Ben Bag-Bag said, "Delve into it over and over again, for everything is contained in it."
AVOT 5:22
Divine service, for the Jew, consists not simply of worship and the performance of prayer rituals but pervades every facet of his existence. The mode of worship prescribed by Judaism is not limited to specific times, places or actions. No aspect of human life is removed from the service of God. In the Torah man finds a paradigm for every aspect of human conduct.
The ultimate goal of man, asserts Maimonides, is the attainment of the knowledge of God insofar as it is possible for mortal man to know Him.1The Eight Chapters, chap. 5. Cf. Guide of the Perplexed, III, chap. 51; and Abraham ibn Daud, Emunah Ramah, III. This, according to Maimonides, is the essence of divine service and constitutes man's paramount duty. Ideally, all of man's actions should be directed to this end. Every word and deed should be weighed in order to determine whether or not it furthers this goal. Man's aim, even in purely mundane activities, should be the preservation of his bodily health so that he may be able to acquire moral and intellectual virtue, thereby furthering his ultimate purpose, that of serving God.
This ideal is, to be sure, only rarely attained and, indeed, Maimonides places one who has achieved this exalted state of human perfection "in a rank not lower than that of the prophets." Although he may fall short of reaching this goal, the Jew is bidden to strive for its attainment. The commandments of the Torah are designed to maximalize the natural propensity for divine service which is present in every man and, insofar as is possible for ordinary mortals, to consecrate all human activity to the worship of God.
To this end, the Torah ordained manifold precepts and laws governing virtually every aspect of human conduct. "Mizvot were given solely that people might be purified by means of them," declared the Sages (Bereshit Rabbah XLIV, 1). In the performance of mizvot man finds existential fulfillment. The actions required of him are designed to produce both physical and intellectual perfection so that man, insofar as he is capable of doing so, may turn his attention to matters of the spirit and achieve a knowledge and awareness of the divine.
The miscellaneous and varied halakhot governing human conduct are all manifestations of divine beneficence toward the people of Israel. As the Mishnah, Makkot 23b, declares, "The Holy One, blessed be He, desired to bestow merit unto Israel; therefore He increased unto them Torah and commandments."
Delayed Burial
The cemetery strike which affected the New York City metropolitan area in 1969 caused untold anguish to the many bereaved who were unable to bury their dead. For observant Jews bound by the halakhic requirement of speedy burial this grief was compounded by distress at violation of religious scruples. Fortunately, a court order was forthcoming assuring that no attempt would be made to interfere with private arrangements for the digging of a grave by individuals who demanded immediate burial as a matter of conscience.
Jewish law clearly stipulates that every possible effort be made to assure immediate interment. However, there were cases where, for whatever reason, such arrangements were not made and burial was perforce postponed until the resolution of the labor dispute. The bodies were turned over to the custody of the cemetery officials who assumed responsibility for interment. In such instances questions of when the laws of mourning become applicable and when recitation of the kaddish is begun are germane.
The precedents for conduct in such circumstances are reviewed by Rabbi Meir Amsel, the editor of Ha-Ma'or, in the Kislev–Tevet–Shevat 5730 issue of that journal. Rosh, in his comments on the third chapter of Mo'ed Katan, records that Rabbenu Kalonymos died during a period of siege. Since his body could not be transported to the cemetery outside the city his coffin was placed in the ritualarium for the duration of the hostilities. Rosh records that the ritual of mourning commenced immediately upon deposit of the body in the ritualarium despite the intention of the family to effect proper burial upon the lifting of the siege. Even though, in accordance with Halakhah, mourning is deemed to begin only after burial has actually taken place, in this case the sealing of the coffin and its deposit in a specific shelter are tantamount to burial with regard to the laws of mourning. This ruling is cited by the Shulḥan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah 375:44.
There is yet another consideration that would mandate immediate observance of mourning. In cases where the mourners do not accompany the bier—for example, when burial takes place in a distant locale—the laws of mourning become effective as soon as the coffin has been "delivered to the porters," i.e., mourning commences immediately after the mourners have completed all funeral arrangements and are no longer personally responsible for funeral procedures. The status of the deceased during the period of the strike is literally that of having been "delivered to the porters" since the family has already completed all funeral arrangements and has left the body in the custody of the cemetery authorities and empowered them to make the actual burial.
The following issue of Ha-Ma'or contains an article on the same topic by Rabbi Chananyah Yom-Tov Lippa Dreisinger. Rabbi Dreisinger states that his responsum was originally written in reply to identical questions raised during an earlier strike on the part of gravediggers in 1967. The sources cited and conclusions reached parallel those of Rabbi Amsel. Chavrusa, April 1967, published by the Rabbinic Alumni of Yeshiva University, contains an article entitled "The Cemetery Strike—Some Halakhic Considerations," by Rabbi Fabian Schonfeld, in which the author presents a conflicting view.2See also R. Shmuel Hubner, Ha-Darom, Tishri 5728; and R. Yechiel Michal Tucatzinsky, Gesher ha-Ḥayyim, I, chap. 18, no. 1, sec. 4.
