There is much debate as to whether cosmetics and toiletries must be chametz-free in order to be used on Pesach. In this chapter, we hope to clarify the points of contention and outline the halachic basis for both the lenient and strict approaches to this issue.
Talmudic Background – Eino Ra’ui L’achilat Kelev and Achsheveih
The Gemara (Pesachim 21b) states that if chametz is burned before erev Pesach, one is permitted to benefit from it on Pesach. Tosafot (ad. loc. s.v. Chorcho) clarify that this rule applies only if the bread was so thoroughly burned that it is no longer fit even for a dog to eat.
A similar rule applies to all forbidden foods – as the Gemara (Avodah Zarah 67b-68a) states, the Torah forbids only food that is fit for human consumption. Regarding Pesach, however, we are stricter, requiring that the chametz be unworthy even for canine consumption.1This is consistent with Halachah’s unusually strict overall approach to chametz on Pesach, which manifests itself in such laws as the prohibition to own chametz and the impossibility of nullifying it in a mixture. The Ran (13b in the pages of the Rif s.v. Tanu Rabbanan) and the Magen Avraham (442:14) explain that chametz that is fit for canine consumption has the potential to ferment bread. Hence, it is similar to sourdough, which the Torah (Shemot 12:19) specifically forbids for Pesach consumption.
Although the Gemara makes clear that one may benefit from chametz that is no longer ra’ui l’achilat kelev, the Rishonim debate the permissibility of actually eating it. The Rosh (Pesachim 2:1) cites opinions that one may even eat such chametz. He himself rejects this view, however, and rules that one may only benefit from such chametz (as explicitly stated in the Gemara); by eating it, one would “elevate” the chametz (achsheveih) from a non-food item to a food item. The basis for this is the Gemara’s (Shevuot 24b) ruling that if one swears not to eat an inedible item and subsequently eats it, he has then violated his oath because he has “elevated” that item to the status of food by consuming it. The Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 442:9; see Mishnah Berurah 442:43) rules in accordance with the Rosh.
Although normative Halachah does accept that achsheveih creates a food status, the principle has some limitations. The Taz (O.C. 442:8) clarifies that achsheveih creates only a rabbinic prohibition, with which the Mishnah Berurah (442:43) and Aruch Hashulchan (O.C. 442:30) agree.2The Bach (O.C. 442 s.v. V’yeish Omrim Shemutar), though, seems to disagree with the Taz. Furthermore, the Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 442:10) permits writing on chol hamo’eid Pesach3This is assuming that the situation is one in which writing itself is permissible on chol hamo’eid (see Shulchan Aruch O.C. 545). with ink that was cooked in barley beer in the course of its preparation. The Mishnah Berurah (442:45, citing the Magen Avraham 442:15 in the name of the Terumat Hadeshen 129) adds that this is permitted even though a scribe might absentmindedly put his quill in his mouth (as was done in the pre-modern age), because achsheveih applies only if one intentionally eats the item.
Is Denatured Alcohol Considered Eino Ra’ui L’achilat Kelev?
It is often difficult to determine what is considered nifsal mei’achilat kelev. In fact, Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Teshuvot Minchat Shlomo 1:17) suggests that just because we modern eaters are finicky (mefunakim) and regard certain items as disgusting does not necessarily give us the right to classify these items as unsuitable for human consumption.4Rav Shlomo Zalman is discussing the classification of inedible foods for non-Pesach use, for which the determining factor is whether the food is fit for human consumption. The same question, though, should apply to eino ra’ui l’achilat kelev foods for Pesach use. Just because we think, based on common sense, that a dog would not eat a certain food does not mean that it truly falls into the category of eino ra’ui l’achilat kelev. For example, the Rambam (Hilchot Tum’at Ochlin 10:2) writes that human ear and nose excretions, as well as human urine, are considered suitable for human consumption. Rav Shlomo Zalman is unsure whether such definitions of ra’ui l’achilah are subject to change depending on the standards of each generation.
