Indeed that man is remembered for good! Joshua ben Gamala is his name. If not for him the Torah would have been forgotten by Israel… [he] came and ordained that they establish teachers of children.
BABA BATRA 21a
From time immemorial, Judaism has manifested a concern for education bordering on the obsessive. Abraham is described as worthy of divine favor "For I have known him to the end that he may instruct his children and his household after him, that they keep the way of God, to do righteousness and justice" (Genesis 18:19). Loyalty to the traditions of Judaism in adulthood can be assured only if proper training is provided during formative years. As expressed by King Solomon, "Train a child in his way and even when he is old he will not depart from it" (Proverbs 22:6).
Education is frequently regarded as instrumental in nature, i.e., a process of acquiring knowledge and skills to be utilized for specific purposes. Judaism recognizes two distinct forms of religious education. One is ḥinnukh, a concept which is more accurately rendered as "training"; the second is study and acquisition of knowledge. The instrumental value of the latter is incontrovertible. A child who has not been instructed in the laws of tefillin will lack the knowledge necessary for proper performance of the mizvah. Nevertheless, the obligation to teach Torah to children is far more encompassing in nature. The verse "And you shall teach them to your sons" (Deuteronomy 11:19) establishes not simply an obligation to teach children so that they be enabled to perform mizvot, but is an intrinsic component of the mizvah of talmud Torah. A Jew is obligated to teach his son Torah just as he is obligated to study Torah himself. Just as one's own study of Torah is an end in itself, so also is the teaching of Torah to children an end in itself. Study of Torah is not merely a means to observance but in itself constitutes the greatest and most profound of mizvot. Thus the obligation of talmud Torah mandates the study and teaching of all aspects of Torah, including even the study of subject matter pertaining to mizvot which cannot be observed in our time.
Hinnukh or training with regard to mizvot entails "training" in the performance of mizvot by means of actual practice. In order to satisfy the obligation of ḥinnukh the child must perform the mizvah in precisely the same manner in which an adult is required to perform the act in order to discharge his obligation. Teaching a kindergarten student to recite the kiddush during the course of a Friday morning Shabbat party or to conduct a model seder prior to the holiday no doubt serves a valid pedagogical purpose but nevertheless fails to satisfy the requirements of the mizvah of ḥinnukh. Hinnukh, in its essence, is a "dress rehearsal" requiring all the accoutrements of an actual performance. Thus a child who has reached the appropriate age for training in performance of the mizvah of the four species must be given a kosher etrog on Sukkot, not a lemon or even a hybrid citron (murkav). Similarly, a child being trained to recite the shema must be instructed to recite the shema at an appropriate hour rather than after the time period during which the shema must be recited has elapsed.
Cheating
An eloquent and refreshing statement on the issue of dishonesty in the taking of examinations appears in a short essay in the Tammuz 5736 issue of Shma'atin, an Israeli journal devoted to the discussion of topical issues in the field of education. This item was authored by Tziporah Wieder, then a ninth grade student of the Ulpana school in Kfar Pines. This school is the only educational institution in Israel which operates on the honor system. Even the all-important bagrut or baccalaureate examinations, upon which university admission hinges, are administered in this school by the Ministry of Education in accordance with the honor system.
Writing in the middle of her ninth year of school, her first in Ulpana, Miss Wieder reflects upon the difficulties encountered by herself and her peers in making the transition from an elementary school in which an entirely different atmosphere prevailed. In retrospect, wonders Miss Wieder, how was it possible for the students in a religious school to engage in copying and falsification? How did the students rationalize and justify their conduct to themselves? This student quite cogently points out that cheating involves not simply a breach of academic discipline but transgressions of Halakhah as well.
The concerns expressed by this young student are, to this writer's knowledge, reflected in only one formal rabbinic responsum. The question of the permissibility of engaging in various forms of intellectual chicanery, including the copying of answers to examination questions and plagiarism, is examined by Rabbi Menasheh Klein, Mishneh Halakhot, VII, no. 275. [Rabbi Klein carefully prefaces his answer with a caveat indicating that his reply to the question of cheating should not be construed as endorsement of secular studies.]
