אָמְרוּ לוֹ אָכַלְתָּ חֵלֶב, מֵבִיא חַטָּאת. עֵד אוֹמֵר אָכַל וְעֵד אוֹמֵר לֹא אָכַל, אִשָּׁה אוֹמֶרֶת אָכַל וְאִשָּׁה אוֹמֶרֶת לֹא אָכַל, מֵבִיא אָשָׁם תָּלוּי. עֵד אוֹמֵר אָכַל וְהוּא אוֹמֵר לֹא אָכַלְתִּי, פָּטוּר. שְׁנַיִם אוֹמְרִים אָכַל וְהוּא אוֹמֵר לֹא אָכַלְתִּי, רַבִּי מֵאִיר מְחַיֵּב. אָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר, אִם הֱבִיאוּהוּ שְׁנַיִם לְמִיתָה חֲמוּרָה, לֹא יְבִיאוּהוּ לְקָרְבָּן הַקַּל. אָמְרוּ לוֹ, מָה אִם יִרְצֶה לוֹמַר מֵזִיד הָיִיתִי: If witnesses said to a person: We saw that you ate forbidden fat, he is liable to bring a sin offering if he did so unwittingly. If a witness says: He ate forbidden fat, and a witness says: He did not eat forbidden fat, or if a woman says: He ate forbidden fat, and a woman says: He did not eat forbidden fat, he is liable to bring a provisional guilt offering, brought by one who is uncertain as to whether he committed a sin that requires a sin offering. If a witness says: He ate forbidden fat, and the person himself says: I did not eat forbidden fat, he is exempt. If two witnesses say: He ate forbidden fat, and the person himself says: I did not eat forbidden fat, Rabbi Meir deems him liable to bring a sin offering. Rabbi Meir said: This conclusion can be derived a fortiori: If two witnesses could have brought him liability to receive the severe punishment of death, can they not bring him liability to sacrifice an offering, which is relatively lenient? The Rabbis said to him: Witnesses are unable to render another person liable to bring an offering contrary to his statement, as what if he wishes to say: I did so intentionally, in which case he would be exempt from bringing an offering?
אָכַל חֵלֶב וְחֵלֶב בְּהֶעְלֵם אֶחָד, אֵינוֹ חַיָּב אֶלָּא חַטָּאת אֶחָת. אָכַל חֵלֶב וְדָם וְנוֹתָר וּפִגּוּל בְּהֶעְלֵם אֶחָד, חַיָּב עַל כָּל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד. זֶה חֹמֶר בְּמִינִין הַרְבֵּה מִמִּין אֶחָד. וְחֹמֶר בְּמִין אֶחָד מִמִּינִין הַרְבֵּה, שֶׁאִם אָכַל כַּחֲצִי זַיִת וְחָזַר וְאָכַל כַּחֲצִי זַיִת מִמִּין אֶחָד, חַיָּב. מִשְּׁנֵי מִינִין, פָּטוּר: If one unwittingly ate an olive-bulk of forbidden fat and then ate another olive-bulk of forbidden fat during one lapse of awareness, i.e., in a case where he did not discover in the interim that fat is forbidden, or that the food he is eating is forbidden fat, he is liable to bring only one sin offering. If one ate forbidden fat, and blood, and piggul, and notar in one lapse of awareness, he is liable to bring a sin offering for each and every one of them. This is a stringency that applies to one who eats several types of forbidden food and does not apply to one who eats one type of forbidden food. And a stringency that applies to one who eats one type of forbidden food and not to one who eats several types of forbidden food is that if one ate half an olive-bulk and then ate another half an olive-bulk during one lapse of awareness, in a case where they were both from one type of forbidden food, he is liable to bring a sin offering. If they were from two types, he is exempt, because he did not eat an olive-bulk of any specific forbidden food.
