Part I: Issuing the Summons
In the next two chapters, we focus on the topic of hazmanah, summons to beit din (a rabbinical court). We begin by discussing the details of how beit din issues a hazmanah.
Source of the Rule
The Gemara (Mo’eid Katan 16a) provides the source for summoning a defendant (nitba) to a beit din:
From where do we know that an agent of beit din is sent to summon a defendant? As it is written (Bemidbar 16:12), “Moshe1See Nimukei Yosef (Mo’eid Katan 8a in the Rif’s pages s.v. Ata Uploni) regarding whether Moshe was considered the equivalent of an actual dayan or merely a messenger of the beit din in the dispute with Korach. sent forth to summon Datan and Aviram the sons of Eliav.” [How do we know that] we inform the defendant that he will be judged in the presence of a great man? As it is written (Bemidbar 16:16), “Moshe said to Korach, ‘You and your entire assembly, appear before Hashem.’” [How do we know that] we mention the plaintiff? As it is written (ibid.) “You, they, and Aharon.” [How do we know that] a set date is mentioned in the hazmanah? As it is written (ibid.), “Tomorrow.” [How do we know that] a second hazmanah is sent? As it is written (Yirmiyahu 46:17, as explained by Rashi; however, see Ritva), “Place Paroh, King of Egypt, in excommunication for having ignored his appointed time more than once.” From where do we learn that the agent of the court [who delivers the summons] is permitted to report to the beit din [about the actions of a recalcitrant defendant] without concern for violating lashon hara (slander) prohibitions? As it is written (Bemidbar 16:14), “Even if you would gouge out the eyes of those men, we shall not go up.” [The court agent must have told Moshe that Datan and Aviram made these remarks, or else he would not have known about the remarks in order to respond angrily – Rashi s.v. Ha’einei.] From where do we derive that we excommunicate (nidui) one who refuses to appear in beit din? As it is written (Shoftim 5:23), “Curse Meroz [for their refusal to join the battle against Chatzor].”
Delivering the Hazmanah
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 11:1) describes the process of issuing the hazmanah as follows: “Beit din sends their agent (sh’liach beit din) to summon the defendant to appear before beit din.” Hence, the hazmanah is served the same way that Moshe summoned Datan and Aviram; a messenger appears personally to the defendant and issues a verbal summons.2See Encyclopedia Talmudit (8:646 note 9) for a discussion of whether the dayanim themselves, or only their shaliach, may serve a hazmanah. Of course, presenting the hazmanah in person often cannot be done today. Therefore, the Israeli Rabbinate’s batei din permit delivering a written hazmanah by mail (Takanot Hadiyun [5753 edition] 4:36). Batei din in America also issue hazmanot by mail. Professor Eliav Shochetman (Seder Hadin p. 148), addressing the Israeli beit din system, explains the justification for this practice:
The reason [that contemporary authorities permit delivering the hazmanah by mail] appears to be the great number of cases litigated in beit din - tens of thousands per year.3Rav Itamar Warhaftig told me (in 2004) that, in truth, batei din in Israel handle a relatively low number of monetary disputes, apparently because some observant Jews are not fully sensitized to the severity of the prohibition against litigating in civil court (see previous chapter). Presumably Prof. Shochetman’s calculations also include divorce cases, thereby greatly increasing the total number of hazmanot that are sent for all cases handled by batei din. Bear in mind that each case has at least two litigants to be summoned, and if we consider that court dates are postponed and that hazmanot thus need to be sent a second time, for this and various other reasons, it turns out that tens if not hundreds of thousands of hazmanot are sent per year. This reality certainly does not allow for a shaliach to deliver each hazmanah personally.4Prof. Shochetman notes that the Israeli Rabbinate’s official policy permits mailing hazmanot only if no possibility exists to send a shaliach. Nevertheless, he acknowledges that batei din routinely mail hazmanot, presumably because the reality he describes in the above passage does not allow for sending personal shlichim.
On a practical note, I have found that a personally delivered hazmanah can often influence a recalcitrant party to appear in beit din. A personal visit sends a message to the recalcitrant husband that the beit din “means business” and is serious about doing whatever it can to ensure that justice is served.