Rabbi Klein observes that cheating involves two specific infractions of Jewish law. Such conduct, it may be argued, is akin to genevat da'at, a term which connotes "theft of mind" but which is more accurately rendered as "misrepresentation." Shulḥan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 228:6-7, presents a description of specific activities which are deemed to be "theft" of this nature even though no one suffers a pecuniary loss as a result of such actions. Secondly, this type of misrepresentation may readily result in fraud in the fundamental sense of the term. Grades earned in courses serve to indicate proficiency in the subject matter and to determine eligibility for scholarships. Moreover, it is assumed that an academic record reflects a level of competence which may be relied upon in determining whether the graduate is qualified to hold a position for which remuneration is paid. Frequently, the scholastic record may serve to establish the level of compensation as well. An employer who, on the basis of grades earned, assumes that an employee has attained a level of competence which the employee has, in fact, not attained has been defrauded. An employer who pays a premium for the services of an employee on the basis of academic honors which, in turn, are based on grades, had been cheated if the employee has not indeed reached the level of proficiency associated with such honors. In such cases, argues Rabbi Klein, not only has the student who has engaged in cheating committed a moral offense, but the employer, or the grantor of a scholarship, has an actionable claim for recovery of funds obtained by means of fraud.
Miss Wieder raises an additional problem not mentioned by Rabbi Klein. This student points out that teachers are employed to serve as proctors during examinations. A teacher who is not vigilant in assuring honesty on the part of the examinees—or worse, one who tacitly condones dishonest conduct—accepts payment for services which have not been rendered. This, too, is a form of theft.
To these arguments there should be added an additional consideration of paramount significance. When students or graduates of religious institutions engage in academic dishonesty of whatever form, their actions entail the gravest of all transgressions, namely, ḥillul ha-Shem, or profanation of the Divine Name. Rambam, Hilkhot De'ot, chapter 6, clearly indicates that any form of conduct which reflects negatively upon students of Torah constitutes an act of ḥillul ha-Shem. Bringing disrepute upon Torah scholars is tantamount to bringing disrepute upon the Torah itself. Certainly, with regard to this provision of Jewish law, all students are to be considered "scholars" regardless of their level of erudition. The unethical actions of any Torah student redounds to the discredit of the entire Torah community and hence each and every student must be held to exemplary standards of conduct.
Teachers' Unions
A decision of the Rabbinical Administrative Board of Torah Umesorah, the National Association of Yeshivot and Day Schools, prohibiting teachers from joining national labor unions has been disseminated widely. The statement, which is entirely declarative in nature and contains neither an analysis of halakhic issues nor citation of precedents, has evoked much comment. This pronouncement, dated 2 Kislev 5741, is particularly note-worthy since R. Moses Feinstein, honorary chairman of the Rabbinical Administrative Board, in his Iggerot Mosheh, Hoshen Mishpat, no. 59, has sanctioned strike action by Yeshivah and Day School teachers, at least under certain limited circumstances.
It is a well-established principle of Jewish law that the residents of any town may promulgate rules and regulations for the common benefit of the townspeople. Rosh, Baba Batra 1:33, states that members of a particular profession or craft may establish regulations which are binding upon all such professionals or artisans. The members of such professions or crafts are deemed to be "townspeople" entitled to exercise coercive power upon members of their own "society" for the common benefit. This principle is recorded by Rambam, Hilkhot Mekhirah 14:10 and Shulḥan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 231:28. Hence, persons engaged in a common trade or profession are entitled to unionize and to impose organizational discipline upon one another. Moreover, when acting in a representative manner on behalf of all persons engaged in a given occupation, not only is a union entitled to engage in strike action but it may also legitimately forbid both its own members and outsiders from acting as strikebreakers.
Persons earning a livelihood from the teaching of Torah, argues Rabbi Feinstein, are in a somewhat different position. The compensation of such persons is not in the form of a fee for services rendered but payment in lieu of not engaging in some other remunerative activity (sekhar batalah). Teachers who are underpaid might well seek other employment, but in the event of their not being otherwise gainfully occupied, the obligation of teaching Torah falls upon their shoulders even during a strike period. Since teachers must teach even when on strike, the net result, according to Rabbi Feinstein, is to nullify the very concept of a strike. Although it is clear that when not engaged in earning a livelihood every person is obligated both to study and to teach Torah, Rabbi Feinstein does not address the question of whether teachers might not "strike" and spend the time as volunteers teaching Torah in other institutions or in faculty seminars teaching one another. Nor does he raise the question of whether striking teachers might not be permitted to offer to conduct classes in their own homes since it is not clear that the obligation to teach Torah obliges the teacher to spend either the time or the carfare required for him to travel to his students.
