INTRODUCTION TO QUOD OMNIS PROBUS LIBER SIT
This treatise is usually believed to be a youthful essay of Philo’s and we may well suppose that it belongs to a period of his life when he still had the dialectic of the philosophical schools fresh in mind and before he had settled down to his life’s work of interpreting the Pentateuch. Its genuineness has been impugned but on no good grounds. It has the testimony of Eusebius, who names it in his list of Philo’s works, and also makes a long extract from it, and it is also used on a considerable scale by St. Ambrose though he does not name the author. But apart from these the close resemblance in style and language, remarkably close, considering the difference of subject to the main body of treatises, leaves little doubt as to the authorship.
The tract is an argument to show the truth of the Stoic “paradox” that the wise man alone is free. The paradoxes are one of the best known features of the Stoic system. The doctrine that all the gifts and qualities generally held desirable belong in the true sense to the virtuous or wise man is a natural deduction from the primary maxim that the morally excellent, τὸ καλόν, is the only good. Though they sometimes assume a fantastic form, as when the Stoics claimed, or were supposed to claim, that only the wise man could be a general or a pilot or a poet or a cobbler, the more obvious ones that he alone is free or rich or noble or beautiful, are really almost truisms which have been echoed by preachers and moralists in every age. But they put the doctrine in arresting forms which impressed the serious and also gave occasion for banter to those who observed that the life of the philosophers was not always consistent with their principles. Allusions to them and short explanations of their meaning abound in Stoic writings. The list compiled by Arnim (S.V.F.) contains some 120 items. But the peculiarity of this treatise is that it argues out the matter with a fullness and lengthiness unparalleled elsewhere, though since the writings of the founders of Stoicism have not survived we cannot say how they may have treated it. At any rate the treatise, whatever its intrinsic merits, has this interest that we have in it a specimen of Stoic dialectic preserved to us almost by accident because it was part of the works of an author whose treatment of the Pentateuch appealed so strongly to the Christian mind.
The length and fullness become still more remarkable when we find that we have here only the second part of a disquisition, for Philo tells us in his opening sentence that it was preceded by “that every fool or bad man is a slave,” which is also mentioned by Eusebius in the catalogue named above. Since mankind are divided into free and slaves and also, according to orthodox Stoicism, into wise and fools, then if the wise alone is free it must follow that a fool is a slave, and one cannot but think that the two should be taken together as they are by Cicero. However, it is a fact that the slavery of the bad though frequently just mentioned is never discussed at length in our treatise except in §§ 51 if., where the argument that the wise enjoy the right of free discussion (ἰσηγορία), which is the mark of the free, is followed by the converse so completely worked out that it can hardly have been given in the earlier half. The slavery of lovesickness is also described at some length in § 38, but it is introduced there so incidentally that one would not be surprised to find it earlier. The main topic presumably was the slavery to the passions which is noted in § 45 and more fully in §§ 156 and 158 f. and is a subject capable of development to any extent. Slightly different to this is the slavery of the multitude to opinion, cf. § 21, and he may well have noticed also what Cicero gives as an example, the devotion to artistic objects. The description of a statesman who never cringes to the mob in De Ios. 67 suggests that something about the statesman who is in servitude to the people would be appropriate, and this again appears in Cicero. The thought that slavery in the sense of subjection to the wise is the best hope for the wicked, a moral which he draws from the story of Esau (§ 57) and from Noah’s curse of Canaan in De Sob. 69, may well have played a part. One thing we may be sure of is that examples were drawn from secular history such as the slavish fear of Dionysius or the impious infatuation of Xerxes to correspond to the examples of philosophical heroism in which this tract abounds.
The great preponderance of secular illustration may be fairly regarded as another sign that this and the twin treatise belong to the youth of Philo. There are altogether only five allusions to or quotations from the Pentateuch. In this the treatise stands in marked contrast to the De Nob, which as I have pointed out elsewhere is really a dissertation on the twin paradox that the wise man is noble but is illustrated entirely from the Pentateuch.
It is a consequence of this predominantly secular character that to judge from Cohn’s footnotes little use of the treatise was made by Christian writers with two marked exceptions. The first is the account of the Essenes in §§ 75–91, which is quoted in full by Eusebius, Praep. Ev. viii. 12. Eusebius has special reasons for making this extract. The other is the 37th letter of Ambrose, a large part of which is a kind of paraphrase of the Quod Omnis Probus. I have mentioned in my notes three passages from this which have some bearing on the text or its interpretation, but there are many others cited by Cohn.
The following is an analysis of the treatise.
