"You shall not perform any labor" (Exodus 20:10): I [know] only that acts of labor and [their] derivatives are prohibited. Whence [do I know] to prohibit rabbinic forms of labor? The verse states "any labor." I would think that one is liable for a sin-offering for transgressing a rabbinic prohibition; [therefore] the verse states "labor"—there is liability [for a sin-offering] for designated labor but there is no liability [for transgression of] a rabbinic prohibition.
MEKHILTA DE-RABBI SHIMON BAR YOHA'I, EXODUS 35:2
Use of Crockpots on Shabbat
The slow cooking method that has made the crockpot appeal to housewives who are away from their homes during the day has also made that appliance popular among Jewish women for preparing the Sabbath cholent. In order to satisfy rabbinic restrictions against allowing as yet inedible food to cook on Shabbat, the practice among women who avail themselves of the crockpot for preparing cholent is to begin the cooking process early enough before Shabbat so that the ingredients become cooked before Shabbat to at least one third of the extent that would make the food comfortably edible. Although the food is not properly cooked, Jewish law regards food cooked to that extent to be acceptable by a sufficiently hungry and impatient individual. Since the food is at least minimally edible there is no fear that in his or her haste the cook might seek to increase the cooking temperature in order to make the food fit for consumption.
Although it is as yet unpublished, a brief responsum by the late R. Shlomoh Zalman Auerbach discussing the propriety of this procedure has been widely disseminated in the observant community. In all likelihood this was the last responsum authored by Rabbi Auerbach prior to his death. The concern expressed by Rabbi Auerbach is limited to crockpots composed of two parts, an outer pot containing heating elements along the circumference of its walls and a second, removable inner container that fits snugly within the outer utensil and does not protrude above the outer cusp of the crockpot. Other crockpots may be unacceptable for Shabbat use for entirely different reasons. The considerations upon which Rabbi Auerbach's short, undated response is based are spelled out in detail in a letter addressed to him by R. Isaac Mordecai Rubin dated 10 Tevet 5755.
The Gemara, Shabbat 34b, declares that even fully prepared food may not be "concealed" in a substance that "adds heat" (e.g. ashes or sand that themselves retain heat) prior to Shabbat for fear that, were that to be permitted, a person might be led to bury the food in hot ashes and later, on the Sabbath, rake the hot embers in order to maintain the temperature of the food. There is some disagreement among early authorities with regard to the parameters of the prohibition against "concealment" (hatmanah). Rashba and others rule that even "partial concealment" is forbidden. Nevertheless, Rema, Oraḥ Hayyim 253:1, rules that "partial concealment" is not a prohibited form of "concealment." Since Rema speaks of prohibited concealment as concealment "on all sides" it might well be assumed that the prohibition does not extend to a pot insulated on the sides by a substance that "adds heat" but is exposed on the top. Accordingly, since the outer pot containing the heating element encases the inner container only on its sides but does not extend over the cover, use of the crockpot would be permitted. It may be noted that "concealment" in substances that "do not add heat," e.g. cloth or clothing, is forbidden only if the pot is covered on all sides, including the top, and only if the "concealment" takes place on Shabbat.
There is, however, considerable doubt with regard to the accuracy of this analysis of Rema's position. Pri Megadim, Mishbezot Zahav 259:3, s.v. hatmanah, expresses doubt with regard to whether Rema intended to permit a pot to be "concealed" on all sides save for its cover. Mishnah Berurah 257:43, quoting Hayyei Adam 20:22, rules that a pot may be placed in sand only to its midpoint, but permits the upper portion of the pot to be wrapped in cloth. Rabbi Rubin points out that Rabbenu Tam, in his Sefer ha-Yashar, no. 235, is somewhat equivocal in stating that " 'concealment' connotes being covered in its major portion or in its entirety." It is not absolutely clear whether, in that statement, Rabbenu Tam's use of the disjunctive is an expression of doubt with regard to whether it is only "concealment" of a pot in its entirety that is forbidden or whether even "concealment" of more than fifty percent of the utensil is prohibited or, alternatively, whether Rabbenu Tam simply means to indicate that concealment of the major portion is tantamount to concealment of the entity in its entirety. To this writer, were the latter interpretation correct, the appropriate formulation would have been "in its entirety or [even] in its major portion"; the formulation "in its major portion or in its entirety" would seem to indicate that Rabbenu Tam is in doubt with regard to whether "concealment" of only the major portion is indeed prohibited. Nevertheless, as previously cited, both Hayyei Adam and Mishnah Berurah rule that concealment of a major portion of the pot is prohibited. However, Shulḥan Arukh ha-Rav, Oraḥ Hayyim 257:10, Kuntres Aharon, sec. 3, rules that a pot may be totally immersed in sand so long as the top remains exposed. The outer utensil of a crockpot which contains the heating element is assuredly "a substance that adds heat." Hence, permissibility of the use of a crockpot for purposes of preparing the Sabbath cholent depends directly upon proper analysis of Rema's position, i.e., does Rema prohibit "concealment" even if the pot is partially exposed.
In his brief response Rabbi Auerbach simply endorses the cogency of his interlocutor's restrictive conclusion prohibiting use of crockpots for preparation of cholent and adds that "concealment" is not negated by the fact that the inner container does not actually touch the outer pot containing the heating element as evidenced by the fact that the utensil actually cooks in this manner. He does, however, offer a somewhat cumbersome solution in advising that an additional metal "utensil," i.e., aluminum foil, be interposed between the sides of the inner container and the outside pot. However, this writer finds that suggestion puzzling since it is not clear that interposition of such a "utensil" would resolve the problem. Although heat conducted to the inner container will indeed be marginally diminished, nevertheless, such a metal liner would itself become warm. It would seem to this writer that such metal is a substance that "adds heat" and, accordingly, nothing is gained by means of its use since the inner container remains "concealed" within the interposed metal that itself "adds heat."