Rabbi Feinstein does advance one further significant consideration. Society has an obligation to provide for the Torah education of children. Although, intrinsically, the teacher has no greater obligation in this regard than does any other member of the community, nevertheless, in accepting employment, he has accepted delegation of this responsibility. Therefore, opines Rabbi Feinstein, the teacher may not withdraw, even for purposes of earning a livelihood in some other fashion, unless he provides a suitable replacement.
Despite these considerations, Rabbi Feinstein maintains that strike action is warranted under certain conditions, namely, when the level of compensation is so low that the teachers are not able to fulfill their responsibilities properly. Under such circumstances, if a strike will succeed in producing the necessary remedy, teachers are justified in suspending instruction temporarily in order that ultimately Torah study be maximized and enhanced. Such a determination, Rabbi Feinstein cautions, can be made only upon careful assessment of all factors and should be considered only as a last resort.
The propriety of strike action by Yeshivah teachers is also discussed in the course of a wide-ranging decision of a Tel Aviv Rabbinical Court, Piskei Din shel Batei ha-Din ha-Rabbaniyim, VIII, 160-161. In its decision, the Bet Din cites the above mentioned responsum of Rabbi Feinstein, but places even heavier emphasis upon the consideration that work stoppage on the part of Yeshivah teachers must inevitably lead to bittul Torah, i.e., disruption of Torah study, which, in and of itself, is a serious transgression.
When strike action is warranted, Rabbi Feinstein rules that teachers are entitled to payment for the period during which they performed no teaching services. Although he does not explicitly state the basis for such a claim on the part of striking teachers, it must be remembered that, essentially, they are paid, not for teaching, but for refraining from pursuing other means of earning a livelihood. Teachers who strike solely in order to make it possible for them to be able to discharge their duties adequately are indeed fulfilling their duty and, it may be argued, if not otherwise gainfully employed during the strike period, are entitled to compensation. Rabbi Feinstein further advises that striking teachers be paid for time missed even when the strike cannot be justified in accordance with Halakhah. It may be presumed, says Rabbi Feinstein, that teachers who strike are driven to such action by "pain and poverty." Since their intentions are unexceptionable, it is only equitable that they not be penalized financially.
In light of this published responsum it is clear that the Torah Umesorah proclamation is not directed against unionization per se but against membership in national unions whose actions and policies are not governed by halakhic considerations and constraints. Indeed, the text of the document bans affiliation solely with "secular" labor unions. Moreover, the same document calls for the formation of an "Irgun ha-Morim" (Teachers' Organization) under the aegis of Torah Umesorah for the purpose of "advancing the status of Yeshivah teachers materially and professionally." Such a body would undoubtedly enjoy the prerogatives which Jewish law conveys upon craft guilds and, to all intents and purposes, would function as a union without affiliation with any secular group.
Privacy of Personal Correspondence
In recent years a number of Supreme Court court decisions have been issued which serve to establish the right to privacy as one of the human freedoms guaranteed by the American constitution. The newly-developed constitutional right to privacy is the right of immunity from governmental interference in one's private affairs, unless legitimate state interests are at stake. There exists no concomitant constitutional right to privacy vis-à-vis the private acts of fellow citizens, although actions harmful, or potentially harmful, to others are forbidden by law.
Jewish law, by means of rabbinic legislation, has adopted certain specific measures in order to safeguard the individual's right to privacy. The most obvious example is the talmudic requirement that a wall be erected between adjacent courtyards in order to assure that the residents of each courtyard may enjoy unencumbered privacy. Another example is the well-known post-talmudic ban of Rabbenu Gershom forbidding the reading of another person's mail without permission. This edict is cited by Be'er ha-Golah, Yoreh De'ah 334:123. Sefer ha-Leket, I, no. 173, declares that Rabbenu Gershom's ban is based upon the admonition, "You shall not go as a talebearer among your people" (Leviticus 19:16). The prohibition against talebearing, argues Sefer ha-Leket, is equally applicable whether the bearing of tales is directed to another person or to oneself. Intercepting another person's private correspondence is, in effect, bearing tales, i.e., divulging another person's private affairs to oneself.
