TEXTUAL STUDY AND PUBLIC PRAYER are two major foci of Jewish activity today. Both are performed in a communal setting, and until recently, both have been dominated by men. Since the rabbis developed these forms of worship, with their associated rules of inclusion and exclusion, we may reasonably infer that they did not accord importance to women’s spiritual or intellectual life, that they actively sought to maintain women at the margins. As for study, this conclusion is warranted. Many Jewish women today—although enrolled in Jewish schools—are not allowed to study Talmud. In traditional circles, women may still not be ordained as rabbis. As for public prayer, however, we must be careful not to confuse today’s religious realities with those of the second to fifth centuries. Given that Judaism in the time of the Talmud was not focused on synagogue life—Judaism in Israel today still is not—we must investigate the question: How did the rabbis view women’s need for or connection to a wide variety of ritual acts? For what reasons did they either obligate women to perform, or exempt or prohibit them from performing, these acts?
Many account for women’s exemptions and exclusions with the claim that women’s demanding domestic role would conflict with the discharging of ritual responsibilities, or that women, by nature, are private, and men public. But the rabbinic statements themselves do not support those claims and distinctions. On the contrary, the powerful argument for the differing levels of ritual responsibility, arising from a close reading of the words of the texts themselves, is that women occupy secondary social status in comparison to men, an argument utilized in Chapter 9 to explain women’s exclusion from testimony. This status will not only explain women’s pattern of exemptions but also their inability to assist men in the discharge of their ritual obligations. Even so, as time passed, the rabbis imposed on women more and more ritual obligations. These additions are proof of the rabbis’ increasing recognition of women’s spiritual needs and of the fact that excluding women from active Jewish observance could undermine their commitment to Jewish life in general. Finally, we will see that the very same rabbi who obligated men to recite daily, “Blessed be God for not making me a woman,” explains this blessing not as a misogynist gibe but as a statement of men’s gratitude for their higher level of ritual obligation. He does not go so far as to say that this level of obligation derives from men’s status as head of household, although a later rabbi implies exactly that. As we saw in the chapters on sotah, divorce, niddah, and inheritance, here, too, we will find evidence of struggle and conflict: Some rabbis favored greater ritual involvement for women and some lesser. The former triumphed.
The key passages on the topic of women and ritual obligations are not found in any of the tractates dealing with ritual, but, surprisingly, in Kiddushin, the tractate dealing with betrothal. Since we know that the redactor of the Mishnah acted with intention in his arrangement of material, we may assume he had a reason for locating the two sets of rules adjacent to each other. To discover that reason, we will first look at these passages on their own and then interpret them within their literary and legal context.
As already noted in Chapter 3, the first six mishnahs of chapter 1 of Kiddushin discuss the acquisition by men of a whole range of goods, from a wife, at one end, to slaves, cattle, and real estate, at the other. The striking similarity between the methods of betrothing women and those of purchasing slaves and fields suggests that wives were owned by their husbands as property. In what appears to be a radical break in the flow of material, mishnahs 7 and 8 discuss a different topic altogether: obligations to perform mitzvot, first the obligations of fathers (or parents) and children to each other, and then the ritual obligations of women and men. In a concluding aggadic flourish, mishnahs 9 and 10 talk about the reward that accrues from performance and the punishment that is incurred by lack of performance.
All obligations1The word in Hebrew, mitzvat (not mitzvot), appears throughout in the singular. I have translated it in the plural. of the son on the father [כל מצות הבן על האב], men are obligated but women are exempt.
And all obligations of the father on the son [וכל מצות האב על הבן], both men and women are obligated. (M Kiddushin 1:7a)
It is hard to know what the two key phrases mean—the “obligations of the son on the father” and the “obligations of the father on the son.” Each can be interpreted in more than one way, either as the obligations a father has to his son or those that a son has to his father. In a sense, one has to work backwards: Since women are exempted in the first clause but obligated in the second, it seems more reasonable in an ancient authoritarian society to exempt them from obligations to their children than to their parents. “Father” and “son” in the first clause are to be understood literally but in the second as referring to parents and children.2The word בן in the first clause, on the subject of parental obligations to children, refers to sons only because a father has no obligations to his daughters, but בן in the second clause refers to both sons and daughters and their obligations to their parents; אב in the first clause refers to fathers only, but אב in the second clause refers to both mothers and fathers, since honoring parents, as defined by the Torah, includes both mothers and fathers.
The parallel passage in the Tosefta defines the two difficult phrases, presenting them in the same order as in the Mishnah but reversing the meaning:3For the Tosefta, obligations incumbent on the son to perform for the father are called “obligations of the son on the father” rather than “obligations of the father on the son,” as in the Mishnah. The same reversal holds true for obligations incumbent on the father to perform for the son: For the Tosefta, these are “obligations of the father on the son,” whereas for the Mishnah they are “obligations of the son on the father.” It is easily noticed that the Tosefta reverses the order for the two kinds of obligations: It discusses those that fall on children to perform for parents first and the obligations of parents to children second. The Mishnah, at least according to the Tosefta and Bavli, does the opposite. That is, even though both works present the Hebrew phrases in the same order, the Tosefta interprets them in one way and the Mishnah in another.
What is the obligation of the son on the father [מצות הבן על האב]? He must feed him, give him drink, dress him, cloak him, take him out and in, and wash his face, hands, and feet. The same applies to both men and women, except that a man has the means at his disposal [to accomplish these tasks] whereas a woman does not [אין ספק בידה לעשות], because she is under the control of others [שיש רשות אחרים עליה].
What is the obligation of the father on the son [מצות האב על הבן]? To circumcise him, redeem him [from a kohen, if he is a firstborn], teach him Torah, teach him a trade, and marry him off. And some say, to [teach him to] swim in the river. (Tosefta Kiddushin 1:11)
We see that, according to both the Mishnah and the Tosefta, men and women alike are obligated to care for parents. The Tosefta, however, goes on to qualify the daughter’s obligation: She is, for the most part, exempt, because both she herself and her financial assets are controlled by others, that is to say, her husband.4One manuscript of the Tosefta (Erfurt) reads “husband” instead of “others.” That is most likely an interpretation or clarification. The Tosefta thus establishes a connection between a woman’s subordinate social and marital status and her ability to fulfill mitzvot: When married, she is not in control of her time or money and will, therefore, not be able to care for her parents. It is possible that the redactor of the Mishnah chose to say that she is “obligated,” without qualification, because he disagrees with the opinion expressed in the Tosefta. Even if in many cases it will not be possible for a married daughter to take care of her parents, the redactor still says she is obligated. It would seem that as the father of a daughter, the redactor wants to require her to take care of him, even though as the husband of a wife, he will have to allow her to cater to her parents’ needs at the expense of his. The reason, according to the Gemara, that a father, but not a mother, is obligated to his son is that if a woman is not obligated to perform a specific ritual act for herself, such as redemption of the firstborn, she is not required to perform it for others (BT Kiddushin 29a).