Sounding the Trumpets
It is of singular interest that after a lapse of millennia the opportunity now present itself for the performance of a virtually forgotten mizvah. All are familiar with the shofar and the mizvot attendent upon it. There is yet a second wind instrument associated with mizvot with which we are less well acquainted. Scripture commands the fashioning of two trumpets of hammered silver to be blown by the kohanim for purposes of assembling the congregation and as a signal to continue on the journey through the wilderness. These trumpets were also to be blown on festivals in conjunction with the sacrificial offerings. Furthermore, in the event of warfare, the trumpets were to be sounded in order that "… you shall be remembered before the Lord your God and you shall be saved from your enemies" (Num. 10:9). The possibility that this latter exhortation be applicable in our own day in face of the dangers besetting the State of Israel is discussed in two articles which appeared recently. Rabbi Judah Gershuni, in the Tevet 5730 issue of Or ha-Mizraḥ, and Rabbi Chaim Shrage Frank, in the Tammuz 5730 issue of Ha-Ma'ayan, cover much the same ground and reach similar conclusions.
Although the Sefer Mizvot Gadol does not include the commandment to sound the trumpet in time of war in his enumeration of the 613 commandments, both Rambam, Sefer ha-Mizvol, mizvot 'aseh, no. 59, and Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Ta'anit 1:1, and Sefer ha-Hinukh, mizvah 384, view the sounding of trumpets as a positive commandment obligatory not merely in time of war but in the event of any potential misfortune, such as famine, plague or pestilence. The sounding of trumpets under these circumstances is an appurtenance of prayer and serves as a summons to repentance. The commandment to sound the trumpet in time of danger is binding, according to these authorities, not merely while the Temple is in existence but subsequent to its destruction as well.
Many authorities are of the opinion that there exists no obligation to sound the trumpets in the event of a calamity in the Diaspora. Magen Avraham, Oraḥ Hayyim 576, queries why this practice has lapsed even though it appears to be a biblical obligation. Various commentators, including Pri Megadim, Oraḥ Hayyim 575:2, and Mishneh Berurah 575:1, answer that the fulfillment of this commandment is limited solely to the Land of Israel. Both express doubt as to whether the commandment is obligatory even in Erez Yisra'el when that country is not under Jewish sovereignty. In any event, it is clear, according to all authorities, that there is a clear-cut obligation to sound these instruments in times of trouble when the Land of Israel is under Jewish dominion.3Cf. Arukh ha-Shulḥan, Oraḥ Ḥayyim 576:4. Thus the question of whether this mizvah should be performed nowadays becomes germane.
There is considerable discussion and controversy among early authorities with regard to the details of the performance of this mizvah and as to when the trumpets are to be blown alone and when together with the shofar as indicated in Psalms 98:6, "With trumpets and the voice of the shofar shall you sound the teru'ah before the King, God." Some authorities maintain that the trumpets together with the shofar are to be sounded only on the Temple Mount; in other locales the shofar alone is to be blown. Rabbi Frank explains that this opinion is based upon Numbers 10:9, "… and you shall be remembered before the Lord your God." According to this line of reasoning, only the Temple site is considered to be "before God." Nowadays, considerations of ritual purity preclude entry onto the Temple Mount. Rabbi Frank, however, brings evidence that all of Jerusalem is considered to be an extension of the Temple with regard to the sounding of trumpets. He adds that the shofar need not be sounded together with the trumpets other than at the actual site of the Temple, since the relevant passage in Psalms indicates that both instruments are employed simultaneously only "before the King, God." Rabbi Frank maintains that while the entire city of Jerusalem is "before God," nevertheless the site of divine kingship is limited to the Temple Mount proper. Hence the rest of Jerusalem is not "before the King, God." Therefore, argues Rabbi Frank, trumpets unaccompanied by the shofar must be sounded in Jerusalem in the event of impending misfortune.
It should be noted that the silver trumpets must be sounded by kohanim. Indeed, R. Jacob Emden, Mor u-Ketzi'ah, Oraḥ Hayyim 576, states that this commandment has lapsed in our day because the genealogical purity of kohanim is now subject to doubt. Rabbi Gershuni objects to this line of reasoning because, in any event, there is no transgression involved in the blowing of the trumpets should it transpire that one who does so is not of priestly lineage, while the biblical commandment must be observed even in the case of doubt.
In the following issue of Ha-Ma'ayan, Tishri 5731, Rabbi Kalman Kahane notes that at least one authority maintains that this mizvah can no longer be fulfilled. Rabbi Moses Feinstein, Iggrot Mosheh, Oraḥ Hayyim, I, no. 169, is of the opinion that only trumpets fashioned for use in the Temple proper may be used for fulfillment of the mizvah of sounding the trumpets in time of peril. For this reason Rambam, in his enumeration of the 613 mizvot, views the commandment to blow the trumpets at the time of sacrificial offerings and the commandment to sound the trumpets when confronted by impending misfortune to be a single mizvah rather than two distinct commandments. Rabbi Kahane himself argues that, practically speaking, trumpets may be fashioned in an infinite number of sizes and shapes. However, for fulfillment of the mizvah a specific shape and form was ordained. The exact form in which the trumpets are to be made is now unknown to us since the tradition with regard to their proper shape has lapsed. Accordingly, adds Rabbi Kahane, it has been the custom of the Ashkenazic community in Jerusalem to sound the shofar rather than trumpets on fast days and in times of trouble.
