"And Deborah, a prophetess, the wife of Lapidoth, judged Israel at that time" (Judges 4:4). What was the special quality of Deborah that she judged Israel at that time? … I call upon heaven and earth to bear witness that whether Jew or gentile, whether man or woman, whether manservant or maidservant, the Divine Spirit rests upon him in accordance with the deed which he performs.
TANNA DE-BEI ELIYAHU RABBAH, 9
The activities of the feminist movement within the general community have been paralleled within some sectors of the Jewish community by agitation for greater parity for women in matters of religious observance and expression. Rabbinic scholars have long emphasized that the differing ritual obligations which Judaism imposes upon men and women reflect the diverse roles and responsibilities associated with the two sexes rather than the relegation of women to a subordinate or inferior position. Nevertheless, in recent years, the restrictions placed upon women's participation in certain ritual observances and their prerogatives with regard to other observances as well as the philosophical perspectives giving rise to these distinctions have been the subject of wide discussion.
There is one aspect of communal religious life in which an evident lack of parity exists and in which the governing halakhic considerations are the subject of some controversy. Most synagogues, either by explicit provision of their by-laws or by tacit practice, exclude women from membership on their boards of directors and from positions as officers of the congregation. The halakhic basis of this practice, or the absence thereof, has been examined in two articles which appeared in Ha-Darom. Rabbi Seymour Turk, writing in the Nisan 5735 issue of that publication,1This article was subsequently reprinted in Rabbi Turk’s Pri Malkah (New York, 5741), no. 67. See also op. cit., nos. 68-71. argues that there is no basis in Jewish law for the exclusion of women from positions of synagogue leadership. His position is rebutted2Another rebuttal by R. Menasheh Klein appears in his Mishneh Halakhot, VII, no. 254. in the Tishri 5736 issue by Rabbi Kasriel Tchursh, of Tel Aviv.3This article is reprinted in Shevilin, Kislev 5737.
Regrettably, neither author cites any of the numerous previous analyses pertinent to this subject. The earliest discussions of the general topic were generated more than half a century ago in what was then Palestine by a raging controversy over granting women suffrage and the right to hold public office. In 1918 women won these rights with respect to elections held by the Jewish Agency but there ensued an impassioned polemic in which leading Palestinian, European and American rabbinic figures espoused opposing views. Many of these diverse positions, originally presented in the form of pamphlets and newspaper articles, are cited briefly by Rabbi Chaim Herschensohn, Malki ba-Kodesh, II, no. 4, in the course of a lengthy exposition of his own permissive view with regard to this matter. Opposing views are cited by R. Yechiel Ya'akov Weinberg, Seridei Esh, III, no. 105.4With regard to the question of female suffrage see also Seridei Esh, II, no. 52. An impressive roster of authorities including the Hafez Hayyim, R. Chaim Ozer Grodzinski, R. David Hoffmann (Jeschurun, vol. VI, no. 5-6, lyar-Sivan 5679) and four eminent Palestinian scholars, R. Joshua Leib Diskin, R. Yosef Chaim Sonnenfeld, R. Yechiel Michal Tucatzinski, and R. Yisrael Ze'ev Minzberg (Zot Hukat ha-Torah, Jerusalem, 1920) vigorously opposed permitting women to hold public office.5See also R. Eleazar Meir Preil, Sefer ha-Ma’or, nos. 55-56. Permissive views were held by R. Ya'akov Levinson, rabbi of the Chovevei Torah synagogue in Brooklyn (Shivayon ha-Nashim mi-Nekudat ha-Halakhah, New York, 1920),6See also Chaim Tzernowitz, Ha-Olam, vol. IX, no. 23, March 19, 1920 and vol. IX, no. 24, March 26, 1920; reprinted in Ha-Ivri, vol. X, no. 16-17. and Rabbi Herschensohn. This position was later endorsed by R. Ben-Zion Uziel, Mishpetei Uzi'el, Hoshen Mishpat, no. 6 Some twenty years later, Rabbi Moses Feinstein adopted a somewhat equivocal, but essentially negative view with regard to the election of women to the presidency of a synagogue. This material, which originally appeared in the Tishri 5721 issue of Ha-Pardes and was amplified in a contribution to the Heshvan-Kislev 5721 issue of Ha-Ma'or, has been reprinted in Rabbi Feinstein's responsa collection, Iggerot Mosheh, Yoreh De'ah, II, nos. 44-45. A strongly negative view was presented by the editor of Ha-Ma'or, Rabbi Meir Amsel, in the Tishri and Heshvan-Kislev 5721 issues of that journal. The current, renewed debate, while contributing but little to the halakhic analysis, broadens the scope of the discussion by adding the dimensions of the very real social and religious concerns of a later generation.