One example of the challenge of defining eino ra’ui l’achilat kelev is the dispute between modern poskim about denatured alcohol. The alcohol in cosmetics and toiletries is not pure alcohol – it is significantly modified in ways that render it unsuitable for drinking as a beverage. This is done so that the companies that use such alcohol in their products do not have to pay a liquor tax.5Rav Dovid Heber reports that the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives is extraordinarily strict (even stricter than the Internal Revenue Service) in monitoring the sale of alcohol. Thus, in order to avoid paying liquor taxes, companies strictly ensure that the alcohol they use for such products is denatured to make it unsuitable for drinking as a beverage. However, certain chemicals can be added to reconstitute the alcohol and render it drinkable. Does Halachah assess the denatured alcohol in cosmetics and toiletries according to its present state or according to its potential state of restored potability?
Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank (Mikra’ei Kodesh 54) argues that it is forbidden to derive benefit from denatured alcohol on Pesach. He points out that the Chavat Da’at (Y.D. Bei’urim 103:1) distinguishes between a case in which a prohibited item itself is nifsal, which is permissible to benefit from, and a case in which the item is nifsal only due to being mixed with other ingredients, which, if it can be restored, is prohibited even while it remains unrestored. Since denatured alcohol falls into the latter category, it should be prohibited. Rav Moshe Feinstein (Teshuvot Igrot Moshe O.C. 3:62) also prohibits benefiting from denatured alcohol, arguing that it is considered suitable for consumption. Rav Moshe explains that “There are those [indigent alcoholics] who drink this with only slight additions and modifications.” The Teshuvot Minchat Elazar (5:37), on the other hand, rules that pure denatured alcohol technically is not considered suitable for consumption, though he notes that common practice is to be strict about this matter. The Minchat Elazar believes that the aberrant behavior of marginal members of society cannot determine the standards of ra’ui l’achilat kelev for the entire community. In general (see, for example, Shulchan Aruch O.C. 168:6 and Y.D. 198:1), Halachah would say of such people, “Batlah da’atan eitzel kol haberiyot” (their opinion is disregarded in the face of everyone else’s). Rav Yosef Adler told me that Rav Yosef Dov Soloveitchik agreed with this approach.
Rav Moshe takes it as a given that the potential for the “slight modifications” that make denatured alcohol potable are halachically significant. As Rav Frank notes, many of the great early-twentieth-century poskim doubted whether this potential renders denatured alcohol potable for mainstream society. While Rav Eliyahu Klatzkin (Devar Eliyahu 5) rules stringently, the Teshuvot Atzei Halevanon (17) is lenient and disregards the possibility of chemical restoration. The Teshuvot Minchat Elazar buttresses this lenient view with the observation of Tosafot (Pesachim 46b second s.v. Ho’il) that the Mishnah (Pesachim 2:2) allows benefiting from chametz that a non-Jew owned during Pesach, even though a Jew could easily have purchased the chametz from the non-Jew. Apparently, the feasibility of changing an item’s status is halachically irrelevant. The Minchat Elazar therefore permits one who fueled his car with gasoline that had alcohol mixed in to drive the car on chol hamo’eid Pesach, even though the alcohol can potentially be restored to a drinkable form by a chemical process.
Proofs to Each Approach
One proof to the strict approach, offered by Rav Gedalia Felder (Yesodei Yeshurun 6 p. 227), is the Gemara (Eruvin 28b) that deems bitter almonds edible because they can be rendered edible by roasting. Apparently, any item that can be rendered edible by a comparably simple process is considered edible even before this process occurs. Raw spaghetti, which can be rendered edible simply by being boiled, is an apt modern analogue to the Gemara’s bitter almonds. Since, Rav Moshe claims, denatured alcohol can be restored to an unquestionably potable state with little effort, it should have the same status as the almonds and spaghetti.
On the other hand, Rav Chaim Ozer Grodzinsky (Teshuvot Achiezer 3:31)6Rav Chaim Ozer is addressing the permissibility of a medicine that contains an inedible non-kosher ingredient. contends (based on the Chavat Da’at Y.D. Bei’urim 103:1) that we consider the potential of an inedible item to be reconstituted only if this is what normally occurs to such items (omeid l’kach). Raw spaghetti is thus considered edible, since it is normally cooked. Similarly, the Torah forbids using sourdough on Pesach even though it is inedible because it normally facilitates baking bread. Denatured alcohol, on the other hand, is not generally modified for consumption purposes, so it is not analogous to bitter almonds and is not considered edible.
