משנה: הַפֶּסַח שֶׁשְּׁחָטוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ בַשַּׁבָּת חַייָב עָלָיו חַטָּאת. וּשְׁאָר כָּל־הַזְּבָחִים שֶׁשְּׁחָטָן לְשֵׁם פֶּסַח אִם אֵינָן רְאוּיִין חַייָב. וְאִם רְאוּיִין הֵן רִבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר מְחַייֵב חַטָּאת. וְרִבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ פּוֹטֵר. אָמַר רִבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר מָה אִם הַפֶּסַח שֶׁהוּא מוּתָּר לִשְׁמוֹ כְּשֶׁשִּׁינָּה שְׁמוֹ חַייָב. זְבָחִים שֶׁהֵן אֲסוּרִין לִשְׁמָן כְּשֶׁשִּׁינָּה אֶת שְׁמָן אֵינוֹ דִין שֶׁיְּהֵא חַייָב. אָמַר לוֹ רִבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ. לֹא. אִם אָמַרְתָּ בַּפֶּסַח שֶׁשִּׁינָּהוּ אֶת שְׁמוֹ בְדָבָר אָסוּר. תֹּאמַר בַּזְּבָחִים שֶׁשִּׁנָּן בְּדָבָר מוּתָּר. אָמַר לוֹ רִבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר. אֵימֻרֵי צִיבּוּר יוֹכִיחַ. שֶׁהֵן מוּתָּרִין לִשְׁמָן הַשּׁוֹחֵט לִשְׁמָן חַייָב. אָמַר לוֹ רִבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ. לֹא. אִם אָמַרְתָּ בְּאֵימֻרֵי צִיבּוּר שֶׁכֵּן יֵשׁ לָהֶן קִיצְבָה. תֹּאמַר בַּפֶּסַח שֶׁאֵין לוֹ קִצְבָה. רִבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר. אַף הַשּׁוֹחֵט לְשֵׁם אֵימוֹרֵי צִיבּוּר פָּטוּר׃ MISHNAH: He who slaughters the Pesaḥ not for its purpose103As well-being sacrifice. on the Sabbath is for this liable for a purification sacrifice104If he slaughtered in error, i. e., either if he did not know that slaughtering not for its purpose is forbidden or if he did not realize that it was a Sabbath.. For any other sacrifice which he slaughtered for the purpose of Pesaḥ, if they are not suitable105If they are not male sheep or goat yearlings. he is liable, if suitable, Rebbi Eliezer declares him liable for a purification sacrifice but Rebbi Joshua declares not liable106For him a valid sacrifice even if wrongly presented cannot trigger liability..
Rebbi Eliezer said to him, since for Pesaḥ, which is permitted for its purpose107If the 14th is a Sabbath., he is liable if he changed its purpose, sacrifices which are forbidden for their purpose108Festival offerings or general well-being offerings on a Sabbath., it should be logical that he be liable if he changed their purpose. Rebbi Joshua answered him, no. If you argue about Pesaḥ, which he changed to something forbidden, what can you infer about sacrifices which he changed to something permitted109Since anything called Pesaḥ may be slaughtered on a 14th of Nisan which is a Sabbath.? Rebbi Eliezer said to him, public parts110The altar’s parts of those public sacrifices of which the rest is consumed by the priests, such as holiday purification sacrifices and the public well-being sacrifice of Pentecost. should prove it, which are permitted for their purpose and he who slaughters for their purpose is liable111If he erroneously slaughters any other sacrifice for the purpose of public sacrifice.. Rebbi Joshua answered him, no. If you argue about public parts which are fixed in number, what can you infer about Pesaḥ which is not fixed in number? Rebbi Meïr says, also he who slaughters for the purpose of public parts is not liable112Since he slaughtered with the intent of fulfilling a commandment, there can be no liability, and R. Eliezer’s premise is incorrect..