I. The Sources
The major halakhic consideration militating against women's eligibility to serve in positions of communal office is Rambam's ruling, Hilkhot Melakhim 1:5: "A woman may not be established as monarch as it is said '[You shall set] over you a king,' but not a queen. Similarly, with regard to all appointments in Israel, only a man may be appointed to them." Commentaries on Rambam give as the source for this ruling the comments of Sifre, Deuteronomy 17:15. Statements similar to that of Rambam are found in the writings of Ramban, Ran, Rashba, Ritva and Rosh, particularly in their commentaries to Shevu'ot 30a, as well as in those of numerous other early authorities, although it is not certain that all of these authorities endorse Rambam's view that offices other than the monarchy are included in this ban.
Rabbi Feinstein points out that while indeed the comment " 'a king,' but not a queen" occurs in Sifre, it is not clear that the exclusion of women applies to offices other than the monarchy. The same verse contains the admonition, "… from among your brethren shall you set a king over you; you can not put over you a foreign man who is not your brother." Both non-Jews and converts are included in this prohibition. Sifre cites the statement of the Gemara, Yevamot 45b, to the effect that foreigners are excluded not only from kingship but from all other positions of authority as well. Rambam apparently assumes that in interpreting the word "a king" as denoting exclusively a male monarch, Sifre intended to bar women from all other communal appointments as well, just as the latter part of the verse excludes non-Jews not only from the monarchy but also from all other positions of authority. Rabbi Feinstein, however, points out that, in its literal meaning, the passage speaks of the monarchy but not of other offices. The exclusion of foreigners from other appointments stems from a pleonasm, the redundant phrase "som tasim—place you shall place." The repetition of the word "tasim—you shall place" is understood as extending the application of the clause "from among your brethren" and rendering its limitation a condition of all communal appointments. Rabbi Feinstein argues that it would be logical to assume that regulations derived from this pleonasm apply only to foreigners but not to women. Since women are barred from sitting upon the throne by virtue of a literal understanding of the word "king" it should not be assumed that women are excluded from other offices as well.
Rabbi Herschensohn contends that women cannot be barred even from the monarchy on the basis of this source. He argues ingeniously—but hardly convincingly—that Rambam misunderstood the passage in Sifre which served as the basis for his ruling. In its entirety, the passage in Sifre reads as follows: " 'You shall set [over you],' if he dies you shall appoint another in his stead; 'a king,' but not a queen." Rabbi Herschensohn avers that the intent of Sifre is not to exclude women from kingship but rather to indicate that the king need not necessarily have a consort. In the event that the king dies another king must be appointed. If, however, the queen dies the king is not required to remarry (as must the High Priest if he is to perform the sacrificial rites on the Day of Atonement). The phrase employed by Sifre is "melekh ve-lo malkah." Rabbi Herschensohn contends that the Hebrew term "malkah" denotes the consort of a king. The term "molekhet," claims Rabbi Herschensohn, is employed by Scripture (II Kings 11:3 and II Chronicles 22:12) as the title of a woman who reigns in her own right.7In point of fact, the term “malkat Shva” (Queen of Sheba) occurs both in I Kings 10:4 and in II Chronicles 9:12; see Sefer ha-Ma’or, loc. cit. Rabbi Uziel refutes this contention and asserts that the proper Hebrew term for a queen who rules in her own right is indeed "malkah." The term "molekhet" in the passages cited is not a noun to be translated "queen," but rather a verb to be translated "reigns." In any event Rambam's understanding of Sifre cannot be set aside unless there is evidence that early authorities interpreted this source in a different manner. Since such evidence is lacking the philological argument is moot.