In its discussion of the second clause of the mishnah, women’s obligation to care for parents, the Gemara quotes the above passage from the Tosefta and then continues:
––Said R. Iddi b. Abin said Rav: If she gets divorced, the two of them—[a son and a daughter]—are equal. (BT Kiddushin 30b)
R. Iddi bar Abin in the name of Rav is making an exception to the exemption: Although the Tosefta does not obligate a married woman to care for parents, he obligates a woman who became single to do so, because she is no longer controlled by a man.
The Yerushalmi develops this idea further:
The same goes for a man, the same goes for a woman. A man has means at his disposal, but a woman does not have means at her disposal, because she is under the aegis of others. If she is widowed or divorced, she becomes like one who has the means.5Rashi notes (s.v. sippek), that her husband could object. To what? To her spending her time in this way. Tosafot (s.v. sheyesh reshut) comment that even though she must turn over her earnings to her husband, the problem is not lack of means but lack of access: How can one obligate a married woman to care for her father and mother when she lives elsewhere, with her husband?
This comment of the Tosafot is similar to the argument raised above: Rather than say that others control her and she is not free to spend her time caring for her parents, the Tosafot say that the issue is that she is not living close enough to her parents to be able to care for them. (PT Kiddushin 1:7; 61a)
The Yerushalmi makes the same point as the Bavli in essentially the same words but includes the exceptions to the exemption, the widow and the divorcee, within the baraita itself, rather than presenting them as an Amora’s addition. The freedom of action that these rabbinic texts attribute to the divorced or widowed woman echoes Numbers 30:10, where the only women who must keep the vows they take are those who do not have a husband or father who could cancel them. The Torah thus recognizes that women have religious needs, but it subjects their religious behavior to the approval of the man under whose control they happen to be.
The connection between women’s freedom to perform mitzvot and their marital status assists us in interpreting the second part of mishnah 7. It, too, compares women’s and men’s obligations, this time with respect to ritual.
And all positive mitzvot that are time-bound, men are obligated but women are exempt. And all positive mitzvot that are not time-bound, the same holds for men and for women, they are [both] obligated.
And all negative mitzvot, whether or not time-bound, the same holds for men and for women, they are obligated.… (M 1:7b)
This mishnah, the only one that presents general rules of ritual obligation for women, obligates women and men equally to three of the four categories of mitzvot: positive mitzvot that are not time-bound and negative mitzvot, both time-bound and not time-bound. Women are exempt only from time-bound positive mitzvot. We can begin to find out why by examining the associated passage in the Tosefta.
What is [an example] of a positive time-bound mitzvah? Succah [dwelling in a booth on the festival of Succot], lulav [waving palm branches on the festival of Succot], and tefillin [donning phylacteries each morning].
What is [an example] of a positive non-time-bound mitzvah? Returning a lost object [to its owner], sending away the mother bird when taking the young, erecting a railing on a roof, and tzitzit [wearing fringes on the corners of the garment]. R. Simon exempts women from tzitzit because it is a positive time-bound mitzvah. (Tosefta Kiddushin 1:10)
Why are women exempt from the positive time-bound mitzvot listed here? The most popular explanation is that performing these mitzvot would interfere with a woman’s ability to meet her domestic responsibilities, in particular to care for her children.6Shmuel Safrai, in his article on women’s obligation to the mitzvot, “Mehuyavutan shel Nashim Bemitzvot Bemishnatam shel Hatannaim,” Bar Ilan Yearbook for Jewish Studies and Humanities, 5755 26/27: 227–236, concludes that since women, according to the rabbis, were present at Sinai, they would have been obligated by the mitzvot. It is their heavy domestic schedule that precludes them from performance. Therefore, the mishnah about women’s obligations and exclusions is a summary of what women found themselves capable of doing. It reflects social reality already in practice; it is not a set of rules for determining which mitzvot obligate women and which do not. I see no textual evidence for such an interpretation. Safrai is deriving social realities from a legal text. But this answer assumes that the performance of positive time-bound mitzvot must occur in a highly specified window of time. It also assumes that no one else could share her domestic responsibilities, freeing her for whatever time was necessary for the performance of the mitzvah.
These two assumptions are false. First, because a woman in Talmudic society lived with her husband’s family,7For example, BT Pesahim 87a says that on the first festival after she gets married a woman is very anxious to go back to her father’s home to celebrate. This implies that she lived with her husband’s family. See also the baraita in BT Ketubot 82b, which understands divorce as a woman’s leaving her father-in-law’s home and returning to her father’s home. See also M Eruvin 8:5, which makes reference to a man’s going to spend the Sabbath with his daughter who lives in the same city but not in his house. she would probably have had no trouble getting help with domestic chores from a mother-in-law, sister-in-law, or even from her own children. Second, this domestic explanation creates a false distinction between men’s and women’s daily responsibilities. When the mishnah was articulated, mitzvot that took much time were unlikely to be appropriate for either men or women, because each had many daily tasks to perform. Life was hard for all but the upper class of society. That women would find it more difficult than men to find time to pray the morning prayers between 6 and 10 A.M. does not make sense: If they did not have servants, the husband and wife would each have vast responsibilities. If they did have servants, each would have the opportunity to devote time to prayer. Third, the domestic explanation does not account for the fact that many mitzvot, such as the requirement to hear the shofar blasts on Rosh Hashanah or light the Chanukah candles, take very little time, can be performed within a wide block of time, and can be performed at home. But the most pointed critique of the domestic theory of exemption is that one of the most time-consuming of all mitzvot, prayer—the set of eighteen petitionary blessings that had to be recited twice or even three times daily—is obligatory not just upon men but also upon women (M Berakhot 3:3)!