Sometimes, though, it is difficult to serve a hazmanah. Unfortunately, some unscrupulous individuals try to evade receipt of the summons. Thus, the Israeli Rabbinate’s batei din provide alternative means for delivering hazmanot, such as printing a notice in a newspaper or leaving the hazmanah with neighbors or co-workers.5Takanot Hadiyun of 5753 4:34-37. Also see Encyclopedia Talmudit (8:650-651) regarding the delivery of a hazmanah to a neighbor of the defendant.
Content of the Hazmanah
Acharonim debate whether the hazmanah must include the matter to be adjudicated in beit din, as the Gemara does not mention such an obligation. The Shach (Choshen Mishpat 11:1) requires that the hazmanah inform the defendant what the case is about. Otherwise, the defendant can claim that were he to know the issue in advance, he would appease the plaintiff outside of beit din. The Shach notes that the Be’er Sheva (54) does not obligate the hazmanah to contain any details of the case. Nevertheless, both the Netivot (11:1) and the Aruch Hashulchan (Choshen Mishpat 11:2) adopt the Shach’s own position.
Interestingly, Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igrot Moshe, C.M. 2:6) limits the Shach’s ruling to the hazmanot of a non-recognized beit din. However, he argues that the defendant can assume that a recognized beit din never would have sent a hazmanah for a matter that the litigants could easily settle out of beit din.
Rav Gedalia Schwartz told me that experience teaches that all batei din should inform defendants what the trial will be about, as the parties will often resolve the matter without litigation in beit din. Indeed, the Israeli Rabbinate’s batei din mention the cause of action in their hazmanot (Takanot Hadiyun of 5753 4:32).
How Many Hazmanot are Sent?
The Shulchan Aruch (C.M. 11:1) speaks of sending three hazmanot to a rural resident who occasionally visits the city and one hazmanah to a city dweller. Acharonim (Tumim, cited approvingly by Netivot 11:4; Pitchei Teshuvah, C.M. 11:1; Aruch Hashulhan, C.M. 11:1) note that nowadays we send three hazmanot even to city dwellers, because our lives have become so hectic that we need reminding. In America, we follow the practice of always sending three hazmanot. In Israel, the practice has developed to send only one hazmanah, in both the non-government batei din (Badatz) and state-sponsored Israeli Rabbinate batei din (see Teshuvot Minchat Yitzchak 9:155 and Takanot Hadiyun of 5753 Chapter 4).6See Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 334:74), who writes that one who ignores hazmanot is excommunicated. The consequences for refusing to appear in beit din are delineated in Y.D. 334:2. Rav Mordechai Willig (in a 1992 lecture) mentioned that he would consider applying a form of communal pressure known as harchakot d'Rabbeinu Tam (see Gray Matter 1:17-20) after a husband ignores even a first hazamanah.
The practice of Yemenite batei din is particularly interesting. If a party would respond only to a second or third notice, the dayanim would conduct the proceedings without asking him why he ignored the earlier hazmanot, lest they be biased against him. However, after the final decision was issued (gemar din), they inquired as to the reason for the delay. If he failed to provide a legitimate excuse for the tardy response, the dayanim would reprimand him (Rav Yosef Kafich, Halichot Teiman p. 71).7Rav Kafich also records another unique practice of the Yemenite community regarding hazmanah. Initially, the plaintiff himself would request of his adversary to appear in beit din at a particular time, without the beit din issuing a hazmanah. If the defendant did not appear in beit din as requested, then the dayanim would write a hazmanah, which the plaintiff himself would deliver to the defendant.
One other change has evolved in recent generations. In the time of the Shulchan Aruch, the respondent received one day (!) to appear in beit din, presumably because Moshe demanded that Korach appear “tomorrow.” Today, batei din allow more time for the parties to respond to hazmanot, depending on the determination of the particular beit din.8Rav Yonah Reiss (in a letter dated July 25, 2003) referred me to the RCA Beth Din of America’s Rules and Procedures (Section 2) regarding the practice of allowing 30 days to respond to a summons before issuance of a shtar seruv. He explains:
The practice of waiting at least thirty days before taking action against a mesareiv is codified in our Rules and Procedures and is generally consistent with the principle of z’man beit din shloshim yom (see Bava Metzia 118a and Aruch Hashulchan, C.M. 16:1). This practice is based in part on the principle articulated in C.M. 11 that time is always extended to the defendant following a summons because he may not be able to attend to the summons immediately based on other distractions (see Aruch Hashulchan, C.M. 11:1). Since it is deemed appropriate that time be given anyway, I believe the practice developed to extend that time to thirty days based on z’man beit din shloshim yom.