There is, however, another method that may be employed. Sefer ha-Terumah, no. 231, states that the ban against "concealment" does not apply when "the pot is not covered on all sides and air seizes control over it" (shalit bah avira) since under such circumstances it is clear "that he is not so concerned that it become heated and there is no reason to fear that he will rake [the embers]." Rabbi Auerbach notes that the fact that the inner container does not actually touch the outer part, i.e., that there exists a minimal air space between them, does not negate the prohibition. Since the air circulation is de minimis the air cannot be said to "seize control," i.e., to penetrate, as witnessed by the fact that the utensil actually cooks in this manner. However, the inner container is somewhat conical in shape. As a result, if the inner container is raised by even an inch or so by placing a flat can or the like on the bottom of the crockpot before Shabbat and resting the inner container on that object, the airspace between the inner container and the outer pot is increased significantly. Since, when the inner container is raised, air does indeed penetrate, there is no longer "concealment' in an object that enhances heat and hence the problem with regard to the prohibition against "concealment" is resolved.
Shortly after dissemination of Rabbi Auerbach's letter, a slim monograph by R. David Solomon entitled Kuntres Hatmanah be-Mikzat appeared in Jewish bookstores. Although the timing of publication was probably coincidental, and indeed crockpots are not at all mentioned in this work, it is clearly evident from the title that the issue addressed is precisely that of "partial concealment."
Tosafot, Shabbat 47b, cite the position of Rashbam who maintains that any food that may be left on a stove over Shabbat, e.g., food that has been on the stove one third of its cooking time prior to the onset of Shabbat, may also be "concealed." Rabbenu Tam emphatically disagrees and maintains that even food that may be left on the stove may not be concealed. Rabbenu Tam's position is accepted by both Shulḥan Arukh and Rema, Oraḥ Hayyim 257:7. Hazon Ish, Hilkhot Shabbat 37:19, assumes that Rema, Oraḥ Hayyim 253:1, in permitting a partially exposed pot to be placed on hot embers, does not base his ruling upon the fact that the pot is only partially covered but relies upon Rashbam in permitting "concealment" of partially cooked food. If so, points out Hazon Ish, that ruling contradicts Rema's own earlier cited ruling negating the position of Rashbam. Rabbi Solomon argues that, quite to the contrary, Rabbenu Tam himself, in his Sefer ha-Yashar, permits "partial concealment" as earlier noted and hence Rema's rulings are entirely consistent.
Rabbi Solomon engages in a meticulous examination of the writings of early-day authorities with regard to their view concerning "partial concealment" and concludes that the majority of those authorities accept Rabbenu Tam's position in ruling that "partial concealment" is permissible. He notes that many of those works were not available to R. Joseph Caro and those who accepted his ruling that "partial concealment" is forbidden.
As noted earlier, Rashba and those who follow his position in prohibiting "partial concealment" do so if even one surface of the pot is "concealed," e.g., if the bottom of the pot is placed in hot ashes. Rabbenu Tam rules that "concealment" is forbidden only if the pot is concealed "in its major portion or in its entirety." Acceptance of Rabbenu Tam's position leaves open the earlier discussed question of whether Rabbenu Tam is to be understood as prohibiting concealment only when the utensil is entirely covered or even when the major portion of the utensil is "concealed." That question is not addressed by Rabbi Solomon.
Care of Soft Contact Lenses on Shabbat
Hard lenses are made from polymethyl methecrylate (PMMA) and are essentially non-permeable. Rigid gas permeable contact lenses, also known as oxygen permeable lenses, are made of permeable materials, usually silicone and fluorine, that allow oxygen to reach the eye. Because they are made of a relatively hard material such lenses retain their shape when the wearer blinks which, in turn, is one of the reasons that such lenses tend to provide crisper vision than is provided by soft lenses. They are also extremely durable and with proper care may last years. Hard lenses do not absorb water. As a result protein and lipids naturally present in tears do not bind to hard lenses as easily as to soft lenses. If deposits of these substances are not removed they impede use and may cause a corneal abrasion. Such deposits are also a haven for bacteria that may cause sight-threatening infections. Proper use of the lenses requires lightly rubbing a cleansing solution in the lens with the index finger, rinsing the lens and storing it in a contact lens case filled with a storing and conditioning agent as well as, in most cases, occasional use of an enzymatic cleanser on a daily, weekly or monthly basis to assist in removal of protein deposits. Since the lenses do not absorb liquid and the cleansing process is designed only to remove surface debris and dust, the cleaning of hard lenses on Shabbat and Yom Tov is generally regarded as being problem-free insofar as Halakhah is concerned.
Most patients find frequently replaced soft lenses to be more comfortable than hard lenses. More important is the fact that they eliminate the buildup of protein deposits and hence reduce the risk of corneal abrasion and infection. The replacement schedule for soft lenses may be daily, weekly, bi-weekly, monthly, semi-monthly or quarterly. Some contact lenses are also designed for extended or overnight wear. Although the F.D.A. has approved extended wear for up to seven days, some practitioners advise that wear for even three days without removal can lead to potentially dangerous infections of the eye.
