The obligation to abide by the halachic practices of our families is best illustrated by the following Talmudic passage (Pesachim 50b):
“Bnei Byshan” had a practice not to travel from Tyre to Sidon on Friday (to avoid detracting from their preparations for Shabbat - Rashi). Their children posed the following question to Rabi Yochanan: “Our fathers were able to abide by this stringent practice because they were wealthy. We, however, find it economically cumbersome to abide by this stringency. Are we obligated to maintain their practice?” Rabi Yochanan answered, “Your ancestors accepted it upon themselves [and you must follow your fathers’ custom], as the pasuk states, “Listen, my son, to the teachings of your father, and do not abandon the Torah of your mother” (Mishlei 1:8).
A question arises, though, when a husband and wife have divergent family minhagim: whose minhagim should be followed? In this chapter, we will review both published and unpublished responsa on this topic.1For a thorough review of this topic and the responsa written about it before 1981, see Rav Menachem Slei’s essay in Noam (23:145-180).
Whose Customs?
A major dispute exists regarding the obligation to follow established customs. The Teshuvot Chavot Ya’ir (126), after establishing that this obligation is rabbinic in nature, asserts that it applies only to community minhagim (practices). However, children are not bound to follow the personal stringencies adopted by their parents. This is evident from the Gemara (Chullin 105a) that records that Mar Ukva did not observe his father’s stringency to avoid dairy for twenty-four hours after consuming meat. If children were bound by their parents’ stringencies, Mar Ukva would have been required to continue his father’s practice. Apparently, then, the Gemara that requires children not to abandon their parents’ practices applies only to communal minhagim. This understanding of the story of Bnei Byshan is endorsed by the Gilyon Maharsha (Y.D. 214:2).
On the other hand, the Pitchei Teshuvah (Y.D. 214:5) cites the Teshuvot Zichron Yosef (Y.D. 14), who disputes the contention of the Chavot Ya’ir. He maintains that the story of Bnei Byshan refers to family practices as well. According to this approach, the reason why Mar Ukva was not obligated to observe his father’s stringency was not because there is no such thing as a binding family practice, but rather because he himself never practiced it.2The critical time for evaluating minhagim is when the child becomes independent (Teshuvot Maharam Schick O.C. 259). Rav Shmuel Wosner (Teshuvot Sheivet Halevi 6:59) writes that such discretion regarding whether one should follow his father’s practices does not apply to practices of one’s “tribe,” meaning the accepted practices of Sephardic and Ashkenazic Jews. Thus, a Sephardic Jew cannot decide not to recite selichot during the month of Elul, and an Ashkenazic Jew cannot absolve himself of the custom to avoid kitniyot (legumes) during Pesach (see Gray Matter 1 pp. 239-254). If, however, Mar Ukva had ever practiced his father’s stringency, he would have been bound to it for his entire life. 3There is some dispute regarding how many times a child must observe a parent’s practice in order for it to become binding. The Pri Chadash (Kuntress Haminhagim 7) seems to obligate the child to maintain his family’s practice even if he kept it just one time, whereas the Matteh Efraim (589) appears to require the child to uphold the family custom three times in order for it to become binding.
The issue of communal minhagim has been complicated by contemporary circumstances. As Rav Moshe Feinstein writes (Teshuvot Igrot Moshe O.C. 1:159), “Here in New York and Brooklyn, where people have gathered from many different communities where there were divergent minhagim, everyone should follow the minhagim of the place he came from.” People are resistant to establishing one custom in the United States, as evidenced by a visit to most synagogues on chol hamo’eid, where one will find some men wearing tefillin and others who are not.4See Teshuvot Sho’el B’shlomo 30 for a discussion and partial defense of this practice. In many communities, the situation of “two courts in one city” (Yevamot 14a) prevails, as people retain many of the customs of the communities that their parents and grandparents came from. Thus, even according to the Chavot Ya’ir, today, when communal minhagim have not fully emerged in many communities, family practices have to a certain extent replaced them.5Rav Hershel Schachter (Beit Yitzchak 39:516) notes that some minhagim are communal and some are familial; however, it sometimes is difficult to determine the category in which a minhag belongs. For example, the practice of Jews from Germany is to wait only three hours between meat and milk. Rav Schachter believes that this is a communal practice and that one who does not reside in a German-Jewish community should follow the practice of most Jews to wait six hours between milk and meat. Rav Yeshaya Siff and Rav Mordechai Willig, however, told me that they believe this to be a familial custom and that Jews from Germany may continue to wait only three hours between meat and milk even though they do not live in a German-Jewish community. Accordingly, when husbands and wives come from families that came from different communities, whose minhagim should be followed - the husband’s or the wife’s?