וְכַמָּה יִשְׁהֶה הָאוֹכְלָן. כְּאִלּוּ אֲכָלָן קְלָיוֹת, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים, עַד שֶׁיִּשְׁהֶה מִתְּחִלָּה וְעַד סוֹף כְּדֵי אֲכִילַת פְּרָס. אָכַל אֳכָלִין טְמֵאִין, וְשָׁתָה מַשְׁקִין טְמֵאִין, שָׁתָה רְבִיעִית יַיִן וְנִכְנַס לַמִּקְדָּשׁ, וְשָׁהָה כְּדֵי אֲכִילַת פְּרָס. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר, אִם הִפְסִיק בָּהּ אוֹ שֶׁנָּתַן לְתוֹכוֹ מַיִם כָּל שֶׁהוּא, פָּטוּר: How much time can one expend while eating an olive-bulk of forbidden food and still be liable for violating the prohibition? The duration is calculated as though he were eating toasted grain, which one eats one kernel at a time. If he eats the olive-bulk of forbidden food within the amount of time it would take to eat an olive-bulk of toasted grain, he is liable. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Unless the amount of time he expends from beginning to end is more than the time it takes to eat a half-loaf [peras] of bread, he is liable. Likewise, one who ate a quarter-loaf of ritually impure foods or drank a quarter-log of ritually impure liquids within the amount of time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread is rendered unfit to partake of teruma, the portion of the produce designated for priests, until he becomes pure. Similarly, if one drank a quarter-log of wine and entered the Temple, and he remained there for the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread, he is liable. Rabbi Elazar says: If he interrupted his drinking of the quarter-log of wine or if he placed any amount of water into the wine, he is exempt.
יֵשׁ אוֹכֵל אֲכִילָה אַחַת וְחַיָּב עָלֶיהָ אַרְבַּע חַטָּאוֹת וְאָשָׁם אֶחָד. טָמֵא שֶׁאָכַל אֶת הַחֵלֶב, וְהָיָה נוֹתָר, מִן מֻקְדָּשִׁים, וּבְיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים. רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר, אִם הָיְתָה שַׁבָּת וְהוֹצִיאוֹ בְפִיו, חַיָּב. אָמְרוּ לוֹ, אֵינוֹ מִן הַשֵּׁם: There is a case where one can perform a single act of eating an olive-bulk of food and be liable to bring four sin offerings and one guilt offering for it. How so? This halakha applies to one who is ritually impure who ate forbidden fat, and it was left over from a consecrated offering after the time allotted for its consumption [notar], on Yom Kippur. He is liable to bring sin offerings for eating forbidden fat and notar, for eating the meat of an offering while impure, and for eating on Yom Kippur. He is also liable to bring a guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property. Rabbi Meir says: If it was Shabbat and he carried it out from a private domain to a public domain while eating it, he would be liable to bring an additional sin offering for performing prohibited labor on Shabbat. The Rabbis said to him: That liability is not from the same type of prohibition, as it is not due to the act of eating, and therefore, it should not be counted.
יֵשׁ בָּא בִיאָה אַחַת וְחַיָּב עָלֶיהָ שֵׁשׁ חַטָּאוֹת. הַבָּא עַל בִּתּוֹ, חַיָּב עָלֶיהָ מִשּׁוּם בִּתּוֹ וַאֲחוֹתוֹ וְאֵשֶׁת אָחִיו וְאֵשֶׁת אֲחִי אָבִיו וְאֵשֶׁת אִישׁ וְנִדָּה. וְהַבָּא עַל בַּת בִּתּוֹ, חַיָּב עָלֶיהָ מִשּׁוּם בַּת בִּתּוֹ וְכַלָּתוֹ וַאֲחוֹת אִשְׁתּוֹ וְאֵשֶׁת אָחִיו וְאֵשֶׁת אֲחִי אָבִיו וְאֵשֶׁת אִישׁ וְנִדָּה. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר, אִם עָבַר הַזָּקֵן וּנְשָׂאָהּ, חַיָּב עָלֶיהָ מִשּׁוּם אֵשֶׁת אָב. וְכֵן הַבָּא עַל בַּת אִשְׁתּוֹ, וְעַל בַּת בַּת אִשְׁתּוֹ: There is a case where one can engage in a single act of intercourse and be liable to bring six sin offerings for it. How so? It is possible for one who engages in intercourse with his daughter to be liable due to having violated the prohibitions of engaging in intercourse with his daughter, his sister, the wife of his brother, the wife of his father’s brother, a married woman, and a menstruating woman. It is possible for one who engages in intercourse with his daughter’s daughter to be liable to bring sin offerings due to the unwitting violation of the prohibitions of engaging in intercourse with his daughter’s daughter, and his daughter-in-law, and the wife of his brother, and the wife of his father’s brother, and his wife’s sister, and a married woman, and a menstruating woman. Rabbi Yosei says: If the elder, i.e., the man’s father, who is the woman’s great-grandfather, transgressed and married her, the man would also be liable for engaging in intercourse with her due to the prohibition of intercourse with the wife of his father. And likewise, it is possible for one who engages in intercourse with the daughter of his wife to be liable to bring six sin offerings, similar to one who engages in intercourse with his own daughter, for violating the prohibitions against engaging in intercourse with his wife’s daughter, his sister, the wife of his brother, the wife of his father’s brother, a married woman, and a menstruating woman. And it is possible for one who engages in intercourse with his wife’s daughter’s daughter to be liable to bring seven sin offerings, similar to one who engages in intercourse with his own daughter’s daughter, for violating the following prohibitions: Engaging in intercourse with his wife’s daughter’s daughter, his daughter-in-law, the wife of his brother, the wife of his father’s brother, his wife’s sister, a married woman, and a menstruating woman.
