Recently, procedures have been developed to tattoo permanent or semi-permanent makeup on women. In the process of applying permanent makeup, also known as micropigmentation, dermapigmentation, or cosmetic tattooing, a needle deposits colored pigments made from iron oxide into the skin’s dermal layer (the layer between the permanent base layer and the constantly changing top layer). This procedure is performed on the lips or around the eyes under antiseptic conditions, with the patient under anesthesia. The tattooing can be either permanent or semi-permanent, with the latter form lasting up to three years and eventually disintegrating. These procedures are very tempting for observant women (especially those blessed with the task of caring for young children), as they save time and avoid the problem of applying makeup on Shabbat.1We discuss the issue of applying makeup on Shabbat in a later chapter. However, there are serious halachic problems associated with such makeup. The consensus among contemporary poskim is that it violates the prohibition of kitovet ka’aka (tattooing; Vayikra 19:28). We will explore the prohibition of applying a tattoo and see how contemporary poskim relate it to the issue of permanent and semi-permanent makeup. As with countless other contemporary halachic issues, poskim are compelled to define the parameters of kitovet ka’aka very rigorously in order to arrive at a conclusion.
We will base our discussions on two essays on this topic that have been published in Techumin, one by Rav Ezra Basri (10:282-287) and the other by Rav Baruch Shraga (18:110-114). In addition, two prominent poskim, Rav Shraga Shneebalg of London (Teshuvot Shraga Hamei’ir 8:44 and 45) and Rav Natan Gestetner of Bnei Brak (Teshuvot L’horot Natan 10:64), have published teshuvot in recent years regarding cosmetic tattooing. Rav Shmuel Wosner (Teshuvot Sheivet Halevi 10:137) wrote a brief responsum on this issue as well.
How Long Must Kitovet Ka’aka Last?
The Rishonim disagree about how long a tattoo must last in order to constitute a violation of the prohibition of kitovet ka’aka. While Rashi (commentary to Vayikra 19:28 and Gittin 20b s.v. Kitovet) and the Ritva (Makkot 21a s.v. Hakotev) describe kitovet ka’aka as something permanent, the Nimukei Yosef (Makkot 4b in the pages of the Rif s.v. Ad Sheyichtov) defines kitovet ka’aka as something that lasts “for a long time.”
Rav Gestetner points out that the Rambam (Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 12:11) and the Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 180:1-4) do not limit the prohibition to permanent tattooing, thus implying that one violates the kitovet ka’aka prohibition even if the markings are not meant to last permanently, as the Nimukei Yosef believes. Moreover, Rav Gestetner suggests that when Rashi writes that kitovet ka’aka lasts “l’olam,” he does not mean “forever” literally. Elsewhere, (Shabbat 111b s.v. V’eilu Kesharim) Rashi uses this term in a context from which it is fairly obvious (in light of his comment on Shabbat 112a s.v. B’d’chumrata) that he means for a long period of time, not necessarily forever.2See the Mishnah Berurah’s introduction to O.C. 317, wherein he defines “l’olam,” in the context of tying a knot on Shabbat, as when one does not set a time to undo the knot and the knot is capable of lasting permanently.
Ariel Herzog notes that the Torah (Shemot 21:6) states that if a Jewish slave elects to stay with his master at the end of his six years of servitude, he remains in bondage “l’olam,” which the Gemara (Kiddushin 15a) interprets to mean until the yovel (the fiftieth year of the agricultural cycle). This is another instance in which the term “l’olam” does not mean literally forever. Indeed, the Ibn Ezra (Peirush Ha’aroch to Shemot 21:6) proves from elsewhere in Tanach that the term l’olam means for a lengthy time and not forever. Rav Gestetner rules that three years is considered “a long time,” and thus even semi-permanent cosmetic tattoos that last for three years are biblically prohibited even according to Rashi.