הלכה: מַתְנִיתָא בְיוֹדֵעַ בּוֹ שֶׁהוּא פֶסַח וּשְׁחָטוֹ לְשֵׁם שְׁלָמִים. הָיָה יוֹדֵעַ בוֹ שֶׁהוּא שְׁלָמִים וּשְׁחָטוֹ לְשֵׁם עוֹלָה. רִבִּי מָנָא אָמַר. יֵשׁ בָּעֲשִׂייָתוֹ מִצְוָה. רִבִּי יוֹסֵה אָמַר. אֵין בָּעֲשִׂייָתוֹ מִצְוָה. אֵילֵי צִיבּוּר שֶׁהָיָה סָבוּר שֶׁהֵן כְּבָשִׂים וּשְׁחָטָן לְשֵׁם אֵלים שֶׁמָּא לֹא עָלוּ לְצִיבּוּר לְשֵׁם אֵלים. וְתַנֵּי כֵן. אֵילֵי צִיבּוּר שֶׁהָיָה סָבוּר שֶׁהֵן כְּבָשִׂים וּשְׁחָטָן לְשֵׁם אֵלִים כְּבָר עָלוּ לַצִּיבּוּר לְשֵׁם חוֹבָה. מַתְנִיתָא בְסָבוּר בּוֹ שֶׁהוּא פֶסַח וּשְׁחָטוֹ לְשֵׁם פֶּסַח. הָיָה יוֹדֵעַ בוֹ שֶׁהוּא שְׁלָמִים אֶלָּא שֶׁהָיָה סָבוּר לוֹמַר שֶׁמּוּתָּר לְשַׁנּוֹת שְׁלָמִים לְשֵׁם פֶסַח. רִבִּי מָנָא אָמַר. אֵין בָּעֲשִׂייָתוֹ מִצְוָה. רִבִּי יוֹסֵה אָמַר. יֵשׁ בָּעֲשִׂייָתוֹ מִצְוָה. מִסְתַּבְּרָא דְרִבִּי מָנָא בְקַדְמִייָתָא וּדְרִבִּי יוֹסֵי בָאַחֲרִיתָה HALAKHAH: The Mishnah if he realized that it was Pesaḥ but he slaughtered it for the purpose of well-being offerings113If he knew that it was Pesaḥ and intentionally changed the purpose, there is liability if he erred in thinking that this was permitted, since his intent was executed. But if it was Pesaḥ, only the slaughterer thought that it was a well-being offering and he slaughtered it as well-being offering, it is valid Pesaḥ since an intent based on a false premise has no legal consequence. Cf. Pesachim.72a">Babli 72a.. If he knew that it was a well-being offering but he slaughtered it for the purpose of an elevation offering. Rebbi Mana said, there is fulfilling of a commandment in his action. Rebbi Yose said, there is no fulfilling of a commandment in his action114This is a continuation of the preceding argument. The animal was dedicated as Pesaḥ, the slaughterer thought that it was a well-being offering and he slaughtered it as elevation offering. R. Mana holds that the slaughterer’s intent is ineffective since it is based on a wrong premise; the sacrifice is qualified as Pesaḥ. R. Yose holds that in all cases the slaughterer’s intent determines qualification.. Rams of the public which he thought were sheep and he slaughtered them for the purpose of rams, are they perhaps not counted as rams for the public115Rams are supplementary elevation sacrifices on holidays, as are the sheep mentioned here. Menachot.49a">Babli Menaḥot49a.? It was stated thus: Rams of the public which he thought were sheep and he slaughtered them for the purpose of rams, already are counted for the public as fulfillment of their obligation. The Mishnah applies if he thought it was Pesaḥ and he slaughtered it for the purpose of Pesaḥ116The second case of Pesachim 6:5:1" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Pesachim.6.5.1">Mishnah 8, “for any other sacrifice which he slaughtered for the purpose of Pesaḥ, …”, if an animal was dedicated as well-being offering but is of the kind qualified for Pesaḥ, and was slaughtered as Pesaḥ, R. Joshua declares him not liable since the sacrifice is qualified and he erred in the fulfillment of a commandment.. If he knew that it was a well-being sacrifice but thought to say that it is permitted to change well-being sacrifice into Pesaḥ, Rebbi Mana said, there is no fulfilling of a commandment in his action; Rebbi Yose said, there is fulfilling of a commandment in his action117The difference here is the interpretation of R. Joshua’s stance. R. Mana holds that since he knew that the animal was not a Pesaḥ, it cannot be called error in the fulfillment of a commandment and even R. Joshua will agree that he is liable. R. Yose holds that since the sacrifice is qualified it must be called error in the fulfillment of a commandment and R. Joshua will hold that he is not liable.. It is reasonable following Rebbi Mana in the first case, following Rebbi Yose in the last.