Rav Felder also suggests a proof to the lenient view. Although we are forbidden even to benefit from chametz, the Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 442:9, and see Mishnah Berurah 442:42) permits using chametz as a seat if the chametz has been smeared with clay. The Mishnah Berurah explains that the clay removes the chametz from the category of food. The Taz (O.C. 442:8) seems to imply that one even may benefit from this chametz, a position that the Aruch Hashulchan (O.C. 442:30) endorses explicitly. The Sha’ar Hatziyun (442:72), however, writes that the smearing of clay merely excuses one from the requirement to remove this chametz from his home. This Halachah appears to prove the lenient approach, as the Shulchan Aruch permits one to own such chametz even though its status as food can easily be restored by removing the clay. This proof does seem compelling according to the Aruch Hashulchan’s view that it is actually permissible to benefit from this chametz so long as it remains covered with clay. According to the Sha’ar Hatziyun, though, this Halachah does not prove that we disregard future restoration; it merely proves that one may own such chametz while it remains in its current state, not that it may be benefited from.
Rav Frank cites two reasons to consider alcohol chametz even if it is unfit for canine consumption. First, Rav Yosef Shaul Nathanson (Teshuvot Sho’eil Umeishiv 1:1:141) rules that the exemption of eino ra’ui l’achilat kelev applies only to items that are normally consumed. Since these items are consumed only when they are edible, the prohibition to consume them does not apply if they are unfit even for canine consumption. However, if an item is not meant for consumption, the prohibition to own and benefit from it (if it contains chametz) applies even if it is inedible.
Rav Frank himself judges this line of reasoning to be unpersuasive. In fact, he adds, even Rav Nathanson seems to contradict himself in another responsum (Teshuvot Sho’eil Umeishiv 3:2:148) in which he permits soap for Pesach use because the chametz in the soap is inedible. We may add that Rav Nathanson’s reasoning also appears to conflict with the Shulchan Aruch’s aforementioned permission to use ink that was cooked in barley beer, wherein the Shulchan Aruch applies eino ra’ui l’achilat kelev even though ink is not normally consumed. Accordingly, most poskim reject Rav Nathanson’s stringent view, although some take it into account as a reason to be strict when possible about such issues on Pesach (see, for example, Yesodei Yeshurun 6:227).
The other reason for stringency that Rav Frank quotes is the opinion of the Teshuvot Levushei Mordechai (O.C. 86), who argues that the category of nifsal mei’achilat kelev is irrelevant to alcohol, since dogs would not consume even the conventional alcohol that humans regularly drink. The Teshuvot Minchat Elazar (ad. loc.) challenges this argument, asserting that even dogs can potentially acquire a taste for alcohol (see Rosh Hashanah 4a)7Yehuda Ness notes that this response is questionable based on the aforementioned argument that Halachah is not formulated based on exceptions (batlah da’ato eitzel kol haberiyot). Most dogs certainly do not indulge in alcohol. On the other hand, the Gemara refers to a dog being trained to drink alcohol. It is perfectly normal for dogs to do as they are trained, so perhaps the rule of batlah da’ato eitzel kol haberiyot is inapplicable. just as humans can.
Ultimately, Rav Frank concludes that one should not use denatured alcohol as cooking fuel (apparently a common practice in the early twentieth century) on Pesach.8For further discussion of this debate, see She’arim Mitzuyanim Bahalachah (3:78-79).