Rav Shneebalg disagrees, but only about the severity of the prohibition – he understands Rashi to mean literally forever, and he therefore is inclined to consider semi-permanent cosmetic tattooing a rabbinic violation.3This understanding of Rashi seems to accord with the Mishnah Berurah’s comment cited in the previous footnote. Indeed, all Rishonim agree that one violates at least a rabbinic prohibition even if the tattoo is not a permanent one. The proof to this is the debate in the Gemara (Makkot 21a) about whether one is permitted to put stove ashes on an open wound, which creates a mark that resembles a tattoo. This mark does not last very long and is undoubtedly classified as temporary. That the Gemara even raises the possibility of regarding such a mark as kitovet ka’aka proves that one violates at least a rabbinic prohibition even if the mark does not last forever. The Rivan4The primary Talmudic discussion of tattooing appears in Masechet Makkot (21a). Rashi did not finish his commentary to the last few pages of Masechet Makkot, so his son-in-law, the Rivan, completed his father-in-law’s commentary. Hence, we will be referring to the Rivan frequently in this chapter. (ad. loc. s.v. Uchtovet) might also indicate this, as he writes that “It is forbidden to write any writing” on the flesh.
How Deep Must the Tattoo Be?
How deeply must the ink or dye be inserted to qualify as kitovet ka’aka? The Ritva (ad. loc.) writes that “The dye enters between the skin and the flesh.” Rav Shneebalg derives from this comment that one violates the prohibition even if the dye is inserted immediately below the skin level. It seems that the Shulchan Aruch (ad. loc.) agrees with this assessment, as he describes kitovet ka’aka as “scratching the flesh.” Even by penetrating one layer of skin, then, one violates the prohibition. As mentioned above, the process of cosmetic tattooing involves the insertion of the pigments into the skin’s dermal layer, which would appear to be included in the prohibition.
We should clarify that the Mishnah (ad. loc.) imposes the punishment of Malkot (lashes) only on one who both writes and cuts the skin. The Minchat Chinuch (253:1) cites a dispute among the Acharonim as to whether one violates a rabbinic prohibition by merely writing on the skin without cutting it. The Minchat Chinuch observes that since the common practice among Jews is to avoid making indelible markings even if the skin is not cut, the normative Halachah follows the opinions that believe that it is a rabbinic prohibition to do so.
The Minchat Chinuch clarifies, though, that this rabbinic prohibition obviously applies only if the mark cannot be erased. Simple writing on the hand with ink, however, is not prohibited at all. Although writing with ordinary ink on one’s skin is, generally speaking, undignified, it appears that it is not technically prohibited - Chazal forbade only activities that resemble kitovet ka’aka (see Tosafot Gittin 20b s.v. B’chtovet). Accordingly, it seems that it is permitted to have one’s hand stamped at an amusement park to prove that the admission fee has been paid – amusement park stamps and ordinary writing on the body do not resemble a tattoo at all. The fake tattoos that small children apply also seem to be permitted, even on a rabbinic level.5Rav Mordechai Willig told me that he believes this to be permissible.
The Order of the Process
As mentioned, the Mishnah (Makkot 3:6) states that one receives malkot only if he both inserts the dye and scratches the skin. The Rivan (ad. loc. s.v. Kitovet) describes the process of kitovet ka’aka as specifically following that order – first writing and then making a tear in the skin. The Rambam (Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 12:11), on the other hand, describes kitovet ka’aka as first tearing the skin and subsequently inserting the dye. Might the status of cosmetic tattooing, in which a cut is made before dye is inserted, hinge on this dispute between the Rambam and the Rivan?
The Bach (Y.D. 180 s.v. V’hu Shekoteiv) argues that there is in fact no dispute between the Rambam and the Rivan. The Rivan is merely following the order as it is found in the term “kitovet ka’aka” – writing then cutting – whereas the Rambam describes the process as it is normally conducted – cutting before writing. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 180:1) describes kitovet ka’aka as first cutting the skin and subsequently inserting the dye, the Shach (Y.D. 180:1) indicates that one violates the biblical prohibition even if the order is reversed.6See the Minchat Chinuch (253:1), who interprets the Shach in this manner, but cites authorities who contend that the biblical prohibition applies only to the sequence described by the Rambam and the Shulchan Aruch. Rav Gestetner adds that one also violates the biblical prohibition even if the writing and cutting occur simultaneously, which is what he understands cosmetic tattooing to entail.
What Must Be Written?
The Teshuvot Me’il Tzedakah (31, cited in the Pitchei Teshuvah Y.D. 180:1) asks whether one must write letters in order to violate the prohibition of kitovet ka’aka or whether any marking constitutes a violation. Though he suggests that creating a marking without writing is only a rabbinic prohibition, other Acharonim (such as the Minchat Chinuch) note that the Rishonim already disputed this matter.