The Tashbeitz’s Responsum
In earlier times, it was unusual for people to marry someone who lived far away. Hence, there was little chance of divergent family customs between husband and wife. The development of modern means of transportation and the mass migration movements of the past century facilitated marriages between Jews of different backgrounds. Therefore, many twentieth-century authorities addressed this issue without the benefit of explicit sources in the writings of earlier poskim. Moreover, in pre-war communities, the principle of community custom (minhag hamakom) prevailed, and the question of whose family customs should be followed was almost moot, as the couple would follow the practices of whichever community they elected to reside in.
In one of the few responsa on this topic published before the twentieth century, the Tashbeitz (3:179) presents two reasons why the wife should adopt her husband’s customs. First, it would be highly disruptive if both the husband and the wife were to maintain their respective, conflicting family practices. For example, if the husband is Sephardic and the wife is Ashkenazic, the husband would eat kitniyot (legumes) on Pesach and the wife would not. It would be extremely difficult for the husband and the wife to abide by two different standards of kashrut. Second, the Tashbeitz invokes the Talmudic principle “ishto k’gufo” (lit. his wife is like his own body; see Sanhedrin 28b and Encyclopedia Talmudit 2:300-301). Because we consider a husband and wife as one person, the Gemara states that one is disqualified from testifying about his wife’s relatives just as one is disqualified from testifying about his own relatives. The Tashbeitz understands that based on this principle, the wife should adopt her husband’s family traditions.
The Tashbeitz also writes that even after the husband dies, the wife should continue practicing her husband’s family customs if the couple has children and she has not remarried. He bases this assertion on the Torah’s laws regarding a woman whose father is not a kohen eating terumah (kohen’s tithe; see Vayikra 22:11-13). If her husband is a kohen, she may eat terumah even after his death if the couple has children and she has not remarried.
The Responsa of Rav Feinstein, Rav Felder, Dayan Weisz, and Rav Yosef
Rav Moshe Feinstein (Teshuvot Igrot Moshe O.C. 1:158), Rav Gedalia Felder (Yesodei Yeshurun 6:239-240), Rav Yitzchak Yaakov Weisz (Teshuvot Minchat Yitzchak 4:83), and Rav Ovadia Yosef (Teshuvot Yabia Omer 5 O.C. 37) rule that the wife must adopt the halachic customs of her husband. As a precedent, they cite the Mishnah Berurah’s (468:19, and see Bei’ur Halachah 468:4 s.v. Haholeich) ruling that if one permanently relocates to a community whose halachic practices differ from those of the community which he left, he should adopt the new community’s customs. This rule applies whether the new community’s customs are stricter or more lenient than the old community’s.
These authorities explain that Halachah views a woman who marries as moving to a new community — her husband’s home. Rav Moshe cites a number of biblical verses that demonstrate that the Torah views marriage as a woman moving into her husband’s home. For example, the Torah (Devarim 24:1), in describing the procedure for a divorce, states that the husband “shall send her from his home.” We see that the Torah considers a wife to be in her husband’s domain during the marriage. Accordingly, the wife must accept the customs of her husband’s family. Rav Ovadia and Rav Felder also cite the Tashbeitz as a precedent for their ruling.
Reflecting the rulings of Rav Moshe, Rav Felder, Dayan Weisz, and Rav Ovadia, wives commonly accept their husbands’ family traditions.
