accordingly, when the value of silver is depressed, it is possible that a bottle cap indeed is worth a perutah (if not in the United States, then perhaps in an undeveloped country, which, as we will see, may be significant). Rav Moshe Heinemann (in an essay available at www.star-k.org), however, cites Rav Moshe Feinstein, who rules that in order to qualify as a shaveh perutah, a coin must have some purchasing power. Rav Heinemann writes that according to this approach, a shaveh perutah is at least a nickel. (Kiddushin 2a). This is so essential that mesadrei kiddushin (rabbinic wedding officiants) commonly clarify under the chuppah that the ring has a value of at least a perutah (Rama E.H. 31:2).
Nevertheless, the Gemara (Kiddushin 12a) presents the opinion of Shmuel that if one uses an item that was worth less than a perutah in his own locale, we must still be concerned that the item might be worth a perutah somewhere else. Although Rav Chisda disagrees with Shmuel’s opinion, the Shulchan Aruch (E.H. 31:2) rules in accordance with Shmuel, as do almost all Rishonim. Thus, a couple that used an item that was worth less than a perutah is considered only possibly married and would require another kiddushin if they wish to be married to each other (Shulchan Aruch ibid. 4) or a get if they wish to marry others. The Beit Shmuel (31:11) and Aruch Hashulchan (E.H. 31:18) argue that the mainstream opinion among the Rishonim is that the requirement of the get is only rabbinic, as there is no biblical-level concern for the item being worth a perutah elsewhere.
In our case, although a bottle cap is not worth a perutah in the United States, it might be worth a perutah in an undeveloped country. Accordingly, we cannot assume that the kiddushin is invalid based on the fact that the cap was worth less than a perutah. However, Rav Senderovic cites the Aruch Hashulchan’s (E.H. 31:18) suggestion that if the item would seemingly be worthless anywhere in the world, the marriage should be invalid. Rav Senderovic argues that a bottle cap appears to fit this qualification, making the ceremony in our case void. Although the Aruch Hashulchan himself expresses hesitancy about this distinction, Rav Senderovic uses the Aruch Hashulchan’s suggestion as a consideration for a lenient ruling.10Poskim who adjudicate these regrettable cases generally strive to amass many considerations for a lenient ruling (see, for example, Teshuvot Noda Biy’hudah 2 E.H. 75, cited in Pitchei Teshuvah E.H. 42:6 and Teshuvot Igrot Moshe E.H. 1:82).
Omission of “Harei At Mekudeshet Li”
In our case, the boy was silent. The only one to speak was the girl who said, “If you love her, marry her.” The boy thus did not fulfill the usual practice of the chatan to say “Harei at mekudeshet li b’taba’at zo k’dat Moshe v’yisrael” (behold you are betrothed to me with this ring in accordance with the laws of Moses and Israel) before presenting the ring to the kallah (Shulchan Aruch E.H. 27). However, the Rama (E.H. 27:1) notes that the kiddushin is valid even if the chatan does not address the kallah as long as marriage is discussed in her presence (asukim b’oto inyan; see Kiddushin 6a).
Even this limited requirement, though, may demand more than was present in our case. Indeed, the Taz (E.H. 27:2) writes that the one to speak must be the chatan, whereas in our case, the boy said nothing. The Otzar Haposkim (27:15:2), however, cites authorities who rule that the marriage is valid even if the chatan is not the speaker. We also cannot invalidate the marriage on the grounds that the sole witness was unsure whether he heard the girl’s words, as the Aruch Hashulchan (E.H. 27:17) raises the possibility that the witnesses might not be required to hear the statement made in the presence of the kallah. It is possible, he asserts, that it is sufficient for the witness simply to see the delivery of the item from the chatan to the kallah.11These disputes hinge to a great extent on the role of the marriage statement. If the statement (amirah) is an essential component of the wedding ceremony, as Rashi (Kiddushin 5b s.v. Hachi Ka’amar) seems to indicate, the chatan is required to make the statement himself and the witnesses must hear it. If, however, the statement merely serves to clarify that the delivery of the item from boy to girl is for the purpose of marriage, as the Ran (1b in the pages of the Rif s.v. Tannu Rabbanan) seems to indicate, it might not be necessary for the chatan to make the statement or for the witnesses to hear it. Still, even though the boy’s omission of the statement is insufficient basis to invalidate the ceremony, it does provide another consideration to support a lenient ruling.