The Semak (72), Rabbeinu Peretz (cited in the Semak), the Orchot Chaim (22:4), and the Sefer Hachinuch (253) seem to believe that one violates this prohibition only if he tattoos letters into his skin. This approach might be based on the reason offered by the Rishonim (Rambam Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 12:11 and Tur Y.D. 180) for the prohibition of kitovet ka’aka – that idolaters would often tattoo the names of their gods into their skin, wishing to communicate that they were committed slaves to those particular gods. Accordingly, a number of Rishonim and Acharonim – the majority of them, according to Rav Basri – believe that one violates kitovet ka’aka only by writing letters, since this was the manner in which the idolaters expressed their commitment to idolatry.
On the other hand, the Minchat Chinuch (253:3) judges that most Rishonim believe that one violates kitovet ka’aka even if he does not write letters. Among the Rishonim who explicitly state that writing is not necessary are the Ra’avad (Torat Kohanim, Kedoshim 76) and the Rash MiShantz (ibid.). Rav Gestetner argues that the Rambam (ad. loc.) and Shulchan Aruch (ad. loc.) also indicate that one violates kitovet ka’aka even without inscribing letters, as they make no mention of any such requirement.
Rav Shneebalg asserts that all Rishonim would agree that one transgresses at least a rabbinic prohibition even if he does not write letters. He proves this from the Gemara’s suggestion that placing stove ashes on a wound might be prohibited because the resultant scab resembles a tattoo, as we discussed above. The scab obviously does not appear in the form of a letter. Nonetheless, the Teshuvot Me’il Tzedakah (31) suggests that the scab actually does look like a letter, in which case there is not necessarily even a rabbinic prohibition if no letters are written.
Rav Avigdor Nebenzahl (cited in Techumin 18:113) believes that even the strict opinion among the Rishonim prohibits only imprinting a picture or figure, such as an anchor or a heart. Imprinting amorphous color, he asserts, does not qualify as writing and thus does not constitute kitovet ka’aka. Indeed, in the context of Shabbat, writing letters and drawing pictures are included under the single av melachah (one of the thirty-nine categories of prohibited Shabbat activity; see Rambam Hilchot Shabbat 12:9-17) of koteiv (writing), while coloring a surface is defined as Tzovei’a (coloring), an entirely separate av melachah. The Torah prohibits only kitovet (writing), not coloring. Accordingly, Rav Nebenzahl is inclined to permit semi-permanent cosmetics based on a combination of two lenient factors: the absence of any writing and the impermanence of the markings.
In contrast, Rav Basri, Rav Gestetner, and Rav Shneebalg argue that according to the strict opinion, any form that is imprinted on the body is included in the prohibition. The Rambam and Shulchan Aruch also apparently endorse this position, as they declare that one transgresses this prohibition when he injects dye beneath the skin. Not only do they make no mention of a requirement for writing letters to violate the prohibition, but they also make no mention of a requirement for a picture or figure to be drawn. Furthermore, we may question Rav Nebenzahl’s proof based on the Sefer Hachinuch’s ruling (ad. loc.) that beit din punishes someone for tattooing just one letter, even though beit din does not punish for writing fewer than two letters on Shabbat. Since the rules governing writing itself are not the same for Shabbat and kitovet ka’aka, the distinction between writing and coloring that we find in the former might be irrelevant to the latter.
Intriguingly, Rav Wosner forbids cosmetic tattooing not because of a technical violation of kitovet ka’aka, but because of “serach issur kitovet ka’aka,” which translates loosely to “because it will habituate one to kitovet ka’aka.”7See a similar usage of “serach” in Masechet Eruvin (40b). Even if cosmetic tattooing is not exactly like tattooing proper (perhaps because of Rav Nebenzahl’s reasoning), it nevertheless resembles kitovet ka’aka too closely for comfort. As Tosafot (Gittin 20b s.v. B’chtovet) teach, Chazal forbade even acts that resemble kitovet ka’aka, such as making permanent markings on the skin without cutting it. Thus, even if Rav Nebentzahl’s argument is correct, it still would not suffice to permit cosmetic tattooing. Nevertheless, it might bolster the argument that the tattooing is only a violation of a rabbinic law.