After stating the subject of this and the preceding treatise Philo points out that such high doctrines are beyond the comprehension of the uneducated multitude (1–3) to whom they seem wild illusion (4–5). He gives a highly coloured picture of the way in which the ignorant react to the paradoxes that the wise and the foolish are respectively (a) citizens and exiles (6–7), (b) rich and poor (8–9) and says that they raise the same objection to the paradox of freedom and slavery which is here discussed (10). Such persons should like sick people put themselves under the guidance of the physician, that is the philosopher, and if they do so they will feel that they have wasted their past, whence we see the need of philosophical education for the young (11–15).
Coming to the main question, after pointing out that he is not dealing with freedom or slavery of the body (16–18) and declaring that the true freedom, like true sovereignty (though this does not concern us at present), lies in following God (19–20), he passes at once to the main point that the wise man is free from the domination of the passions (21–22). What the poet rightly says of the contempt of death is true of the contempt of other ills, and the wise man will assert his freedom by facing these bravely (22–25). This is supported by citing the resolution shown by pancratiasts (26–27); also the wise man is unmoved and thus has the leadership of the common herd (28–31). At this point he seems to digress in order to show that some common conceptions of slavery are inconsistent. Such are (a) the fact of service, but soldiers serve without being slaves and the same is true of the impoverished free man, whilst slaves often have control of others (32–35), (b) the fact of having to obey, but children obey their parents yet are reckoned free (36), (c) of being purchased, but free men are ransomed and purchased slaves often rule their masters just as purchased lions intimidate their owners (37–40). The argument is resumed by showing that the wise man is (a) happy (41), (b) like Moses a friend of God and therefore free (42–44), also as law-abiding cities are considered free, so he also obeys the law of reason (45–47). Next comes an intricate argument on the ἰσηγορία or right of discussion on an equal footing enjoyed by the wise (48–50) and not enjoyed by the fool (51–52), and this is supported by a saying of Zeno (53–56) which Philo supposes him to have derived from Moses’s account of Isaac condemning Esau to be the slave of Jacob (57). A final argument is: “the wise man is free because he does right voluntarily, cannot be compelled to do wrong and treats things indifferent with indifference” (58–61).
Here till towards the end of the treatise the argument proper is dropped and we have several stories of persons who exemplify the picture of the wise man given above. These are introduced by a discussion whether such persons are to be found. Some doubt it (62), yet they do exist and have existed though they are scarce and also hard to find because they seek retirement from the wickedness of the world (62–63). We ought to seek them out instead of ransacking land and sea for jewels and the like (64–66) and we should remember the text, “the word is very near thee in thy mouth and thy heart and thy hand.” The thoughts, words and deeds here symbolized will if properly cultivated produce good fruit (67–70), but we neglect this and consequently the rarity of the virtuous (71–72). Still they exist both in Greece itself and outside Greece, among the Persians and Indians (73–74), while in Palestine we have the Essenes (75). The long account of the Essenes which follows describes the innocence of their occupations (76–78), rejection of slave labour (79), devout study of the law, particularly on the Sabbath (80–82), threefold devotion to God, virtue and man (83–84), the last particularly shown by sharing house and property and providing for the sick and aged (84–87). Their excellence is attested by the respect shown them even by tyrants and oppressors (88–91). Passing on to individuals, we have the story of the Indian Calanus and his firm resistance to Alexander (92–97), and returning to the Greeks some examples from poetry and history, the picture of Heracles in Euripides (98–104) and, leaving demigods out as not fair specimens, Zeno the Eleate and Anaxarchus (105–109). Further, the dauntlessness shown by those who are not philosophers assures us that the true philosopher is still more dauntless. Among these are the athletes (110–113) and even boys and women (114–117), and whole people like the Xanthians (118–120). In these we see a fortitude which ends in their death, but there is also a fortitude in continuing to live, and so we here have a number of anecdotes of Diogenes, somewhat irrelevantly, since Diogenes was a philosopher (120–124). This leads to other stories of bold answering by Chaereas and Theodorus (125–130); after this digression we return to the fortitude which defies death, the example being fighting cocks who fight on till they are killed (131–135). Then there is another digression. That freedom in the ordinary sense is noble and slavery disgraceful is universally recognized (136–137) and examples of this feeling are given—the desire for political freedom shown by senates and generals (138–139), the abhorrence of slavery shown by exclusions of slaves from festivals and from the Argo (140–143). The remainder of the treatise is connected though loosely with the main theme. The wise man will scorn and have a ready answer for all attempts which threaten his independence (144–146) for, since actual slaves when in asylum often exhibit great boldness, the wise man will find a stronger asylum in his virtue (148–153) and will discard all crooked and crafty ways (154–155). It is absurd to suppose that manumission gives true liberty (156–157). The concluding sections (158–161) repeat the main doctrine that freedom lies in eliminating the passions and emphasize the need of education of the young to attain this end.