Ownership of the Ring
Another potential reason for leniency is the basic requirement of weddings that the ring must belong to the chatan (Shulchan Aruch E.H. 28). In fact, mesadrei kiddushin verify with the chatan that he owns the ring and did not simply borrow it. If the chatan forgot to bring the wedding ring, the mesader kiddushin will ensure that the “lender” of a replacement ring transfers title of the ring to the chatan with proper kinyanim (halachic mechanisms of conveyance). Accordingly, the ceremony in our case would appear to be invalid, since the bottle cap did not belong to the boy.
On the other hand, the Rosh (Kiddushin 1:20) asserts that if a “lender” knows that the “borrower” of a ring intends to use it for kiddushin, it is certain (anan sahadei) that he presents the ring as a gift and not a loan, since he knows that kiddushin can be accomplished only with a ring that belongs to the chatan. This ruling is codified by the Shulchan Aruch (E.H. 28:19) and is applied by the Mishnah Berurah (649:15) in the context of borrowing a lulav on the first day of Sukkot.12On the first day, the lulav must belong to the person who is attempting to fulfill the mitzvah with it. For a discussion of whether this issue applies on the second day outside of Israel, as well, see Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 649:5) and Bei’ur Halachah (ibid. s.v. Pesulei). Accordingly, the bottle cap may have belonged to the boy, since we assume that the girl transferred title of the bottle cap to him for the purpose of kiddushin.
On the other hand, Rav Moshe Feinstein (Teshuvot Igrot Moshe E.H. 1:90, addressing a case of a frivolous marriage ceremony) argues that the Rosh’s anan sahadei did not apply in his case, as most people in his locale were not aware of the requirement for the chatan to own the ring. 13Rav Moshe wrote this in the United States in 1949. Moreover, in the context of a joke kiddushin, there is no anan sahadei that the “lender” wished to transfer title to the ring in order to ensure the validity of the kiddushin. In such a situation, it is reasonable to assume that the lender specifically wished to ensure that the kiddushin would be invalid. This is true even if we are unsure whether the lender understood that the couple was not serious, asserts Rav Moshe, as the concept of anan sahadei can apply only where there is relative certainty.14He makes a similar assertion in Teshuvot Igrot Moshe E.H. 1:76-77. For further discussion and a list of poskim who agree and disagree with this assertion, see Gray Matter 1 p. 72. In this case, there is a strong doubt as to whether the “lender” wished to transfer title of the ring to the chatan. Moreover, perhaps the fact that another male was not summoned to serve as the second witness to the betrothal demonstrates that the couple and the other girl were not seeking to create a valid kiddushin. Thus, it seems that one may assume that the girl did not transfer title of the bottle cap to the boy.
Rav Senderovic, however, cogently argues that although Rav Moshe’s responsum addresses the Rosh’s anan sahadei, it does not solve a different problem that distinguishes our case. Rav Moshe speaks of transferring ownership of a ring that one wishes to have returned to him. In such a case, it is reasonable to assume that one who is not learned would not be transferring title, since he knows of no such requirement. In our case, however, the girl gave the boy an item (the bottle cap) worth so little that she had no interest in having it returned to her. Thus, there is no reason not to assume that the girl transferred title of the bottle cap to the boy, even if she was unaware of the requirement for the ring to belong to the chatan.
Rav Senderovic cites Tosafot (Gittin 20b s.v. Ishah), in their comments to the Gemara’s discussion of the requirement that the husband own the get he gives his wife, as a precedent for such a distinction. The Gemara explores whether one may assume that the wife transferred title of her writing tablet (on which the get was written) to the husband. The Gemara suggests that one might assume that the woman was not aware of the need to transfer title of the tablet to the husband, since she presumably was unaware of the requirement that the get belong to the husband, and therefore did not transfer the tablet. Tosafot, in turn, explain that this concern applies only to items that one normally lends; a woman certainly intends to transfer title of a gift that she does not expect to be returned to her. By the same logic, the girl in our case certainly meant to transfer the bottle cap to the boy.