Purpose of the Tattooing
The Mishnah (Makkot 3:6) records the opinion of Rabi Shimon that one is flogged for violating the prohibition of kitovet ka’aka only if he tattoos the name of an idol onto his skin. The Chachamim, however, require flogging for any tattoo. The Rishonim disagree about which opinion is regarded as normative. While we usually accept the majority opinion, the Gemara (ibid.) records a discussion of the opinion of Rabi Shimon, leading some Rishonim to conclude that his opinion is the accepted one. 8For a summary of the opinions, see the Otzar Meforshei Hatalmud, Makkot p. 847 note 20. The Beit Yosef (Y.D. 180 s.v. Shechayav) quotes Rabbeinu Yerucham, who cites conflicting opinions and concludes that the Halachah follows the view of the Chachamim. The Beit Yosef agrees, noting that this also appears to be the opinion of the Rambam.
The Rivan (Makkot 21a s.v. Uchtovet) writes that even Rabi Shimon prohibits tattooing any writing, even if it is not the name of an idol - Rabi Shimon and the Chachamim disagree only about whether one is flogged for such tattooing. It is possible, however, that one violates the prohibition of kitovet ka’aka on a biblical level only if his intention is for idolatry, even according to the stringent opinion of the Chachamim. Recall that the Rambam and the Tur maintain that the reason for the kitovet ka’aka prohibition is to avoid idolatry. Indeed, the Chatam Sofer (commentary to Gittin 20b s.v. B’chtovet) writes that one does not violate a biblical prohibition if he tattoos for non-idolatrous reasons. The Shach (Y.D. 180:6) seems to support this view, as he explains that it is permitted (on a biblical level) to put ashes on a wound because his wound proves that he is not coloring with idolatrous motives. The Teshuvot Sho’eil Umeishiv (2:1:49) agrees with the Chatam Sofer.
The Aruch Laner (commentary to Makkot 21a s.v. Gam Im), on the other hand, states that one violates a biblical prohibition even if his intention is not for idolatry. The Aruch Laner and Rav Gestetner note that the Rambam and Shulchan Aruch seem to agree with this view, as they do not confine this prohibition only to one whose intention is for idolatry. Moreover, Rav Gestetner observes that Tosafot (Gittin 20b s.v. B’chtovet) clearly indicate that a biblical prohibition is violated even if one’s intention is not for idolatry.9The Maharam Schick (commentary to Sefer Hamitzvot, mitzvah 254) contends that the prohibition of kitovet ka’aka is related to the prohibition to imitate gentile practices (Vayikra 18:3) and as such is violated as long as the tattoo is made for no (substantive) reason.
Branding a Slave
The Chatam Sofer (ad. loc.) acknowledges that normative Halachah undoubtedly forbids tattooing for non-idolatrous purposes, since the Rama (Y.D. 180:4) forbids branding one’s slave to avoid his escape. It seems from the Shulchan Aruch and Rama, however, that this is prohibited only on a rabbinic level. Commenting on the Shulchan Aruch’s statement that one who performs such a branding is “exempt,” the Rama adds that one should nonetheless refrain from this activity “l’chatchilah (initially).” Generally speaking, the Shulchan Aruch and Rama do not address issues of when one deserves to be flogged, because these authorities do not address issues that apply only in messianic times.10When one deserves flogging is currently relevant, though, regarding the laws of giving testimony; see Shulchan Aruch C.M. 34:2. Consequently, it seems that the Shulchan Aruch is “exempting” the brander from the biblical prohibition, and the Rama is adding that one should still avoid such branding l’chatchilah because it entails a rabbinic violation. The reason why no biblical prohibition is violated, asserts the Chatam Sofer, is that there is no intention for idolatry. If so, cosmetic tattooing, which likewise does not involve idolatrous intent, constitutes only a rabbinic prohibition.
The Get Pashut (124:30, cited by the Minchat Chinuch 253:2), offers a slightly different explanation for the exemption in the case of the slave. He suggests that the criterion for whether one violates the biblical prohibition of kitovet ka’aka is not whether his intent is for idolatry, but whether the purpose of the tattooing is for the writing to appear on one’s body. The Get Pashut asserts that the idolaters’ purpose in tattooing was for the actual writing to appear on the body. Therefore, one who does not do so for the purpose of the writing itself is not imitating the idolatrous practice and is exempt from the biblical prohibition. The objective of one who tattoos his slave is not the actual writing - he simply wants to deter the slave’s escape. As such, he does not violate a biblical prohibition. This is comparable to performing a prohibited labor on Shabbat when one’s purpose is not for the primary result of the labor (melachah she’einah tzerichah l’gufah). Normative Halachah (see Mishnah Berurah 316:34) accepts the opinion of Rabi Shimon that this type of action does not violate a biblical prohibition.