Another popular, contemporary explanation of women’s exemption, that the rabbis felt it was not necessary to obligate them to perform key ritual acts because they are on a higher spiritual level than men and thus do not need them, also does not make sense. Let alone that there is no evidence of such a difference between men and women, the obligation of women to many mitzvot, even positive time-bound ones such as prayer and Grace after meals, seriously challenges the notion that the rabbis felt that women do not need mitzvot. In fact, a major theme of the Torah is the requirement for a Jew to perform ritual acts as a sign of acceptance of the terms of God’s covenant.8See, for instance, Deut. 11:13–21. This paragraph is part of the Shema and recited twice daily by men. The essence of the Mishnah and Gemara is the elaboration of those mitzvot and their application to both men and women.
The answer, therefore, has to be sought elsewhere. Why are the rules about women and mitzvot found in this particular place in the Mishnah, right after the rules of acquiring a wife? Their juxtaposition suggests that a woman who is acquired by a man becomes obligated to him primarily. He controls both her time and her money. Once married, she would not have the opportunity to fulfill religious obligations unless her husband allowed her to do so. She thus cannot be independently obligated to perform them.9Abudarham Hashalem (Jerusalem: Usha Press, 1340/1963), 25. Abudarham says that since a wife was subservient to her husband, were she obligated, she would have to choose between pleasing God and pleasing her husband. See the article by Noam Zohar, “Mah Bein Ish L’ishah,” Et La’asot, no. 1 (Summer 1988): 103–112, in which the author sees social status as a crucial factor in determining the level of obligation to the mitzvot. This explanation tallies with the Tosefta’s statement of why a woman is exempt from caring for her parents, which is mentioned in the first half of the same mishnah. That others control her is a fact of married life with far-reaching consequences.10It is only in the modern world that we dismiss such logic because we are not comfortable with the idea that religious obligations are contingent upon, or vary with, social position. Furthermore, that men, in the rabbinic period, controlled women in marriage is a notion that many people in the modern period are not willing to state openly. It is also true that performance of some of these mitzvot announces to the world that a person is free and independent, in charge of himself. R. Joshua b. Levi says that a slave who dons tefillin is a free man (BT Gittin 40a). Were a woman to don tefillin, she would be proclaiming to all that she is no longer subordinate to her husband. The rabbis could not permit her to take such a step.
The rule of women’s exemption can be understood in yet another, related way. A more literal rendering of the Hebrew phrase mitzvot aseh shehazeman gerama is that these mitzvot are ones that will come your way no matter what, independent of the circumstances of your life. As the seasons, the zemanim, roll around, the time for eating the paschal lamb, hearing the shofar blasts, and sitting in a succah will certainly arrive.11See Jay Rovner, “Rhetorical Strategy and Dialectical Necessity in the Babylonian Talmud: The Case of Kiddushin 34a–35a,” HUCA 65 (1994): 200–201. See, in particular, n. 48, and the references to Jacob Neusner’s phrase, “dependent on the time [of the year].” The category called mitzvot aseh shelo hazeman gerama, non-time-bound positive mitzvot, in contrast, will not necessarily come your way, ever. If you do not own a home, you will not be obligated to build a railing on the roof; if you do not find someone’s lost object, you will not have an opportunity to return it; if you do not come across a nest with a mother bird and young, you will never have the opportunity to send away the mother and keep the young. A woman is thus exempt from those active mitzvot that a Jew will surely find himself executing in the course of the Jewish day, week, and year, but is obligated to those that may never come her way. Why?
The Talmud mentions the phrases “positive time-bound” or “non-time-bound” mitzvot only in connection with women. That is, this distinction was created solely for the purpose of distinguishing between women’s ritual obligations and her exemptions. It was not a category that had any other use. For men, who are obligated to perform all positive mitzvot, there is no significance to this distinction. Had there been some other meaning to this categorization of mitzvot, not relating to women, I would have to concede that their exemption could flow from some other reason. If, for the sake of argument, time-bound positive mitzvot required the expenditure of money, then we could explain women’s exemption as flowing from her lack of control of financial assets. But since this distinction was devised only to create a category from which women are exempt, the reason for the exemption has to lie in the meaning of the phrase itself, namely, that these are the key mitzvot of marking Jewish time. It is not that they take time.
Women were exempted from the essential ritual acts of Judaism, those that year in and year out mark Jewish time, in order to restrict their performance to men, to heads of household; only people of the highest social standing, according to the rabbis, does God consider most fit to honor or worship Him in this important way. This hierarchical arrangement is reminiscent of Temple protocol. Only kohanim, the individuals of highest social standing, as evidenced by their more stringent rules for marriage, ritual purity, and physical fitness (Leviticus 21), could serve as Temple functionaries.12This male hierarchy is also reminiscent of the community organization of the Dead Sea sects. Only men could undergo initiation rites and become full-fledged members. Women were present in these communities, but not obligated nor permitted to participate in communal rites in the same way as men. See Lawrence H. Schiffman, Reclaiming the Dead Sea Scrolls (Philadelphia: JPS, 1994), pt. 2, “The Community at Qumran. ” The point is that those who serve God must themselves be especially worthy. In rabbinic society this meant that only males were fitting candidates for the time-bound positive commandments, the highest form of ritual act. Women are exempt, although not forbidden, because they are individuals of lower social standing, who, therefore, honor God less when serving Him. This status argument, a variation of the previous one that women are controlled by men, is, in my opinion, a reasonable explanation of women’s exemption. The location of the rules of ritual performance in the tractate about betrothals and the meaning of the defining phrases themselves are the clues.
The next mishnah in the chapter, although it concerns Temple sacrifice rather than time-bound mitzvot, will, when read together with its associated Gemara, sharpen our understanding of this one. It is part of the same group of mishnahs.