Rambam's ruling is found in yet another source. Pesikta Zutrati, a medieval collection of earlier rabbinic comments and aphorisms, derives the restriction against the appointment of a female monarch from the phrase "you cannot put over you a foreign man." In explaining this phrase, Pesikta Zutrati comments, " 'A man,' but not a woman—from here it is derived that a woman is not appointed to a position of authority over the community." On the basis of this derivation women are excluded from all offices barred to foreigners8Rabbi Judah Gershuni, Ha-Torah ve-ha-Medinah, II (Iyar 5710), 74, posits an interesting exception to the prohibition against appointment of women to communal office based upon the selfsame exclusion of foreigners and women from the monarchy. He cites an early authority who questions the propriety of the appointment of Shemiah and Abtalion as heads of the Bet Din since they were the sons of converts as stated by Rambam in his introduction to his Commentary on the Mishnah. [See also R. Jonathan Eibeschutz, Urim ve-Tumim 7:1.] Riva is cited as answering that such appointment is permissible if no equally qualified person of Jewish parentage is to be found. Rabbi Gershuni suggests that, similarly, there may not be a prohibition against appointment of a woman to communal office if she is better qualified for the position than any available male. and indeed Pesikta Zutrati speaks explicitly of any "position of authority." Rabbi Feinstein and Rabbi Herschensohn both question the authenticity of this source. It is, however of interest to note that Rabbi Shlomoh Abraham Wertheimer (Maḥazikei ha-Dat, vol. II, no. 9, 12 Kislev 5680) claims to have found in the Cairo genizah a manuscript edition of Sifre which contains a reading identical to that recorded in Pesikta Zutrati.
A further source indicating that women are barred from the monarchy is cited by Rabbi Pinchas Estherson in a contribution to Maḥazikei ha-Dat, vol. II, no. 8. The Gemara, Berakhot 49a, cites an opinion which states that Grace after Meals need not include the phrase "and on the kingship of the House of David, your annointed" because this phrase is not applicable to women or slaves. The implication of this statement is that women may not occupy royal office. Rabbi Herschensohn rejects this evidence and asserts that women are not barred from occupying the position of monarch by virtue of a direct biblical prohibition. Only when David assumed the throne did the monarchy become the exclusive prerogative of the House of David. Thereafter women were effectively precluded from serving as monarchs because the office became the legacy of male heirs. Exclusive male succession is evidenced in II Chronicles 13:5 "… for you should know that the Lord, God of Israel, gave the kingdom over Israel to David for ever, to him and to his sons …" Male succession is necessary to assure that the royal office remain a prerogative of the House of David. Since the monarchy is an inherited office and since familial as well as tribal identity is transmitted paternally, failure to exclude female descendants would have resulted in the office of king ultimately passing to heirs not of the House of David, because the children of a female monarch would not be of "her" house but of the "house" of her consort.9Cf., however, Minḥat Ḥinnukh, no. 497, who suggests that a woman may indeed serve as monarch in the event that she becomes heir to the throne.
There is yet another passsage in Sifre which may be cited in support of the position that women are barred from holding public office. This argument was formulated by Rabbi Ritter of Rotterdam in the 12 Kislev 5680 issue of Maḥazikei ha-Dat.10See also another article by Rabbi Ritter, “Das Frauenwahlrecht nach der Halacha,” Jeschurun, VI, no. 9-10, Elul-Tishri 5679. Deuteronomy 1:12 records that Moses addressed the community of Israel and declared, "Get for yourselves men, wise, understanding and known to your tribes and I will place them over you." Sifre, puzzled by the seemingly superfluous term "anashim—men," queries, "Would you then have thought women?" and proceeds to interpret the term "anashim" as connoting individuals possessing exemplary qualities. While this exegetical comment recorded in Sifre certainly does not, in itself, serve to establish a halakhic prohibition against appointment of women to positions of communal leadership, Rabbi Ritter argues that the incredulity expressed by the Sages reflects the fact that such a prohibition was known to exist on the basis of some other source. However, in context, the comment of Sifre does not bear out Rabbi Ritter's contention. Moses' quest was not simply for persons to fill positions of communal leadership, but for judges to share the burden of judicial duties. Women are barred from serving as judges11See Ḥoshen Mishpat 7:4. but their exclusion from the ecclesiastic judiciary is based upon technical grounds not at all relevant to the question of whether or not they may occupy other communal offices. Since women are barred from serving as judges, Sifre, quite understandably, points out that the term "anashim" is superfluous. There is no reason to assume that Sifre would have expressed the same incredulity with regard to their suggestion of the appointment of women to other offices. Accordingly, no proof may be adduced from this source in establishing a prohibition against women occupying other positions of formal communal leadership.12Cf., Mishpetei Uzi’el, Ḥoshen Mishpat, no. 64, sec. 2.