Part II: Selecting a Court
In this chapter, we discuss the appropriate response to a hazmanah (summons) if one does not wish to submit to the jurisdiction of the particular beit din that has summoned him.
An Alternate Beit Din
The Aruch Hashulchan (Choshen Mishpat 26:5) rules in accordance with Rav Yonatan Eybeshutz (Urim 26:13), who writes that a defendant (nitba) who wishes to have his case heard in an alternate beit din should not be equated with one who refuses to appear in any beit din. The Aruch Hashulchan adds, however, that if the beit din believes the defendant to be intentionally procrastinating, they may treat him as if he refuses to appear in any beit din. Let us cite several examples of how this distinction has worked in practice.
In 1957, someone wished to press a claim in the Jerusalem District Rabbinical Court (Seder Hadin p. 151, note 43). Upon receiving the hazmanah, the defendant responded that he wished to adjudicate the case in the (Jerusalem) beit din of the eminent Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank. The Jerusalem District Court found the defendant to be recalcitrant and permitted the plaintiff to seek relief in the civil court system.1The state of Israel grants the Israeli Rabbinate’s batei din exclusive jurisdiction only over matters of Jewish personal status, such as conversions, marriage, and divorce. The defendant appealed to the Israeli Rabbinate’s Court of Appeals. This beit din (which included Rav Yosef Shalom Eliashiv) ruled in favor of the defendant, overturning the decision of the District Rabbinical Court. It reasoned, “The defendant had the right to have the case adjudicated in a different beit din in Jerusalem and thus should not have been characterized as recalcitrant.”
Rav Moshe Feinstein (Teshuvot Igrot Moshe, C.M. 2:9) ruled similarly regarding a divorce case in Bnei Brak where a husband demanded to adjudicate in a non-government beit din, while his wife (the defendant) insisted on going to a state-recognized beit din of the Israeli Rabbinate. Rav Moshe ruled that the wife’s demands were not of a recalcitrant nature, because she preferred a beit din with the necessary government recognition to enforce its rulings.
The right to choose a court applies only if the alternate beit din is an absolutely neutral venue. For example, Tel Aviv Rabbinical Court (cited in Seder Hadin, ibid.) heard a case in 1986 where the defendants, members of a particular Chassidic group, sought to move the case to a beit din consisting of their group’s rabbis. The plaintiff was not Chassidic, so he did not wish to use their beit din. The Tel Aviv Rabbinical Court, which consisted of outstanding dayanim (including Rav Shlomo Dichovsky and Rav Avraham Sherman), denied the motion of the defendants:
The beit din of [this Chassidic group] is not situated in the locale where the disputants reside.… It is inconceivable to force one who is not [Chassidic] to submit to the jurisdiction of a [Chassidic] beit din.... It is reasonable to say that the [Chassidic] dayanim will be more sympathetic towards [their group’s Chassidim] than towards one who is not affiliated with [their group].2Rav Mordecai Willig (in a lecture to the Yeshiva University Yadin Yadin Kollel) similarly advised against congregational rabbis serving on batei din when one of their congregants is a litigant.
Using Arbitration Instead of an Established Beit Din
Rav Akiva Eiger (gloss to Shulchan Aruch, C.M. 3:1) ruled that the defendant may claim that he wishes to bring the case before people (not necessarily rabbis) who will adjudicate it according to prevalent business practice (minhag hasocharim), and not according to Halachah. Rav Eiger explains, “Since this is the local custom, in such a case we say that prevalent business practice overrides Halachah (minhag mevateil Halachah).”
In 1982 the Ashdod Rabbinical Court (Piskei Din Batei Din Harabbaniyim 13:330), headed by Rav Shlomo Dichovsky, faced a plaintiff who sought to summon the defendant to the arbitration panel of the Israel Union of Engineers and Architects. The plaintiff pointed out that the parties’ contract contained a clause stating that all disputes would be brought to that body. The defendant refused to cooperate, arguing that the clause violated Halachah. The beit din ruled in favor of the plaintiff, citing the comments of Rav Akiva Eiger to prove that the arbitration claim did not contravene Halachah. The beit din explained that the panel made judgments based on common sense and common business practice, rather than ruling based on secular law.3We address the permissibility of using arbitration panels in our earlier chapter “The Prohibition Against Using Civil Courts.”