Laying on of hands [on the head of the sacrificial animal], waving [the minhah sacrifice], bringing it close [to the altar], …, sprinkling the blood, receiving [the blood from the neck of the animal to be sacrificed]—[these acts] are to be carried out by men but not by women [נוהגים באנשים ולא בנשים],13The verb נוהג \ לא נוהג means “applies to/does not apply to” or “may be practiced by/may not be practiced by.” It does not mean “customarily performed by.” See, for instance, M Shevuot 4:1, “The oath of adjuration may be administered to men but not to women,” which uses the same verb, [נוהגת [באנשים ולא בנשים. For another example of this usage, see Tosefta Hagigah 1:4. except for the minhah [offering] of the sotah and the nezirah [person who vows not to drink wine or cut (his or) her hair for a specified period of time], that the women themselves wave. (M Kiddushin 1:8)
To begin with, this mishnah teaches that laying on of hands on the animal to be offered and waving the minhah sacrifice may be performed by lay Israelite men but not lay Israelite women. The third activity, bringing the animal to the altar, and all those that follow, may be performed only by kohanim, not even lay Israelite men. Since the Torah itself makes clear that men but not women may serve as Temple functionaries, why need the mishnah state that these rituals may be carried out by the sons of Aaron, the kohanim, but not by the daughters of Aaron? On what basis could one have thought that priestly women were allowed to function in the Temple that the mishnah found it necessary to rule it out?14Cf. Tosafot (s.v. haqabbalot v’hazaot), who ask a similar question, “Why is it necessary to list the Temple activities that women may not perform; cannot one deduce these rules simply from the fact that women could not be Temple functionaries—only Aaron and sons were fit?” Although my answer differs from theirs, they, too, are troubled by the superfluity of most rules of this mishnah. Since it is clear that not even Israelite men can perform any of the activities beyond the first two, this mishnah must be addressing only kohanot, women of the priestly clan. Does this passage imply that a question arose in those days about the eligibility of women serving in the Temple and therefore the rabbis issued this set of prohibitions?
I do not think so. The mishnah’s repeated references to women’s absolute exclusion from Temple ritual may lead us to a deeper understanding of M 1:7b (about women’s ritual exemptions): It is only Temple practices that are forbidden to women, none of the other ritual activities. Reading M 1:8 and M 1:7 in reverse order makes their purposes clear. M 1:8 is saying that every single Temple activity is not only not obligatory upon women, but even forbidden to them. M 1:7 goes on to say that the rituals that were able to survive the destruction of the Temple, such as shofar, lulav, and succah, are obligatory upon men, but not women. But it does not forbid women from participation, as it does with respect to the Temple service. It allows them to choose to engage in these activities. The associated Gemara, BT Kiddushin 36a, derives from verses, several times over, that women are forbidden to participate in the offering of sacrifices in the Temple. It is standard practice in Midrash Halakhah to derive or state the same teaching, again and again, in order to emphasize thereby the legitimacy of the derived conclusion. The same is true of M 1:8 here.
This significant difference between the rabbis’ treatment of women’s participation in Temple ritual and post-Temple Jewish ritual strongly suggests an alteration in their basic outlook: Although in post-Temple Judaism women are not obligated to participate in key religious rituals, they are no longer forbidden to do so. Moreover, the many exceptions the rabbis made to these exemptions, as we shall see, give further evidence that the rabbis considered women to be religiously needy. To say it in different words: The rabbis recognized that the practice of Judaism after the destruction of the Temple had to differ significantly from the practice of Judaism during the time of the Temple. So, along with the radical restructuring of Jewish ritual practice that brought the celebration of the Sabbath and holidays from the Temple into the home and from the kohen to the lay Israelite, the rabbis also opened the door to greater participation by women.15Tal Ilan (Jewish Women in Greco-Roman Palestine [Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1995], 176–184) argues the opposite. In the period of the Temple, she says, women were actively involved in Temple life, bringing sacrifices and coming to pray. In the laws of the Mishnah, which, according to her, reflected actual practice in the post-Temple period, there is a sharp reduction in women’s participation. I do not accept this analysis. One should not compare laws about obligations and exemptions to historical evidence of women’s participation. Moreover, if, in this case, law reflects social and religious reality, why not say the same for other laws as well and thereby reach the conclusion that women, in the rabbinic period, were reciting the set of eighteen blessings at least twice a day? By suggesting—without basing her argument in the words—that this mishnah reflects historical reality, she undermines her entire thesis that laws and historical evidence are not to be confused with each other, and that most Jews were not living strictly according to the law as the Tannaim presented it. Judith Wegner (Chattel or Person? [New York: Oxford University Press, 1988], 147ff.) says that the framers of the Mishnah went beyond Scripture in banning women outright from many mitzvot or exempting them in theory and discouraging them in practice. She, too, makes assumptions that do not have a basis in the text. Rather than compare exemption to obligation, it is more useful to compare exemption (M 1:7) to prohibition (M 1:8). Women could not actively participate in the Temple service, as noted in M 1:8, but they did gain permission (M 1:7) and even acquired obligation to participate in some key rituals in the new configuration of Jewish practice.
A careful look at tannaitic and amoraic statements about women and mitzvot shows that the rabbis made more and more exceptions to the rule of women’s exemption, obligating them, as time passed, to more and more time-bound positive mitzvot.
Women, slaves, and minors are exempt from Shema and tefillin but obligated to prayer, mezuzah, and Grace after meals.
It is easy to see that this mishnah disagrees with M Kiddushin 1:7. It obligates women to prayer, a clear example of a positive time-bound mitzvah, the boundaries of which this very tractate of Mishnah spends much time delineating.16The stama d’gemara in Berakhot 20b suggests that prayer obligates women because, although one might think this mitzvah is time-bound, it is not. That is not the simple explanation of the mishnah’s rule. It seems to me that the stama fabricated this answer in order to respond to the question it raised about why the Mishnah obligates women to this mitzvah. See my article “Women and Prayer: An Attempt to Dispel Some Fallacies,” Judaism, Winter 1993. That women are obligated to Grace after meals is not surprising because it is not a time-bound positive mitzvah; it need only be performed if a person ate, in particular if he ate the amount of food that necessitated a full Grace (M Berakhot 7:2). Mezuzah, too, is a non-time-bound positive mitzvah.
The Tosefta lists other positive time-bound mitzvot that obligate women that are not found in the Mishnah: They are required to eat matzah (unleavened bread), the paschal lamb, and bitter herbs (Tosefta Pesahim 2:22); they are required to bring the simhah sacrifice to the Temple on the three pilgrimage festivals, a remarkable requirement in view of the fact that the Torah requires only men to be seen three times a year at the Temple (Tosefta Hagigah 1:4). In fact, the rabbis themselves construct the entire notion of the requirement of a simhah sacrifice and also women’s obligation to bring it.17All the Torah requires is that a man not come empty-handed to the Temple on the pilgrimage festivals. It is the rabbis who determine that he must bring three kinds of sacrifices: olot re’iyah, shalmei hagigah, and shalmei simhah. It is possible they have the future in mind, or the past—the fact that women in the time of the Temple did bring festival sacrifices18See the article by Chana Safrai, “Women and Processes of Change in the Temple in Jerusalem,” in A View into the Lives of Women in Jewish Societies, ed. Yael Azmon (Jerusalem: Mercaz Shazar, 1995), 63–76.—but more likely the simhah obligation is a statement on their part that women should be ritually involved, although not to the same extent as men. That is, they create for women an imaginary obligation of the past, not grounded in any verse, in order to suggest that women are obligated to be involved in religious ritual, even though certain exemptions still apply. They are not free to choose to become involved. Note also that the Torah itself requires women to be present at the reading of the entire Torah to the people, once in seven years on the holiday of Succot (Deuteronomy 31:12).