Rav Ovadia Yosef’s Major Limitation of this Rule
Rav Ovadia Yosef (Ohr Torah, Iyar 5761 and Yalkut Yosef O.C. 318:12), though, imposes a major limitation on the rule that the wife must adopt her husband’s halachic practices. He writes that this rule applies only to practices that the husband’s family has practiced for generations, such as refraining from kitniyot. However, the wife is not obligated to adopt the stringent practices (chumrot) that her husband accepted upon himself.6This recalls the ruling of the Chavot Ya’ir that the obligation not to abandon established practices does not apply to personal stringencies adopted by parents. Rav Ovadia says essentially the same thing regarding personal stringencies of a husband. For instance, if the husband accepted the stringent level of shemittah observance by refusing to rely on the hetter mechirah,7This refers to the practice of selling farmland in Israel to non-Jews so as to circumvent the restrictions of shemittah. For a more in-depth discussion of the validity of this practice, see the essays on the topic available at www.koltorah.org. the wife is not required to abide by this stringency.8We should note that Rav Ovadia is following his approach (Teshuvot Yabia Omer 3 Y.D. 19:7) that the hetter mechirah is essentially acceptable. Many poskim, however, regard it as possibly invalid (e.g. Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, Teshuvot Minchat Shlomo 1:44) or completely invalid (e.g. Rav Yosef Shalom Eliashiv, cited by Rav Yosef Efrat, Mesorah 1:72). Rav Ovadia writes that if the husband is unable to maintain his strict practice due to his wife’s lack of cooperation, the husband should seek hatarat nedarim (annulment of vows) for his stringency.
Another common application of this ruling is that if the husband avoids relying on communal eruvin,9See Gray Matter 1 pp. 165-199 for a discussion of the laws of communal eruvin and why some people do not rely on them. the wife is not bound to follow this stringency. Similarly, if the husband accepts the stringency to observe Shabbat according to Rabbeinu Tam’s standards of assessing when nighttime begins,10For a review of the debate between Rabbeinu Tam and the Geonim as to when the halachic night begins, see the essay about counting the omer during bein hashmashot (twilight) available at www.koltorah.org. she does not have to abide by this stringency.
It appears that common practice reflects Rav Ovadia’s ruling on this matter. For example, Rav Moshe Snow told me that although Rav Moshe Feinstein himself adopted the strict approach to chalav yisrael,11See our later chapter about chalav yisrael for a more in-depth discussion of the issues involved. Rebbetzin Feinstein did not. Indeed, Rav Moshe writes (Teshuvot Igrot Moshe E.H. 2:12) that a husband “cannot impose his stringencies on her.”
Rav Yehuda Henkin’s Responsum
Rav Yehuda Henkin writes (Teshuvot Bnei Banim 3:29) that although the common practice is for wives to accept their husband’s family customs, in accordance with the aforementioned rulings, there is some room for flexibility. Rav Henkin challenges the fundamental assumption of Rav Moshe, Rav Felder, Dayan Weisz, and Rav Ovadia’s ruling. They assume that the Torah believes that, metaphysically speaking, a wife moves into the home of her husband. Rav Henkin, though, notes the dispute between Rabbeinu Tam and the Maharam of Rothenberg regarding whether a wife must move to the husband’s town or vice versa (see Tur E.H. 75). The Rama (E.H. 75:1) and the Beit Shmuel (ibid. 7) rule that Halacha takes cognizance of Rabbeinu Tam’s ruling that the husband must move to the wife’s town.12Rav Elchanan Grunwald argues that the Rama and Beit Shmuel do not accept Rabbeinu Tam’s ruling. Rather, they merely assert that the wife cannot be forced to move into the husband’s town, as she has a strong opinion (i.e. Rabbeinu Tam) to rely upon. Perhaps even the Rama and Beit Shmuel agree that ideally the wife should move to the husband’s town. Indeed, even Rav Henkin notes that most Rishonim disagree with Rabbeinu Tam concerning this matter. If the husband moves to the wife’s town, observes Rav Henkin, then he will be required to observe the local halachic practices — those of his wife’s family.
Rav Henkin also asserts that the pesukim cited by Rav Moshe do not necessarily constitute a halachic statement that the marital home belongs to the husband. It could be that the Torah merely reflects the sociological reality of the time, in which the husband controlled the marital home and, upon divorce, the wife left the home. Rav Henkin believes that the Torah does not preclude joint-ownership in either an economic13See our later chapters about marital financial arrangements for a more thorough analysis of this issue.or a metaphysical sense.
Moreover, Rav Henkin argues that the responsum of the Tashbeitz does not constitute a relevant precedent because it runs counter to the ruling of the Rama. Rav Henkin observes that the Tashbeitz (1:97 and 3:87 s.v. V’hasomeich) himself rejects Rabbeinu Tam’s ruling that the man must move to the wife’s town. It follows that the Rama, who does consider Rabbeinu Tam’s ruling, would disagree with the Tashbeitz.