There are, however, very few rights, if any, which are absolute in nature. Rights must perforce yield to superseding interests and considerations. It is necessary to determine what, if any, are the limitations upon the right of privacy as recognized in Jewish law. The possibility of at least one interesting limitation with regard to the privacy of one's correspondence is discussed in the Adar II and Tammuz 5736 issues of Shma'atin. Teachers and counselors, at times, have reason to suspect that their charges are engaging in activities detrimental to their moral development but find themselves unable to deal with the situation effectively because of lack of concrete factual information. In some situations the educators have reason to believe that the desired information might be gleaned from mail received by their students. They are, however, understandably reluctant to tamper with the correspondence of their charges because it would appear that the privacy of such communications is protected and rendered inviolate by virtue of the ban promulgated by Rabbenu Gershom. The editors of Shma'atin, therefore, turned to Rabbi David Halevi, Sephardic Chief Rabbi of Tel Aviv, and solicited his opinion with regard to the halakhic permissibility of intercepting and reading the mail of students for the express purpose of preventing moral infractions. Rabbi Halevi's response appears in the Adar II issue of that publication.
Rabbi Halevi argues that the resolution of the question addressed to him hinges upon whether or not the ban of Rabbenu Gershom bears the weight of law even in situations in which its enforcement will entail nonperformance of a mizvah. A precedent is found with regard to the application of another edict issued by Rabbenu Gershom, viz., the well-known ban against polygamy. Despite Rabbenu Gershom's edict against plural marriages, Shulḥan Arukh, Even haEzer 1:9, rules that a married man may take as a wife the widow of a brother who has died childless. The explanation advanced is that Rabbenu Gershom's edict was not intended to extend to situations which would result in nonperformance of a mizvah. In the case discussed by Shulhan Arukh the mizvah of levirate marriage would be abrogated if the ban against polygamy were to be enforced. Rema, however, appends a gloss in which he cites authorities who maintain that Rabbenu Gershom's ban encompasses such situations as well. Rabbi Halevi argues that, according to Shulḥan Arukh, not only is the ban against polygamy suspended in such situations, but that all edicts issued by Rabbenu Gershom are suspended in face of the necessity of fulfilling a mizvah. Rabbi Halevy further argues that even those authorities who dissent—as cited by Rema—do so only with regard to situations in which obedience to the edict results merely in passive nonfulfillment of a mizvah but that all authorities are in agreement that the edict is suspended if the action in question is necessary to prevent an overt transgression. Accordingly, Rabbi Halevi permits the opening of letters when such action is absolutely necessary to prevent untoward conduct on the part of the student.
The Tammuz issue of Shma'atin contains a concurring opinion authored by Rabbi Eliezer Katz. Rabbi Katz offers a further argument bolstering this position. A person who smites a fellow Jew transgresses a negative commandment as recorded by Rambam, Hilkhot Hovel u-Mazik 1:1. Nevertheless, a father who smites a child or a teacher who smites a pupil for purposes of reproving him and correcting his conduct may not only do so with impunity, but the action is deemed to be a mizvah.1Makkot 8b. In effect, Rabbi Katz argues that assault is an infringement of the right to privacy of one's person. Since the biblical right to privacy of one's person is suspended in face of overriding pedagogical considerations, a fortiori, the rabbinic right to privacy of correspondence is suspended in the presence of identical considerations.
In a short note appended to the article, the editor of Shma'atin cites R. Chaim Pelaggi, Hikekei Lev, I, Yoreh De'ah, no. 49, who asserts that it is permissible to open a letter in order to obtain information necessary to prevent financial loss. By the same token, he argues, it is permissible to open a letter in order to prevent moral and spiritual loss to the recipient.2In point of fact, the editor’s statement is somewhat inaccurate. Ḥikekei Lev does not unequivocally sanction tampering with correspondence in order to prevent financial loss; he states “yesh ẓedadin le-ka’n u-le-ka’n—there are arguments which may be advanced in support of both sides of the question.”
Rabbi Halevi concludes his responsum by questioning whether the same corrective measures might not be taken even in the absence of information gained in this manner and indicates that if such corrective measures might indeed be instituted, in any event, the right to privacy with regard to correspondence must be regarded as being inviolate. He further admonishes that any information obtained in this manner may not be divulged to other persons.
To this a further comment must be added. Procedures involving violation of privacy are likely to be counter-productive. To be successful in their efforts, educators must gain and retain the confidence and trust of their students. It is virtually impossible to impart ethical sensitivity while employing means which are themselves perceived by students as being unethical in nature. It is a commonplace truism that not every procedure which is permissible should be pursued. In this instance, since such a course of action is sanctioned only as a means of achieving a higher goal, the inefficacy of the theoretically permissible renders such a course of action impermissible in practice.