When the anonymous voice of the Gemara wonders how the mishnah’s rule of women’s exemption from positive time-bound mitzvot can be taken at face value, since there are so many exceptions to it, we find the following answer:19The Yerushalmi asks the same question (Kiddushin 1:7; 61c).
––R. Yohanan said: We do not learn from general rules even if the exceptions are listed. (BT Kiddushin 34a)
This Amora is saying that one may not apply a general rule to all cases, even if it begins with the word hakol, meaning “this rule applies to all,” and even if it lists (all) exceptions. For the rule under discussion, women’s exemption from positive time-bound mitzvot, the mishnah lists no exceptions. According to R. Yohanan, the Mishnah’s statements are not prescriptive rules but generalizations of particular instances: Many cases, therefore, are consistent with the stated rule but many others are not. The Mishnah does not bother to list all exceptions that we learn from other rabbinic texts.
This unusual array of rules and exceptions can also be explained differently. The numerous references in the Mishnah to women and individual mitzvot, such as their exemption from succah (M Succah 2:8) and from re’iyah (appearing at the Temple on the pilgrimage festivals, M Hagigah 1:1) and their obligation to prayer (M Berakhot 3:3) are unnecessary because the rules of M Kiddushin 1:7 cover all cases and therefore obviate the need for a separate listing. The presence of all these bits of information may point to an underlying rabbinic debate about the nature of women’s religious obligations, some thinking she should have more and some less. An analogy to the rules about children and ritual obligations will help clarify this point.
The rabbis seem to have had two ways of looking at a minor’s obligations. One is that as he reaches each developmental stage, more mitzvot are required of him, such as when old enough to talk, his father must teach him “Shema yisrael” (the first verse, Tosefta Hagigah 1:2). The other is that when a child reaches puberty, later defined as thirteen for boys and twelve for girls, and not before, all the mitzvot apply.20T Hagigah 1:3; M Niddah 6:11. This view is somewhat at variance with that of Yitzhak Gilat, “Ben Shelosh Esreh Lemitzvot,” Mehkerei Talmud 1 (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1990), who writes that the word minor, קטן, does not have a set meaning in tannaitic literature. He says that there is no fixed age at which a minor becomes obligated to perform mitzvot. As for legal acts that require knowledge and/or consent, such as vows, M Niddah 5:6 talks about intellectual maturity. Even at the end of the tannaitic period there is a debate about the age of maturity, some saying boys mature earlier and some saying girls do (BT Niddah 45b). In the amoraic period, Gilat says, there was a move toward standardization. He thus sees no evidence of conflicting opinions but rather of development over time. The Mishnah seems to lean in the latter direction but still includes some examples of the first approach: A child who is able to shake a lulav has to do so (M Succah 2:8); or, a child who is able to go up to the Temple on his father’s shoulders, or holding his hand, has to do so (M Hagigah 1:1). The Amoraim accommodate these two approaches by distinguishing between a child who has reached the age of education, who is obligated to the mitzvot, and one who has not, who is thus exempt.21BT Hagigah 4a. See also BT RH 33b; Megillah 19b; Succah 28b; Arakhin 2b. However, theirs is not the simple explanation for this phenomenon. It is more likely that the Mishnah is preserving evidence of the existence of two competing approaches.
As for women, the Mishnah also presents evidence of two approaches: For some Tannaim, a woman’s obligations and exemptions are derived from the rules of M Kiddushin 1:7; for others, each case is dealt with separately. This second approach probably mandates a higher level of obligation.
These differences notwithstanding, in the amoraic period, we see marked movement in the direction of greater obligation.
––Said R. Joshua b. Levi: Women are obligated to read the megillah, because they too were part of the miracle [of deliverance].22M Megillah 2:4 says that all except for a deaf-mute, minor, or a mentally impaired individual are eligible to read the megillah, the Book of Esther, in public for others, though R. Judah disagrees and considers a minor a fit reader. The mishnah’s silence with respect to women implies that it holds that they are included in the cohort of fit readers. It is possible that this is what led R. Joshua b. Levi, in the time of the Gemara, explicitly to obligate women and permit them to read the megillah for others (BT Megillah 4a). See also BT Pesahim 108b, TR: Men and women must drink four cups of wine … (BT Megillah 4a)
––Said R. Joshua b. Levi: Women are obligated to drink the four cups [of wine that punctuate the Pesah seder], because they too were part of the miracle [of deliverance]. (BT Pesahim 108b)
––Said R. Joshua b. Levi: Women are obligated to light the Chanukah lamps, because they too were part of the miracle [of deliverance]. (BT Shabbat 23a)
==[The reason that women are obligated to pray is that] prayer is petitions.
––Said R. Ada b. Ahavah: Women are obligated to recite Kiddush [on the Sabbath], as stipulated by the Torah.…
––Said Rava: Anyone who is bound by the Sabbath restrictions is similarly bound by the Sabbath ritual acts. (Berakhot 20b)
––Said R. Elazar: Women are obligated to eat matzah on Pesah, according to the Torah; for anyone who is bound not to eat hametz (leavened products), is similarly bound to eat matzah. (BT Pesahim 43b)
In all these instances, Amoraim are imposing upon women new obligations to perform ritual acts—all positive time-bound mitzvot—that M Kiddushin 1:7 would have exempted them from.23T Pesahim 2:22 obligated women to eat matzah. The Mishnah did not. In each case, a reason is given. By the end of the amoraic period, women are locked into observance of the key rituals of Pesah, Chanukah, Purim, and, to a large extent, the Sabbath. I think this development is strong evidence that the rabbis recognized the importance of making religious practice more central to the lives of women.