הַבָּא עַל חֲמוֹתוֹ, חַיָּב עָלֶיהָ מִשּׁוּם חֲמוֹתוֹ וְכַלָּתוֹ וַאֲחוֹת אִשְׁתּוֹ וְאֵשֶׁת אָחִיו וְאֵשֶׁת אֲחִי אָבִיו וְאֵשֶׁת אִישׁ וְנִדָּה. וְכֵן הַבָּא עַל אֵם חֲמוֹתוֹ, וְעַל אֵם חָמִיו. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן נוּרִי אוֹמֵר, הַבָּא עַל חֲמוֹתוֹ, חַיָּב עָלֶיהָ מִשּׁוּם חֲמוֹתוֹ וְאֵם חֲמוֹתוֹ וְאֵם חָמִיו. אָמְרוּ לוֹ, שְׁלָשְׁתָּן שֵׁם אֶחָד הֵן: It is possible for one who engages in intercourse with his mother-in-law to be liable to bring seven sin offerings for doing so, due to the unwitting violation of the prohibitions of engaging in intercourse with his mother-in-law, and his daughter-in-law, and the wife of his brother, and the wife of his father’s brother, and his wife’s sister, and a married woman, and a menstruating woman. And likewise, the same applies with regard to one who engages in intercourse with the mother of his father-in-law or with the mother of his mother-in-law. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri says: It is possible for one who engages in intercourse with his mother-in-law to be liable due to the unwitting violation of the prohibitions of engaging in intercourse with his mother-in-law, and the mother of his mother-in-law, and the mother of his father-in-law. The Rabbis said to him: Those three prohibitions are all one category of prohibition, derived from the same verse: “You shall not uncover the nakedness of a woman and her daughter; you shall not take her son’s daughter, or her daughter’s daughter” (Leviticus 18:17). Consequently, one is not liable to bring separate sin offerings for violating these prohibitions.
אָמַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, שָׁאַלְתִּי אֶת רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל וְאֶת רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בָּאִטְלִיס שֶׁל אֶמָּאוֹם, שֶׁהָלְכוּ לִקַּח בְּהֵמָה לְמִשְׁתֵּה בְנוֹ שֶׁל רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, הַבָּא עַל אֲחוֹתוֹ וְעַל אֲחוֹת אָבִיו וְעַל אֲחוֹת אִמּוֹ בְּהֶעְלֵם אֶחָד מַהוּ, חַיָּב אַחַת עַל כֻּלָּן, אוֹ אַחַת עַל כָּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת, וְאָמְרוּ לִי, לֹא שָׁמָעְנוּ. אֲבָל שָׁמַעְנוּ, הַבָּא עַל חָמֵשׁ נָשָׁיו נִדּוֹת בְּהֶעְלֵם אֶחָד, שֶׁהוּא חַיָּב עַל כָּל אַחַת וְאַחַת. וְרוֹאִין אָנוּ שֶׁהַדְּבָרִים קַל וָחֹמֶר: Rabbi Akiva said: I asked Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua in the meat market [itlis] in Emmaus, where they went to purchase an animal for the wedding feast of the son of Rabban Gamliel: In the case of one who unwittingly engages in intercourse with his sister, and the sister of his father, and the sister of his mother, during one lapse of awareness, what is the halakha? Is he liable to bring one sin offering for all three prohibitions, or is he liable to bring a separate sin offering for each and every one of the prohibitions? They said to Rabbi Akiva: We did not hear a ruling from our teachers about that case, but we heard the following ruling: One who engages in intercourse with each of his five wives while they are menstruating, during one lapse of awareness, we heard that he is liable to bring a separate sin offering for having engaged in intercourse with each and every one of them. And it appears to me that these matters can be derived from an a fortiori inference: If he is liable to bring separate sin offerings for having engaged in intercourse with five menstruating women, who are forbidden by one prohibition, he should certainly be liable to bring separate sin offerings for having engaged in intercourse with his sister, the sister of his father, and the sister of his mother, who are forbidden by three separate prohibitions.