Soft lenses that are discarded daily require no cleaning and hence present no halakhic problems. The removal schedule for extended wear lenses can readily be arranged to obviate the need for removal on Shabbat or Yom Tov. However, since soft lenses absorb water the cleansing of lenses that must be removed nightly does present a problem on Shabbat and Yom Tov. The water content of soft lenses ranges from 36% to 70% by weight. Permavision lenses, which are visibility tinted contact lenses manufactured by Bausch and Lomb, are 36% water by weight when immersed in a sterile borate buffered saline solution. SofLens, one-day disposable contact lenses also manufactured by Bausch and Lomb, are 70% water by weight.
Soft lenses that are reused require daily cleansing and must be kept in a saline solution in order to prevent them from drying out and hence becoming unusable. Since soft lenses become water-laden when placed in an appropriate solution, lens care on Shabbat and Yom Tov presents three separate issues: 1) Is soaking the lens a form of "washing" that is forbidden on Shabbat and Yom Tov? 2) Does the cleansing process performed by dipping a finger in the solution and rubbing it over the lens constitute a forbidden form of washing? 3) Does handling the lens in the course of cleaning and removal from the solution constitute a forbidden form seḥitah, i.e., of expressing or squeezing a liquid from a solid? The issue of soaking lenses on Shabbat is addressed by R. Joseph Shalom Eliashiv in a brief item included in his recently published volume of responsa, Kovez Teshuvot (Jerusalem, 5760), no. 18. A more detailed discussion of those issues is presented by R. Isaac Mordecai Rubin in Yeshurun, vol. VII (Elul 5760). The same edition of Yeshurun contains a letter by R. Samuel ha-Levi Woszner to Rabbi Rubin addressing these questions. The issue is also addressed by R. Abraham Salem, Teshuvot va-Ya'an Avraham, IV (Jerusalem, 5760), no. 7; R. Yeshayahu Pinchas Rotenberg, Teshuvot Minḥat Pri, III (Jerusalem, 5760), no. 34; R. Yehonatan Ben Tzur, He'ir ha-Mizraḥ, no. 22-30: R. Ephraim Greenblatt, Kiryat Sefer, published by Machon Naḥalat Yisra'el, Kislev 5960; and R. Abraham Chanunu, Kol ha-Torah, no. 50 (Nisan 5751), published by Agudath Israel of Europe. An earlier succinct ruling regarding use of soft lenses on Shabbat is included in R. Joshua Neuwirth's Shemirat Shabbat ke-Hilkhatah 15:2.
As recorded by Rema, Oraḥ Hayyim 302:9, it is forbidden to soak clothing made of cloth in water on Shabbat because soaking, in and of itself, is a form of "washing" that is prohibited because it constitutes melabben or "whitening," one of the thirty-nine forms of "labor" prohibited on Shabbat. However, as recorded by Shulḥan Arukh, Oraḥ Hayyim 302:9, it is permitted to pour water on leather garments on Shabbat because mere soaking is not regarded as a form of melabben with regard to leather. R. Moshe Feinstein, Iggerot Mosheh, Yoreh De'ah, II, no. 77, expresses the opinion that the usual restrictions regarding washing do not apply to plastic tablecloths because they are non-absorbent but he nevertheless concludes that "since it is impossible to find this din explicitly stated because [plastic] is a new species that was not seen in early generations it is therefore proper to be stringent and not to pour water directly with force but to be lenient in cleansing gently with water." With regard to plastic, Iggerot Mosheh apparently relies upon the lenient view recorded by Rema, Oraḥ Hayyim 302:9, that permits an individual to pour a small quantity of water upon a garment to which dirt has not adhered but nevertheless prohibits him to pour a copious quantity of water upon the garment "lest he squeeze the water out of the garment."
Although made of plastic, soft contact lenses are regarded in an entirely different light by the earlier-cited authorities because they do absorb water. Rabbi Rubin tentatively suggests that the distinction between cloth and leather is not based upon absorbency but upon the consideration that soaking either is not effective in cleaning leather or that it takes much longer to achieve that effect. If so, absorbent plastic may have a halakhic status comparable to leather.
Rabbi Eliashiv draws attention to a controversy among early-day authorities cited by Rema, Oraḥ Hayyim, 302:9. Rosh, Yoma 8:4, maintains that soaking constitutes a prohibited form of "washing" only if the garment has been soiled in some manner. If, however, the garment is perfectly clean, or even if it has become somewhat dull or drab because of wear and/or the passage of time and hence the soaking is designed solely to brighten or freshen the garment, the garment may be soaked in water. Rema cites the view of Rosh and prefaces the contradictory view with the phrase "some forbid." Rabbi Eliashiv adds that, even according to the stringent view, soaking an unsoiled garment is prohibited only if the garment has become dull or grey and the soaking has the effect of restoring the garment's luster. If, however, the soaking has no effect whatsoever upon the appearance of the garment, concludes Rabbi Eliashiv, soaking is permissible according to all authorities. Rabbi Eliashiv carefully notes that his opinion in this matter is contra that of Shulḥan Arukh ha-Rav, Oraḥ Hayyim 302:21, but that R. Abraham Borenstein of Sochachow, Avnei Nezer, Oraḥ Hayyim, no. 159, sec. 10, expresses astonishment because he could find no basis for the view expressed by Shulḥan Arukh ha-Rav. Accordingly, Rabbi Eliashiv permits placing the lenses in a saline situation on Shabbat, but only if the lenses have been properly cleaned before Shabbat. Under such circumstances, soaking has no cleansing effect but serves only to prevent the lens from shriveling and hence becoming useless.