Their statement about women’s obligation to pray is especially revealing. The same mishnah—Berakhot 3:3—exempts women from reciting the paragraphs of the Shema but obligates them to prayer. Since both relatively lengthy rituals are pillars of the morning service, shaharit, it is hard to understand the distinction. The Gemara cited explains that even though it would follow from the rules that she should be exempt, she is obligated to prayer because “prayer is petitions,” meaning, that a woman is the best advocate before God for herself and for those for whom she prays. It follows that the rabbis understood and accepted the fact that people, both men and women, need to turn to God to ask for help, and that the most effective way of doing so is by oneself. As the Yerushalmi (PT Berkahot 3:3; 6b) says in reference to obligating women to prayer: each and every person needs to ask for mercy himself (or herself). This argument does not apply, however, to the recitation of the Shema, a set of verses constituting a confession of faith and an acceptance of the yoke of the mitzvot. Only men are obligated to recite these theologically significant words twice daily.
The corollary of imposing ritual obligations on a woman is allowing her to discharge the obligations of others—recite Grace after meals for men, read the megillah for men, and so on.
The Mishnah makes only one explicit statement on this topic: someone who is not obligated to a certain mitzvah may not discharge the responsibilities of others who are obligated (Rosh Hashanah 3:8). The immediate context in M Rosh Hashanah is that a deaf-mute, minor, or mentally impaired man may not blow the shofar for anyone obligated to hear the blasts because those people themselves are not obligated to hear them. This means that obligation is a necessary condition for being able to discharge the responsibilities of others. Is it also sufficient?
The Mishnah (Berakhot 3:3) obligates women to recite Grace after meals but then excludes them from the quorum of three who together will recite Grace and the call to Grace, the zimmun (M Berakhot 7:2). In this case a woman is obligated but, nevertheless, may not join men in the mutual discharge of this responsibility.24According to BT Berakhot 20b, at issue is whether women’s obligation to recite Grace after meals is from the Torah, like men’s, or from the rabbis. Only if it is from the Torah may she recite the Grace after meals for men. This question is left hanging. See my article “Women and Prayer,” n. 19. It seems, then, that one can be obligated and still not be able to discharge the responsibilities of others. An obligation is thus a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the eligibility to perform rituals for others. What else is needed?
A variety of texts on the topic of women and minors assisting men with reciting sacred texts and leading public prayer suggests that the individual reader’s social status also matters. The Gemara cites a baraita that says that anyone who affronts the dignity of the congregation, like a woman or a child,25However, M Megillah 4:6 says the opposite, that a minor is allowed to read from the Torah and Prophets (the haftarah) in public. Since a child has lower social status than an adult, it would seem that what allows him to read from sacred texts in public is the need for capable readers. According to Albeck (Moed, 366), it was a custom to honor a smart child with the haftarah reading. It is also true that a male minor is on his way to becoming a fit adult reader. may not represent it—may not read from the Torah in public—even though that person is technically eligible (BT Megillah 23a).26When this baraita appears in the Tosefta, it says that “all count in the seven Torah readers, even a child, even a woman, but one does not call upon women to read in public” (Tosefta Megillah 3:11). The passage gives no reason for not calling upon women even though it has just said that they are eligible. It is the Gemara’s version of this baraita that says explicitly that women may not read in public, although technically eligible, out of concern for the dignity of the congregation [כבוד הצבור] (BT Megillah 23a). This is probably an explanatory addition. See my article “Women and Prayer,” 102, n. 24. The idea of public honor also seems to underlie the same mishnah’s other rules: that a minor kohen may not bless the congregation27Rashi (s.v. v’eyno noseh et kapav) says that it is degrading [גנאי] for the congregation to be blessed by a minor. and that a person dressed in rags, with his body exposed, may not read from the Torah in public, pass before the ark, or recite the priestly blessing.
The Tosefta presents the clearest statement of all on the role that dignity plays in determining who may discharge which mitzvah for whom.
A minor may translate for an adult [who is reading from the Torah in public] but it is beneath his dignity [אין כבודו] for an adult to translate for a minor. (Tosefta Megillah 3:21)
The reason that the dignity of an adult is compromised in translating for a minor is that translation is a lesser role than reading from the Torah itself. Differing from all the other tannaitic sources, this one does not leave it up to the reader to conclude that social status is a factor in determining who may discharge ritual responsibilities for whom, but says so explicitly.28A similar statement is made later in the same chapter, Tosefta Megillah 3:30, that a person who is inappropriately dressed may not read from the Torah, “because it is not dignified [אין כבוד].” Younger people command less respect than older people. Age, like gender, matters.
Finally, some passages curse any man who needs to depend on women, slaves, and minors to assist him in discharging his ritual responsibilities.
If a slave or a woman or a minor recites Hallel (Psalms 113–118, recited on festivals) for him, he must repeat everything that they say [since he is obligated to this mitzvah and women and minors are not]. And let him be cursed. If an adult man was reciting Hallel for him, he answers hallelujah [after each verse or section of a verse]. (M Succah 3:10)
Come and hear [the following tannaitic source]: … A son recites Grace after meals for his father, a slave for his master, and a wife for her husband. But the Sages said: Let a man be cursed if his wife or child recites Grace for him.29Compare the parallel in Tosefta Berakhot 5:18. After saying that women are not obligated and may not recite Grace for others, the Tosefta continues and says, “In fact they said, a woman recites Grace for her husband, a son for his father, and a slave for his master.” No second clause curses men for relying on women. (BT Berakhot 20b)
When we read these two sources in conjunction with each other, we see that it is not merely because a man is unlearned that he should be cursed. If his ignorance were the object of condemnation, it would not matter who recited Grace after meals or Hallel for him. He is cursed only if the person who assists him is of lower social status; when an adult man assists him in reciting Hallel, he is not cursed.30Rashi, in Succah 38a (s.v. v’tavo lo me’erah), calls women, slaves, and minors “despicable representatives” [שליחים בזויים]. This distinction within the law suggests that it is not fitting for a head of household to be dependent for the execution of religious ritual on those who are dependent on him. The curse is invoked not just because he should have learned the prayers or blessings but also because he finds himself or has placed himself in circumstances that compromise his dignity.
This wide array of rules leads us to a general conclusion: In addition to being obligated, the one who functions on behalf of others—be it one or many—must be someone who does not affront their dignity, who occupies the same social standing. In the ancient world women were on a lower social rung than men and for that reason could not assist them in discharging their ritual obligations. Even women’s obligation to various mitzvot could not cancel out the problem of their lower social status.
We noted above that the ban on women’s participating in the Temple worship service implies that the exemption of women from the performance of religious ritual is only that and nothing more. This means that women may choose to perform these acts on a voluntary basis. The question then arises whether women can perform them even if they break some law in the process, a law that men, who are obligated, are allowed to break in the course of performing a mitzvah. For instance, can a woman blow the shofar for herself on Rosh Hashanah, on a voluntary basis, if, in the course of doing so, she violates the rule of shevut, complete cessation from work?