אָֽמְרִין. לֵית הָדָא דְרִבִּי לִיעֶזֶר תְּתוּבָה עַל דְּרִבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ. דּוּ יְכִיל מֵימוֹר לֵיהּ. הֵיאַךְ אַתְּ מֵשִׁיבֵינֵי מִדָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לְחַלֵּף עַל דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין דַּרְכּוֹ לִיתְחַלֵּף. וְלֹא הָדָא דְרִבִּי יוֹשׁוּעַ תְּתוּבָה עַל דְּרִבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר. דּוּ יְכִיל מֵימוֹר לֵיהּ. הֲרֵי פִסְחוֹ שֶׁל רְאוּבֵן שֶׁשְּׁחָטוֹ לְשֵׁם שִׁמְעוֹן הֲרֵי שִׁינֵּהוּ לְדָבָר כָּשֵׁר. וְתֵימַר. חַייָב. Pesachim 6:5:3-6" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Pesachim.6.5.3-6">Halakhah 7118Discussion of Pesachim 6:5:1" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Pesachim.6.5.1">Mishnah 9.: They said, that argument of Rebbi Eliezer is no answer to Rebbi Joshua, since he could say to him, how can you answer me with an argument about something that is apt to change for something that is not apt to being changed119The Pesaḥ after the 14th is automatically a well-being offering; but animals dedicated as well-being offerings cannot validly be changed into anything else.? Neither is the argument of Rebbi Joshua an answer to Rebbi Eliezer, since he could say to him, the Pesaḥ of Reuben which he slaughtered in the name of Simeon is changed into something qualified120Pesachim 5:3:1" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Pesachim.5.3.1">Mishnah 5:3.; and you are saying, he is liable?
רִבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר. אַף הַשּׁוֹחֵט לְשֵׁם אֵימֻרֵי צִבּוּר פָּטוּר׃ אָמַר רִבִּי לָֽעְזָר. דִּבְרֵי רִבִּי מֵאִיר אֲפִילוּ עֶגֶל. אַתְּ שְׂמַע מִינָּהּ תַּרְתֵּיי. אַתְּ שְׁמַע מִינָּהּ. דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין לוֹ קִיצְבָה וְדָּבָר שֶׁאֵין דַּרְכּוֹ לְהִתְחַלֵּף וְיֵשׁ בָּעֲשִׂייָתוֹ מִצְוָה. רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ אָמַר. יֵשׁ בָּעֲשִׂייָתוֹ מִצְוָה כְּגוֹן יְבִמְתּוֹ נִדָּה וּבָא עָלֶיהָ. רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר. (יֵשׁ) [אֵין] בָּעֲשִׂייָתוֹ מִצְוָה כְגוֹן שְׁנֵי שְׁפוּדִין אֶחָד שֶׁלִּשְׁחוּטָה וְאֶחָד שֶׁלִּנְבֵילָה. וּבִיקֵּשׁ לוֹכַל מִזֶּה וְאָכַל מִזֶּה. מַתְנִיתָא פְלִיגָא עַל רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. שָׁכַח וּמָל אֶת שֶׁל אַחַר שַׁבָּת בַּשַּׁבָּת. רִבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר מְחַייֵב חַטָּאת. וְרִבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ פּוֹטֵר׃ הֲרֵי אֵין בָּעֲשִׂייָתוֹ מִצָוָה וְרִבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ פּוֹטֵר. שְׁמוּאֵל קַפּוֹדָקְיִּא אָמַר. לְמָחָר יֵשׁ בַּעֲשִׂיָּיתָהּ מִצְוָה. “Rebbi Meïr says, also he who slaughters for the purpose of public parts is not liable.” Rebbi Eleazar said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: even a calf121No public sacrifice is a calf. According to him, R. Meïr in interpreting R. Joshua’s position that no action resulting in a qualified sacrifice can trigger liability.. You understand from here two things. You understand something which has no fixed number, or that is apt to being changed, only if the act is meritorious122Even if there are two detriments as enumerated in the Mishnah, as long as there is an angle of merit there is no liability.. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, if the act is meritorious, for example his sister-in-law which is menstruating and he slept with her123If the sister-in-law is a childless widow the brother-in-law is biblically obligated to sleep with her (Deuteronomy.25.5">Deut. 25:5). Incidentally by this act she becomes his wife, but this is not the point here. Since his act is in obeying a biblical commandment it cannot be sanctioned; even though he was negligent in not asking her whether sex with her was permissible; in the interpretation of R. Joshua’s position given here, the purification offering due for erroneously sleeping with a menstruating woman is neither due nor possible in this case.. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if the act is [not]124An addition by the corrector which seems to be erroneous. meritorious, for example two spits, one with slaughtered meat, the other with carcass meat, and he intended to eat from one but ate from the other125This sentence seems to be corrupt. Eating non-kosher meat is a simple violation, not a deadly sin whose commission in error would require a purification sacrifice. One might try to amend the text; which has been done in very many different ways, none of which is convincing. If one assumes that the uncorrected text is genuine, one has to assume, in the general spirit of the discussion, that the kosher meat is sanctum, whose consumption is meritorious. R. Joḥanan asserts that if the intended act was meritorious, the actual action, while a sin, cannot be sinful.. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan126Šabbat 19:4, about two babies to circumcise, one on the Sabbath and one on Sunday.: “If he forgot and circumcised the one for Sunday on the Sabbath, Rebbi Eliezer makes him liable for a purification sacrifice but Rebbi Joshua declares him not liable.” In this case the act is not meritorious and Rebbi Joshua declares not liable. Samuel from Cappadocia said, the next day it is meritorious127Since on Sunday the baby is lawfully circumcised, the Mishnah cannot be used to show that R. Joshua declares not liable even if no commandment was obeyed in the action..
אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. דְּרִבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא. דְּרִבִּי מֵאִיר אָמַר. דָּבָר שֶׁיֵּשׁ בַּעֲשִׂייָתוֹ מִצְוָה [פָטוּר. דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין בַּעֲשִׂיָתוֹ] מִצְוָה חַייָב כְּמַחֲלוֹקֶֹת. רִבִּי שִׂמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר. דָּבָר שֶׁיֵּשׁ בַּעֲשִׂייָתוֹ מִצְוָה חַייָב. וְשֶׁאֵין בַּעֲשִִׂייָתוֹ מִצְוָה פָטוּר כְּמַחֲלוֹקֶֹת. רִבִּי יָסָי רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. דִּבְרֵי רִבִּי מֵאִיר וְהוּא שֶׁיְּהֵא שֶׂה תָמִים וּבֶן שָׁנָה וּשְׁלָמִים וְרָאוּי לְהִשְׁתַּנּוֹת לְשֵׁם פֶּסַח. אַתְּ שְׁמַע מִינָהּ תְּלַת. אַתְּ שְׁמַע מִינָהּ. דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין לוֹ קִצְבָּה. וְדָבָר שֶׁאֵין דַּרְכּוֹ לְהַחֲלִיף. וְדָבָר שֶׁיֵּשׁ בַּעֲשִׂייָתוֹ מִצְוָה. מָה אִית לָךְ דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין לוֹ קִיצְבָּה. רִבִּי יִרְמְיָה סְבַר מֵימַר שֶׁלֹּא נָֽתְנָה הַתּוֹרָה קִצְבָּה כַּמָּה פְסָחִים יִדְחוּ אֶת הַשַּׁבָּת בְּכָל־שָׁנָה. רִבִּי יוֹסֵי סְבַר מֵימַר. שֶּׁאֵין אַתְּ יָכוֹל לַעֲמוֹד עַל מִינְייָנָן. רִבִּי יוֹסֵה כַּד הֲוָה מַטֵּי לְאִילֵּין תִּינּוֹקוֹת סְפֵיקוֹת הֲוָה אֲמַר. יָפֶה לִימְּדָנוּ רִבִּי יִרְמְיָה. אִית לָךְ מֵימַר. שֶׁאֵין אַתְּ יָכוֹל לַעֲמוֹד עַל מֵינְיָינָן. אֶלָּא שֶׁלֹּא נָֽתְנָה הַתּוֹרָה קִיצְבָּה כַּמָּה פְסָחִים יִדְחוּ אֶת הַשַּׁבָּת בְּכָל־שָׁנָה. אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא. דִּבְרֵי רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן תִּיפְתָּר שֶׁהָיָה שָׁם חֲבוּרָה אַחַת שֶׁלֹּא שָֽׁחְטָה. אָמַר רִבִּי זְעוּרָא. מִילְּתֵיהּ דְּרִבִּי יַנַּאי אָֽמְרָה. וְהוּא שֶׁשָּׁכַח וּמָל אֶת שֶׁלְשַׁבָּת בְּעֶרֶב שַׁבָּת. מָלוֹ בְשַׁחֲרִית. רִבִּי זְעוּרָא אָמַר. סָבַר רִבִּי יַנַּאי. פָּטוּר. רִבִּי אַבָּא אָמַר. חַייָב. וּלְיֵידָה מִילָּה אָֽמְרָהּ רִבִּי יַנַּאי. בָּא לְהוֹדִיעֲךָ הֵיאַךְ דַּרְכָּן שֶׁלְתִּינּוֹקוֹת לְהִתְחַלֵּף. עַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּרִבִּי זְעוּרָא כְרִבִּי יַנַּאי. עַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּרַב כְּרִבִּי מֵאִיר. אָמַר רִבִּי מָנָא קוֹמֵי רִבִּי יוֹסֵה. מַה דְאָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא כְרִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן. מָה דְאָמַר רִבִּי יַנַּאי כְּרִבִּי מֵאִיר. מֵשִׁיבִין דָּבָר בֵּין רִבִּי מֵאִיר לְרִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן. אַשְׁכְּחנָן פְלוּגָא בֵין רִבִּי מֵאִיר לְרִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בְּשִׁיּוּר. אִילֵּין תִּינּוֹקוֹת סְפֵיקוֹת מָה אַתְּ עֲבַד לוֹן. כְּדָבָר שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ קִיצְבָּה אוֹ כְדָבָר שֶׁאֵין לוֹ קִיצְבָה. [אִין תַּעַבְדִּינוּן כְּדָבָר שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ קִצְבָּה.] אֲפִילוּ אֵין שָׁם תִּינּוֹק אֶחָד לָמוּל. וְאִין תַּעַבְדִּינוּן כְּדָבָר שֶׁאֵין לוֹ קִיצְבָּה. וְהוּא שֶׁיְּהֵא שָׁם תִּינּוֹק אֶחָד לָמוּל. אִיתָא חֲמִי. הִקְדִּים זְמָנוֹ פָּטוּר. אִיחֵר זְמָנוֹ חַייָב. רַב הוּנָא אָמַר. מִחְלְפָה הִיא מַתְנִיתָא. דְּתַנֵּי. אָמַר רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן. לֹא נֶחֱלַק רִבִּי לִיעֶזֶר וְרִבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ עַל מִי שֶׁהָיָה לוֹ לָמוּל לְאַחַר שַׁבָּת וּמָלוֹ בַּשַׁבָּת שֶׁהוּא חַייָב. וְעַל מַה נֶחְלְקוּ. עַל מִי שֶׂהָיָה לוֹ לָמוּל בְּעֶרֶב שַׁבָּת וּמָלוֹ בַּשַׁבָּת. שֶׁרִבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר מְחַייֵב חַטָּאת וְרִבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ פּוֹטֵר. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹסֵי בֵירִבִּי בּוּן. מִן קוֹשֵׁיי מַקְשֵׁי לָהּ רִבִּי יַנַּאי. וְהוּא שֶׁשָּׁכַח וּמָל אֶת שֶׁלְשַׁבָּת בְּעֶרֶב שַׁבָּת. רַב אָדָא בַּר אַחֲוָא אָמַר. זוֹ דִּבְרֵי רִבִּי מֵאִיר וְרִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן. אֲבָל דִּבְרֵי רִבִּי יוֹסֵי. אֲפִילוּ דָבָר שֶׁאֵין בְּעֲשִׂייָתוֹ מִצְוָה הוֹאִיל וְטוֹעֶה בוֹ לְשֵׁם מִצְוָה פָטוּר. 128The text from here to the end of the Halakhah is from Shabbat 19:4:2-3" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Shabbat.19.4.2-3">Šabbat 19, Notes 110–141. The connection with the topics here seems to be the mention of mazzah in the last two sentences. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is Rebbi Meïr’s, since Rebbi Meïr said, for something where there is a commandment performed one is not liable, but if no commandment is performed whether he is liable is disputed. Rebbi Simeon says, where there is a commandment performed one is liable, but if no commandment is performed whether he is not liable is disputed. Rebbi Yose, Rebbi Joḥanan: The words of Rebbi Meïr are, on condition that it be a sheep without blemish, a yearling, and a well-being sacrifice fit to be changed into a Passover sacrifice. One understands from this three consequences. One understands something which is not a fixed number. And which is not usually exchanged. And doing something which fulfills a commandment. What means “something which is not a fixed number”? Rebbi Jeremiah wanted to say that the Torah did not specify how many Pesaḥ sacrifices should push the Sabbath aside in any given year. Rebbi Yose wanted to say, where you cannot determine the amount. When Rebbi Yose came to these “children in doubt” he used to say, Rebbi Jeremiah taught us correctly. Could you say that you cannot determine the amount? But the Torah did not specify how many Pesaḥ sacrifices should push the Sabbath aside in any given year. Rav Ḥisda said, one may explain the words of Rebbi Simeon if a group was there which did not slaughter. Rebbi Zeˋira said, the word of Rebbi Yannai implies that he forgot and circumcised the one for the Sabbath on Friday. It he circumcised him in the morning, Rebbi Zeˋira said that Rebbi Yannai was of the opinion that he is not liable. Rebbi Abba said, he is liable. In relation to what did Rebbi Yannai say it? He comes to tell you in which cases can there be a switching of children. In Rebbi Zeˋira’s opinion following Rebbi Yannai Rav followed Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yose, what Rav Ḥisda said follows Rebbi Simeon, and what Rebbi Yannai said follows Rebbi Meïr. Can one object anything between Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon? Do