Rabbi Nissim Karelitz is quoted by Rabbi Ben Tzur as permitting the soaking of contact lenses on Shabbat on the basis of an entirely different consideration. It is virtually impossible to express the solution absorbed by the lenses. The moisture that is absorbed by the lenses is, practically speaking, removable only through evaporation. Soaking, reportedly argues Rabbi Karelitz, is tantamount to "washing" only with regard to cloth and the like from which absorbed liquid can be squeezed.
Rabbi Eliashiv omits any explanation for his insistence upon cleansing the lenses before Shabbat. However, Rabbi Rubin observes that "it is logical" to assume that, although soaking the leather is not regarded as a form of libbun because of its lack of effectiveness, nevertheless, effective chemical removal of a stain that has penetrated a leather garment is forbidden. The halakhic status of plastic, he contends, is comparable to that of leather. Rabbi Rubin then proceeds to argue that soaking lenses in a cleansing solution on Shabbat is halakhically forbidden. Presumably, Rabbi Eliashiv insists that the lenses be cleaned prior to Shabbat in order to assure that the saline solution will not serve a cleansing purpose. That rationale is explicitly cited in the name of Rabbi Eliashiv by Rabbi Chanunu in the latter's discussion of the topic.
This writer fails to understand the application of this line of reasoning to contact lenses. The silicone lens does not absorb stains and does not become sullied; on the contrary, a properly maintained lens is always crystal clear. Any distortion that is perceived in a properly maintained lens is due to the presence of surface debris. As explained by Mishnah Berurah 302:7 and Avnei Nezer, Oraḥ Hayyim, no. 157, sec. 4, removal of surface dirt or debris is not a form of melabben.1Cf., R. Akiva Eger, Gilyon ha-Shas, Shabbat 147a and Mishnah Berurah, Bi’ur Halakhah 302:1 and Sha‘ar ha-Ẓiyyun 302:41. Avnei Nezer, Oraḥ Hayyim, no. 159, sec. 7, demonstrates that libbun applies only to removal of stains or absorbed materials that mar the appearance of the garment. Thus, for example, Avnei Nezer, Oraḥ Hayyim, no. 157, sec. 11, demonstrates that kashering utensils on Yom Tov, albeit forbidden for other reasons, is not prohibited by virtue of melabben because the "taste" absorbed by a utensil in no way sullies or mars its appearance. If so, as noted by Minḥat Pri, it would be permissible even to rub the solution over the lenses on Shabbat.
Apparently conceding these points, Rabbi Rubin argues that, if not removed, the proteins adhering to the surface of the lens will eventually cause the lens to become discolored and hence "it is logical" to assume that their removal constitutes a form of libbun. This writer is unaware of any source that might substantiate the view that application of a substance designed to prevent future discoloration constitutes libbun. The mere fact that a contact lens that is left uncleaned will turn yellow does not lead to the conclusion that removal of the colorless protein is a form of libbun. In any event, that consideration is germane only with regard to utilization of an enzyme solution but not with regard to use of a cleansing solution that serves only to remove surface dirt and bacteria. Accordingly, there appears to be no reason to insist upon cleansing the lenses before Shabbat if they are to be soaked on Shabbat only in an ordinary cleansing solution.
Cleansing the lenses by means of rubbing the wet lens with a finger is somewhat more problematic. Rubbing a leather garment on Shabbat in order to remove a stain is forbidden. Mishnah Berurah, Bi'ur Halakhah 302:9, asserts that, although rubbing hard leather in this manner is rabbinically prohibited, rubbing soft, supple leather in such a manner constitutes a biblical offense. Rabbi Woszner, however, questions that distinction and asserts that the prohibition against cleansing leather is, in all circumstances, rabbinic in nature. However, the disagreement is only with regard to the stringency of the prohibition, not with regard to the prohibition itself. Accordingly, Rabbi Rubin explicitly prohibits manual cleansing of soft lenses on Shabbat. Again, for reasons identical to those stated above, this writer fails to understand how removal of substances that do not sully or stain the lenses can be regarded as a form of libbun.
The issue posed by virtue of possible seḥitah or squeezing is summarily dismissed by Rabbi Rubin on empirical grounds. Although the lens absorbs water it is extremely difficult to force it to expel the liquid it has absorbed. To do so would require an inordinate amount of pressure. Accordingly, he concludes that there is no problem with regard to handling soft contact lenses on Shabbat.
The most incisive analysis of these issues may well be that of the late R. Shlomoh Zalman Auerbach as reported by R. Joshua Neuwirth. In his Shemirat Shabbat ke-Hilkhatah 15:2, Rabbi Neuwirth permits removal of soft contact lenses and their placement in a "solution" immediately upon removal. When questioned by Rabbi Rubin regarding R. Shlomoh Zalman Auerbach's opinion concerning this matter, Rabbi Neuwirth responded in the name of his mentor: "Ordinary cloth absorbs in its molecules and between the molecules. Contact lenses do not have molecules and intermolecules; rather, they swell because of water, i.e., in the manner of a balloon that swells from the air" (i.e., the balloon fills with air but does not absorb the air).
Employing terminology almost identical to that of Rabbi Neuwirth, Rabbi Ephraim Greenblatt, author of Teshuvot Rivevot Efrayim, also permits soaking contact lenses on Shabbat but does not permit rubbing the wet lens. Rabbi Greenblatt emphasizes that dirt is not absorbed within the lens but only adheres to the surface, that liquid cannot be expressed from the lens, that the "dirt" does not impede vision, i.e., that it is invisible to the eye, and that the lens does not absorb liquid but that the liquid occupies "the holes in the lens" which is "placed as a ball is placed in water."