Speak to the people of Israel.… And he shall lay his hand [on the head of the sacrifice] (Leviticus 1:2, 4)—the men of Israel perform laying on of hands; the women of Israel may not.
R. Yossi and R. Simon say: The women of Israel may perform the laying on of hands on a voluntary basis.
Said R. Yossi: Abba Elazar told me that once we had a calf designated as a shelamim sacrifice and we brought it to the women’s gallery, and the women performed laying on of hands, not because the women were obligated to do so, but in order to give them spiritual satisfaction [נחת רוח].
In this remarkable anecdote, the rabbis invite women to lay their hands on the head of an animal sacrifice, not because they thought women were required to do so, but in order to allow women to express themselves religiously, to derive spiritual satisfaction. The rabbis’ motivation is a moving detail in and of itself.
The Gemara goes on to note that, in its opinion, the issue was more complicated than at first meets the eye. In the course of laying their hands on the animal, if they did so with full force, the women would be breaking a different rule: performing work or activity on an animal that has been designated as heqdesh, Temple property. Interpreting the story so that the women are not committing this infraction, the Gemara reduces women’s activity to letting their hands “float” on the head or the back of the animal. This interpretation, however, does not seem to be the simple understanding of this anecdote, or others like it. The story suggests, rather, that minor rules may be broken even for voluntary performance of mitzvot, because allowing people, that is, women, to express themselves religiously supersedes a minor infraction of the law. According to Tosefta Rosh Hashanah 2:16, women, although not obligated to blow the shofar on Rosh Hashanah, may choose to do so for themselves, even though blowing a shofar for someone not obligated to do so would be considered a violation of the day. Post-Talmudic commentators learn from these examples that not only may women choose to perform these ritual acts, they may also recite the accompanying blessings—which infuse the ritual act with religious meaning—even though one might think that in doing so they invoke God’s name in vain. Again, rabbis bend the rules in order to afford women spiritual satisfaction. We thus see that this anecdote, in which the rabbis valued women’s spiritual lives, came to have critical halakhic significance.31See Tosafot RH 33a, s.v. ha R. Yehudah; and Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Tzitzit 3:9. See my article “Women’s Voluntary Performance of Commandments from Which They Are Exempt” (in Hebrew), Proceedings of the Eleventh World Congress of Jewish Studies (Jerusalem), 1994.
The discussion of women and ritual would not be complete if we did not make reference to perhaps the most sexist Jewish ritual practice. The statement, “Blessed be God for not making me a woman,” which in the post-Talmudic period entered the daily morning service,32The proposed alternative blessing for women in the Orthodox prayer book is “that he made me according to His will [שצשני כרצונו].” Other proposals include casting the blessing in positive language, “that God has made me in His image [be’tzalmo].” A fascinating Renaissance alternative blessing was discovered by George Jochnowitz (“… Who Made Me a Woman,” Commentary, April 1981, 63). He writes that in the vernacular in southern France, we find: “Blessed are Thou … who made me a woman.” seems to express an intensely disparaging attitude to women. Many cite this blessing as evidence of rabbinic misogyny.33For example, Wegner (Chattel or Person? 153) says that this kind of exemption and exclusion diminishes the status of women. Reading it in context may deepen our understanding of its intended meaning and the thinking that led to its adoption in the daily liturgy.
R. Judah says, [there are] three things a man must say every day, blessed [be God] for not making me a gentile; blessed [be God] for not making me a boor; blessed [be God] for not making me a woman.
Not a gentile, because gentiles are not worthy in God’s eyes (Isaiah 40:17); not a boor, because a boor does not avoid sin; not a woman, because women are not obligated by the mitzvot. (Tosefta Berakhot 6:18; PT Berakhot 9:1; 13b, with minor variations)
The context of this passage in the Tosefta is a discussion of the blessings a Jew recites before performing a mitzvah, such as putting on tzitzit or tefillin. Note that the very same rabbi who argues for daily recitation of these blessings then goes on to explain why each is recited. He finds nothing wrong with women as women; the issue for him is that they are not obligated to perform mitzvot in the same way that men are.34He is not saying that women are not obligated by any but by time-bound positive mitzvot, like succah and tefillin. See Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-fshutah, Berakhot, 121. Were this second half of the passage, justifying the recitation of the blessing, issued today, we would call it apologetics—a deliberate attempt to explain away a serious rabbinic bias against women. But it is the same man who issued both statements back then. He instituted the recitation of these three blessings and then went on to rationalize each one. What did he mean by his statement that men should thank God for not being created as women because of women’s exemption from mitzvot? Is he acknowledging men’s superiority over women but trying to attribute it—and perhaps limit it—to men’s more demanding ritual lives, a rather benign way of perceiving superiority?
If the triad were not of his making, if it rather were something that people were known to say anyway—and there is much evidence that this was so35Diogenes Laertius (Lives, Loeb ed., chap. devoted to Thales, 35) remarks that it was stated in the name of Socrates that there were three blessings for which he was grateful to Fortune: “first, that I was born a human being and not one of the brutes; next, that I was born a man and not a woman; thirdly, a Greek and not a barbarian.” See Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-fshutah, Berakhot, 120, for a full treatment of this subject. See also Ilan, Jewish Women in Greco-Roman Palestine, 176, n. 1.—then his deeming it obligatory to recite each day, together with his “religious” interpretation, would mean that he is deliberately trying to modify people’s outlook, to get them to see women in less negative terms. If so, he may be saying that women are not unworthy in God’s eyes like gentiles, nor are they sinners like boors. Rather, the reason that men thank God for not being created as women is that men see themselves as more religiously worthy because God makes more ritual demands of them. That is, it is possible, if not too likely, that R. Judah was aware of the misogynist or triumphalist underpinnings of the popular statement about women and was trying to counteract them with his argument about mitzvot.36Even his statements about gentiles and boors can be viewed as an improvement on popular ideas about these people. Common to all three statements is the status of the group vis-à-vis the mitzvot.
