משנה: נָֽדְרָה אִשְׁתּוֹ וְסָבוּר שֶׁנָּֽדְרָה בִתּוֹ. נָֽדְרָה בִתּוֹ וְסָבוּר שֶׁנָּֽדְרָה אִשְׁתּוֹ. נָדְּרָה בַנָּזִיר וְסָבוּר שֶׁגָּֽדְרָה בַקָּרְבָּן. נָדְּרָה בַקָּרְבָּן וְסָבוּר שֶׁנָּֽדְרָה בַנָּזִיר. נָֽדְרָה מִן הַתְּאֵינִים וְסָבוּר שֶׁנָּֽדְרָה מִן הָעֲנָבִים. מִן הָעֲנָבִים וְסָבוּר שֶׁנָּֽדְרָה מִן הַתְּאֵינִים. הֲרֵי זֶה יַחֲזוֹר וְיָפֵר. MISHNAH: If his wife made a vow and he was under the impression that it was his daughter, or his daughter made a vow and he was under this impression that it was his wife. If she vowed to be a nazir and he was under the impression that she vowed a sacrifice, or if she vowed a sacrifice and he was under the impression that she vowed to be a nazir. If she woved to abstain from figs and he was under the impression that it was from grapes, or if from grapes and he was under the impression that it was from figs, he shall dissolve a second time60Since erroneous dissolutions or confirmations are invalid, the time limit for dissolution starts to run again the moment he is informed of his error..
הלכה: אָֽמְרָה קוֹנָם תְּאֵינִים וַעֲנָבִים אֵילּוּ כול׳. אֲפִילוּ שָׁמַע וְשָׁתַק. אֲפִילוּ שָׁמַע וְקִייֵם. HALAKHAH: “If she said, a qônām that I shall not taste these figs and grapes,” etc. Even if he heard and remained silent, even if he heard and confirmed62This refers to Mishnah 5. Even if he had erroneously confirmed the vow, once he is informed of the true situation, he may dissolve. This is explicit in the Tosephta, 7:4..
משנה: אָֽמְרָה קוֹנָם תְּאֵינִים וַעֲנָבִים אֵילּוּ שֶׁאֵינִי טוֹעֶמֶת קִייֵם לַתְּאֵינִים כּוּלּוֹ קִייֵם. הֵיפֵר עַל הַתְּאֵינִים אֵינוֹ מוּפָר עַד שֶׁיָּפֵר אַף לָעֲנָבִים. אָֽמְרָה קוֹנָם תְּאֵינִים שֶׁאֵינִי טוֹעֶמֶת וָעֲנָבִים שֶׁאֵינִי טוֹעֶמֶת הֲרֵי אֵילּוּ שְׁנֵי נְדָרִים. MISHNAH: If she said, a qônām that I shall not taste these figs and grapes, if he confirmed for the figs he confirmed everything. If he dissolved for figs it is not dissolved unless he also dissolves for grapes61A partially confirmed vow is confirmed; a partially dissolved vow is not dissolved (Tosephta 7:4).. If she said, a qônām that I shall not taste these figs, that I shall not taste these grapes; these are two vows.