Expulsion of Students
The Heshvan 5736 issue of Shma'atin contains a discussion by Rabbi Zevi Sloucz regarding the circumstances which warrant expulsion of a student or refusal on the part of a school to accept a potential student. Principals of Yeshivot and Day Schools often experience a dilemma when confronted by students or applicants who are of questionable moral character or who are nonobservant. Outside of the educational framework of such schools there is little hope that character or behavior patterns will change in a material way. On the other hand, such students may well serve as a negative influence within the school with disastrous consequences for other pupils.
Rambam, Hilkhot Talmud Torah 4:1, rules that one may teach Torah only to a student of good moral character who comports himself in a decorous manner or to a "simple" student. At the same time, Rambam rules that a student who is found lacking in this regard is not to be rejected out of hand. On the contrary, Rambam emphasizes that such a student should be corrected and given moral training; but only subsequently may he be taught Torah. This ruling is based upon a discussion in Berakhot 28a. While serving as head of the academy, Rabban Gamaliel posted a doorkeeper at the entrance whose task it was to deny admission to students whose moral or religious credentials were subject to question. Upon the appointment of R. Eleazar ben Azariah as successor to Rabban Gamaliel, the doorkeeper was removed. The result was an immediate and vast increase in enrollment. According to one opinion recorded in the Gemara, 400 seats had to be added to the House of Study; according to another opinion, 700 seats had to be added.
Commentaries on the Mishneh Torah explain that both Rabban Gamaliel and R. Eleazar ben Azariah agreed that a student of ill repute should not be accepted. They disagreed only with regard to acceptance of a student of unknown character. Rabban Gamaliel demanded evidence of probity, while R. Eleazar was amenable to accepting any student as long as there was no negative information regarding his character. According to these commentaries, Rambam rules in accordance with the opinion of R. Eleazar ben Azariah and hence permits the teaching of Torah to a "simple" student. These commentators understand the word "simple" (tam), employed by Rambam in this context, as denoting a person of unknown moral character. Other authorities understand the term as referring to a person of neutral moral character, i.e., a person lacking exemplary character traits, but one who has not developed negative traits.
Rabbi Sloucz points to the apparently contradictory dictum of Bet Hillel recorded in Avot de-Rabbi Nathan 9:9: "One should teach everyone for there were many transgressors among Israel who were brought close to the study of Torah and righteous, pious and worthy [individuals] emerged from among them." Bet Hillel, in apparent contradiction to the position of R. Eleazar ben Azariah, quite obviously favored instruction for all. Midrash Shmuel, Avot 1:1, endeavors to resolve the discrepancy between the position of Bet Hillel and that of R. Eleazar ben Azariah by explaining that Bet Hillel did not advocate admission of transgressors to the academy. On the contrary, they advocated instruction for such individuals only outside of the basic educational system. In the words of the Mishnah, Bet Hillel "established many students" but they also "made a fence for the Torah." Midrash Shmu'el explains the latter phrase as meaning that, although Bet Hillel were willing to teach everyone, they insisted upon a "fence" between various groups of students, i.e., they insisted upon separate instruction for unworthy students.3Cf., Magen Avot and Petaḥ Einayim, ad loc. The words of Bet Hillel, observes Rabbi Sloucz, are the source of Rambam's concluding statement which advises that students of less than exemplary character be given remedial moral and religious training.
In an earlier article on the same subject, which appeared in the 5730 issue of Niv ha-Midrashiyah, Rabbi David Werner similarly concludes that all are in agreement that a student of degenerate character may be expelled. Rabbi Werner, however cites Maharasha, Berakhot 28a, who maintains that Rabban Gamaliel demanded evidence of "fear of Heaven" or, in the words of the Gemara, that the student be of unimpeachable sincerity, "his interior as his exterior" (tokho ke-baro). It was only with regard to a student lacking "fear of Heaven," or sincerity of commitment, that R. Eleazar ben Azariah disagreed and was willing to grant admission. R. Eleazar ben Azariah, according to this analysis, maintained that a student might be excluded only on the basis of negative conduct, but not because of lack of commitment. Use of the term "simple" by Rambam, declares Rabbi Werner, indicates that the student's internal motivation and commitment need not be examined; as long as his conduct and deportment is moral and beyond reproach he may be instructed in Torah.