וְעוֹד שְׁאָלָן רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא. אֵבָר הַמְדֻלְדָּל בִּבְהֵמָה, מַהוּ. אָמְרוּ לוֹ, לֹא שָׁמַעְנוּ. אֲבָל שָׁמַעְנוּ בְּאֵבָר הַמְדֻלְדָּל בְּאָדָם, שֶׁהוּא טָהוֹר. שֶׁכָּךְ הָיוּ מֻכֵּי שְׁחִין שֶׁבִּירוּשָׁלַיִם עוֹשִׂין, הוֹלֵךְ לוֹ עֶרֶב פֶּסַח אֵצֶל הָרוֹפֵא וְחוֹתְכוֹ עַד שֶׁהוּא מַנִּיחַ בּוֹ כִשְׂעֹרָה, וְתוֹחֲבוֹ בְסִירָה, וְהוּא נִמְשָׁךְ מִמֶּנּוּ, וְהַלָּה עוֹשֶׂה פִסְחוֹ, וְהָרוֹפֵא עוֹשֶׂה פִסְחוֹ. וְרוֹאִין אָנוּ שֶׁהַדְּבָרִים קַל וָחֹמֶר: And furthermore, Rabbi Akiva asked Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua in the meat market of Emmaus: What is the status of a dangling limb of an animal? Does it impart ritual impurity like a severed limb? They said to Rabbi Akiva: We have not heard a ruling from our teachers in that specific case, but we have heard with regard to a dangling limb of a person that it is ritually pure. And in this manner would the people afflicted with boils, whose limbs were dangling due to their affliction, act in Jerusalem: Each of them would go on Passover eve to the doctor, who would cut the affected limb almost completely until he would leave it connected by a hairbreadth of flesh, so that neither the doctor nor the afflicted would be rendered ritually impure by a severed limb. Then, the doctor would impale the limb on a thorn attached to the floor or the wall, and the afflicted would pull away from the thorn, thereby completely severing the limb. And that person afflicted with boils would perform the rite of his Paschal offering, and the doctor would perform the rite of his Paschal offering, as neither had come into contact with the limb once it was severed. In any case, as long as it was dangling, the limb did not impart impurity. And I consider that these matters can be derived from an a fortiori inference. If a person’s limb, the impurity of which when amputated is severe, does not impart impurity when it is dangling, it is all the more so logical that an animal’s limb, the impurity of which when amputated is lenient, does not impart impurity when it is dangling.