A Zabla Beit Din
According to the Shulchan Aruch (C.M. 3:1), a defendant has the right to claim that he wants “zabla,” an acronym for “zeh boreir lo echad” (“each picks one for himself”). The litigants create a zabla beit din by each party selecting one dayan and then those two dayanim choosing their third colleague. The Rosh (Sanhedrin 3:1; based on Rashi, Sanhedrin 23a s.v. Yeitzei) explains the logic of this system:
Truth will emerge from such a beit din, because litigants will be inclined to follow this beit din’s ruling. Each side will reasonably believe that he chose a dayan who will argue in his favor, if such an argument is indeed plausible. The dayanim themselves will seek to find sound arguments for both sides.4Unfortunately, the reality of creating a beit din with three dayanim who do not necessarily wish to work with one another often does not correspond to the Rosh’s idyllic portrayal. Rav Mordechai Willig (addressing the Rabbinical Council of America) recounted that he has participated in many zabla batei din and finds certain types of them “complicated.” He commented that it is almost always preferable to submit a dispute to a standing beit din rather than opting for zabla. I have heard similar comments from many other Rabbanim. In addition, see Rav Willig’s important discussion regarding the practices of certain arbiters in certain types of zabla batei din, in Beit Yitzchak (36:17-21).
Nevertheless, the Rama (C.M. 3:1) rules that a litigant cannot insist on zabla if there is a local established beit din (beit din kavu’a). The Chazon Ish (Sanhedrin 15:7) offers an explanation for the Rama’s ruling:
This [ruling] applies specifically when the community has enacted this policy…. They would find reason to enact such legislation due to crooked individuals, who utilize the right to select a judge as a means of escaping justice, by delaying until the beit din is assembled. In addition, the litigant has the right to reject the dayan selected by his adversary [and dishonest people abuse this right to delay the application of justice]. Moreover, sometimes a litigant appoints an unscrupulous dayan (or arbiter) and it is [often] difficult to prove that he indeed is unscrupulous. It appears that just as the defendant cannot insist on zabla if the city has a beit din kavu’a, he similarly cannot insist on going to another beit din in the same city, even if it is greater.
The System’s Pitfalls
Rav Yosef Eliyahu Henkin (Eidut Leyisrael p. 167) laments the fact that all of the major Jewish communities in America lack centralized batei din. Consequently, the Chazon Ish’s concerns reportedly remain relevant today. Indeed, Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igrot Moshe, C.M. 2:3) and Rav Yitzchak Isaac Liebes (Teshuvot Beit Avi 5:142) point out that there is no beit din kavu’a in New York. Thus, any defendant may insist on zabla with all its resultant pitfalls. In Rav Moshe’s words:
That which the Rama writes, that if there is a beit din kavua in the area one may not refuse to submit to its jurisdiction, applies only to situations such as in the cities of the “old country” where the local community appointed the beit din. In the old country, the town Rav had the authority to summon people to submit to his jurisdiction. However, in New York there are no established dayanim appointed by the Jewish community. Moreover, there are batei din of the many and varied rabbinic organizations [Rabbinical Council of America, Igud Harabanim, Agudat Harabanim, Hitachdut Harabanim-Satmar - C.J.] so that not even all the rabbis of a particular community subscribe to the jurisdiction of a particular beit din. Thus, if one party requests zabla, the other side must agree to it.
Rav J. David Bleich (Contemporary Halakhic Problems 4:5-6) details the difference in communal structure between European communities of past generations and contemporary America:
In many communities it was customary for all householders to affix their signatures to the formal ketav rabanut, a rabbinic contract, presented to a newly appointed rabbi specifically designating him as the presiding judge of the local beit din. That practice was instituted in order to assure that no person might refuse to obey a summons issued by the communal rabbi on the plea that he didn’t recognize the rabbi’s judicial authority. Thus was the commandment “Judges and officers shall you place unto yourself” fulfilled. Not so in America. The kehillah system has not been replicated in this country. Rabbis are engaged by individual congregations rather then by the community at large. Membership in a synagogue doesn’t ipso facto imply binding acceptance of the synagogue’s rabbi, no matter how qualified he may be, with regard to religious or jurisprudential matters that are personal in nature. The result is that no rabbi enjoys the authority to compel a litigant to appear before him and to accept his judicial authority.