Noteworthy are the comments of Shulḥan Arukh ha-Rav, Hilkhot Talmud Torah, kuntres aḥaron. Noting Rambam's ruling that a student of poor character should not be taught Torah but should first be corrected, Shulḥan Arukh ha-Rav adds the comment that this principle applies only if exclusion from Torah study will aid in effecting a transformation of character. If, however, exclusion will not effect a transformation of character, even though the student is unworthy, he may be taught Torah.
In yet another article dealing with this subject published in Niv ha-Midrashiyah, 5730, Rabbi Chaim Naftalin relates that Hazon Ish declared in an oral ruling that the restrictions against teaching Torah to unworthy students do not apply in our day. In earlier times, declared Hazon Ish, expulsion from the House of Study was itself a corrective measure. Such ostracism would prompt a student to mend his ways. In our day, counseled Hazon Ish, such a policy is likely to confirm the student in his evil ways and cause him to stray even further.
Rabbi Werner advances a similar explanation in resolving the earlier noted discrepancy between the dictum of Bet Hillel and the view of R. Eleazar ben Azariah. Rabbi Werner maintains that the counsel of Bet Hillel, who advocated teaching Torah even to transgressors, was formulated for historical epochs in which other methods would be of no avail. At such times the only way to influence students is directly through the teaching of Torah. Under such conditions the restrictions posited by Rabban Gamaliel and R. Eleazar ben Azariah do not apply.
A student may legitimately be expelled, not only because of moral infractions, but also because of a breach of school discipline, since such conduct is likely to have a negative pedagogic effect upon other students. As is reported in Horiyot 13b, R. Meir and R. Nathan were expelled from the House of Study precisely because of such considerations. According to the explanation of Rabbenu Gershom, Baba Batra 23a, R. Jeremiah was expelled for like cause. Sefer Hasidim, no. 187, states explicitly that a student whose presence is disruptive should be expelled lest he "do harm to others."
Although he fails to adduce compelling evidence in support of his view, Rabbi Werner makes a distinction between young students and students of a mature age. In his view, young children should be accepted as students even if their conduct is unseemly, provided that they do not exercise a negative influence upon other students. According to Rabbi Werner, the qualifications posited for receiving Torah instruction and the dispute between Rabban Gamaliel and R. Eleazar ben Azariah with regard to such qualifications are limited to mature students. On the basis of Rambam, Hilkhot Talmud Torah 2:2, Rabbi Werner defines a "young" student as a student below the age of twenty-four or "perhaps" as below the age of sixteen.
Rabbi Katriel Tchursh, Keter Efrayim, no. 51, reaches a conclusion essentially identical to that of Rabbi Werner. Rabbi Tchursh advises that nonobservant children be accepted as students providing that they do not manifest a disdainful and disparaging attitude.
Damages to School Property
The Tammuz 5736 issue of Shma'atin contains a short item by Rabbi Shlomoh Min-Hahar dealing with liability for damage to school property caused by students. Although there is nothing novel in this discussion it merits note simply by virtue of the fact that the issue is one which is raised with some frequency.
Baba Kamma 87a establishes quite clearly that children below the age of halakhic maturity (thirteen in the case of boys, twelve in the case of girls) cannot be held liable for tort damages. A minor does not incur liability for his actions. Therefore, individuals who have caused personal or property damage while yet minors cannot be held responsible for compensation even after they have reached the age of legal capacity. This is true not only with regard to damage caused inadvertently but also with respect to acts of vandalism. However, the liability of children who have reached the age of halakhic maturity is exactly the same as that of adults committing the same acts, although adolescents may well not have independent financial resources which may be used to satisfy a claim. Halakhah recognizes no responsibility on the part of parents to compensate for damages caused by children of any age.
Rambam, in his Commentary on the Mishnah, Baba Kamma 8:4, does, however, declare that the courts are empowered to punish and chastise minors in order to prevent future acts of an anti-social nature. As Rabbi Min-Hahar points out, this authority is derived from the power to preserve the social order which is vested in the Bet Din. Teachers and school authorities do not exercise such power. They are, however, charged with the education of their students. It is incumbent upon them to instill moral values no less than to impart academic knowledge. In order to achieve these objectives they are empowered to utilize appropriate disciplinary measures. They are, therefore, entitled to impose nonmonetary punishment if, in their opinion, there exists a pedagogic reason for doing so.