Rabbi Tchursh advances another consideration which would preclude women from occupying synagogal office. Rema, Hoshen Mishpat 37:22, rules that officers of the kahal (Jewish community) acquire the status of judges and hence all those disqualified from serving as judges are disqualified from holding communal office. Since, in terms of normative Jewish law, women are disqualified from serving as judges, it follows that they may not hold office.
II. The Arguments
1. Acceptance as Distinct from Appointment
Rabbi Uziel adopts a permissive attitude toward the election of women to communal office. He draws attention to Tosafot, Niddah 50a, which records one opinion to the effect that a woman may indeed serve as a judge and that Deborah actually did fulfill this function in an official capacity. If a woman may serve even as a judge it follows that there is no impediment to women holding any other communal office. Thus it appears that at least one authority—Tosafot, Niddah 50a—disagrees with Rambam's position. Moreover, argues Rabbi Uziel, Rambam's restriction of women from holding public office should be understood as referring only to appointments made by the Bet Din. Such appointments do not require communal approval and are limited to males. The community may, however, at its discretion, choose any individual to occupy a position of communal leadership. Occupants of such office exercise authority by virtue of consent or "acceptance" (kabbalah) on the part of the community rather than on the basis of appointment by means of fiat. Since such choices are entirely voluntary insofar as the community is concerned, contends Rabbi Uziel, no restrictions are made upon the person who may qualify. This is also Rabbi Turk's rationale in permitting women to occupy synagogal office.13The identical argument was also advanced by Chaim Tzernowitz, Ha-Olam, March 26, 1920.
However, the notion that the prohibition against women occupying communal office applies only to appointments and not to voluntary "acceptance" is rejected by Rabbis Feinstein, Amsel and Tchursh. While Rabbi Feinstein fails to distinguish between "acceptance" and appointment of a woman insofar as the prohibition is concerned, he nevertheless maintains that Tosafot disputes Rambam's exclusion of women from communal office. Rabbi Feinstein draws attention to other statements of Tosafot (Shevu'ot 29b, Gittin 88b and Baba Kamma 15a) in explanation of Deborah's role as a judge. Tosafot explains that despite the specific exclusion of women from serving as members of a Bet Din, Deborah served as a judge because she was "accepted." Female incumbency of the office of judge presents two problems: 1) the general question of whether women may hold public office; 2) the narrower question of whether a woman may serve as a judge even on an ad hoc basis. The second question poses an entirely different problem which may be restated as follows: How can the decisions of a person disqualified from holding judicial office have binding authority upon litigants? Tosafot's explanation, argues Rabbi Feinstein, resolves only the question of how the decision can have binding force. It is a well-established principle that persons disqualified from serving as judges may serve in that capacity on an ad hoc basis with the consent of the litigants. Under such circumstances, decisions rendered by judges who have been voluntarily "accepted" by the litigants are fully enforceable. Rabbi Feinstein maintains that "acceptance" is possible only on an ad hoc basis, but is not an operative concept with regard to permanent occupancy of an office by one who is barred from positions of communal authority. Accordingly, reasons Rabbi Feinstein, Tosafot must have been of the opinion that women are excluded only from the monarchy but not from other offices. Thus Tosafot was not at all troubled by Deborah's incumbency in office and found it necessary to explain only how it was possible for her judicial decisions to be binding. According to Rabbi Feinstein's analysis, Rambam's exclusion of women from communal office is disputed by Tosafot.
Several scholars dispute the contention that Tosafot disagrees with Rambam and permits the appointment of women to public office. Rabbi Amsel argues that there is no basis for the thesis that the community may "accept" the authority of a woman and permit her to occupy an office of leadership. The concept of "acceptance" is found only in the context of legitimization of persons otherwise disqualified from serving as judges. In such instances litigants may voluntarily accept the binding authority of a judge on an ad hoc basis. This, contends Rabbi Amsel, is the meaning of "acceptance" as applied by these authorities with regard to Deborah. Her authority was voluntarily accepted in each individual case by the litigants who appeared before her.