A Practical Example
A practical example illustrates the chaos that prevails in the Jewish community in America. Rav Moshe Snow placed a bid on a house in Brooklyn approximately thirty years ago. The bid was immediately accepted, but soon after a higher bid was offered. The homeowner then informed Rav Snow that he must match the higher bid, or he would call the original deal off. Rav Snow sought the advice of Rav Moshe Feinstein, who warned that the homeowner was going to receive a mi shepara.5Mi shepara is a curse given by Chazal when one violates a verbal commitment in business (Bava Metzia 44a). It warns, “He who punished the generation of the flood and the generation of the Tower of Bavel, He will eventually punish those who fail to abide by their verbal commitments.” Rav Snow reported Rav Moshe’s comments to the homeowner, and he impudently responded, “Rav Moshe is not my rabbi; I don’t have to follow him!” Consequently, the homeowner ignored Rav Moshe’s warning and sold the house to the highest bidder.
Rav Bleich’s Proposed Solution
Rav Bleich (p. 16) presents a solution to this problem, organizing a national beit din:
By establishing a fairly large roster of dayanim and permitting litigants to use a limited form of the zabla system - litigants might be permitted to designate the members of the beit din that would hear this case but would be limited in being able to select a panel of dayanim only from among the designated list of members of the national beit din.
This type of beit din adopts the advantages of the zabla system, yet has the potential to control the problems with it. The national beit din could carefully monitor and verify the integrity of the dayanim participating in the zabla. Such an organization could also monitor the behavior of the to’anim [rabbinical lawyers, whose status is discussed in two later chapters - C. J.], who in the current system are essentially not monitored.
Comments on Rav Bleich’s Proposal
Rav Bleich’s proposal seems like the appropriate solution to the chaotic system that exists today. As he notes, it would also help ameliorate the agunah problem, by empowering the entire community in pressuring a recalcitrant spouse to participate in the get ceremony.6For further discussion of the agunah problem, see our first volume (pp. 3-59). In fact, Rav Bleich writes that Rav Yaakov Kaminetzky suggested this approach to him.
However, Rav Leib Landesman told me that even if a national beit din were to be formed, he believes that one still retains the right to insist on zabla to the point of choosing a dayan whose name does not appear on the roster. According to Rav Landesman, even such a national roster would not attain the status of a beit din kavua. Rav Landesman reasons that people lose their right to request zabla only if they themselves take positive action to accept a beit din kavua (such as by signing the European ketav rabanut that Rav Bleich describes). On the other hand, if rabbis or Jewish communal leaders adopt a national roster, their adoption of the roster would not bind their congregants. Thus, Rav Bleich’s proposal appears difficult to implement in practice.
I have heard of a couple of additional suggestions to modify zabla in a manner that can prevent turmoil. Sometimes, each litigant will select a beit din (rather than an individual dayan), and each of the selected batei din will assign one of its dayanim to the case. Those two dayanim then select a third dayan. Initially selecting batei din, rather than individual dayanim, reduces the sense that each rabbi should advocate on behalf of the litigant who selected him. Alternatively, rather than each beit din assigning one of its own dayanim, the two batei din can select a third beit din to hear the case. Finally, a system has been suggested whereby the defendant would name three reputable batei din, and the plaintiff would select one of these batei din to hear the case.7The Be’er Hagolah to Choshen Mishpat 14:10 might serve as a source for the latter two alternatives.
Rav Willig and Rav Goldberg’s Proposals
In the absence of a national roster of dayanim, Rav Mordechai Willig (in a lecture to the convention of the Rabbinical Council of America) reported that Rav Zalman Nechemia Goldberg suggested a proposal for as many communities as would cooperate. All member synagogues of a particular umbrella organization could designate that organization’s beit din as their community’s beit din. For example, every synagogue that belongs to the Orthodox Union could accept the (OU/RCA) Beth Din of America. Consequently, the synagogues would require, as a condition for receiving synagogue membership, that every congregant sign a binding arbitration agreement to litigate all disputes with his fellow congregants at the Beth Din of America. From that point on, nobody in the synagogue could ever demand zabla as a means to procrastinate.