Rabbi Frank nevertheless reports that in light of the serious threat of war which existed at that time the Bet Din of Jerusalem decreed that trumpets be sounded and accordingly, on 12 Iyar, 5730, kohanim sounded trumpets of hammered silver before the Western Wall.4Cf. however, R. Eliezer Waldenberg, Ẓiẓ Eli‘eẓer, XI, no. 16. We join in the prayer expressed by Rabbi Frank that these trumpets sounded in time of grave danger lead to the fulfillment of the divine promise "and you shall be remembered before the Lord your God and you shall be saved from your enemies" and that we may speedily be privileged to fulfill the second mizvah associated with these trumpets: "And on the day of your rejoicing, and on your festivals and on your New Moons, and you shall sound the trumpets on your burnt offerings and your peace offerings and they will be for you a remembrance before the Lord your God."
The Names of God
In any halakhic study, it is necessary to clarify whether a particular practice is mandated as a halakhic requirement, is to be followed on the basis of minhag, or is to be dismissed as being grounded upon superstition and ignorance. Undoubtedly, in the course of Jewish history—particularly in areas having little contact with centers of Torah scholarship—many folk-customs did arise which diverge from the original Halakhah to so great a degree as to constitute a farcical distortion thereof. On the other side of the coin are the many time-hallowed practices followed by knowledgeable Jews which are founded upon authentic halakhic considerations.
A case in point involves practices related to the writing and vocalization of the Names of God. The Tishri-Cheshvan 5730 issue of Kol Torah features an article by Rabbi A. Steinsalz in which he examines the wide-spread tendency to avoid writing the letters of the Divine Name even when such letters occur in a secular context.5See also R. Menasheh Klein, Mishneh Halakhot, V, nos. 117–122. This practice is most commonly encountered in the writing of proper names in which one of the Divine Names is incorporated as part of the cognitive meaning of the appellation, e.g., Azaryah ("God helped") or Netanel ("God gave"). Many individuals also refrain from employing such letter combinations even in words totally disassociated from reference to the Deity. Thus, for example, when a Hebrew word ends in the letter he preceded by a yod either the final letter is dropped or the word is written with a dividing mark between the two letters.
The Gemara, Shevu'ot 35a, states that it is forbidden to erase the name of God and for that reason care is taken not to write the Divine Name upon any document or paper which might be destroyed. Megillat Ta'anit 7a and the Gemara, Rosh Hashanah 18b, report that during the Hasmonean period promissory notes bore the legend, "In such and such year in the reign of Yochanan, High Priest of the most high God." The Sages, upon hearing of this innovation, exclaimed: "Tomorrow the debtor will repay his debt, with the result that the note will be cast away with the refuse!" Accordingly, they abrogated the practice and declared the day on which they did so to be a holiday. On the basis of this source, Rema, Yoreh De'ah 276:13, rules that it is forbidden to write the Divine Name "other than in a book, for it may come to dishonor. Therefore, we take heed not to write the Divine Name in a letter." The prohibition against erasing the Name of God is, however, limited to the specifically enumerated Divine Names which possess intrinsic sanctity. Mesekhet Sofrim 4:4 states clearly that even these names may be erased when they do not stand independently but form an integral part of the name of a mortal.
Rabbi Steinsalz notes that examination of early rabbinic manuscripts shows that words combining letter combinations spelling a Divine Name were written out in their entirety. Although it is now universal practice to employ the combination tet-vav for the number fifteen rather than a yod followed by a he, this custom is of comparatively recent origin. The usage of yod followed by he to represent fifteen would appear to be particularly objectionable since these two letters standing alone constitute the complete spelling of one of the sanctified names. Yet in earlier times there appears to have been no objection to this practice. One may conclude that since these letters are not intended to stand for a Divine Name their mere juxtaposition does not endow them with sanctity.
The same point is made by Dr. Louis Rabinowitz, former Chief Rabbi of South Africa, in an article entitled "On the Names of God," which appeared in the London Jewish Chronicle, April 10, 1970. Rabbi Rabinowitz also discusses the status of the term shalom. Rabbi Rabinowitz comments with amazement that he has been told of "one distinguished rabbi who never writes the word shalom in full, but writes only the first three letters and an apostrophe—because the Talmud states (Shabbat 10b) that shalom is one of the names of God." It is indeed true that Teshuvot ha-Rosh 3:15 declares, "We have found no one who forbids the erasure of shalom." Rabbi Rabinowitz, however, fails to mention the many authorities who insist that shalom may not be erased. Tosafot, Sotah 10a, comments that the list of seven Divine Names which may not be erased is not exhaustive and that shalom is to be included in this category. Writing only the first three letters of this word is a time-honored custom. Birkei Yosef, Oraḥ Hayyim 85:8, quotes Rabbenu Yechiel who asserts that, since it is one of the Divine Names, the word shalom is not spelled out in a greeting. Rema, Yoreh De'ah 276:13, also cites this practice.