Although Rabbi Rubin acknowledges that the scientists whom he consulted did not provide definitive explanations regarding the manner in which permeable lenses absorb liquids, he dismisses Rabbi Auerbach's contention as scientifically incorrect. In actuality, although imprecisely expressed, Rabbi Auerbach's analysis may well be scientifically accurate. Soaking is regarded as a form of washing because water permeates cloth and is absorbed within its threads, i.e., it replaces air that otherwise occupies the space between the molecules of the cloth. Plastic is known to be non-absorbent. The plastic used in soft contact lenses is probably non-absorbent as well. The so-called "absorption" that takes place in soft lenses probably does not take place within the molecular strands of which the plastic is composed but may simply be the result of the phenomenon of water pushing between strands of plastic without being absorbed in the space between individual molecules. Thus, the phenomenon is analogous to air blown into a balloon that forces the walls of the balloon apart without being absorbed within the walls themselves. If this is indeed the case, there may be grounds to argue that the halakhic status of soft contact lenses is that of leather rather than of cloth.
There is, of course, some absorption of water even by hard leather. The distinction between leather and cloth lies in the fact that leather does not become permeated by water in a manner similar to cloth. Accordingly, it is arguable that, if the water indeed does not thoroughly permeate the intermolecular space of soft plastic, the status of plastic is comparable to that of leather. It was, of course, this lack of precise information regarding the physical properties of plastic that prompted Rabbi Feinstein's earlier noted cautionary advice with regard to even ostensibly non-absorbent plastics.
Dr. Abraham S. Abraham, Nishmat Avraham, V, Oraḥ Hayyim 321:11, sec. 2, records that Rabbi Neuwirth reported that R. Shlomoh Zalman Auerbach permitted placing contact lenses in liquid only while they are still moist. Rabbi Auerbach forbade placing a dried out lens even in a non-cleansing saline solution because in such circumstances, the liquid has a restorative effect, a factor that renders the act forbidden just as it is forbidden to place a lulav in water on Shabbat. Rabbi Auerbach is also quoted as stating that if the lens has become shriveled or wrinkled because of lack of moisture the infraction is even more serious. Since a lens in such condition is unusable, placing it in a liquid, declared Rabbi Auerbach, is tantamount to the forbidden act of completing the fashioning of a utensil on Shabbat.
Wheelchairs on Shabbat
Transporting a person through a public thoroughfare who is himself capable of walking constitutes a rabbinic rather than a biblical offense. Nor is there a biblical infraction in transporting such a person while he or she occupies a bed because the bed is regarded as an appurtenance of the person. However, if the person is incapable of walking, carrying that individual through a public thoroughfare on Shabbat constitutes a biblical transgression.2See Mishnah Berurah, Bi’ur Halakhah 308:41, s.v. she-lo. Thus, it is clear that a person who cannot walk may not be pushed through the streets on Shabbat in a wheelchair.
R. Zevi Pesach Frank, Teshuvot Har Ẓevi, Oraḥ Hayyim, I, no. 170, examines the interesting question of whether such a person may push his own wheelchair on Shabbat. The Mishnah, Shabbat 65b, declares that an amputee is free to walk with a prosthesis because, as Rashi explains, the prosthesis is regarded as his "shoe." For the same reason Shulḥan Arukh, Oraḥ Hayyim 301:16, rules that an amputee may walk on leather pads. Similarly, it may be argued, with regard to a person who is not ambulatory, the wheelchair is tantamount to his "feet."
Nevertheless, Rabbi Frank rules that use of a wheelchair on Shabbat in a public thoroughfare is forbidden.3Use of a wheelchair within an area in which carrying is permissible would seem to be entirely permissible. Cf., however, R. Yechiel Ya’akov Weinberg, Seridei Esh, II, no. 25. Seridei Esh addresses the question of use of a “wagon” within an area enclosed by an eiruv. Rema, Oraḥ Ḥayyim 305:18, rules that it is forbidden to ride in a horse-drawn coach on Shabbat even when the coachman is a non-Jew for two reasons: 1) such an act involves rabbinically proscribed “use of an animal;” and 2) the rabbinic injunction prohibiting riding on the back of an animal lest the rider sever a branch from a tree in order to spur the animal applies also to riding in a wagon or a carriage drawn by an animal. Seridei Esh cryptically comments that, in the case of the “wagon” used by a paralyzed person, the sole applicable prohibition is the rabbinic injunction “lest he repair (shema yetaken).” Accordingly, he rules that a sick person may be taken to the synagogue, but only to the synagogue, in a wagon driven by a non-Jew since, on the Sabbath, a non-Jew may be directed to perform a rabbinically proscribed act in order to facilitate performance of a miẓvah.
Seridei Esh is certainly not referring to transportation by means of a horse-drawn wagon since Rema rules that, in such a situation, the Jew seated in the coach himself transgresses two rabbinic prohibitions. Indeed, in discussing use of a “wagon” on Shabbat, Seridei Esh posits a rabbinic prohibition not cited by Rema with regard to use of a horse-drawn coach, viz., “lest he repair.” Presumably, then, the “wagon” to which Seridei Esh refers is a wheelchair. That prohibition is not cited by Rema because, although the Sages did forbid playing musical instruments on Shabbat “lest he repair” the instrument should it malfunction, they did not issue a blanket edict forbidding use of all utensils. To this writer’s knowledge, no one has suggested that use of a wheelchair within a dwelling is forbidden on Shabbat as a violation of a rabbinic prohibition based upon the consideration “lest he repair.” If so, there is no apparent reason why a wheelchair may not be pushed for any purpose, even by a Jew himself, within an area in which carrying is permissible. See the note of R. Shlomoh Zalman Auerbach included in the Jerusalem, 5759 edition of Seridei Esh, I, no. 32. A prosthesis, cane or pad is designed to assist a person in using his own physical power in walking. Those items make the process possible and have the status of shoes which may be worn on Shabbat because they are articles of clothing and, as such, are appurtenances of the body. A wheelchair does not assist its user in walking and does not have the status of a shoe; since a wheelchair is not worn on the body it is not an item of clothing. Accordingly, Rabbi Frank concludes that a person may not wheel himself on Shabbat just as others are not permitted to push the wheelchair.
