Laws of Feeding Workers and Animals

Sources

When workers are performing activities with produce that grows from the earth, but the work required for it has not been completed, and their actions bring the work to its completion, the employer is commanded to allow them to eat from the produce with which they are working. This applies whether they are working with produce that has been harvested or produce that is still attached to the ground.
This is derived from Deuteronomy 23:25, which states: "When you enter the vineyard of your colleague, you may eat grapes as you desire," and ibid…

Mishneh Torah, Hiring 12-13

Rabbi Ami stated an alternative answer: A verse is not required to teach the right of a person to eat from detached produce, as it is written: “When you come into your neighbor’s vineyard, then you may eat grapes” (Deuteronomy 23:25). Are we not dealing even with a case in which the employer hired the laborer to transport the grapes out of the vineyard, and yet the Merciful One states that he may eat? The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that an ox must be allowed to eat from attached…

Bava Metzia 88b:13-89b:9

The expression: “until you have enough” indicates that a laborer may eat until he is satiated, but he may not engage in excessive eating. The phrase “but you may not put any in your vessel” teaches that at a time when you put the grapes in the owner’s vessels, i.e., when harvesting the grapes, then you may eat, but at a time when you are not putting the grapes in the owner’s vessels, i.e., if the laborer is performing other tasks in the vineyard before harvesting, you may not eat.

Bava Metzia 87b:21

§ Rami bar Ḥama raises a dilemma: If one placed a thorn in the mouth of a threshing animal, what is the halakha? The Gemara is puzzled by this question: If he placed the thorn in its mouth, this is certainly considered proper muzzling. Rather, the dilemma should be formulated as follows: If a thorn settled in its mouth and one did not remove it, what is the halakha? The Gemara poses a similar question: If one made a lion crouch over it from outside, to frighten the animal and stop it from eating…

Bava Metzia 90b:5-13

MISHNA: If a laborer was performing labor with his hands but not with his feet, or with his feet but not with his hands, e.g., pressing grapes, or even if he was performing labor only with his shoulder, this one may eat the produce of the field. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: A laborer may not eat unless he performs labor with his hands and with his feet. GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the ruling of the Rabbis stated in the first clause of the mishna? The Gemara explains…

Bava Metzia 91b:4-92a:17

MISHNA: A man can stipulate on his own behalf that he receive a certain increase in his wages instead of eating the produce with which he works, and similarly, he can stipulate this on behalf of his adult son or daughter, on behalf of his adult Canaanite slave or Canaanite maidservant, or on behalf of his wife, with their agreement, because they have the basic level of mental competence, i.e., they are legally competent and can therefore waive their rights…

Bava Metzia 93a:5-14

The Gemara answers: The one who maintains that robbery from a gentile is permitted interprets the phrase “in your neighbor’s vineyard” as teaching that a laborer may eat produce only in his neighbor’s vineyard, but he may not eat produce of consecrated property. The baraita continues: The term “then you may eat” indicates that a laborer must eat the entire grape and may not suck its juice and cast the rest away. The word “grapes” teaches that a laborer may eat only grapes by themselves and not grapes and something else, i.e…

Bava Metzia 87b:19

or that thresh teruma and tithe, which one may not allow his cows to eat, if he muzzles them he does not violate the prohibition of: Do not muzzle, but due to the appearance of prohibition, as observers are unaware that he is acting in a permitted manner, he should bring a piece of that species of produce and hang it in the basket [bateraskalin] that is by the animal’s mouth. Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai says: He does not have to use the same food that the animal is threshing, as he may bring vetches and hang them for it…

Bava Metzia 90a:1-3

Rather, the Gemara offers a slightly different answer: It is not difficult; here, the ruling in this baraita is stated with regard to definite teruma of the tithe, separated by a Levite from his tithe and given to a priest; there, the ruling in that baraita is stated with regard to teruma of the tithe from demai. § The Sages raised a dilemma before Rav Sheshet: If the animal was eating from the produce it was threshing, and it was excreting diarrhea [matrezet]…

Bava Metzia 90a:11-14

The Gemara cites yet another relevant source: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (93a): In the case of one who hires a laborer to perform labor with his fourth-year produce, such laborers may not eat the fruit, as all fruit of the fourth year of a tree must be taken and consumed in Jerusalem. And if he did not inform them beforehand that they were working with fourth-year produce, they are considered to have been hired under false pretenses. Consequently, he must redeem the fruit and feed them.…