Another question requiring clarification is the permissibility of writing the name of God in the vernacular. This question is, of course, relevant only with regard to correspondence or other forms of writing which are likely to be discarded heedlessly. As previously noted, Rema states explicitly that the name of God may be written out in full in printed works which presumably will be treated with respect. The prohibition against obliterating the name of God is limited to the specifically enumerated Divine Names; other cognomens are regarded as adjectival descriptions rather than as names of the Deity and as such are not included in the prohibition against erasure. Both Shakh, Yoreh De'ah 179:11, and R. Akiva Eger, Yoreh De'ah 276:9, state definitively that the name of God occurring in languages other than Hebrew is regarded as a cognomen and hence the prohibition with reference to erasure does not apply.
Although the prohibition against erasure is not applicable, proper respect must nevertheless be paid to the name of God even when it occurs in languages other than Hebrew. Nedarim 7b states: "Every place where the unnecessary mention of the Divine Name is found, there poverty is to be found." This is deduced from the biblical verse "… in every place where I cause My name to be mentioned I will come unto thee and bless thee" (Exod. 20:21), indicating that the pronunciation of the Divine Name in a sacred manner is rewarded with blessing and prosperity. From this the converse is also deduced, viz., that the pronunciation of the Divine Name in vain leads to poverty.
Two renowned authorities, R. Yonatan Eibeschutz, Urim ve-Tumim 27:2, and R. Ya'akov of Lissa, Netivot ha-Mishpat 27:2, maintain that reverence must also be accorded to written occurrences of the Divine Name, whether in Hebrew or in the vernacular. Both scholars decried even the use of the French adieu (the root meaning of which is "with God") in written communications because of the dishonor of the Divine Name resulting from careless disposal of such correspondence. These authorities maintain that poverty follows not merely improper vocalization of the Divine Name but also failure to accord proper respect to written occurrences of the Divine Name even in the vernacular. Rabbi Rabinowitz errs in describing scrupulousness with regard to the writing of the Divine Name in languages other than Hebrew as a recent development and in contending that mention of this prohibition appears for the first time in the comparatively recent Arukh ha-Shulḥan, Hoshen Mishpat 27.
Another practice questioned by Dr. Rabinowitz is constraint in pronouncing the terms Shaddai and Ẓeva'ot. The prohibition against vocalizing the name of God other than in the reading of Scripture, prayer, or recitation of blessings is derived from the positive commandment "The Lord your God shall you fear" (Deut. 6:13). Restraint in not mentioning the name of God in vain is a manifestation of fear and awe. Rav Aḥai Ga'on, She'iltot, Yitro, She'ilta 53, deems this to be a transgression of the negative prohibition "Thou shalt not take the name the Lord your God in vain" (Exod. 20:7). According to numerous authorities, e.g., Rambam Hilkhot Shevu'ot 12:11 (see Teshuvot R. Akiva Eger, no. 25), this prohibition embraces all of the seven names of God. Since both Shaddai and Ẓeva'ot are enumerated among the seven names of the Deity common practice is to use the assonant forms Shakai and Ẓevakot respectively as substitutes for these names. Dr. Rabinowitz' incredulity at this "strange mispronunciation of Hebrew" is misplaced.
Utterance of the Divine Name in languages other than Hebrew is discussed by Nimukei Yosef in his commentary on Nedarim 7b. This authority declares that while needless mention of the name of God in secular languages is not encompassed by the biblical prohibition, nonetheless, "go'arin bo—the one doing so is to be admonished and chastised." It should be noted that Rabbi Moses Feinstein, Iggrot Mosheh, Yoreh De'ah, I, no. 172, states that this statement of Nemukei Yosef regarding inappropriate vocalization of the name of God in the vernacular is limited to the proper name of the Deity in such languages (e.g., "God") and not to adjectival cognomens (e.g., "Almighty").6Cf. Ḥiddushei Ḥatam Sofer, Nedarim 2a, and Teshuvot R. Akiva Eger, no. 25.
In conclusion, it is quite apparent that regardless of the final adjudication of these questions, the meticulousness with which God-fearing Jews have always conducted themselves in the writing and vocalization of the Divine Name is grounded upon a deeply rooted reverence for Halakah in all its ramifications. Improper understanding of the halakhic bases of such practices may at times lead to their being treated with a levity which is unwarranted. To paraphrase a famous dictum, afilu ketivat ḥullin shel talmidei ḥakhamim zerikhah limmud—even the idle writing of Torah scholars bears studious attention.
Religiously motivated forms of conduct practiced by devout Jews over a span of generations are but seldom without a firm basis. Our Sages long ago counseled in this regard, "Even if they are not prophets, they are the sons of prophets." Those who inveigh in caustic tones against the manner in which their coreligionists spell the name of God not only err in their preconceptions but fail to realize that such time-hallowed customs acquire a meaning and significance of their own. The Jew who inserts a dash in spelling the Divine Name is filled with an all-pervasive sense of the immanence of the Almighty. His action demonstrates that he feels no inhibition in expressing his reverence for the divine in all aspects of his daily life. Whether or not one chooses to adopt this practice, whether one regards it as well-grounded or as ill-founded, the usage "G-d" should, at the very minimum, command a dash of respect.