R. Shimon Grunfeld, Teshuvot Maharshag, II, no. 13, makes the identical point with regard to the status of a wheelchair. Maharshag argues that even if the person occupying the wheelchair is capable of walking, and hence carrying or pushing him is merely a rabbinic infraction, pushing the wheelchair itself constitutes a biblical transgression because the wheelchair cannot be considered to be comparable to an article of clothing.
Maharshag, quite understandably, forbids allowing the wheelchair to be pushed by a non-Jew even for purposes of a mizvah such as public prayer in a synagogue. Moreover, Maharshag prohibits employment of a non-Jew for this purpose even in an area in which carrying is only rabbinically forbidden. In doing so, Maharshag rules in accordance with the authorities cited by Shulḥan Arukh, Oraḥ Hayyim 307:5, who maintain that it is forbidden to direct a non-Jew to perform a rabbinically proscribed act even when the act is undertaken for purposes of fulfilling a mizvah. However, the consensus of opinion among latter-day authorities is in accordance with the permissive view cited by Shulḥan Arukh sanctioning employment of a non-Jew for performance of a rabbinically proscribed act when such is necessary in order to fulfill a mizvah.
R. Moshe Feinstein, Iggerot Mosheh, Oraḥ Hayyim, IV, no. 90, adopts a position directly at variance to that of Rabbi Frank and Rabbi Grunfeld in ruling that a wheelchair is the "shoe" or "garment" of a person incapable of walking. Accordingly, Iggerot Mosheh has no reservation with regard to permitting a person to wheel himself in a wheelchair on Shabbat.
R. Yitzchak Ya'akov Weisz, Teshuvot Minḥat Yizḥak, II, no. 114, is in agreement with Rabbi Frank and Rabbi Grunwald in declaring that a wheelchair cannot have the status of a "shoe" since it does not serve as an aid in self-ambulation. He nevertheless tentatively advances another consideration that would serve to render use of a wheelchair permissible. Minḥat Yizḥak takes it for granted that, were such a situation logically conceivable, there would be no prohibition against a person carrying himself even if that person is physically unable to walk. Minḥat Yizḥak suggests that the wheelchair may be regarded as an appurtenance of the person (tafel) and hence a person may "carry" his wheelchair just as he may carry himself. That consideration is based upon the statement of the Mishnah, Shabbat 93b, indicating that transporting a person reclining upon a bed into a public thoroughfare on Shabbat involves no biblical infraction because the bed is tafel to the person. A similar argument is presented by R. Joshua Neuwirth, Shemirat Shabbat ke-Hilkhatah, 2nd edition (Jerusalem, 5739), 34:27, note 103, in the name of R. Shlomoh Zalman Auerbach. The only area of doubt, according to Minḥat Yizḥak, is whether the wheelchair is indeed tafel to the person. Even though early-day authorities speak not only of a bed but also of a chair as being tafel to the person, Minḥat Yizḥak suggests that the reference may be limited to the type of chair that is used in the home on a regular basis for ordinary activities but that a chair used only for purposes of transportation may not be tafel to the body. Although the two matters are not entirely identical, Minḥat Yizḥak compares the question of the wheelchair to the rule with regard to a cane. A cane that is needed for assistance in walking both at home and abroad has the status of a "shoe;" a cane that is needed for walking in the street but not at home is not regarded as a "shoe."
Shemirat Shabbat ke-Hilkhatah quotes Rabbi Auerbach as having raised another objection. When a person reclining upon a bed is transported by others their intention is to carry the person and the bed is incidental to the person transported thereon. However, the invalid who pushes himself in a wheelchair is, in fact, primarily propelling the wheel-chair and in doing so takes advantage of the opportunity to move with the wheelchair. In effect, argues Rabbi Auerbach, the invalid becomes an appurtenance to the wheelchair. Rabbi Auerbach further suggests that the same consideration should apply in situations in which the wheelchair is pushed by others. Shemirat Shabbat ke-Hilkhatah relies upon the permissive opinion in ruling that an invalid may propel his own wheelchair but only in areas in which carrying is merely rabbinically forbidden.
Minḥat Yizḥak further suggests that even if the chair itself is tafel to the person, nevertheless, the wheels designed for use with the wheel-chair are not intrinsic to the chair itself and hence are an appurtenance of the chair rather than an appurtenance of the person. Consequently, since the wheels are not an appurtenance of the person, Minḥat Yizḥak argues that the wheels may not be transported on Shabbat. To this writer that objection would seem germane only in the case of a chair to which wheels have been added as an appendage. A conventional wheel-chair, however, has no feet and hence, were the wheels to be removed, would be unusable. It is difficult to understand why, under such circumstances, the wheels need not be regarded as the feet of the chair and hence integral to its function as a chair.