Of course, it is hard to imagine many synagogues imposing such a precondition for membership. Accordingly, Rav Willig suggested a more modest goal, which he said that Rav Goldberg also considered halachically viable. Rav Willig’s proposal calls for each synagogue, as a community, signing a declaration that all disputes must be submitted to its umbrella organization’s beit din. The document would seem to have no authority in American law, but Rav Willig and Rav Goldberg believe that it would halachically establish the specified beit din as a beit din kavu’a, stripping requests for zabla of their halachic merit.8Rav Leib Landesman’s aforementioned objection to Rav Bleich’s proposal would appear to similarly apply to this proposal, as each individual congregant does not sign the agreement. Orthodox communities could then pressure one who fails to cooperate with the designated beit din as they would someone who refuses to appear in any beit din.9Rav Mordechai Willig’s suggestion on how to create a beit din kavua in the contemporary American setting, appears in Beit Yitzchak (36:13-17).
Conclusion
Some leading contemporary rabbis have offered interesting proposals to alleviate the current chaos in the Jewish community in America. Nevertheless, batei din in America today have not yet found a completely effective way to prevent people from procrastinating or avoiding a particular beit din by demanding zabla. In situations where the two litigants begin their relationship amicably, such as two people planning their future partnership, they can sign a binding arbitration agreement that commits them to the jurisdiction of a particular beit din. Similarly, marrying couples should sign a binding arbitration agreement as part of their halachic prenuptial agreement.10We discuss halachic prenuptial agreements in detail in our first volume (pp. 8-16). On the other hand, when no agreement has been signed in advance, batei din lack any enforceable means to prevent the system’s potential abuses. Although the system in America is chaotic, one should strive to act honorably in cases of monetary dispute. When monetary disputes arise, the Mishnah Berurah (606:1), in the context of the laws of repentance prior to Yom Kippur, advocates approaching a Rav for guidance on how to act in the most honest way, lest people’s own temptations get the best of them. The Mishnah Berurah’s comments are especially relevant in our present situation.
Postscript
Due to the reported existence of unscrupulous batei din, we have chosen to add a few criteria by which to assess a beit din’s credibility. An honorable Beit Din must avoid conflicts of interest (Shulchan Aruch, C.M. 7:12 and 37:1), anything that even slightly resembles bribery (C.M. 9:1), and excessively high fees (C.M. 9:5).11Also see Teshuvot Minchat Yitzchak (7:131), who assumes that honorable dayanim will charge only enough to compensate them for the fact that they could not do other work during the court proceedings (s’char batalah), and they will not charge more than the litigants can afford. In addition, they may not accept the testimony of one litigant when his adversary is not present (C.M. 17:5), and they must thoroughly investigate all facts (see Rashi’s commentary to Bereishit 11:5). Indeed, the Chazon Ish is often quoted as saying that most erroneous halachic rulings stem from a deficient understanding of the facts.12For example, Rav Mordechai Willig (addressing an RCA convention) once recounted how Rav Yonah Reiss traveled to a Midwestern city in order to investigate whether a particular woman had been institutionalized (which might have enabled her husband to receive a document known as a heter me’ah rabbanim). Rav Reiss could have relied on the testimony of local rabbis in that city regarding the woman’s mental state, but he nevertheless traveled there himself, as dayanim must always investigate the facts as thoroughly as possible. Finally, the beit din must not allow rabbis of ordinary stature to rule on matters of great complexity or import (see Teshuvot Meishiv Davar 4:50). For example, the Noda Biy’hudah (vol. 2 Y.D. 88) criticizes an ordinary rabbi for ruling on a case of ro’eh machmat tashmish, a complex area of the laws of family purity that can potentially result in forcing a couple to divorce (see Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 187). Rav Moshe Feinstein (Teshuvot Igrot Moshe, Even Ha’ezer 1:64) similarly writes that ordinary rabbis should not rule on matters of contraception.13Regarding the pervasiveness of this problem in our generation, see Nishmat Avraham (4:13-16) and Rav Tzvi Gartner’s essay in Tradition (32:3:94-95). Also see Pitchei Teshuvah (Y.D. 99:6).