Residence in Spain
The permission granted in 1968 by the Franco government for the repair of an ancient synagogue in Madrid brought to the fore the question of whether permanent Jewish settlement in Spain is proper. An article by Rabbi Judah Gershuni in the Tishri 5731 issue of Ha-Darom deals with this topic, as do a prolonged series of brief items appearing in Ha-Ma'or over a period of several months. The Kislev–Tevet 5729 issue of Ha-Ma'or contains a note bearing the initials of the editor stating that although no source can be cited, it is well known that following the expulsion of Jews from Spain the rabbinic authorities of that generation placed the country under an interdict forbidding any Jew to establish residence there upon pain of anathema. It is alleged that this prohibition was originally promulgated for a period of only four hundred years but was voluntarily accepted by later generations as a permanent decree. The editor further asserts, in light of the fact that this prohibition has been accepted by "all of Israel," that no subsequent Bet Din may annul the decree.
The latter point is disputed both by Rabbi Shlomoh Wahrman, writing in the following issue of Ha-Ma'or, and more recently by Rabbi Gershuni. Rabbi Wahrman cites a discussion of this prohibition in Teru'at Melekh, no. 13. This authority, Rabbi Joseph Susmanovitz, son-in-law of the renowned R. Moshe Mordecai Epstein of Slobodka, states clearly that the decree did not extend to "all of Israel" but merely to those who were expelled from Spain and therefore can be rescinded by subsequent authorities. Furthermore, the prohibition was not promulgated in the form of a decree but was proclaimed as a ḥerem (interdict), which may be annulled by another Bet Din.
Rabbi Gershuni cites Iggrot Re'iyah, II, no. 632, of Rabbi Abraham I. Kook, in which the latter voices his doubts with regard to the nature of this prohibition, but declares that the ban is surely no more stringent than the biblical prohibition against returning to Egypt. Accordingly, only permanent settlement is forbidden; temporary residence for purposes of commerce is permissible. Rabbi Gershuni argues that the ban may have been merely against the establishment of Jewish settlements, but once such communities are established in violation of the ban there may be no prohibition against an individual subsequently establishing residence in Spain. Others have suggested that the ban was applicable only during the period of the Spanish monarchy but lapsed with the establishment of the republic. One who vows not to enter a certain house is bound by the vow only as long as the owner has not died or sold the dwelling. Similarly, it has been argued, Spain, following the establishment of the republic, may be deemed to be a new country against which an interdict was never pronounced. Since the text of the ban is not available, Rabbi Gershuni argues, such conjecture serves only to establish a doubt. Violation of this ban may involve a biblical transgression. The governing canon is safek de'oraita le-chumra—actions involving even the possibility of a biblical violation must be eschewed. Hence Rabbi Gershuni concludes that permanent residence in Spain cannot be permitted.
An item in the Av-Elul 5729 issue of Ha-Ma'or reports that at least one authority did permit Jewish settlement in Spain. Rabbi Chaim Elazar Schapiro, popularly known as the Munkatcher Rebbe, published a responsum in Tel Talpiot, Tishri 5691, in which he granted permission for residence in Spain provided that the Jewish nationals of that country be granted full religious freedom. To this may be added the discussion of this topic by Rabbi Shlomoh Aaron Wertheimer in his She'elat Shlomoh. II, no. 53, in which he concludes that no ḥerem was ever issued against residence in Spain. Moreover, it is evident from a responsum contained in Teshuvot Mabit, I, no. 307, that the author, R. Moshe di Trani, was unaware of any such ban. It is most unlikely that a ḥerem, had it existed, would have been unknown to this sixteenth-century scholar.
Nevertheless, it is clear that residence in Spain was discountenanced. Mr. Tovia Preschel, in an article which appeared in the Israeli newspaper Ha-Modi'a, 30 Tishri, 5714, and in a subsequent article in Ha-Do'ar, 11 Tevet, 5731, reports that the archives of the Sephardic community of Hamburg contain a document indicating that in 1658 the community adopted a regulation which provided that "whoever visits Spain or Portugal may not be called to the Torah or honored with any other mizvah for two years."7Jahrbuch of the Juedisch-litterarische Gesellschaft of Frankfurt, VIII (1911), 231.
Professor Cecil Roth, Jewish Life, Adar 5717, cites religious sanctions imposed upon visitors to Spain and Portugal. These sanctions were incorporated in the regulations of the "Society for Dowering the Brides" promulgated in Leghorn in 1727. In 1785 similar sanctions were included in the "Ascamot" of Congregation Sahar Asamaim of London.8See also Tovia Preschel, “Al Ḥerem Sefarad,” Ha-Do’ar, 22 Kislev 5732. Roth states that such sanctions were based upon earlier regulations of the Sephardic communities of Amsterdam and Venice.
In a study published in Talpiot, III (5708), nos. 3–4, Professor Abraham Shalom Yahuda offers an interesting explanation of the opprobrium associated with travel to Spain. The text of the edict of expulsion issued by Ferdinand and Isabella stated that any Jew found in Spain after the stipulated date of expulsion would be obliged to convert to Christianity or suffer death by hanging. Thus, subsequently, any Jew who wished to visit the country would have found it necessary to pretend to be a Christian. Since Halakhah forbids a Jew to pretend to be a Christian, return to Spain was effectively banned, not by virtue of the promulgation of a ḥerem but because of the prohibition involved in the subterfuge of pretending to be a Christian. The transgression would have been sufficiently odious to warrant communal sanctions. A somewhat similar explanation is also offered by Cecil Roth. According to Yahuda, following the disbandment of the Inquisition in 1834 there no longer exists any reason for Jews not to visit Spain or even to establish residence there since they are no longer compelled to disguise their Jewish identity.