It is not entirely clear how the Get Pashut would treat cosmetic tattooing. Rav Basri argues that he would not consider it a biblical prohibition, since its purpose is beauty, not writing per se. Rav Gestetner disagrees with this reasoning, contending that the purpose of cosmetic tattooing is indeed the writing, which makes it a full-fledged biblical prohibition.
Moreover, both the Minchat Chinuch and Rav Gestetner question the Get Pashut’s explanation of the Shulchan Aruch. Rav Gestetner cites Acharonim (based on Tosafot Shabbat 75a s.v. Tfei) who posit that the exemption of melachah she’einah tzerichah l’gufah is unique to Shabbat. In fact, the Pnei Yehoshua (commenting on Tosafot Shabbat 46b s.v. D’chol) argues that it does not even apply to Yom Tov! Thus, the concept is entirely irrelevant to the prohibition of kitovet ka’aka.
Who Violates the Prohibition?
Precisely how does one violate the prohibition of kitovet ka’aka – by actually inscribing the tattoo, or even by having it inscribed on his body? Which does the Torah intend when it commands (Vayikra 19:28), “Uchtovet ka’aka lo titenu bachem,” “You shall not put a tattoo on yourselves?” The Tosefta (Makkot 3:9) states that both aspects are included – both one who inscribes a tattoo and one who allows a tattoo to be made on his body violate the biblical prohibition.
The Rambam (Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 12:11) seems to qualify this, stating that the one who permits the tattoo to be inscribed on his body is punished with Malkot only if he actively assists the inscription of the tattoo. This is an application of the rule that one is flogged only if he violates a sin that involves a physical action, such as eating non-kosher food or wearing sha’atnez. Nonetheless, the Minchat Chinuch (253:4) writes, one who allows a tattoo to be inscribed on his body violates a biblical prohibition despite his exemption from Malkot.
It is not clear whether the Shulchan Aruch agrees with this last point. The Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 180:2) writes that one who permits a tattoo to be inscribed in his body is “patur” if he did not assist in the inscription. Rav Shneebalg asserts that although one who has a cosmetic tattoo inscribed on his face does not assist in the process (an anesthetic is administered), he nevertheless transgresses a biblical prohibition. It is possible, though, that the terminology of “patur” in the Shulchan Aruch (in contradistinction to the Rambam’s phrasing, “He is not flogged”) might imply that only a rabbinic prohibition is violated. Thus, it is possible that one who undergoes cosmetic tattooing might violate only a rabbinic prohibition.
It is important to add that Rav Shneebalg cites the Yad Ketanah,11The Minchat Chinuch (253:4) adopts this approach as well. who asserts, based on the Tosefta and Rambam, that one violates the kitovet ka’aka prohibition on a Torah level even if the individual who inscribes the tattoo is not Jewish. Thus, the problem of cosmetic tattooing is not mitigated by using a non-Jewish technician, since one is forbidden to have a tattoo inscribed in his body, regardless of who is performing the inscription.
Must One Remove a Cosmetic Tattoo?
As we have explained, the Torah prohibits both applying a tattoo and allowing a tattoo to be applied to one’s body. Nowadays, though, tattoo removal is readily possible and is a common procedure. Does the Torah also forbid maintaining a tattoo on one’s body when he can so easily remove it? It seems from the Rambam and Shulchan Aruch that no such prohibition exists. However, it is possible that these authorities did not address this issue because in their time it was impossible to remove a tattoo.
Dayan Weisz (Teshuvot Minchat Yitzchak 3:11) discusses a case in which someone had a disgraceful tattoo on his body (applied before he became observant) on the place where he now affixed his tefillin. Dayan Weisz advises him to remove the tattoo, but makes no mention of an obligation to remove the tattoo under the kitovet ka’aka prohibition. Furthermore, Rav Ephraim Oshry (Teshuvot Mima’amakim 4:22) strongly urges a Holocaust survivor not to remove the tattoos that the evil Nazis (yemach shemam) branded on her. He writes, “God forbid that this woman should remove this number, because by doing so, she aids those who wish to erase the evil actions perpetrated on the Jewish people….Just the opposite, it is incumbent upon us to bear this mark with pride.” Accordingly, there appears to be no obligation to remove a tattoo. Still, Rav Eliyahu Bakshi-Doron (Techumin 22:387) recommends removing the tattoo to avoid the constant reminder of an earlier sin. In certain circumstances, he even permits the removal of Hashem’s name that was (sinfully) tattooed on one’s body, even though it is ordinarily forbidden to erase Hashem’s name.