הלכה: אִית תַּנָּיֵי תַנֵּי. יְקִימֶינּוּ מִמֶּינּוּ. וִיפִירֶנּוּ מִמֶּינּוּ. אִית תַּנָּיֵי תַנֵּי. יְקִימֶינּוּ כּוּלּוֹ. יְפִירֶנּוּ כּוּלּוֹ. אִית תַּנָּיֵי תַנֵּי. יְקִימֶינּוּ מִמֶּינּוּ. וִיפִירֶנּוּ כּוּלּוֹ. וְאִית תַּנָּיֵי תַנֵּי. יְקִימֶנּוּ כּוּלּוֹ. וִיפִירֶנּוּ מִמֶּינוּ. מַתְנִיתָא כְּמָאן דְּאָמַר. יְקִימֶינּוּ מִמֶּינּוּ. וִיפִרֶנּוּ כּוּלּוֹ. דְּתַנֵּי קִייֵם לַתְּאֵינִים קִייֵם לְכוּלּוֹ. הֵפֵר לַתְּאֵינִים אֵינוֹ מוּפָר עַד שֶׁיָּפֵר אַף לָעֲנָבִים. אָֽמְרָה. קוֹנָם תְּאֵינָה שֶׁאֵיני טוֹעֶמֶת וְעוֹד עֲנַב. תַּפְלוּגְתָא דְּרִבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל וְרִבִּי עֲקִיבָה. דְּרִבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל אוֹמֵר. אַחַר הַנֵּדֶר. וְרִבִּי עֲקִיבָה אוֹמֵר. אַחַר הָאִיסָּר. HALAKHAH: Some Tannaïm state: “He shall confirm it63Num. 30: 14: “Her husband may confirm it or her husband may dissolve it.”
The Tosephta (7:4) has a fifth version: The husband may confirm one and dissolve the other of two vows made at the same time, i. e., it is applicable to the situation described at the end of Mishnah 6.”, even partially, “he shall dissolve it”, even partially. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall confirm it”, totally64The husband has only the choice to accept or to reject the wife’s vow in toto., “he shall dissolve it”, totally. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall confirm it”, even partially, “he shall dissolve it”, totally. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall confirm it”, totally, “he shall dissolve it”, even partially. The Mishnah follows him who said, “he shall confirm it”, even partially, “he shall dissolve it”, totally. As we have stated: “If he confirmed for the figs he confirmed everything. If he dissolved for figs it is not dissolved unless he also dissolves for grapes.” If she said, a qônām that I shall not taste a fig nor a grape berry, that is a matter of difference between Rebbi Ismael and Rebbi Aqiba since Rebbi Ismael says, the vow decides, and Rebbi Aqiba says, the prohibition decides65In Halakhah 9, R. Ismael says the determining factor is the vow. A multiplicity of vows made at the same time is treated as a multiplicity; there are two separate vows in our case. R. Aqiba says that a multiplicity of prohibitions imposed at the same time are one prohibition; there is only one vow..
משנה: יוֹדֵעַ אֲנִי שֶׁיֵּשׁ נְדָרִים אֲבָל אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁיֵּשׁ מְפֵירִין יָפֵר. יוֹדֵעַ אֲנִי שֶׁיֵּשׁ מְפֵירִין אֲבָל אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁזֶּה נֵדֶר. רִבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר לֹא יָפֵר. וְחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים יָפֵר. MISHNAH: ‘I knew that there are vows but I did not know that they can be dissolved.’ ‘I knew that one can dissolve but I did not realize that this was a vow.’ Rebbi Meĩr says, he cannot dissolve, but the Sages say, he can dissolve66R. Meïr holds that he had his chance; if he did not use it because of his ignorance, it is his fault. The Sages hold that the time for dissolution starts only when he is instructed about the law. In the Babli, 87b/88a, R. Meïr’s position is explained by his interpretation of the biblical verses..
הלכה: יוֹדֵעַ אֲנִי שֶׁיֵּשׁ נְדָרִים כול׳. אָמַר רִבִּי זְעִירָא. טַעֲמָא דְרִבִּי מֵאִיר עִילָּה הִיא רוֹצֶה שֶׁתִּדּוֹר וִיגָרְשֶׁנָּהּ. דַּל כֵּן הָיָה לוֹ לְגָֽרְשָׁהּ מִשָּׁעָה רִאשׁוֹנָה. HALAKHAH: “ ‘T knew that there are vows,” etc. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the reason of Rebbi Meïr: It is a subterfuge. He wants her to make vows so he can divorce her67This refers to the second case, when he admits that he knew he could dissolve his wife’s vows. Then he should have dissolved the vow immediately even if it was a borderline case. If it was a vow, it would be dissolved; if it was not a vow, no harm would have been done. We suspect that he wants to encourage his wife to make vows so he could claim that she always makes vows and one cannot expect from him to live with such a wife; he asks permission from the court to divorce her without payment of the ketubah sum (Mishnah Ketubot 7:6).. That is not so, he could have divorced her on the first occasion68This gives the position of the Sages who note that he could have started complaining at the first vow. Therefore, they accept his words at face value..