Nevertheless, since Minḥat Yizḥak regards the status of a wheelchair to be a matter of doubt, he is willing to permit the use of a wheelchair on Shabbat under extremely limited conditions. If two people, each of whom is capable of performing an act of labor independently of the other, perform the act together, the infraction is rabbinic, rather than biblical, in nature. Hence, if the occupant of the wheelchair is capable of walking, the act of carrying or pushing such a person is only rabbinically prohibited. Accordingly, argues Minḥat Yizḥak, a non-Jew may be requested to carry an ambulatory individual for purposes of a mizvah. However, directing a non-Jew to push a wheelchair in which a person is seated constitutes a directive ordering the non-Jew to perform a biblically prohibited act. Minḥat Yizḥak innovatively suggests that asking the non-Jew to push the wheelchair is nevertheless permitted if the occupant pushes the wheelchair together with the non-Jew, provided that the occupant is capable of propelling the wheelchair himself without assistance. Since the Jew and the non-Jew are both performing the act of "labor" simultaneously, the non-Jew is being requested to perform an act that is only rabbinically prohibited.4Minḥat Yiẓḥak, however, concedes that such a procedure would be difficult to execute and, moreover, would arouse astonishment in the eyes of onlookers who might be misled in assuming that use of a wheelchair even in a conventional manner is permissible. In ruling in this manner Minḥat Yizḥak espouses the view that it is permissible to direct a non-Jew to perform a rabbinically forbidden act for purposes of fulfilling a mizvah such as public prayer or the like. Maharshag, whose negative ruling regarding employing a non-Jew to perform a rabbinically proscribed act for purposes of fulfilling a mizvah was cited earlier, would disagree and refuse to sanction use of wheelchairs even under such conditions.
Minḥat Yizḥak fails to cite the discussion of the Sephardic scholar, R. Joseph Chaim ben Elijah, Rav Pe'alim, I, no. 25. The Gemara, Beizah 25b, declares that a palanquin or sedan-chair may not be used for transportation on Yom Tov. Somewhat surprisingly, Tur Shulḥan Arukh, Oraḥ Hayyim 301:19, includes a reference to the rabbinic prohibition against use of a sedan-chair that is formulated by the Gemara with regard to Yom Tov among the laws of Shabbat. Tur also records an exception to that prohibition in the instance of a person whose presence "is required for the benefit of the multitude" (rabbim zerikhim lo). Bet Yosef, ad locum, notes that earlier codifiers omit any reference to that prohibition in their codification of the laws of Shabbat. The obvious explanation of such omission is that they regard use of a sedan-chair on Shabbat to be forbidden under all circumstances because of the Sabbath prohibition against carrying in a public domain. Tur, however, explains Bet Yosef, maintains that the rabbinic prohibition against carrying a person who is himself capable of ambulation is also suspended when the person's presence is "required by the multitude." Accordingly, since Tur maintains that, in at least some circumstances, it is permissible to transport a person in a sedan-chair on Shabbat, it was necessary for Tur to record the regulations pertaining to use of sedan-chairs in his codification of the laws of Shabbat.
Rav Pe'alim cogently observes that Bet Yosef's comment serves to explain Tur's view with regard to carrying the person but fails to account for the permissibility of carrying the chair itself. Consequently, Rav Pe'alim astutely infers that Bet Yosef must have regarded the sedan-chair as no different from a bed or an ordinary chair which are regarded as appurtenances of the body and hence, for purposes of carrying on Shabbat, have the same status as the person himself. There can be no question, he asserts, that, if a sedan-chair is regarded as an appurtenance of the body, a wheelchair must be regarded as an appurtenance of the body as well.5The comment of Rav Pe‘alim is, of course, not germane with regard to Minḥat Yiẓḥak’s reservation regarding the wheels of a wheelchair.
In a responsum addressing the permissibility of riding a bicycle on Shabbat, Rav Pe'alim, I, no. 25, draws attention to the earlier-cited statement of the Gemara, Beizah 25b, forbidding use of sedan-chairs other than by a person whose presence was necessary "for the benefit of the multitude." The most obvious explanation of the rule is that such activity is forbidden by rabbinic decree as a weekday or excessively laborious activity but that an exception was built into the edict permitting such activity when necessary "for the benefit of the multitude." That explanation is reflected in the ruling of R. Ezekiel Landau, Teshuvot Noda bi-Yehudah, Mahadura Tinyana, Oraḥ Hayyim, no. 11 and Mahadura Tinyana, Oraḥ Hayyim, no. 28. However, the same author, in his commentary on Beizah, Ẓlaḥ, ad locum, maintains that the rule is based upon the prohibition against carrying in a public domain. Although the Gemara refers to Yom Tov activity, carrying in a public domain is forbidden even on Yom Tov unless such carrying is undertaken for some need. Accordingly, Ẓlaḥ understands the Gemara as applying that principle in forbidding the carrying of a sedan-chair unless "the multitude" require the presence of the person being carried, i.e., the transport is for satisfaction of some need.6Keren le-David, no. 96, quite cogently objects that, if Ẓlaḥ’s analysis is correct, use of a sedan-chair should be permitted even for the benefit of the passenger since the passenger’s benefit or convenience is certainly a “need.”