Rav Henkin concludes that we should not abandon the accepted practice for wives to follow their husbands’ family traditions. However, he rules that a wife may continue to follow her family’s traditions regarding a matter that does not impinge on her relationship with her husband and does not impose a hardship on her.14These two areas are considered within the husband’s domain, as it is in these areas that he has the right to cancel her vows (hafarat nedarim; see Bemidbar 30:7-17 and Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 234:55). Rav Henkin requires that she stipulate with her fiancée before the marriage that she wants to continue to practice her own family’s traditions. We should note, however, that Rav Hershel Schachter (Beit Yitzchak 39:519) confirms the rulings of Rav Feinstein, Rav Felder, Dayan Weisz, and Rav Ovadia that the wife enters the domain of the husband “since this is the essence of marriage – the wife entering the domain of the husband.”
Other Situations
Rav Henkin also writes (in an unpublished responsum) that if the husband is a convert or a ba’al teshuvah and the wife’s family has a longer chain of halachic observance, the husband may adopt his wife’s family traditions. He writes, though, that it might be more appropriate for the husband to follow the prevalent traditions of the community to which he belongs.15This is appropriate only in a locale that has communal minhagim. Rav Henkin counsels that the husband seek the guidance of his Rav in choosing the most appropriate approach to this issue. Rav Hershel Schachter (ad. loc.) writes that if the wife’s family is observant and the husband’s family is not, it makes sense to say that the husband is joining her family as far as minhagim are concerned. As such, the wife’s family’s minhagim should be observed.
Rav Chaim David Halevi (Techumin 6:84) rules that in a marriage where the wife is observant and the husband is not, the family should practice the wife’s family’s traditions. Rav Zalman Nechemia Goldberg told me that he agrees with this ruling.
Rav Zalman Nechemia also notes (Darchei Hapsak pp. 27-30) that if a couple lives in the same community as the wife’s parents and the husband attends the same synagogue as his father-in-law, he should follow the minhagim of his wife. For example, if an Ashkenazic man marries a Syrian-Jewish woman and moves to the Syrian section of Brooklyn, New York or Deal, New Jersey and joins a Syrian community, he should practice Syrian-Jewish minhagim.16Rav Zalman Nechemia cites the Gemara (Eruvin 41a), Tosafot (ibid. s.v. Mibnei), and Teshuvot Chatam Sofer (C.M. 188) as the basis for this ruling. Rav Zalman Nechemia stresses that it is not a question of whether to follow the practices of the husband or the wife, but rather depends on which community the couple resides in. The community’s minhagim determine the practice of the couple. Nonetheless, Rav Zalman Nechemia’s approach applies only to communities where there are established communal practices.
In addition, Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (cited in Ma’adanei Shlomo p. 17 and Yom Tov Sheini K’hilchato p. 188) rules that a wife must follow her husband’s minhagim as part of her obligations to him. Accordingly, the husband enjoys the right to waive this obligation, which accounts for the common practice for wives to continue to pray with the nusach (liturgy) they are accustomed to.
Rav Mordechai Willig rules that wives should practice certain aspects of the laws of niddah in accordance with their mothers’ family traditions.17This refers to matters that do not directly affect the husband. An example is whether the wife should immerse once, twice, or three times in the mikvah. Rav Willig also maintains this position regarding how many Shabbat candles a woman lights, arguing that both of these matters are passed down from mother to daughter.18Rav Doniel Neustadt (The Weekly Halachah Discussion 1:6-8) writes that many women follow the practices of their mothers in regard to Shabbat and Yom Tov candle lighting, and he defends this practice, citing the Teshuvot Ya’avetz (107).
Conclusion
Generally speaking, a wife should follow her husband’s family traditions, such as those regarding kitniyot on Pesach. Nevertheless, there are certain limited circumstances in which a wife may continue to follow her family’s traditions.19Converts and ba’alei teshuvah should consult their Rav regarding which practices they should follow. The absence of community minhagim in most Jewish communities today complicates this question, as most people simply observe many of the practices of the community from which their families came. Rav Moshe Shternbuch (Teshuvot V’hanhagot 1:369) writes that a ba’al teshuvah should follow the minhagim of his teacher, not of his family before it ceased to be observant.