Rav Shimon Eider (Halachos of Pesach p. 25 footnote 90) writes that he heard that Rav Isser Zalman Meltzer, Rav Aharon Kotler, and Rav Yaakov Kaminetzky agree with Rav Moshe’s position on denatured alcohol. Accordingly, Rav Doniel Neustadt (The Monthly Halachah Discussion p. 187) concludes that most poskim rule strictly about this matter. However, as I heard Rav Yosef Rottenberg of Baltimore state, the problem with oral reports such as these (when not supported by a written responsum) is that it is difficult to determine whether these great authorities meant their rulings as ikar hadin (bottom-line Halachah) or merely as chumrah (stringency). In fact, Rav Kaminetzky is cited (Emet L’yaakov Al Shulchan Aruch p. 200 note 432) as being lenient regarding this matter in case of very great need (especially since the alcohol might be synthetic, as we shall explain later).
We should note that even grain alcohol might not be regarded as chametz on a biblical level. Some poskim (cited in Sha’arei Teshuvah 442:3) argue that alcohol is zei’ah b’alma (“mere sweat,” i.e. of no substance; see Berachot 37a) and is forbidden as chametz only on a rabbinic level. Although the Mishnah Berurah (442:4) rules that the consensus opinion classifies grain alcohol as biblically prohibited, Rav Yehudah Amital told me that the lenient opinions might be utilized as a snif l’hakeil (a lenient consideration) regarding the question of owning products that contain chametz. This is also the opinion of Rav Chaim David Halevi (Techumin 3:69).9See Bei’ur Halacha 489:10 s.v. Af, who considers the lenient opinions in the context of the laws of chadash.
We should clarify that the Shulchan Aruch’s permitting the use of ink cooked in beer, even though the beer in the ink can be chemically reconstituted, is not an ironclad proof to the lenient opinion, as the technique of chemical reconstitution was not available during the Shulchan Aruch’s time. Thus, the stringent opinion presumably would argue that this lenient ruling of the Shulchan Aruch no longer applies, because reconstitution is now a practicable possibility.10Rav Asher Bush adds that because ink is not poisonous, it is not impossible to imagine someone consuming it, yet the Shulchan Aruch permits benefiting from it. Most cosmetics and toiletries, on the hand, are poisonous when consumed, so it is less likely that a person would consume them. As such, there is even more reason to be lenient about cosmetics and toiletries than about ink, which would suggest that the former should be permissible.
Cosmetics and Toiletries that Contain Denatured Alcohol
Later twentieth-century authorities continue to debate the status not only of denatured alcohol, but even of products that contain denatured alcohol. Rav Gedalia Felder, though he acknowledges the possibility of allowing ownership of such products on Pesach, concludes that it is forbidden. He bases his strict ruling on the potential of chemically rendering these products as edible and on the stringent rulings of the Teshuvot Sho’eil Umeishiv and Teshuvot Levushei Mordechai cited above. On the other hand, many observant Jews, following the lead of great poskim such as Rav Ovadia Yosef (Yalkut Yosef, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch p. 585 in the 5760 edition) and Rav Yosef Dov Soloveitchik (cited by Rav Yosef Adler and many others), are lenient in this matter. In fact, the Teshuvot Chazon Nachum (46) writes that although he perceives that the common practice is to be strict in these matters, a Rav who rules leniently should not be criticized.
Rav Shimon Eider (Halachos of Pesach pp. 25-26) articulates a compromise view that is practiced by many people.11The Chicago Rabbinical Council, following the rulings of Rav Gedalia Schwartz, Rav Shmuel Fuerst, and other prominent poskim from Chicago, has adopted this approach as its official policy. He writes, “Many Poskim hold that this problem of alcohol concerns only medications, cosmetics, toiletries and the like which are in liquid form.” Such products include cologne, pre-shave and aftershave lotion, mouthwash, and spray and roll-on deodorants. Rav Eider explains that when the alcohol is not in liquid form, Rav Moshe’s concern for those who drink the alcohol with only slight modifications is not relevant. Moreover, Rav Moshe’s concern does not apply to the alcohol in some liquids, such as nail polish, hand lotion, shoe polish, and paint, and hence Rav Eider permits their use.
Additionally, the alcohol in the products in question often is synthetic, not grain alcohol. Rav Doniel Neustadt (The Monthly Halachah Discussion pp. 187-188) reports that even manufacturers are often unaware of which type of alcohol their products contain. Since they use whatever ingredients are available for the lowest price at the time of manufacture, they often do not have information about the origin of the alcohol in a product manufactured six months before purchase. Obviously, synthetic alcohol would pose no problem for Pesach use.