The Southern Hemisphere
The Tishri–Cheshvan 5730 edition of the Israeli journal, Kol Torah, contains a hitherto unpublished responsum by Rabbi Zevi Pesach Frank, the late Chief Rabbi of Jerusalem. The same material also appears in the Kislev 5731 issue of Ha-Pardes.8aThis item was subsequently included in R. Zevi Pesach Frank’s recently published responsa collection, Har Ḥvi, Oraḥ Ḥayyim, II, no. 29. A shorter item addressed to the inhabitants of New Zealand appears in Har Ẓvi, Oraḥ Ḥayyim, I, no. 56. This responsum, addressed to the Chief Rabbi of Argentina, Rabbi S. Y. Glicksberg, deals with a halakhic question arising from the climatic variations of the Southern Hemisphere.
Leviticus 19:23 stipulates that the fruit of newly planted saplings is forbidden for the first three years of the tree's growth. The three-year period is counted not from the date of planting but from the fifteenth of Shevat, the "New Year of Trees." Those fruits which are formed and show a distinct shape before the fifteenth of Shevat of the fourth year are forbidden as orlah; those formed afterwards are permitted. The question posed by the interlocutor is whether, in view of the reversed seasons in the Southern Hemisphere, the fifteenth of Shevat marks the termination of the period of orlah in those lands as well.
The Gemara, Rosh Hashanah 14a, explains that the fifteenth of Shevat was ordained as the New Year of Trees because by this date "most of the year's rains have been exhausted." Rashi explains the Gemara quite simply by stating that by this date the major portion of the rainy season has elapsed and hence the fruits are already formed. Tosafot, however, maintains that despite the reference to the fifteenth of Shevat, it is really the first day of Tishri which is the New Year of Trees. Fruit nurtured by rain falling prior to the first of Tishri is considered to be the produce of the previous year even though the fruit itself is formed after the New Year. All fruit formed before the fifteenth of Shevat must have been nurtured by precipitation occuring before Tishri; growth after this date cannot be attributed to rains falling before Tishri. Hence, for practical purposes, the fifteenth of Shevat marks the boundary between the old crop and the new.
Rabbi Frank notes that, according to Tosafot, the date ordained as the New Year of Trees quite obviously does not depend upon the local rainy season. Fruit nurtured by rain falling before the first of Tishri is deemed to be of the previous year's growth even though the fruit appears at a later date. According to Tosafot, the talmudic reference to the rainy season is merely an observation of the agricultural phenomenon that rains falling before the first of Tishri are capable of producing fruit only until the fifteenth of Shevat. Hence this date is observed as the New Year of Trees in every locale regardless of local seasons of precipitation. The question at hand, then, arises only according to Rashi's interpretation: Is the date signaling the beginning of a new year with regard to orlah statutory, with the fifteenth of Shevat marking the beginning of the New Year of Trees because it coincides with the close of the rainy season in the Land of Israel, or are these yearly periods contingent upon the local growing season?
Rabbi Frank quotes Rabbi Y. Cohen, currently a member of the Jerusalem Bet Din, in ruling that the New Year of Trees is to be universally observed on the fifteenth of Shevat. Rabbi Cohen advances two reasons for his decision. First, Turei Even, in his commentary on Rosh Hashanah, indicates that the phraseology of the talmudic passage in question indicates that by this date most of the rainy season has passed and therefore the major portion of the crop has assumed a distinctive forum. The fifteenth of Shevat is hence the New Year in only a majority of cases, but since it is a valid date for the major portion of the crop, it becomes the standard date for all trees. Similarly, the general rule remains valid for countries subject to diverse growing seasons.
Secondly, Halakhah accepts the conditions prevailing in Erez Yisra'el as constituting the norm. For example, with regard to the prayer for rain included in the daily Shemoneh Esreh during the winter months, the Shulḥan Arukh, Oraḥ Hayyim 117:2, states that even if the conditions prevailing are such that an entire country is in need of rain during the summer months, the prayer for rain is not recited other than in the winter. The justification is that this prayer was instituted on the basis of the needs of the Land of Israel. Similarly, argues Rabbi Cohen, the laws of orlah were established on the basis of agricultural conditions prevailing in Israel and are applicable without variation throughout the world.
Mizvot on the Moon
As is clearly underscored by the popular witticism regarding "the Elephant and the Jewish Problem," the Jew tends to examine every phenomenon, whether natural, social, political or scientific, in the light of his own particular interests. Little wonder, then, that the contemporary preoccupation with the conquest of space should be reflected in halakhic writings. One of the more intriguing topics in the current literature is the question of the extent to which mizvot are binding upon Jews who may happen to find themselves in the vast regions of outer space. There has now appeared, for the first time, a serious discussion of man's religious obligations on the moon. Undoubtedly, the subject will become a recurrent one and rabbinic literature dealing with this topic will be considerably enriched in the months and years to come.