One Witness at a Wedding
One might wonder why this incident constituted any problem whatsoever given that there was only one witness at the ceremony. Any wedding must be observed by two witnesses, in accordance with the principle ein davar sheb’ervah pachot mi’shnayim (at least two witnesses are necessary to alter one’s personal status), which appears many times in the Gemara (such as Gittin 2b). Accordingly, it is surprising to discover that the Gemara (Kiddushin 65a-b) discusses the possibility of a marriage being valid even if there is only one witness present.
The Gemara first cites Shmuel, who insists (as we would expect) that if there is only one witness at the kiddushin, the marriage is invalid, but the Gemara proceeds to cite Rav Yehudah, who is unsure about this point. After the Gemara discusses the matter further, suggesting and rejecting three proofs that we must be concerned for one witness, it queries, “Mai havei alah,” “What is the final resolution of this matter?” The response is that the matter is not resolved, since Rav Kahana rules in accordance with Shmuel, while Rav Papa rules in accordance with Rav Yehudah.
The simplest explanation for the concern for validity in such a case is that this is a stringency imposed by rabbinic law; biblical law clearly requires a minimum of two witnesses for the kiddushin to be valid. Indeed, the Otzar Haposkim (42:21:2) presents a long list of Acharonim who rule that even Rav Papa believes that this is only a rabbinic stringency. Some poskim, though, believe this to be a biblical-level concern.15For further explanation for Rav Papa’s opinion, see Aruch Hashulchan (E.H. 42:20) and Otzar Haposkim (42:21:1).
The Rishonim are divided as to how to resolve the Gemara’s dispute. The Tur (E.H. 42) states, as the primary opinion, that the betrothal ceremony is invalid, but he cites the Semag’s (Aseih 48) ruling that since the Gemara did not resolve the issue, we must rule strictly. The Beit Yosef (ad. loc. s.v. Hamekadeish) cites the Rambam (Hilchot Ishut 4:6), the Rif (Kiddushin 28a), and the Rosh (Kiddushin 3:13), who also rule that the kiddushin is invalid, and the Otzar Haposkim (42:2:18) likewise cites a very long list of Rishonim who agree with this view. Indeed, the Noda Biy’huda (2 E.H. 75, cited in the Pitchei Teshuvah E.H. 42:6) observes that the overwhelming consensus is that such a ceremony is invalid. However, the Beit Yosef also cites the aforementioned Semag, who cites the Sefer Yerei’im (167) as a precedent for his ruling.
This matter is not fully resolved in the Shulchan Aruch either. While the Shulchan Aruch (E.H. 42:2) and the Vilna Gaon (Bei’ur Hagra E.H. 42:9) rule that the kiddushin is invalid, the Rama (E.H. 42:2) notes that some are strict about this matter. The Rama concludes that it is proper to be strict (i.e. require a get) except in extraordinary circumstances, which is the ruling accepted by Ashkenazic Jews as authoritative (Aruch Hashulchan E.H. 42:20). Thus, if the husband is cooperative,16If the husband does not cooperate, there is more room for leniency. For instance, in a case I dealt with involving a recalcitrant husband who refused to give a get but whose wedding attendees included only one observant Jew (the marriage was performed by a Conservative rabbi), Rav Gedalia Schwartz ruled that the wife could remarry without a get. as in our case, a get is required in order to satisfy the strict opinions despite the absence of a second witness.
However, Rav Akiva Eiger (Teshuvot Rav Akiva Eiger 2:55) rules that a get would not be required if there is an additional substantive doubt as to the validity of the kiddushin. The Otzar Haposkim (42:21:4) cites an extensive list of Acharonim who agree. This leniency is based in part on a s’feik s’feika (double doubt): perhaps a betrothal ceremony conducted in the presence of only one witness is invalid, and even if it is valid, the additional case-specific doubt indicates that this kiddushin might be invalid anyway. The additional doubt also allows for the lenient argument that since, according to most Acharonim, even those who rule strictly regarding one witness do so only on a rabbinic level, a safeik brings the case into the general category of safeik d’rabbanan l’kula (one may rule leniently about a doubt regarding a matter of rabbinic law).