Kevod Habriyot
Part of the reason for our preoccupation with whether cosmetic tattooing constitutes a biblical or rabbinic prohibition is that under certain exceptional circumstances, Halachah tolerates the violation of a rabbinic prohibition. The Gemara (Berachot 19b) states, for example, that one may violate a rabbinic prohibition for the sake of kevod habriyot (preserving human dignity).12Rav Daniel Feldman discusses this issue in depth in his The Right and the Good pp. 189-206.
Both Rav Basri and Rav Shneebalg are inclined to permit cosmetic tattooing in a case of kevod habriyot. For example, Rav Basri permits surgeons to tattoo eyebrows onto the forehead of a woman who has no eyebrows. Rav Shneebalg is inclined to permit cosmetic tattooing even in a more common situation – scar removal. In this procedure, a pigment that matches the color of human skin is injected beneath the scar, allowing that area to appear like the rest of the person’s skin. Although it seems to qualify as kitovet ka’aka, Rav Shneebalg permits it due to kevod habriyot.13Rav Shneebalg adds another compelling reason to be lenient. The procedure is conducted so that the scar should appear no different from the rest of the skin. “This,” suggests Rav Shneebalg, “does not at all resemble kitovet ka’aka.”
Conclusion
The consensus of contemporary poskim forbids permanent and semi-permanent makeup. Rav Wosner rules that cosmetic tattooing is forbidden, though it is not clear if he believes it to constitute a biblical or a rabbinic prohibition. In addition, it is not clear whether Rav Wosner is addressing only permanent makeup or even semi-permanent makeup. Much less ambiguous are the teshuvot of Rav Gestener and Rav Shneebalg, who unequivocally rule that even semi-permanent makeup is forbidden. Rav Shneebalg is inclined to define it as a rabbinic prohibition, whereas Rav Gestetner is inclined to consider it a full-fledged biblical prohibition.
Rav Baruch Shraga writes that he posed this question to many leading Israeli poskim, all of whom responded that even semi-permanent makeup is prohibited. These authorities included Rav Yosef Shalom Eliashiv, Rav Yisrael Yaakov Fischer, Rav Chaim Kanievsky, and Rav Ovadia Yosef. Rav Dovid Heber writes (p. 49 of the Star-K’s 2004 guide to Passover and Cosmetics) that he consulted many poskim about this matter, all of whom ruled strictly.
Even so, some poskim are inclined to permit cosmetic tattooing in cases of extraordinary need. Other than such circumstances, it is difficult, as the Minchat Chinuch notes, to develop lenient approaches to this matter when the Rishonim and Shulchan Aruch all seem to allow no exceptions to this prohibition (as Rav Gestener underscores in his responsum).
Two Final Thoughts
Yet another problem with cosmetic tattooing, Rav Wosner writes, is that it violates the spirit of Halachah. Elsewhere (Teshuvot Sheivet Halevi 6:33), Rav Wosner frowns upon women putting on an excessive amount of makeup. Immoderate use of cosmetics is one of the reasons that the Gemara (Shabbat 62b) offers for the destruction of the Beit Hamikdash. The same applies, argues Rav Wosner, to cosmetic tattooing. As the Rambam teaches (Hilchot Dei’ot chapters 1-3), the Torah emphasizes moderation as a central value. While makeup for women can be appropriate if used in moderation – if a woman feels makeup is necessary for her in order to have a dignified appearance – inscribing makeup on one’s body is entirely out of proportion and immodest.
Additionally, the Torah concludes its prohibition of kitovet ka’aka with the addendum, “I am Hashem.” A reason for this might be that Hashem wishes for us to internalize the essential idea that our bodies do not belong to us; rather, they are on loan to us from Him as tools with which to perform His mitzvot. Thus, we are not permitted to do just anything with our bodies. Whereas moderate use of cosmetics is certainly acceptable, almost all poskim deem cosmetic tattooing to be inconsistent with technical Halachah as well as with fundamental Torah values.