Bava Metzia 92b:3-5

MISHNA: The halakha is the same whether concerning an ox or whether concerning any other animal with regard to liability for falling into a pit, and with regard to keeping its distance from Mount Sinai at the time of the receiving of the Torah, when it was forbidden for any animal to ascend the mountain, and with regard to the payment of double the principal by a thief, and with regard to the mitzva of returning a lost item, and with regard to unloading its burden…

Bava Kamma 54b:6

If you wish, say a different answer to the original contradiction between the baraitot: This is not difficult; here, the ruling in this baraita is stated with regard to definite tithe, which may not be fed to a cow, whereas there, the ruling in that baraita is stated with regard to doubtfully tithed produce [demai], from which one is required to separate tithes by rabbinic law. The Gemara comments: Now that you have arrived at this answer, i.e…

Bava Metzia 90a:9

MISHNA: This mishna details the halakha that a laborer is permitted to eat from the produce with which he is working. And these laborers may eat by Torah law: A laborer who works with produce attached to the ground at the time of the completion of its work, e.g., harvesting produce; and a laborer who works with produce detached from the ground before the completion of its work, i.e., before it is sufficiently processed and thereby subject to tithes…

Bava Metzia 87a:19-87b:17

§ The Sages taught: One who muzzles a cow and threshes with it is flogged, and in addition he must pay the owner of the cow four kav for a cow, the usual amount it consumes while threshing, and three kav for a donkey. The Gemara asks: But isn’t there a principle that an offender is not flogged and also punished by death, and likewise he is not flogged and rendered liable to pay? One who transgresses a prohibition is liable to receive only one punishment for a single offense…

Bava Metzia 91a:4

The Gemara asks: And is projecting one’s voice not considered an action according to Rabbi Yoḥanan? But wasn’t it stated that amora’im engaged in a dispute concerning the following case: If one muzzled an animal by projecting his voice, by berating it whenever it tried to eat, has he transgressed the prohibition of: “You shall not muzzle an ox while it treads out the corn” (Deuteronomy 25:4)? And similarly, if one led different species to work together by projecting his voice, without performing any action…

Sanhedrin 65b:3

Rav Pappa stated a different answer: From the time of his pulling of the cow to rent it for threshing he was rendered obligated to provide its sustenance when it threshes, but as for flogging, he is not liable to be flogged until the actual time of muzzling. In other words, he was liable to pay the monetary payment before he incurred liability to receive lashes, which means that they are two separate liabilities.

Bava Metzia 91a:6

Besides vows, there are other areas of halakha where there is a distinction between different varieties of the same food. We learned in a mishna there (Ma’asrot 2:8): A hired worker who was working with keloppasin, a type of fig, may not partake of benot sheva, a different species of fig, during his work. A worker may partake only of the fruit that he is handling at the time (see Deuteronomy 23:25–26). Similarly, if he was working with benot sheva he may not partake of keloppasin…

Nedarim 50b:8

It was stated previously that a buyer is not required to tithe produce by Torah law. If so, the same certainly applies to a laborer. Consequently, the term kenafshekha cannot serve to teach that a laborer may eat without tithing, as claimed earlier. The Gemara asks: Rather, what does kenafshekha come to teach? The Gemara answers: It comes to teach that which is taught in another baraita: Kenafshekha can mean: Like your own person. Just as with regard to your own person, i.e…

Bava Metzia 88b:2

From the laws of the commandment is what they, may their memory be blessed, said (Bava Metzia 87a), what is the difference between someone involved in what is detached and someone who is involved with what is attached: That the one involved with what is detached eats until he finishes his work, and once he finishes his work, it is forbidden for him to eat. But the one who is involved with what is attached — for example, harvesting and reaping — only eats when he has finished his work. For example, the harvester and the reaper would eat after they have filled the basket…

Sefer HaChinukh 576:3-578:2

To not muzzle an animal at the time of its work: To not prevent an animal from eating that which it is working on, at the time of its work — for example, when it threshes grain or carries straw from place to place on its back — as we do not have permission to prevent it from eating from it. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 25:4), “You shall not muzzle an ox in its threshing.” It is from the roots of the commandment [that it is] to teach ourselves that our souls be a good soul that chooses what is right and clings to it and pursues kindness and mercy…

Sefer HaChinukh 596:1-4

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