Among the opinions published thus far, the most extreme position is advanced by Rabbi Ben-Zion Firrer in the 5730 issue of No'am. Rabbi Firrer maintains that mizvot are incumbent upon man only in his terrestrial habitat. The sole supporting evidence for this radical point of view, which is described by its proponent as being "only in the nature of first thoughts; a modest beginning in investigation of this question," is an argument based upon a statement in Kiddushin 37a. Asserting that commandments which are personal in character are binding not only in Erez Yisra'el but in the Diaspora as well, the Gemara quotes the verse "… all the days which you are alive on the earth" (Deut. 12:1). Rabbi Firrer argues that since a pleonasm, "on the earth," is required to establish this obligation, such obligation must be limited to what is specified in this verse. Therefore, man is exempt from performance of mizvot in places other than those which are "on the earth."
In a report of an interview granted by Rabbi Shlomoh Goren, published in Ha-Ẓofeh, 10 Av, 5729 (and cited by Rabbi Firrer in No'am), Rabbi Goren is quoted as asserting that theoretically mizvot contingent upon "time" cannot be performed on the moon, since "time" as measured by twenty-four hour day-night sequences does not exist on this celestial body. Keri'at shema, for example, is obligatory only during certain time periods. Since these periods are defined in terms of terrestrial cycles of light and darkness, it is not clear when keri'at shema should be recited on the moon where the lunar "day" is equal to a month (which, on the average, is 29 days, 12 hours, 44 minutes and 2.78 seconds in length). The same question arises with regard to determining the occurrence of the seventh day which is to be hallowed as the Sabbath. However, argues Rabbi Goren, in practice man is obligated to perform such mizvot. Since natural atmospheric conditions on the moon cannot support human life, man will be able to exist only by creating an artificial atmosphere composed of elements transported from earth. In light of his continual dependence upon Mother Earth, man living on the moon will continue to be governed by the laws operative on earth.
Rabbi Firrer contests the assumption that dependence upon terrestrial materials renders such dependents subject to "Earth-Halakhah," arguing that once such materials come into contact with the moon they are accorded the same status as lunar material. The Gemara, Gittin 7b, declares that bodies of water in Erez Yisra'el are not part of the Land of Israel and that a ship plying the lakes and rivers of Erez Yisra'el, as long as it does not scrape bottom, is considered to be outside the borders of the Land of Israel. When the vessel does touch bottom, its passengers and cargo, even while submerged, are considered to be within the confines of Erez Yisra'el. Rabbi Firrer observes that the ship acquires the halakhic status of the underlying river-bed simply by coming into physical contact with it. Similarly, argues Rabbi Firrer, Earth material coming into contact with lunar substance acquires the halakhic status of the moon itself.
Another article in the same issue of No'am takes sharp issue with Rabbi Firrer's thesis. In direct contradiction to the opinion of Rabbi Firrer, Rabbi Menachem Kasher declares that halakhic obligations are personal ones and are incumbent upon Jews in any and all places where they may find themselves. Hence, the contention that the observance of mizvot is abrogated in the celestial spheres cannot be entertained. Rabbi Kasher adds that since Rabbi Firrer has described his words as "first thoughts," he is certain that the latter's "second thoughts" will reflect a change of heart. Insofar as the reckoning of time is concerned, Rabbi Kasher opines that this situation is no different from the situation which prevails in the earth's polar regions, which have days and nights of many months' duration. Rabbi Kasher has long been of the opinion that under such circumstances the day must be reckoned on a twenty-four-hour basis with alternating twelve-hour periods of "day" and "night" regardless of the presence or absence of solar illumination. The same practice, contends Rabbi Kasher, should be followed by man on the moon.9On this topic see also R. Meir Blumenfeld, Peraḥ Shoshanah, no. 67.
Comets
The anticipated appearance of the comet Kohoutek was much heralded as potentially the most spectacular astronomical occurrence of the century. Although the predicted celestial extravaganza failed to materialize, the abundant publicity preceding the anticipated event occasioned a discussion of questions concerning blessings associated with this and similar phenomena.
The first question which presents itself is whether the appearance of a comet is included among the specifically enumerated occurrences which, when witnessed, occasion the recitation of a unique blessing expressing praise to God as Creator of the universe. Rabbi Abraham Israel, writing in the Kislev–Tevet issue of Ha-Ma'or, quotes the Gemara, Berakhot 58b, which states that the appearance of a kokhava de-shavit occasions such a blessing. This term is translated as "a star with a tail"—an obvious reference to comets. In accordance with the view of Rambam, Hilkhot Berakhot 10:14, and Shulḥan Arukh, Oraḥ Hayyim 227:1, when experiencing phenomena such as thunder or lightning, the viewer has the option of reciting either the blessing "Whose power and might fill the universe" or the blessing "Who created the works of creation." Rambam explicitly states that the same choice is open to one who witnesses "a star which has a tail." However, Taz, Oraḥ Hayyim 227:1, records that it is customary to pronounce the blessing "Whose power and might fill the universe" when hearing thunder since the phenomenon of thunder is a demonstration of divine power, whereas lightning evokes praise of God as the Creator "of the works of creation." It would therefore follow, according to this custom, that the blessing "Who creates the works of creation" would be appropriate upon the sighting of a comet.