Rav Pe'alim accepts the usual explanation that the Gemara's statement reflects an edict banning weekday activity and is concerned with whether or not that edict includes riding a bicycle as well. Minḥat Yizḥak raises the identical concern with regard to a wheelchair.7Maharshag, however, refuses to forbid use of a wheelchair as a proscribed “weekday activity.” Maharshag cites Teshuvot She’ilat Ya‘akov, no. 45, who forbids use of a bicycle even within an eiruv on such grounds, and Teshuvot Pnei Mevin, no. 71, who similarly forbids use of what appears to have been a rickshaw-like conveyance, but dismisses the contention that use of a wheelchair should be banned as a “weekday activity” with the remark that “We cannot create edicts and prohibitions of our own accord. ” Rav Pe‘alim and Minḥat Yiẓḥak were, however, concerned that use of a bicycle and/or a wheelchair might fall within the ambit of the formal rabbinic prohibition against use of a sedan-chair. That contention is not at all considered by Maharshag. Indeed, bicycles and wheelchairs are readily distinguishable from the sedan-chair that was the subject of rabbinic interdiction. If so, there is reason to assume that use of a sedan-chair is forbidden even in areas enclosed by an eiruv in which there is no problem with regard to carrying but in which use of a sedan-chair may yet be a "weekday activity." R. David ibn Zimra, Teshuvot Radvaz, V, no. 2, 163, does regard the prohibition against use of a sedan-chair to be in effect even in a locale in which there in an eiruv. However, R. Joseph Saul Nathanson, Sho'el u-Meshiv, Mahadura Tinyana, III, no 74, contends that carrying from place to place in a private domain involves no desecration of Shabbat or Yom Tov and the Sages did not seek to ban any form of carrying in a private domain on the grounds that it is a "weekday activity." Nor, argues Sho'el u-Meshiv, did the Sages prohibit any form of carrying in an area enclosed within an eiruv. Hence, Sho'el u-Meshiv finds no objection to use of a sedan-chair in an area circumscribed by an eiruv.8See also the similar view of R. Ezekiel Landau, Teshuvot Noda bi-Yehudah, Mahadura Kamma, no. 11, and the comments of R. Eliezer David Grunwald, Keren le-David, no. 96, s.v. ve-hineh.
Rav Pe'alim himself assumes that the concern with regard to "dishonor of the Sabbath" that prompted the rabbinic edict is cogent only with regard to a trip of significant length. Accordingly, he distinguishes between a sedan-chair that is carried by others and a bicycle which is pedaled by the rider. Rav Pe'alim further distinguishes between a sedan-chair that is designed to accommodate multiple passengers and hence is used for transportation over relatively long distances and a bicycle seating only one person which, contrafactually, he contends is used only for short trips. Keren le-David, no. 96, employs a similar distinction in permitting use of baby carriages on Yom Tov and on Shabbat within an area surrounded by an eiruv9It is of interest to note that Keren le-David concludes his responsum with a report that, his comments notwithstanding, “he heard” that, in Pressburg, God-fearing people did not use baby carriages on Shabbat. on the grounds that carriages are used only for short distances. Minḥat Yizḥak applies Keren le-David's distinction to wheelchairs in stating that the rabbinic prohibition is not applicable to wheelchairs because a wheelchair is generally used to traverse only a short distance.10It must be stated that no hint of this distinction is found in the discussion recorded in Beiẓah 25b. On the contrary, the Gemara reports that R. Nachman bar Isaac carried Mar Samuel “from the sun into the shade and from the shade into the sun” only because “a multitude” needed him. Similarly, an exception to the ruling permitted students to carry Ameimar and Mar Zutra to their seats in the House of Study.
Nevertheless, two other points must be made: 1) The Gemara forbids use of a sedan-chair only for convenience but not for the sick or the infirm in instances in which the passenger would otherwise be afraid of falling. Apparently, then, the rabbinic prohibition forbids use of a sedan-chair only for convenience but not for the sick or the infirm. See Taz, Oraḥ Ḥayyim 622:3. 2) The physical exertion involved in carrying a sedan-chair is far greater and qualitatively different from that required to push a wheelchair or carriage. The former certainly represents a much greater “dishonor of the Sabbath” than do the latter. Hence there is no evidence that the latter were included in the rabbinic edict.
Rav Pe'alim further contends that "the need of the multitude" is not the sole exception to the prohibition against use of a sedan-chair. Rav Pe'alim asserts that use of a sedan-chair for the purpose of any mizvah, including attendance at synagogue services, is similarly permitted. That is also the position of Teshuvot Yesamaḥ Lev, no. 4. However, Sedei Hemed, Asifat Dinim, Ma'arekhet Yom Tov, no. 1, sec. 32, contends that the exclusion is limited to the "need of the multitude" and that there is no exception to the edict for purposes of fulfilling a mizvah.
Minḥat Yizḥak is somewhat more lenient in permitting the use of a wheelchair in an area enclosed by an eiruv. Citing Taz, Oraḥ Hayyim 622:3, Minḥat Yizḥak infers from Taz' comments that a person who cannot walk may push his own wheelchair because the rabbinic edict does not apply to a person transporting himself in situations in which he cannot otherwise move from place to place. Accordingly, Minḥat Yizḥak rules that a person may push his own wheelchair in such an area even for a purpose other than fulfillment of a miḥvah.
Minḥat Yizḥak also recognizes, as did Sho'el u'Meshiv, that there is no rabbinic decree banning the carrying of a person either on Yom Tov or on Shabbat within an area enclosed by an eiruv. Accordingly, Minḥat Yizḥak further implies that, if the wheelchair is to be regarded as an "appurtenance" of the person's body, pushing a wheelchair is no different from carrying the person and the clothes he is wearing and, if so, others may push the wheelchair as well, provided, of course, that the wheelchair is used only within the eiruv. Minḥat Yizḥak, however, regards the status of a wheelchair as an "appurtenance" of the body to be a matter of doubt but nevertheless rules that, since the matter involves a rabbinic prohibition, a permissive ruling is warranted in instances of doubt. As noted earlier, Rav Pe'alim and Maharshag would have no reservation with regard to use of wheelchairs on Shabbat within an area circumscribed by an eiruv.