משנה: הַמּוּדָּר הֲנָייָה מֵחַתְנוֹ וְהוּא רוֹצֶה לָתֵת לְבִתּוֹ מָעוֹת אוֹמֵר לָהּ הֲרֵי הַמָּעוֹת הָאֵילּוּ נְתוּנִים לָךְ בְּמַתָּנָה וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא לְבַעֲלֵיךְ רְשׁוּת בָּהֶן. אֶלָּא מַה שֶׁאַתְּ נוֹשָׂא וְנוֹתֶנֶת בְּפִיךְ. MISHNAH: If a person is by a vow prevented to benefit his son-in-law but wants to give money to his daughter, he says to her: These coins are given to you as a gift on condition that your husband shall have no claim to them, except what you trade for your needs.
הלכה: הַמּוּדָּר הֲנָייָה מֵחַתְנוֹ כול׳. תַּנֵּי. וְלֹא לֵיךְ. אָמַר רִבִּי. מָאן תַּנָּא. וְלֹא לֵיךְ. רִבִּי מֵאִיר. דְּרִבִּי מֵאִיר עֲבַד יַד הָעֶבֶד כְּיַד רַבּוֹ. מִפְּנֵי שֶׁאָמַר. וְלֹא לֵיךְ. הָא אִם לֹא אָמַר. וְלֹא לֵיךְ. זָכָת הָאִשָּׁה זָכָה בַעֲלָהּ. HALAKHAH: “If a person is by a vow prevented to benefit his son-in-law,” etc. It was stated69In this version, the father cannot give his daughter an unrestricted gift. He must spell out a use; the daughter cannot save the money for an unspecified future.: “Neither do you”. Rebbi said, who stated “neither do you”? Rebbi Meĩr, for Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master70For R. Meïr, anything the slave acquires becomes automatically his master’s property. Therefore, no slave can buy his freedom from his master since he cannot have money that is not his master’s. Any money needed for his manumission must be in the hand of a third party [Babli 88b; Qiddušin 1:3 (60a 1. 26), Babli 23b; Ma‘aser Šeni 4:4, Notes 89,96; Ketubot 6:1 (30c 1. 46); Eruvin 7:6 (24c 1. 62)]. Similarly, R. Meïr gives the husband property rights in everything his wife acquires. He will accept a contract in which the wife retains all her earnings while renouncing all support from her husband as a contract in which the wife acts by the husband’s authorization. The majority accepts separate property both for the slave and the wife.. Because he said “neither do you.” If he had not said “neither do you”, if the wife acquired, the husband would have acquired.