וְעוֹד שְׁאָלָן רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא. הַשּׁוֹחֵט חֲמִשָּׁה זְבָחִים בַּחוּץ בְּהֶעְלֵם אֶחָד, מַהוּ. חַיָּב אַחַת עַל כֻּלָּם, אוֹ אַחַת עַל כָּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת. אָמְרוּ לוֹ, לֹא שָׁמָעְנוּ. אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ, שָׁמַעְתִּי בְאוֹכֵל מִזֶּבַח אֶחָד בַּחֲמִשָּׁה תַמְחוּיִין בְּהֶעְלֵם אֶחָד, שֶׁהוּא חַיָּב עַל כָּל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד מִשּׁוּם מְעִילָה, וְרוֹאֶה אֲנִי שֶׁהַדְּבָרִים קַל וָחֹמֶר. אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, לֹא כָךְ שְׁאָלָן רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא. אֶלָּא, בְּאוֹכֵל נוֹתָר מֵחֲמִשָּׁה זְבָחִים בְּהֶעְלֵם אֶחָד, מַהוּ. חַיָּב אַחַת עַל כֻּלָּן, אוֹ אַחַת עַל כָּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת. אָמְרוּ לוֹ, לֹא שָׁמָעְנוּ. אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ, שָׁמַעְתִּי בְאוֹכֵל מִזֶּבַח אֶחָד בַּחֲמִשָּׁה תַמְחוּיִים בְּהֶעְלֵם אֶחָד, שֶׁהוּא חַיָּב עַל כָּל אַחַת וְאַחַת מִשּׁוּם מְעִילָה, וְרוֹאֶה אֲנִי שֶׁהַדְּבָרִים קַל וָחֹמֶר. אָמַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, אִם הֲלָכָה, נְקַבֵּל. וְאִם לָדִין, יֵשׁ תְּשׁוּבָה. אָמַר לוֹ, הָשֵׁב. אָמַר לוֹ, לֹא, אִם אָמַרְתָּ בִמְעִילָה שֶׁעָשָׂה בָהּ אֶת הַמַּאֲכִיל כָּאוֹכֵל וְאֶת הַמְהַנֶּה כַּנֶּהֱנֶה, צֵרַף הַמְּעִילָה לִזְמָן מְרֻבֶּה, תֹּאמַר בְּנוֹתָר, שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ אַחַד מִכָּל אֵלּוּ: And furthermore, Rabbi Akiva asked Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua: With regard to one who unwittingly slaughters five offerings outside the Temple during one lapse of awareness, what is the halakha? Is he liable to bring five sin offerings, one for each and every act of slaughter, or is he liable to bring one sin offering for all the acts of slaughter? They said to Rabbi Akiva: We have not heard a ruling from our teachers in that specific case. Rabbi Yehoshua said: I have heard with regard to one who eats meat from one offering from five different pots in which they were prepared, during one lapse of awareness, that he is liable to bring five guilt offerings, which are for the meat prepared in each and every pot, due to misuse of consecrated property. And I consider that these matters can be derived from an a fortiori inference: If one is liable to bring five guilt offerings for one offering prepared in five pots, all the more so is he liable to bring five sin offerings for slaughtering five offerings outside the Temple. Rabbi Shimon said: It was not that question that Rabbi Akiva asked them. Rather, it was with regard to one who eats notar from five offerings during one lapse of awareness. What is the halakha? Is he liable to bring one sin offering for all the offerings from which he ate notar, or is he liable to bring five sin offerings, one for each and every one of the offerings from which he ate notar? They said to Rabbi Akiva: We have not heard a ruling from our teachers in that specific case. Rabbi Yehoshua said: I have heard with regard to one who eats meat from one offering that was prepared in five different pots, during one lapse of awareness, that he is liable to bring separate guilt offerings for the meat prepared in each and every pot, due to misuse of consecrated property. And I consider that these matters can be derived from an a fortiori inference: If one is liable to bring five guilt offerings for one offering prepared in five pots, all the more so is he liable to bring five sin offerings for eating the notar of five separate offerings. Rabbi Akiva said to Rabbi Yehoshua: If you are reporting a halakha that you received from your teachers with regard to one who eats notar from five offerings, we will accept it, but if it is based merely on the a fortiori inference from misuse of consecrated property, there is a response that refutes the inference. Rabbi Yehoshua said to Rabbi Akiva: Respond. Rabbi Akiva said: And no; one cannot derive the halakha of notar through an a fortiori inference from misuse of consecrated property: If you said with regard to misuse of consecrated property that one is liable to bring five guilt offerings, perhaps that is because there are additional stringent elements unique to misuse. As, with regard to misuse, the Torah established that the status of one who feeds another person sacrificial meat is like that of one who eats sacrificial meat, and the status of one who gives benefit to another from consecrated property that is not food is like that of one who derives benefit himself, in that each is liable to bring a guilt offering for misuse. In addition, the Torah joined the misuse of consecrated property that was performed over an extended period, i.e., if one derived benefit worth half a peruta one day and half a peruta the next, he is liable to bring a guilt offering for misuse. Would you say the same with regard to notar, which has none of these halakhot?
אָמַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, שָׁאַלְתִּי אֶת רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, הָעוֹשֶׂה מְלָאכוֹת הַרְבֵּה בְּשַׁבָּתוֹת הַרְבֵּה מֵעֵין מְלָאכָה אַחַת, בְּהֶעְלֵם אֶחָד, מַה הוּא. חַיָּב אַחַת עַל כֻּלָּן, אוֹ אַחַת עַל כָּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת. אָמַר לִי, חַיָּב עַל כָּל אַחַת וְאַחַת, מִקַּל וָחֹמֶר, וּמָה אִם הַנִּדָּה, שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ תּוֹצָאוֹת הַרְבֵּה וְחַטָּאוֹת הַרְבֵּה, חַיָּב עַל כָּל אַחַת וְאַחַת, שַׁבָּת, שֶׁיֶּשׁ בָּהּ תּוֹצָאוֹת הַרְבֵּה וְחַטָּאוֹת הַרְבֵּה, אֵינוֹ דִין שֶׁיְּהֵא חַיָּב עַל כָּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת. אָמַרְתִּי לוֹ, לֹא, אִם אָמַרְתָּ בַנִּדָּה, שֶׁיֶּשׁ בָּהּ שְׁתֵּי אַזְהָרוֹת, שֶׁהוּא מֻזְהָר עַל הַנִּדָּה וְהַנִּדָּה מֻזְהֶרֶת עָלָיו, תֹּאמַר בַּשַּׁבָּת, שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ אֶלָּא אַזְהָרָה אֶחָת. אָמַר לִי, הַבָּא עַל הַקְּטַנּוֹת יוֹכִיחַ, שֶׁאֵין בָּהֶן אֶלָּא אַזְהָרָה אַחַת וְחַיָּב עַל כָּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת. אָמַרְתִּי לוֹ, לֹא, אִם אָמַרְתָּ בַּבָּא עַל הַקְּטַנּוֹת, שֶׁאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין בָּהֶן עַכְשָׁיו, יֵשׁ בָּהֶן לְאַחַר זְמָן, תֹּאמַר בַּשַּׁבָּת, שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ לֹא עַכְשָׁיו וְלֹא לְאַחַר זְמָן. אָמַר לִי, הַבָּא עַל הַבְּהֵמָה יוֹכִיחַ. אָמַרְתִּי לוֹ, בְּהֵמָה כַשַּׁבָּת: Rabbi Akiva said: I asked Rabbi Eliezer with regard to one who performs multiple prohibited labors on several Shabbatot, and all those labors were subsumed as subcategories of one primary category of prohibited labor, and he performed them during one lapse of awareness. What is the halakha? Is he liable to bring one sin offering for unwitting performance of all these labors or is he liable to bring a sin offering for violation of each and every one of the labors? Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Akiva: He is liable to bring a sin offering for violation of each and every one of the labors, and this is derived from an a fortiori inference: Just as in the case of a menstruating woman, with regard to whom there are not multiple actions that result in transgression and that result in multiple sin offerings, but rather only the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with her, and nevertheless one is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each and every one of his acts of unwitting intercourse; in the case of Shabbat, with regard to which there are multiple primary categories and subcategories of labor that result in transgression and that result in multiple death penalties or sin offerings, is it not right that he will be liable to bring a sin offering for performance of each and every one of the prohibited labors? Rabbi Akiva continues: I said to Rabbi Eliezer that the inference is not valid: If you said one is liable to bring multiple sin offerings in the case of a menstruating woman, with regard to whom there are two prohibitions, as the man is prohibited from engaging in intercourse with the menstruating woman and the menstruating woman is prohibited from engaging in intercourse with him, would you say the same in the case of Shabbat, with regard to which there is only one prohibition? Rabbi Eliezer said to me: The halakha of one who engages in intercourse with minor menstruating girls will prove this refutation is not valid, as in that case there is only one prohibition, because the minor is exempt from the mitzvot, and nevertheless the man is liable to bring a separate sin offering for intercourse for each and every one of the acts of intercourse. Rabbi Akiva said: I said to Rabbi Eliezer that the cases of Shabbat and minor menstruating girls are not comparable. If you said in the case of minor girls that although it is not prohibited for them at present it is prohibited for them after the passage of time, when they reach majority, would you say the same in the case of Shabbat, with regard to which there are neither two prohibitions at present, nor will there be after the passage of time? Rabbi Eliezer said to me: The halakha of one who copulates with an animal will prove this refutation is not valid, as there are never two prohibitions in that case, and nevertheless the person is liable to bring a sin offering for each and every act. Rabbi Akiva said: I said to Rabbi Eliezer that no proof can be cited from the case of an animal, as in my opinion the case of the animal is like that of Shabbat; there is uncertainty with regard to both cases.