משנה: הוֹרָה בִפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ וְעָשָׂה בִפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ מִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ בִפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ. הוֹרָה עִם הַצִּיבּוּר וְעָשָׂה עִם הַצִּיבּוּר מִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ עִם הַצִּיבּוּר. שֶׁאֵין בֵּית דִּין חַייָבִין עַד שֶׁיּוֹרוּ לְבַטֵּל מִקְצָת וּלְקַייֵם מִקְצָת. וְכֵן הַמָּשִׁיחַ. וְלֹא בַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה עַד שֶׁיּוֹרו לְבַטֵּל מִקְצָת וּלְקַייֵם מִקְצָת׃ MISHNAH: If he ruled for himself and acted for himself, it is atoned for himself. If he ruled with the public and acted with the public, it is atoned for him with the public16As shown in the preceding paragraph, his sacrifice is reserved for inadvertent sins peculiar to himself. Even if he concurred with an erroneous ruling by the Court, a separate offering would be inappropriate. This differs from the ritual of the Day of Atonement where the High Priest has to atone for himself (Lev. 16:6) before he can officiate for the other priests (v. 11) and the people (v. 15). But here he is not acting on behalf of others.. As the Court is not liable unless they instruct to void part and confirm part, so is the Anointed17All rules established in Chapter 1 for the Court’s bull apply to the High Priest’s bull. In the verse (Lev. 4:20) it is formulated the other way: All rules of the High Priest’s bull apply to the Court’s.. Also for idolatry they are not liable unless they instruct to void part and confirm part18The rules concerning general infractions are transferred to idolatry by an argument similar to Chapter 1, Note 167..
הלכה: הוֹרָה בִפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ כול׳. הוֹרוּ בֵית דִּין וְהוֹרָה אַחֲרֵיהֶן וְהֶחֱלִיף. פְּשִׁיטָא נַעֲשִׂית אֶצְלוֹ כַעֲקִירַת גּוּף. אֶלָּא הוֹרָה הוּא תְחִילָּה וְהוֹרוּ בֵית דִּין אַחֲרֵיהֶן וְהֶחֱלִיפוּ. אֲפִילוּ כֵן נַעֲשִׂית אֶצְלוֹ כַעֲקִירַת גּוּף. אוֹ מֵאַחַר שֶׁהוֹרָה הוּא תְחִילָּה וְנִדְחָה הוֹרָייָתוֹ בְהוֹרָייָתָן וְאֵינָהּ נַעֲשִׂית אֶצְלוֹ כַעֲקִירַת גּוּף. הוֹרוּ בֵית דִּין וְהוֹרָה אַחֲרֵיהֶן. פְּשִׁיטָא אָכַל בְּהוֹרָייַת בֵּית דִּין פָּטוּר. אֲבָל מִשֶּׁחָֽזְרוּ בָהֶן בֵּית דִּין חַייָב. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹסֵי. וְלֹא מַתְנִיתָא הִיא. הוֹרָה בִפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ מִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ בִפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ. מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוֹרָה בִפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ וְעָשָׂה בִפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ. אֲבָל אִם הוֹרָה עִם הַצִּיבּוּר וְעָשָׂה עִם הַצִּיבּוּר מִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ עִם הַצִּיבּוּר. מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוֹרָה עִם הַצִּיבּוּר וְעָשָׂה עִם הַצִּיבּוּר. אֲבָל הוֹרָה בִפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ מִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ בִפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ. HALAKHAH: “If he ruled for himself,” etc. The Court ruled, he ruled following them, and then changed. It is obvious that for him it is the equivalent of uprooting the whole19R. Moses Margolis (Pene Moshe and Mar’eh Happanim), the author of the only complete Commentary to Horaiot, explains that the Court and the High Priest originally issued consistent rulings. Then the High Priest changed his mind, and issued a new ruling on the same subject so that the two inconsistent prohibitions together amount to a complete removal of a biblical prohibition which according to Mishnah 1:3 prevents atonement by a sacrifice. It is difficult to find this in the language of the paragraph since it says clearly that the High Priest changed his mind, i. e., he permits what the Court forbade and the Court forbids what the High Priest forbade; neither of the parties uproots the entire commandment.
Therefore, it seems that at first the High Priest followed the High Court’s ruling, as stated in the text, but then reversed himself and opposed the High Court’s ruling. Then irrespective of the topic of the dispute, the High Court uprooted Deut. 17:8–13. If the Court stays with its pronouncement, the High Priest is barred from rehabilitating himself by a sacrifice.. But if he ruled first, the Court then ruled following him, and afterwards they reversed themselves. Nevertheless is it for him the equivalent of uprooting the whole20If he continues to adhere to his own ruling after the Court reversed itself., or because he ruled first, but his ruling was overturned by their ruling, for him it should not be the equivalent of uprooting the whole21Since he first ruled by scriptural authorization. The question remains unanswered.? If the Court ruled and he ruled following them, it is obvious that he is not liable if he ate22Forbidden fat which the Court had permitted; the standard example of a sin atonable by a sacrifice. according to the ruling of the Court23Since he follows the public, his action in performing the rites for the Court’s offering also atones for him as noted in the Mishnah.. But after the Court reversed itself, he is liable24Since the Temple is adjacent to the Court’s seat, he will know immediately of the Court’s decision and, therefore, his later actions are not covered by the Court’s offering (Halakhah 1:2). The text in the Babli lacks the last word; this text has to be read as a question: “But after the Court reversed itself? Rebbi Yose said, is that not the Mishnah? …”, i. e., the answer to the question is obvious. There is no material difference in the meaning of the two texts.. Rebbi Yose said, is that not the Mishnah? “If he ruled for himself [and acted for himself]25Addition from B., it is atoned for himself.” Because he ruled for himself and acted for himself. “But if he ruled with the public and acted with the public, it is atoned for him with the public.”26B here has an additional text:
Rebbi Mana said, what you want to prove from the first part [of the Mishnah] is stated in the later part, “if he ruled with the public and acted with the public, it is atoned for him with the public.”
In this text, the quote of the same statement preceding the statement of R. Mana (II, student of R. Yose and R. Jonah) should be omitted. Because he ruled with the public and acted with the public, but “if he ruled for himself [and acted for himself]25Addition from B., it is atoned for himself.”