It may also be inferred from the comments of Radbaz, Hilkhot Melakhim 1:5, that he is of the opinion that a woman cannot be "accepted" for appointment or election to a position of communal leadership. Radbaz seeks to explain how it was possible for Deborah to have been appointed to the office of judge (as distinct from the question of how she could render decisions in particular cases brought before her). Radbaz records several arguments advanced by Tosafot in answering the question of how Deborah's decisions were binding in individual cases, but fails to cite the answer that she was "accepted" by the populace. The omission of this argument is significant. Radbaz obviously maintains that "acceptance" does not vitiate the prohibition against women holding communal office.14Cf., R. Ya‘akov Levinson, Shivayon ha-Nashim, pp. 18ff. Rabbi Yisrael Ze'ev Minzberg also argues vigorously that acceptance is a valid procedure only on an ad hoc basis but cannot validate permanent or prolonged incumbency in office. He notes that the phrase "som tasim," from which the prohibition is derived, refers explicitly to induction into office and asserts that there can be no "acceptance" when a transgression is involved. Rabbi Levinson resolves the question with regard to Deborah's functions as a judge by noting that Scripture carefully states, "… and the children of Israel went up to her for judgment" (Judges 4:5) indicating that Deborah did not occupy an official position but that each such act was spontaneous and voluntary on the part of the litigants.
Rabbi Tchursh also cites evidence to the effect that persons disqualified from holding office cannot be "accepted" by the community. The Mishnah, Kiddushin 76a, indicates that families occupying certain hereditary offices may be considered to be genealogically pure and need no further proof to establish that fact. If, however, queries Rabbi Tchursh, the community may voluntarily "accept" individuals who are otherwise disqualified, how then can incumbency in office, in itself, substantiate a claim of genealogical purity? It follows that a disqualified person may not be voluntarily "accepted" by the community.
2. The Position of Sefer ha-Hinnukh
Rabbi Feinstein further argues that at least one other authority disagrees with Rambam's exclusion of women from public office. Communal posts are passed on by means of inheritance. This provision is derived from regulations prescribed with regard to the monarchy which in the Jewish commonwealth is a hereditary office. Sefer ha-Hinnukh, no. 497, expressly states that this provision applies not only to the monarchy but to lesser positions as well. Although with regard to converts, Sefer ha-Hinnukh, no. 498, is careful to state that their exclusion is not limited to the monarchy but extends to lesser offices as well, in citing the law, no. 497, which excludes females from royal office this authority fails to indicate that a similar restriction applies with regard to other communal offices. Apparently, argues Rabbi Feinstein, the author of Sefer ha-Hinnukh was of the opinion that women are not barred from occupying communal offices other than the monarchy. Nevertheless, despite these differing opinions, Rabbi Feinstein explicitly states that Rambam's position alone is sufficient to preclude the appointment of a woman to synagogal office.
Rabbi Feinstein, however, adds a significant obiter dictum. Citing Rambam, Hilkhot Melakhim 1:7, he strongly emphasizes that evildoers and the nonobservant are prohibited from holding communal office.15See also Iggerot Mosheh, Oraḥ Ḥayyim, III, no. 11. The appointment or election of such individuals, declares Rabbi Feinstein, is a more serious infraction than is the naming of a woman to such office. If confronted with a choice between a nonobservant male and an observant female Rabbi Feinstein asserts that one should strive for the appointment of the observant woman.
3. Election of Women by Women
Rabbi Levinson formulates another—rather ingenious—argument in support of one manner in which he believes women may be elected to office without violation of the prohibition "a king, but not a queen." Noda bi-Yehudah, Hoshen Mishpat, I, no. 1, and Hatam Sofer, Sotah 41b, followed by Minḥat Hinnukh, no. 497, maintains that the prohibition "You shall set over you a king—'a king' but not a queen" applies only to the act of "simah," i.e., appointment or installation. According to this view, there is no concomitant commandment which would, post factum, prohibit a woman who has been appointed to office from exercising the duties of her office. Sefer ha-Hinnukh, no. 497, declares that the commandment "You shall set over you a king" is a binding obligation only upon males but not upon females. Rabbi Levinson argues that if women are not commanded to establish a monarchy and, by extension, are not commanded to establish other communal offices, they are not subject to the prohibition against appointing a female to such office. Since women are exempt from the duty imposed by this verse they are exempt also from the limitations placed upon fulfillment of that duty. However, argues Rabbi Levinson, there is no evidence whatsoever indicating that women are forbidden voluntarily to appoint or to participate in the appointment of a king. Consequently, avers Rabbi Levinson, they are under no constraint which would prevent them from appointing a queen or other female official. Thus, argues Rabbi Levinson, women may legitimately vote for women representatives as their delegates to serve on communal bodies. Since there is no prohibition against women holding office, but only against their appointment, this prohibition may be circumvented, Rabbi Levinson contends, by giving women the power to vote. Since women are not prohibited from electing other women, women may be elected by votes of other women to synagogue boards or similar offices.