Moreover, if a majority of the alcohol that is used in such products is synthetic, then one might be permitted to rely on the rov (majority; see Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 110:2). Indeed, Rav Ovadia Yosef (Yalkut Yosef ad. loc.) rules leniently about using Israeli products specifically because most of the denatured alcohol contained in Israeli products is synthetic.12This obviously is subject to change over time. If it becomes more common in Israel to use grain-based denatured alcohol than synthetic denatured alcohol, Rav Ovadia might forbid using products containing denatured alcohol.
Sichah K’shtiyah
In addition to the issues already discussed, the principle of sichah k’shtiyah (anointing is equivalent to drinking; see Yoma 76b) poses a potential problem for applying cosmetics that contain inedible chametz. We noted above that although one may own and benefit from inedible chametz, he still may not eat it. Accordingly, if the principle of sichah k’shtiyah applies to chametz on Pesach, it would be forbidden to apply makeup that contains even inedible chametz, as this would be the equivalent of “drinking” the chametz. Thus, we must explore the parameters of sichah k’shtiyah to assess its relevance to the prohibitions of chametz on Pesach.
The Gemara (ibid.) presents the principle of sichah k’shtiyah as a reason why it is forbidden to anoint oneself on Yom Kippur (see Yoma 73b). The Gemara also uses this principle to forbid a non-Kohen to anoint himself with olive oil of terumah (the kohen’s tithe, which a non-kohen is strictly forbidden to consume). Thus, it appears that the principle of sichah k’shtiyah extends to all areas of Halachah. However, Rabbeinu Tam (cited in Tosafot Yoma 77a s.v. D’tnan and Niddah 32a s.v. Uchshemen) argues that sichah k’shtiyah applies only to Yom Kippur, terumah, and issurei hana’ah (items that we are forbidden to benefit from, such as chametz on Pesach). Thus, Rabbeinu Tam rules that we are permitted to use soap made from pig fat, since Halachah permits benefiting from pigs.13Rav Dovid Heber reports that soap continues to be made from pig fat even today.
Many Rishonim, including the Mordechai (Shabbat 338-339), the Sefer Haterumah (238), and Tosafot Rabbeinu Peretz (Pesachim 24b s.v. Hiniach) challenge Rabbeinu Tam’s ruling and state that the principle of sichah k’shtiyah applies to all prohibitions. They rule, therefore, that it is forbidden to use soap derived from animals that would be forbidden to eat (such as non-kosher or improperly slaughtered animals).
The commentaries to the Shulchan Aruch continue to debate this issue. The Vilna Gaon (Bei’ur Hagra O.C. 326:10 s.v. Oh Bish’ar Cheilev) notes that the Rama (ibid.) rules that on Shabbat and Yom Tov, it is forbidden to use soaps made from animal fat (such as those commonly used in Europe at that time). This implies that it is permitted to use such soap on other days (even if made from animals which would be forbidden to eat), as Rabbeinu Tam ruled. The Vilna Gaon himself, though, rules in accordance with the Rishonim who reject Rabbeinu Tam’s ruling and forbids soaps made from prohibited animals except in a situation of distress (mekom tza’ar).
The Shach (Nekudat Hakesef, Y.D. 117:4) observes that the common custom is to be lenient in this matter, but that some follow the strict opinion, which he believes is the “proper” practice. The Bei’ur Halachah (326:10 s.v. Bish’ar Cheilev) also writes that the minhag ha’olam (common custom) is to be lenient, though he, too, notes that “A number of people who are scrupulous about Halachah are strict about this matter.” He concludes that if soap made from a kosher source is readily available, it is “certainly proper” (though not required) to accommodate the stringent opinion.