Reading the Bavli’s commentary on the baraita leads to a different interpretation. The first part, R. Judah’s statement that one is required to recite these three blessings every day, also appears in BT Menahot 43b. The second part, the presentation of the rationales for the three blessings, is omitted. The context in the Gemara is a discussion of mitzvot and, in particular, R. Meir’s requirement to recite one hundred blessings every day. An amoraic discussion of R. Judah’s three required blessings follows:
We learned in a baraita: R. Judah37The text of the printed edition reads “R. Meir.” That is a mistake. His name was picked up from the previous statement. The correct name, as indicated in the marginal notes in the printed Talmud, is R. Judah. used to say, a person is obligated to recite three blessings every day, and they are: that He made me Jewish,38The parallel versions in the Tosefta and Yerushalmi say, “that He did not make me a gentile,” שלא עשני גוי. The Bavli’s positive formulation is a correction in response to censorship. The version that entered the daily prayer book is the one that appears in the Tosefta. The Conservative prayer book has adopted the positive formulation. that He did not make me a woman, that He did not make me a boor.39Note also that the blessing “has not made me a boor” has been replaced with “has not made me a slave.” The reason for this change is found in the continuation of the passage.
––R. Aha b. Jacob heard his son reciting, [Blessed be God] that He did not make me a boor. He said to him: To such an extreme? [Rashi: Is this not a show of arrogance?]
––Should I instead thank God for not making me a slave? I cannot, because a slave is like a woman [and that blessing is already part of the liturgy]!
––[No,] a slave is lower than a woman [עבד זיל טפי]. (BT Menahot 43b)
This rabbi’s son interprets R. Judah’s blessings in a sexist manner, namely, that men are thankful that they are not socially inferior like women, who, in this statement, are compared to slaves—either occupying the same low level (according to the son) or one only slightly higher (according to the father). It would seem that the Bavli’s omission of the second part of R. Judah’s statement—about women and mitzvot—made this alternate interpretation of the first part possible; the rabbi and his son seem to know only the first part. This is a third interpretation of R. Judah’s blessing about women. When men express gratitude for being created as men, they are not saying that women by nature are defective, as thought by the Greeks, or that they are inferior because they have fewer religious demands made upon them, as suggested by R. Judah, but that they occupy lower social status.
However, if we think further, we may consider this interchange not a third interpretation of R. Judah’s blessing but a nuanced reading of the second. The father and son may be saying that not obligating women to the time-bound positive mitzvot is a function of their lower social status, because, as we saw above, it may result from their not being full-fledged members of the religious community. It is thus possible that R. Aha and his son did know the second part of R. Judah’s statement, but that they saw exemption from ritual acts as a consequence of low social status and not vice versa.
If we now return to R. Judah and assume, like R. Aha b. Jacob, that he had women’s social status in mind, his statement is even more remarkable. It is as if he is saying, Never mind the fact that women’s exemptions flow from lower status; the real reason a man should thank God for not being a woman is not his higher status but his greater level of ritual obligation. Since obligation to ritual is what matters, men should be thankful for their better, although more demanding, lot in life. Is this a way, perhaps, for the Tanna to comfort the men of his day for the large number of ritual demands placed on them? Is he casting the obligations in a positive light? Is he making a life of obligation more desirable—even though more difficult—than a life of exemption? The entire section seems to be an attempt on the part of the rabbis to “sell” their system to the populace by promising protection from sin as a reward for fulfilling the mitzvot and, in particular, by bolstering a man’s ego for his special level of obligation: A Jewish man’s superiority flows from his being commanded by his Creator.40Cf. Ilan (Jewish Women in Greco-Roman Palestine, 177), who argues that were it not for this statement of R. Judah, we would not know that a life of religious obligation for women is desirable. Mitzvot for women, she says, are presented as punishments(!), such as for Eve’s causing Adam to sin.
A close reading of many texts has shown us that the reason women are exempt from positive time-bound mitzvot is that only the full-fledged members of society are obligated to perform the ritual acts that define Jewish practice, those that need to be performed year in and year out. It would be compromising the dignity of God and of the heads of household to include others in this obligation. It is they who don special garb, like tefillin; it is they who must daily confess faith in God, reenact the great moments of Jewish history at Passover, Shavuot, and Succot, and celebrate the New Year by hearing shofar blasts. A woman’s exemption from these acts has nothing to do with her household and child-rearing chores. She is simply a lesser person in the grand scheme of things, subordinate to her husband and ready to take orders from him. In a patriarchal society, key religious acts are turned over to the patriarchs, the men, and not the subordinates, the women and children.
During Talmudic times, this hierarchical distinction was in the process of becoming blurred. The rabbis began to increase women’s obligations, imposing on them a variety of mitzvot relating to the holidays and the Sabbath. They recognized that women, like men, needed to express themselves religiously, open a direct line of communication with their Maker, and also that women were significant members of Jewish society—not as significant as men, but significant nonetheless.
It seems to me that the issue of who is obligated and who is exempt, and whether it depends on biology, sociology, physical or mental capacity, are all issues that the Talmudic rabbis were struggling with. For this reason, in many tractates we find competing statements as to which segments of the population are obligated and which exempt from fulfilling the particular act under discussion. Two things become clear from surveying rabbinic literature: There were no generally accepted rules of ritual obligation that one could turn to for answers; there was a wide variety of opinion on these matters. In most cases, only one opinion was included in the Mishnah so that the rules of obligation and exemption were set accordingly for generations to come. It was left for the Bavli and Yerushalmi to fill in the wider range of opinions, occasionally changing what the Mishnah had to say, either by citing a baraita that disagreed with the Mishnah or by giving a rationale.
Why is it important to recognize this struggle? Because it is an advance over the Torah’s outlook on women and mitzvot: It acknowledges women’s changing status. The Torah rarely obligates women directly. It addresses itself to men who then relay it to the women who are in their charge. The Ten Commandments are a good example. It is men who are commanded not to commit adultery with someone else’s wife and not to lust after her or anything else that belongs to their fellow man.41Even though linguists would argue that the masculine singular is unmarked in Hebrew, a gendered language, and could therefore be addressing a woman as well as a man, still, the seventh and tenth commandments reveal that the unit as a whole is directed to men. Similarly, the requirement to appear at the Temple three times a year is directed to men. Although women were obligated to live Jewishly, it was their husbands who were in charge of seeing that they did so. Like children, they were not independently obligated.
That the rabbis find it necessary, in most tractates, to deal with the question of whom the law obligates means that they thought in terms other than those found in the Bible. They must have been interested in including, at least some of the time, groups that were not included in the Bible, such as women, or even groups not mentioned at all, such as the physically handicapped. Even if the rabbis declare women exempt, they have still advanced over the Torah, which, for the most part when discussing mitzvot, does not mention women at all.