It should, however, be noted that not all authorities agree that there is no prohibition against women serving in (as distinct from being appointed to) communal office. Tosafot, Sotah 41b, is apparently of the opinion that not only may a woman not be appointed to office, but that a woman, if appointed, is also constrained from exercising the powers of office. Tosafot indicates that failure to protest the exercise of official prerogatives by one who is excluded from appointment to office constitutes a transgression. Failure to protest the exercise of prerogatives of office (as distinct from the original appointment) can logically constitute a transgression only if the exercise of such prerogative is in itself a violation of Halakhah. It is thus difficult to interpret these comments of Tosafot in a manner compatible with the thesis of Noda bi-Yehudah, Hatam Sofer and Minḥat Hinnukh.16Cf., Shivayon ha-Nashim, p. 27.
In this context it is of interest to note a recent pronouncement by a member of the London Bet Din. In Britain's United Synagogue, whose constituent synagogues are subject to the ecclesiastic authority of the Bet Din and the Chief Rabbi, women are not permitted to occupy synagogal office.17In a statement issued on January 9, 1951, the late Chief Rabbi, Sir Israel Brodie, ruled that women are ineligible to hold synagogal office. This restriction is incorporated in the by-laws of the United Synagogue. The ruling of Rabbi Brodie was reaffirmed by the incumbent Chief Rabbi, Immanuel Jakobovits, in a statement issued by the Office of the Chief Rabbi, dated December 5, 1977. Rabbi Jakobovits, while barring women from membership on Boards of Management, suggests that “Synagogue Councils” with women members be established to deal with “spheres of education, youth, cultural and other activities.” The authority and role of such Councils is not defined in this statement and hence it is difficult to assess the halakhic problems, if any, with regard to female membership on such Councils. In a statement to the Jewish Chronicle (May 16, 1975), Dayan Morris Swift declared that it is "halakhically wrong" for women to serve on synagogue boards of management, even if elected by other women members. A similarly negative view was voiced by Rabbi Dr. Benjamin Gelles, rabbi of London's Finchley Synagogue (Jewish Chronicle, May 23, 1975).
4. Communal Office Under Contemporary Conditions
Rabbi Turk alludes to a distinction which may be drawn between contemporary synagogue office and communal offices which are the subject of discussion in rabbinic sources. The point, which is made briefly, requires some amplification. As has been noted, the paradigm case for exclusion of women from office is the monarchy. Women (and converts) are barred from holding lesser offices as well because such offices enjoy in miniscule form powers conferred upon the monarch. The monarch governs by royal fiat and does not require the consent of the governed. The primary attribute of his office is that of coercive authority. Other offices to which specific reference is made by the Gemara as being closed to converts have as their prerogative the power of coercion, e.g., the office of inspector of weights and measures (Kiddushin 76b). A convert may not act as a bailiff or shoter, even though such officials merely carry out the directives of the Bet Din because bailiffs are empowered to use force in discharging their duties. Indeed, the term "serarah" used in this context implies "lordship" or unilateral enforcement of law or edict by one in a position of authority. Tosafot and Rosh, in their commentaries to Yevamot 101b (followed by Shakh, Yoreh De'ah 269:15), both state explicitly that the exclusion of a convert from public office is limited to exclusion from positions of authority involving the power of coercion which is the hallmark of monarchy. It would appear that the same criterion is applicable in determining offices from which women are barred. Nowhere is there an indication that women are to be excluded from purely honorific positions.18This is true for membership in deliberative and advisory bodies as well. It is of interest to note that the name of the Ḥafeẓ Ḥayyim appears together with the names of a number of women on a roster of delegates to a “Pan-Russian Jewish Conference”; see Sefer ha-Ma’or, no. 56. See, however, the letter of R. Chaim Ozer Grodzinski, Aḥi‘ezer: Koveẓ Iggerot, ed., Aaron Sorasky (Bnei Brak, 5730), I, no. 152, in which he declares that he and other prominent rabbinic figures served as delegates to such conferences solely because of the grave need to counter the attempts of secularists to wreak havoc upon the spiritual welfare of the community; see, infra, note 20. Under contemporary conditions, synagogue officials and boards of directors have no power of coercion whatsoever. They rely upon the good will of synagogue members for compliance. Although Rema stipulates that officials of the kahal must meet the selfsame