we find a difference between Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon about the remainder? How do you treat the babies in doubt? Like something which is a fixed amount or something which is not a fixed amount? If you are treating it like something which is a fixed amount, even if there is no (one) [other] baby to circumcise. If you are treating it like something which is not a fixed amount, only if there remains (one) [another] baby to circumcise. Come and see: If he anticipated his time he is not liable, if he delayed his time he is liable? Rav Ḥuna said, the Mishnah is the other way around, as it was stated: Rebbi Simeon said, Rebbi Eliezer and Rebbi Joshua did not disagree about one which was to be circumcised after the Sabbath if he circumcised him on the Sabbath that he is liable, but one who was to be circumcised before the Sabbath if he circumcised him on the Sabbath where Rebbi Eliezer makes him liable for a purification sacrifice and Rebbi Joshua declares him not liable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, because of this objection it was difficult for Rebbi Yannai, only if he forgot and circumcised the one of the Sabbath on Friday. Rebbi Ada bar Ahawah said, these are the words of Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon, but the words of Rebbi Yose [are]: Even if no commandment is performed he is not liable since he erred on behalf of a commandment.
פִּירֵשׁ אֵינוֹ חוֹזֵר אֶלָּא עַל צִיצִין הַמְעַכְּבִין אֶת הַמִּילָה. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. דִּבְרֵי רִבִּי יוֹסֵי. אֲפִילוּ פִירֵשׁ חוֹזֵר אֲף עַל הַצִּיצִין שֶׁאֵין מְעַכְּבִין אֶת הַמִּילָה. הֵיידֵין רִבִּי יוֹסֵי. הֵהוּא דְתַנִּינָן. רִבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר. יוֹם טוֹב הָרִאשׁוֹן שֶׁלְחַג שֶׁחָל לִהְיוֹת בַּשַּׁבָּת שָׁכַח וְהוֹצִיא אֶת הַלּוּלָב בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים. פָּטוּר. מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוֹצִיאוֹ בִרְשׁוּת׃ אַף בְּסַכִּין שֶׁלְמִילָה כֵן. אַף בְּמַצָּה כֵן. מִן מַה דְאָמַר רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. דִּבְרֵי רִבִּי יוֹסֵי. אֲפִילוּ פִירֵשׁ וְחָזַר אֲפִילוּ עַל הַצִּיצִין שֶׁאֵין מְעַכְּבִין אֶת הַמִּילָה. הָדָא אָֽמְרָה. אֲף בְּסַכִּין שֶׁלְמִילָה כֵּן. אֲף בְּמַצָּה כֵן If he finished he can return only for fibers which would invalidate the circumcision. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Yose, even if he finished he may even return for fibers which do not invalidate the circumcision. Which [statement of] Rebbi Yose? That which we stated, “Rebbi Yose says, if the first day of Tabernacles falls on a Sabbath, if he forgot and took the lulav out into the public domain he is not liable because he took it out with permission.” Does the same hold for a knife for circumcision, the same for unleavened bread? Since Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Yose, even if he finished he may even return for fibers which do not invalidate the circumcision; this implies the same even for a knife for circumcision, the same for unleavened bread.