APPENDIX TO ALLEGORICAL INTERPRETATION, II
§ 6. Philo is alluding to the Stoic view that the πάθη are mental judgements. See Diogenes Laertius vii. 111 δοκεῖ δὲ αὐτοῖς τὰ πάθη κρίσεις εἶναι, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ Περὶ παθῶν· ἥ τε γὰρ φιλαργυρία ὑπόληψίς ἐστι τοῦ τὸ ἀργύριον καλὸν εἶναι, καὶ ἡ μέθη δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία ὁμοίως, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα. Here he may mean that he accepts this view in some cases, but not in all; or, perhaps, that his statement that the πάθη are ἄλογα might be doubted if the view that they are κρίσεις be accepted, but is certainly true if that view be rejected.
§ 15. Greek philosophers. Presumably this includes (a) Plato; see Cratylus 401 B, where we are told that the first name-givers must have been considerable persons. Cf. ibid. 390 D. (b) Pythagoras. In Tusc. Disp. i. 62 Cicero, speaking of the greatness of the task of assigning names, says “summae sapientiae Pythagorae visum est.”
§§ 16, 18. Having in 16 prepared the way for his interpretation of Gen. 2:19 by observing that τί = διὰ τί, “why,” Philo goes on to make καλεῖν = “invite,” “welcome,” to treat ψυχὴν ζῶσαν as predicative, putting ὡς before it in his paraphrase, practically to ignore αὐτό as an otiose accusative, πᾶν ὃ ἐὰν being the sufficient object of ἐκάλεσεν. The verse for him has to do, not with assigning names, but with proclaiming affinities. To welcome pleasure, desire, or cowardice as living souls is to proclaim affinity with them, and so to share their title or name.
§ 20. εἴ γε μὴν … σαρκίνη δήπου; “if one of the two sides was filled up with flesh, are we to presume that the one not so treated was not made of flesh?” Philo captiously presses the words of Gen. 2:21, ἀνεπλήρωσεν σάρκα ἀντʼ αὐτῆς, to mean that in the filling up a different material, namely flesh, was substituted (ἀντι) for the material which was there before; which would of course imply that the other side was of a material other than flesh.
§ 22. The power of holding together, etc. This fourfold classification is Stoic (see S. V. F. ii. 457–460). It is explained more fully in Quod Deus 35 ff. It is difficult to see at first sight how the “naked” mind can have these powers, at any rate that of ἕξις, which is the characteristic of inorganic matter. But in Quod Deus 35 we find that the ἕξις which holds together a stone or a piece of wood is a breath or spirit, which extends itself from the centre of the body in question to its extremes and then reverses its course. Thus ἕξις and the others are conceived of as powers distinct from the objects or persons in which they are found. In fact we are told (Themistius, De anima 72 B) that the Stoics held that God ποὺ μὲν εἶναι νοῦν, ποὺ δὲ ψυχήν, ποὺ δὲ φύσιν, ποὺ δὲ ἕξιν. Seneca translates ἕξις when used in this way by unitas. The sense seems different, and perhaps has a different origin, from that of “state” or “disposition” (Lat. habitus). Zeller, however, equates the two by regarding the ἕξις of this passage as = simple quality without any further characteristic (Stoics, p. 208).
§ 44. For the construction ταύτῃ κληθήσεται cf. Jer. 19:6 οὐ κληθήσεται τῷ τόπῳ τούτῳ ἔτι Διάπτωσις. In Judges 18:12 A has ἐκλήθη ἐκείνῳ τῷ τόπῳ Παρεμβολὴ Δάν, omitting ἐν found in some MSS. before ἐκείνῳ. (Or, as the words that follow perhaps suggest, Philo may have taken ταύτῃ as an adverb and explained it as = διὰ τοῦτο.)
§ 46. Rachel, who represents sense-perception (or superficiality), takes her seat upon idols (E.V. “teraphim,” Gen. 31:33), and is rebuked by Jacob (or “Israel,” the man of vision) when her words show that she imagines that mind is the author and originator of movements.
§ 63. The actual meaning of Num. 30:4 ff. is that a woman’s vows hold if her father or husband silently acquiesce, but not if they forbid them; whereas those of a widow, seeing there is no such person to prohibit them, must hold. By taking “husband” or “father” to represent reason, Philo extracts the thought that our wishes are not guilty if our reasoned thoughts prohibit them, so that we do not translate them into action. The “widow” stands for the soul, which has cut itself off from any such controlling influence, and whose guilt is abiding.
§ 65. They were not ashamed. The real meaning of the story is of course that they did not feel shame, but in 68 ff. Philo gives the words a sense, which they are capable of bearing, “they were not shamed,” i.e. “brought to do anything shameful.”
§ 67. Intense and fixed, or “full (or ‘deep’) coloured.” The word κατακορής may be used of any colour. But as in the Timaeus, which Philo knew so well, it is associated (68c) with μέλαν (=“intense black”), he probably uses it here with reference to the complexion of the Ethiopian woman. There may also be a play on its similarity to κόρη in the sense of “a pupil of the eye.”
§ 78. ’Tis well that they say, etc. A clearer meaning could be obtained by reading οὐχ ὅτι “κατελαλήσαμεν ὅτι ἡμάρτομεν,” ἀλλʼ ὅτι “ἡμάρτομεν ὅτι κατελαλήσαμεν.” “It is well that they say, not ‘we spake against the Lord (laying it to His charge) that we sinned,’ but ‘we sinned (in) that we spake against the Lord.’ ” This harmonizes with the next words. It was easy for scribes to confuse the ὅτι’s.
§ 83–87. The meaning of these sections seems to be as follows. We here deal with souls which are more blessed than those mentioned above, yet are subjected to a τροπή by God to convince them of their frailty and that of human kind (§ 83). These souls Philo takes to be described in Deut. 8. They are in contrast with those of Num. 21. in the following ways. First these (the historical situation being ignored) are in Egypt (87 init.). As they were “craving for the habitations of Egypt,” they are virtually (cf. L.A. i. 61) in Egypt. The others are in the wilderness, which is the reverse of Egypt. They too, indeed, are bitten by the serpent of pleasure and the scorpion of scattering, yet these bites are not deadly like those of Numb. 21. And they do not need the brazen serpent of καρτερία to cure them; for they are already καρτερίας ἐρασταί (83). They have the higher spiritual food of the manna and the rock-water, and are thus brought back from their τροπή spiritually enriched. Philo evidently associates himself with these souls.
§ 99. Four-legged. The reference is to the four passions, grief, fear, desire, pleasure. See S. V. F. iii. 381 ff.