requirements as judges, it must be remembered that the officials to whom Rema refers were empowered to levy and collect taxes. Assessment of the rate to be paid by each householder does indeed involve a judicial function. In times gone by these officials could exact taxes and enforce their will in other areas as well. Today, since there exists no autonomous kehillah structure, no decision can be enforced other than by means of voluntary compliance; even assessment and collection of synagogue dues is contingent upon the good will of the membership. Under such circumstances the officers of a congregation do not exercise even an approximation of royal power since they cannot in any way compel compliance.19Chaim Tzernowitz, employing a similar line of reasoning, goes beyond this position in asserting that the prohibition is limited to executive or administrative offices but not to membership in legislative or parliamentary bodies since members of such bodies merely enact laws but do not enforce them. If women are excluded only from communal positions of authority in which the office-holder is endowed with coercive authority it may then be argued that, under present conditions, women are not precluded from holding synagogal office.20Cf., however, the view of R. Chaim Ozer Grodzinski, Aḥi‘ezer: Koveẓ Iggerot, ed. Aaron Sorasky (Bnei Brak, 5730), I, no. 151, opposing participation of women in mixed bodies for reasons of tradition and ẓni‘ut.
While adducing no evidence for his contention, Rabbi Levinson advances an interesting argument in support of the thesis that the prohibition against the appointment of a female monarch is not applicable to contemporary political or communal office. Rabbi Levinson argues that the prohibition, while encompassing not only the monarchy but lesser offices as well, applies only to those offices whose holders enjoy the prerogatives of lifetime incumbency and hereditary succession. In the opinion of Rabbi Levinson, the verse " … that he may prolong his days in his kingship, he and his children" (Deuteronomy 17:20) serves not merely as a description of the nature of royal office but also as a limitation upon the prohibition "a king, but not a queen" contained in the earlier verse. According to this argument, election or appointment of a woman to a term of office for a specific number of years is not at all proscribed.
The halakhah "a king, but not a queen" appears to be a reflection of the religio-social ideal "Kol kevudah bat melekh penimah—The entire glory of the king's daughter is within" (Psalms 45:14). Various explanations have been offered in attempts to formulate the philosophical basis of this ideal. Such explanations are based upon an analysis of the concept of zni'ut in all its ramifications. A review of these formulations is beyond the scope of the present discussion. Suffice it to say that, the ideal of "kol kevudah" notwithstanding, women were never barred from seeking gainful employment or from engaging in commerce. Indeed, there are virtually no halakhic restrictions placed upon a woman seeking a career outside the home.
Nevertheless, the kol kevudah concept does find expression in Halakhah. This expression is perhaps more a matter of form than of substance, but is significant nonetheless. It would appear that the restriction "a king, but not a queen" is designed to give formal recognition to kol kevudah as an ideal, if not a norm. It is precisely in the public arena, in the holding of public office and thereby commanding constant public attention, that the Torah saw the greatest possible violation of feminine zni'ut. Of course, this restriction in no way guarantees the approximation, much less the realization, of this ideal, but it does serve to emphasize the principle as a halakhic desideratum and as such the form is as significant as the substance.
It must be emphasized that the issue of membership of women on synagogue boards is a halakhic question. To be sure, there are diverse views but, as is the case in all other areas of Halakhah, the decision for any specific synagogue must be made only by that synagogue's mara d'atra. The rabbi who is both qualified to act as a halakhic decisor and firmly convinced of the cogency of the arguments of the permissivists is privileged to act in accordance with his views. The rabbi who is unconvinced by these arguments, impressed by the number and eminence of the non-permissivists, or who feels that a breach of accepted practice may genuinely offend the religious sensibilities of some congregants may wish to find a solution which will grant the substantive desire for feminine representation and participation in decision-making without doing violence to halakhic forms. The participation and involvement of women in the synagogue is certainly to be encouraged and maximized. Given a spirit of good will and cooperation, substantive accommodation of the needs and desires of women can be achieved even within existing parameters.