Sichah K’shtiyah for Inedible Products
Both the Aruch Hashulchan (Y.D. 117:29) and the Kaf Hachaim (O.C. 326:45) specify that this dispute applies only to soap that is edible; all would agree, however, that it is permitted to use inedible soap. The Aruch Hashulchan records that this is the commonly accepted and unchallenged practice among Jews throughout the world. Nevertheless, Rav Ovadia Yosef (Teshuvot Yechaveh Da’at 4:43), despite agreeing with this lenient position, observes that the Bei’ur Halachah does not distinguish between edible and inedible soap, which implies that it is preferable to avoid using even inedible soap that is derived from a non-kosher source.
The debate regarding sichah k’shtiyah and soap is relevant to cosmetics as well, since they, too, are applied to the skin. Rav Dovid Heber14Rav Heber’s essay on this topic is available at www.star-k.org. relates that the minhag ha’olam today is to apply cosmetics that contain non-kosher ingredients to one’s face throughout the year. He adds, however, that although cosmetics that are unfit for canine consumption are, strictly speaking, permitted on Pesach, “Nonetheless, many individuals are strict and avoid using creams, lotions, and liquids that contain chometz.”15Examples of chametz ingredients in cosmetics include wheat protein, wheat germ, avena, beta glucan, oat extracts, and triticum vulgare. In any case, Rav Shimon Eider (Halachos of Pesach p. 27) comments, that it seems that all would agree that it is proper to use a fresh stick of lipstick for Pesach, as this is common practice regarding items that one puts in his mouth and that come in contact with chametz, such as toothbrushes.16Although one could simply clean the lipstick or toothbrush, there is concern that one cannot thoroughly clean these items, similar to those described by the Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 442:11) and Rama (ibid.).
Toothpaste on Pesach
The toothpaste that we use today is inedible (despite the fact that many have a pleasant taste), but it commonly contains glycerin (which is often manufactured from forbidden animals) and might have chametz ingredients. Thus, there are two potential problems with toothpaste on Pesach: it may have non-kosher ingredients and it may contain chametz. The common practice in the observant community is to be lenient and to use regular toothpaste year-round despite the potential non-kosher ingredients, though some are strict and use only toothpaste with entirely kosher ingredients. What, then, is the halachic status of toothpaste on Pesach?
Rav Shimon Eider (ad. loc.) cites that Rav Moshe Feinstein ruled that toothpaste is eino ra’ui l’achilat kelev and hence is permissible for use on Pesach. Rav Yosef Adler reports that Rav Yosef Dov Soloveitchik endorsed this position. Rav Moshe adds that we are not concerned about swallowing some of the toothpaste, since achsheveih does not apply to unintended swallowing (as we cited previously from the Mishnah Berurah 442:45). However, he states that since toothpaste that does not contain chametz is readily available, one should not use toothpaste that might contain chametz. Rav Eider reports, based on verbal accounts, that Rav Aharon Kotler agreed with Rav Moshe’s position.
Rav Moshe’s recommendation appears to be based on a ruling of the Rama (Y.D. 155:3) that we do not permit an ill person to consume a forbidden item, even if it is necessary to preserve his life, if a permitted item that is equally effective in fighting the illness is available.17The context of the Rama’s ruling might indicate that the Rama speaks even about a forbidden item that has been rendered inedible. If so, Rav Moshe’s recommendation becomes even more powerful, since the Rama requires using a permissible item even if, as in the modern-day case of toothpaste, the item is inedible. Rav Moshe appears to adopt this approach in his ruling regarding dish soap that is cited later in this chapter. Rav Hershel Schachter told me that Rav Moshe’s preference to avoid using non-kosher items even if they are inedible is due to concern for “timtum halev” (spiritual contamination) resulting from the consumption of non-kosher food, even if it is consumed in a permissible manner. The Rama (Y.D. 81:7) expresses similar sentiments in regard to attempting as much as possible to have a child nurse from someone who consumes only kosher food. The Rama adds that one must wait for the permitted item even if there will be a slight delay in obtaining it, assuming that the delay will not endanger the patient.
What is not clear from Rav Eider’s reports of oral rulings from these eminent authorities is whether they considered this ruling to constitute the ikar hadin or a chumra. As we quoted earlier from Rav Yosef Rottenberg, rulings that are not supported by written responsa are difficult to fully scrutinize and understand.