Another question which has been raised is whether a blessing is required if the comet is not visible to the naked eye but is seen through a telescope. It is of interest to note that some type of optical instrument seems to have been extant in the days of the Gemara. Eruvin 43b10Me‘iri, commenting on this statement in his Bet ha-Beḥirah, ad locum, quotes Rav Hai Ga’on as offering two alternate explanations: (1) that the tube was a tube simpliciter without glass and was used as an ordinary measuring instrument; and (2) that the tube was an astrolabe, to which, in fact, he refers by name. In his other work on Eruvin, Ḥiddushei ha-Me‘iri, Me‘iri refers obliquely to Rav Hai Ga’on’s comments but dismisses them, stating that these interpretations are “difficult to understand” and that Rashi’s interpretation “is sufficient.” reports that Rabban Gamaliel had a "tube" through which he could see a distance of two thousand cubits. There is some question as to whether, from the halakhic perspective, a visual phenomenon perceived through a telescope is deemed to be a veridical perception of the object itself or whether such perception is deemed to be a form of optical distortion rather than a true visual perception of the object per se. This question is discussed by various authorities in a number of different contexts. Rabbi Isaac Schmelkes, Bet Yizḥak, Even ha-Ezer, II, no. 86, demonstrates, on the basis of talmudic sources, that witnesses may testify only to matters which they have perceived directly, but may not testify to events which they have observed through the lens of a telescope. More comparable to the issue at hand is the question of whether the sanctification of the New Moon may be recited in the event that the moon is perceivable only through a telescope. Devar Shemu'el, no. 242 (cited by Be'er Heitev, Oraḥ Hayyim 426:1), declares that one who sees the moon through a telescope or glass instrument should not recite the blessing "for it is not a proper visual perception" (re'iyah gemurah). However, this view is challenged by Shevut Ya'akov, I, no. 126, and by Sha'arei Teshuvah, Oraḥ Hayyim 426:1. The latter authority declares that the sanctification of the New Moon may be recited by a person who requires the aid of eyeglasses even if he is totally unable to see the moon without glasses. Rabbi Israel, citing these sources, draws an analogy between the sanctification of the New Moon seen through a telescope and the recitation of the appropriate blessing upon the occasion of the sighting of a comet by means of a telescope and asserts that the halakhic determination should be the same in both instances. However, any conclusions with regard to the blessing upon the sighting of a comet by means of a telescope predicated upon sources pertaining to sanctification of the New Moon are specious since the rationale underlying the halakhah with regard to the sanctification of the New Moon is not applicable to the sighting of a comet. The very source cited, Sha'arei Teshuvah, indicates that the sanctification of the New Moon may be recited despite the fact that the New Moon is not visible to the naked eye because even a blind person is obligated to pronounce the sanctification and hence it is not necessary actually to "see" the moon. This is certainly not the case with regard to the recitation of a blessing upon the sighting of a comet.
Rabbi Israel adduces further evidence drawn from the discussion of a similar question pertaining to the obligation to rise in the presence of a Torah scholar. Halakhot Ketanot, I, no. 274, rules that one must rise even if the scholar is seen through an intervening pane of glass. Similarly, Shulḥan Arukh, Oraḥ Hayyim 75:5, states that the restriction against reading the shema in the presence of "nakedness" encompasses such utterances even if the "nakedness" is covered by glass. However, Rabbi Israel's conclusion that there is no halakhic distinction between perception by means of the naked eye and perception by means of an optical instrument is unwarranted. The sources dealing with rising in the presence of a scholar and the recitation of the shema in the presence of nakedness speak of intervening windows or sheets of glass which in no way magnify or distort vision. Under such conditions Halakhah deems the perception to be a true one. However, on the basis of these sources, the question of whether or not the perception of an object artificially magnified by means of a glass prism is the equivalent of "seeing" remains an open question. Evidence that it is not deemed a proper visual perception may be found in the previously cited statement of Sha'arei Teshuvah. As noted, this authority rules that the viewing of a telescopically magnified moon occasions the recitation of the sanctification of the New Moon precisely because that moon need not be actually seen, as evidenced by the obligation of a blind person vis-à-vis the sanctification of the New Moon. The clear implication of Sha'arei Teshuvah's discussion is that telescopic magnification does not result in re'iyah gemurah insofar as Halakhah is concerned and accordingly no blessing would be occasioned unless the comet is seen without magnification. However, Sha'arei Teshuvah does not cite Shevut Ya'akov's discussion in its entirety. Deuteronomy 25:9 prescribes that ḥalizah must be performed "before the eyes of the judges." Shevut Ya'akov addresses himself to the question of whether or not the members of a Bet Din convened for purposes of ḥalizah must be capable of seeing the performance of this rite without benefit of eyeglasses. Shevut Ya'akov concludes that inability to see without eyeglasses does not serve to disqualify a person from serving as a member of a Bet Din for this purpose. Not mentioned by these authorities is a possible distinction between eyeglasses, which simply correct a distortion caused by a malfunction of the eye thereby restoring normal vision to the wearer, and magnification by means of a telescope or other instrument which results in a vision not perceivable under normal conditions.