On this basis, Rav Senderovic rules that the boy and girl in our case do not require a get. He notes that there are no fewer than three doubts even beyond the issue of a lone witness’s validity: whether the bottle cap was worth a perutah, whether the omission of a statement from the boy invalidates the kiddushin, and whether the witness ever saw the delivery of the bottle cap. Accordingly, Rav Senderovic rules that the boy and girl do not require a get.
Minor Status of the Boy, Girl, and Witness
Rav Senderovic proposes another lenient consideration to bolster his ruling. He notes the basic Halachah that the chatan, kallah, and witnesses must be adults in order for the kiddushin to be valid (Shulchan Aruch E.H. 43:1). Although this may seem irrelevant to our case, since the boy and witness were both nearly fourteen and the girl was nearly thirteen, one is actually not considered an adult according to Halachah merely at age twelve or thirteen. Physical maturity, in the form of the appearance of two pubic hairs, is the determining factor. We do generally say that one becomes an adult at bar/bat mitzvah, since Rava (Niddah 48b) articulates a principle (known as chazakah d’rava) that one may assume that the two hairs have appeared by the age of bar/bat mitzvah. However, poskim (Magen Avraham 39:1, Mishnah Berurah 271:3, and Aruch Hashulchan O.C.199:4) caution that we may rely on chazakah d’rava to validate teenage youngsters only for rabbinic requirements, not for biblical ones. Thus, we permit bar mitzvah boys to serve as shlichei tzibbur (leaders of communal prayer), because the shliach tzibbur executes responsibilities (e.g. the repetition of the Amidah) that are of rabbinic nature. However, these boys cannot serve as witnesses to a wedding or a get, recite kiddush on behalf of adults, or adjust a knot of a person’s tefillin until it is evident that they have shown signs of physical maturity (see, for example, Shulchan Aruch E.H. 141:25 and Shulchan Aruch C.M. 35:1). This is because we harbor doubts as to whether the individual is among the minority that does not physically mature by the age of bar/bat mitzvah.
Accordingly, if any one of those present – the boy, the witness, or the girl – was not physically mature, the ceremony would be invalid. Although this is certainly insufficient grounds to justify a lenient ruling alone, it might serve as an additional consideration to support one. Rav Senderovic suggests, though, that this may not constitute a valid consideration, since it might be only a rabbinic law that for biblical matters we do not rely on chazakah d’rava. In other words, it is possible that on a biblical level we do rely on the assumption that most of those who have reached the age of bar/bat mitzvah have attained physical maturity.17On a biblical level, we are permitted to rely on rov (majority), but on a rabbinic level, we must be concerned with significant minorities as well (see Rashi to Chullin 12a s.v. Pesach). Thus, it is questionable whether this consideration can be marshaled as legitimate ancillary support for a lenient ruling.
Conclusion
Rav Senderovic was able to reach a favorable outcome due to a fortunate confluence of factors: the presence of only one witness, the possibility that the witness did not see the transfer of the bottle cap, the possibility that the bottle cap may not have been worth a perutah, and the boy’s failure to speak before his delivery of the bottle cap.18For other possible considerations for a lenient ruling in such cases, see Teshuvot Yabia Omer (E.H. 9:20-21). For a ruling regarding a case where a man presented a situation thirty years after he (as a young man) gave a ring to a young woman who has since married someone else and has had children, see Teshuvot V’hanhagot (4:291). Many similar situations, however, do not transpire so conveniently and do require gittin.19See Teshuvot Igrot Moshe (E.H. 4:79:1) and Teshuvot Shaarei Ezra (1:104) for examples. Even though it seems far-fetched, at first glance, to attach any validity to such frivolous ceremonies, Halachah is actually quite stringent when it comes to matters of personal status. Poskim are averse to risking any slight violation of these halachot, which are of paramount importance.
It is crucial that we take marriage very seriously and never countenance such outrageous behavior. Rav Moshe Feinstein (Teshuvot Igrot Moshe E.H. 1:84) even urges the caretakers of the youngsters involved in such incidents to punish them for their behavior, despite the fact that in the specific case he adjudicated, he determined that no get was necessary. If such a situation unfortunately does occur, an eminent Halachic authority must be consulted to adjudicate.20Rav Mordechai Willig told me that unfortunately, he has been presented quite a number of such cases for adjudication, and he submits the cases to Rav Zalman Nechemia Goldberg for a ruling.