Rav Hershel Schachter told me that even if toothpaste has a pleasant taste, it is nonetheless considered eino ra’ui l’achilat kelev and is permissible to use, since it is still inedible. Rav Schachter understands the Rama’s (Y.D. 108:5) prohibition against tasting a forbidden item to apply only if the item is suitable to be eaten. 18Pitchei Teshuvah (Y.D. 98:1), the Mateh Yehonatan (Y.D. 108:5), and the Teshuvot Har Zvi (Y.D. 95) support Rav Schachter’s ruling.
On the other hand, Rav Eider (ad. loc.) infers from this Rama that “Flavored lipsticks may not be used on Pesach.” Apparently, Rav Eider believes that one may not taste even an inedible item.19Rav Asher Bush argues that this reading of the Rama appears to contradict the aforementioned ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 442:10, as interpreted by the Mishnah Beruruah 442:45, citing the Magen Avraham 442:15 in the name of the Terumat Hadeshen 129) that it is permitted, from the vantage point of chametz, to write with ink that was cooked in barely beer even though the scribe might absentmindedly put the quill into his mouth and swallow some of the ink.
Mouthwash
This debate impacts the question of using mouthwash that contains inedible chametz (many contain denatured alcohol) for Pesach. Whereas Rav Schachter permits using any kind of mouthwash, others forbid using one that has a “minty” or other pleasant taste (as opposed to a medicine-like taste). Indeed, Rav Meir Bransdorfer (Teshuvot Knei Bosem 1:25) writes that mouthwash containing inedible chametz is permitted on Pesach only if one does not intend to eat or enjoy the taste of it.20Rav Asher Bush suggests that this may vary from person to person. This seems to imply that he would forbid using mouthwash unless it has a “medicine-like taste.” Rav Eider (ad. loc.), on the other hand, forbids any mouthwash that contains chametz ingredients.21Rav Heber writes that breath sprays and breath strip fresheners that are intentionally swallowed require kashrut certification for Pesach and year-round use. Rav Hershel Schachter, on the other hand, told me that these items do not require kashrut certification for Pesach or year round use, since they are inedible and one does not intend to consume them for the purpose of eating.
Dish Soap
Rav Moshe Feinstein (Teshuvot Igrot Moshe Y.D. 2:30) discusses whether one is permitted to use dishwashing liquid that comes from a source that is not kosher. Rav Moshe rules that it is considered nifsal mei’achilat kelev, citing as a precedent the Shulchan Aruch’s (O.C. 442:10) permission to write on chol hamo’eid Pesach with ink that was cooked in barley beer. Interestingly, Rav Moshe embraces both a leniency and a stringency in this teshuvah. On the one hand, he rules, contrary to the position of some earlier Acharonim (see Yad Efraim to Y.D. 99:5), that one is permitted to manufacture such a liquid and that doing so does not violate the prohibition of ein mevatlin issur l’chatchilah (intentionally nullifying forbidden food) even though it transforms a forbidden item into a permissible one. On the other hand, Rav Moshe does not state that such dishwashing liquid is permitted; rather, he writes, “We cannot forbid it,” implying that it is best not to use such a detergent if an alternative is available. The reason for this might be the aforementioned ruling of the Rama (Y.D. 155:3) that it is forbidden to consume non-kosher items even to fight an illness when kosher ones are available.
Rav Shimon Eider (ad. loc.), in contrast, writes that one should use only dishwashing liquid that is approved for Pesach use. Rav Eider writes that this is consistent with the common practice to use only dishwashing liquid that has no non-kosher ingredients even though it is nifsal mei’achilat kelev. Rav Eider suggests that we are concerned that such liquid may not be entirely nifsal mei’achilat kelev, in which case our dishes are absorbing non-kosher ingredients from the dishwashing liquid when washed with it in hot water.
Conclusion
It is our hope that this chapter has shed some light on this controversial topic. We have seen that there is a basis for both the strict and lenient approaches, and thus it is not appropriate to criticize one who adopts either approach to this issue.