משנה: וְנֵדֶר אַלְמָנָה וּגְרוּשָׁה כֹּל אֲשֶׁר אָֽסְרָה עַל נַפְשָׁהּ יָקוּם עָלֶיהָ. כֵּיצַד. אָֽמְרָה הֲרֵינִי נְזִירָה אַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנִּישֵּׂאת בְּתוֹךְ שְׁלשִׁים יוֹם אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְהָפֵר. נָֽדְרָה וְהִיא בִרְשׁוּת הַבַּעַל וְהֵיפֵר לָהּ. אָֽמְרָה הֲרֵינִי נְזִירָה לְאַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנִּתְאַלְמְנָה אוֹ נִתְגָּֽרְשָׁה בְּתוֹךְ שֶׁלֹשִׁים הֲרֵי זֶה מוּפָר. נָֽדְרָה בוֹ בַיּוֹם נִתְגָּֽרְשָׁה בוֹ בַיּוֹם הֶחֱזִירָהּ בּוֹ בַיּוֹם אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְהָפֵר. זֶה הַכְּלָל כָּל־שֶׁיָּצְָאת לִרְשׁוּת עַצְמָהּ שָׁעָה אַחַת אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְהָפֵר. MISHNAH: “The vow of a widow or a divorcee, anything she forbids to herself shall be confirmed.70For R. Meïr, anything the slave acquires becomes automatically his master’s property. Therefore, no slave can buy his freedom from his master since he cannot have money that is not his master’s. Any money needed for his manumission must be in the hand of a third party [Babli 88b; Qiddušin 1:3 (60a 1. 26), Babli 23b; Ma‘aser Šeni 4:4, Notes 89,96; Ketubot 6:1 (30c 1. 46); Eruvin 7:6 (24c 1. 62)]. Similarly, R. Meïr gives the husband property rights in everything his wife acquires. He will accept a contract in which the wife retains all her earnings while renouncing all support from her husband as a contract in which the wife acts by the husband’s authorization. The majority accepts separate property both for the slave and the wife.” How is that? If she said, I shall be a nazir after thirty days, even if she married within these thirty days he cannot dissolve. If she made the vow under her husband’s authority and he dissolved it, if she had said, I shall be a nazir after thirty days, even if she should become a widow or a divorcee within the next 30 days, it remains dissolved.
If she made a vow, was on the same day divorced71She was definitively married or was an adult. By divorce she became an independent adult. If he remarries her, even on the same day, the vow precedes the marriage and is out of the husband’s power., and taken back, he cannot dissolve. This is the principle: He cannot dissolve for any one who was on her own for one moment.
הלכה: וְנֵדֶר אַלְמָנָה וּגרוּשָׁה כול׳. הָדָא הִיא רִבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל אוֹמֵר. אַחֲרֵי הַנֵּדֶר. רִבִּי עֲקִיבָה אוֹמֵר. אַחַר הָאִיסָּר. הָיָה נֵדֶר וְאִסָּר כְּאַחַת. הֵיךְ עֲבִידָא. אָֽמְרָה. הֲרֵינִי נְזִירָה לְאַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם. וְשָׁמַע בַּעֲלָהּ וְלֹא הֵיפֵר לָהּ וְגֵירְשָׁהּ וְהֶחֱזִירָהּ בְּתוֹךְ ל̇ יוֹם. הַייְנוֹ נֵדֶר וְאִיסָּר כְּאַחַת. HALAKHAH: “The vow of a widow or a divorcee,” etc. This refers to what Rebbi Ismael says, the vow decides; Rebbi Aqiba says, prohibition decides72Cf. Note 65. R. Aqiba says the moment she imposed the prohibition is the decisive one; since at that time she had no husband, the vow is not under the later husband’s jurisdiction. R. Ismael says that the point of activation of the vow determines; there is no vow until after 30 days and the husband then can dissolve the vow. The Mishnah follows R. Aqiba. This interpretation of the opinions of Rebbis Aqiba and Ismael is forced by the Tosephta, 7:6, and is interpreted in this way in the Babli, 89a.. If vow and prohibition came together73It is the normal case that a woman makes a vow for immediate validity. But we are looking for a case involving a divorcee.? How is that? She said, I shall be a nazir in 30 days. Her husband heard it and did not dissolve74For R. Aqiba, he had his chance and missed it. For R. Ismael, his inaction is irrelevant since the vow is not yet activated.. He divorced her and remarried her within the 30 days. Is that when vow and prohibition come together75The Tosephta states: A widow who said: I shall be a nazir the moment I shall be married. R. Ismael says, the husband can dissolve (since the vow starts to be active in his domain, it is not a vow preceding the marriage). R. Aqiba says, he cannot dissolve (since the vow was made when she was a widow). In the case here, the remarriage was before the 30 days were over; for R. Ismael there is no question that the husband can dissolve the vow. For R. Aqiba the question is whether the divorce is counted to introduce a new domain, in which case he can dissolve, or is a continuation of the old, in which case he had his chance and did not use it. The question is not resolved.?