משנה: הוֹרוּ בֵית דִּין וְיָֽדְעוּ שֶׁטָּעוּ וְחָֽזְרוּ בָהֶן בֵּין שֶׁהֵבִיאוּ כַפָּרָתָן וּבֵין שֶׁלֹּא הֵבִיאוּ כַפָּרָתָן וְהָלַךְ וְעָשָׂה עַל פִּיהֶן רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן פּוֹטֵר וְרִבִּי לִעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר סָפֵק. אֵיזֶהוּ סָפֵק יָשַׁב לוֹ בְתוֹךְ בֵּיתוֹ חַייָב. הָלַךְ לוֹ לִמְדִינַת הַיָּם פָּטוּר. אָמַר רִבִּי עֲקִיבָה מוֹדֶה אֲנִי בָזֶה שֶׁהוּא קָרוֹב לִפְטוֹר מִן הַחוֹבָה. אָמַר לוֹ בֶן עַזַּאי מַה שָׁנָה זֶה מִן הַיּוֹשֵׁב בְּבֵיתוֹ שֶׁהַיּוֹשֵׁב בְּבֵיתוֹ אֶיפְשַׁר הָיָה לוֹ שֶׁיִּשְׁמַע וְזֶה לֹא הָיָה אֶיפְשַׁר לוֹ שֶׁיִּשְׁמַע׃ MISHNAH: If the Court gave an instruction; then they realized that they erred and reversed themselves62Publicly.; whether they brought their atonement or they did not bring their atonement63The sacrifice prescribed in Lev.4:13–21., another person went and acted on their instructions64He followed the original instructions after the Court had reversed itself. R. Simeon holds that the responsibility remains the Court’s as long as not all of Israel were duly informed of the new ruling., Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable, but Rebbi Eliezer65One should read with the Babli and many independent Mishnah mss. “R. Eleazar” (ben Shamuaˋ), since the third generation R. Simeon cannot be quoted preceding the first generation R. Eliezer. says, it is in doubt. What is the doubt? If he remained at home, he is liable; if he went overseas he is not liable. Rebbi Aqiba said, I agree in this case that he is closer to not being liable than being liable. Ben Azzai asked him, what is the difference between him and the one staying at home? For one who stays at home might be informed66It would be his duty to stay informed. The one who is far away is still depending on the earlier ruling of the Court; he is not liable for a sacrifice according to everybody. The difference between R. Aqiba and ben Azzai is that the latter requires a sacrifice from anyone who could have known of the reversal whereas the former requires it only from one who should have known. but the other one could not be informed.
הלכה: הוֹרוּ בֵית דִּין וְיָֽדְעוּ שֶׁטָּעוּ כול׳. רִבִּי אִימִּי בְשֵׁם רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ. מַתְנִיתָא כְּגוֹן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן עַזַּאי יוֹשֵׁב לִפְנֵיהֶן. מָה נָן קַייָמִין. אִם בְּשֶׁסִּילְּקָן תְּבַטְּלוּ הוֹרָייָתָן. אִם בְּשֶׁסִּילְּקוּ אוֹתוֹ תְּבַטֵּל הוֹרָייָתוֹ. אֶלָּא כִי נָן קַייָמִין בְּשֶׁזֶּה עוֹמֵד בִּתְשׁוּבָתוֹ וָזֶה עוֹמֵד בִּתְשׁוּבָתוֹ. הוֹרָייָתָן אֶצְלוֹ אֵינָהּ הוֹרָאָה. שֶׁלֹּא סִילְּקוּ אוֹתוֹ. אֶצֶל אֲחֵרִים הוֹרָייָה. שֶׁלֹּא סִילְּקָן. לֵית הָדָא פְלִיגָא עַל רִבִּי מָנָא בַּר תַּנְחוּם. דְּרִבִּי מָנָא בַּר תַּנְחוּם אָמַר. נִכְנְסוּ מֵאָה. עַד שֶׁיּוֹרוּ כוּלָּן. פָּתַר לָהּ בְּשֶׁלֹּא נִכְנַס. אִם בְּשֶׁלֹּא נִכְנַס. מְעַכֵּב. פָּתַר לָהּ כְּרִבִּי. דְּרִבִּי אָמַר. אֵין לְךָ מְעַכֵּב אֶלָּא מוּפְלֶא שֶׁלְּבֵית דִּין (בלוד). וְהָא רִבִּי מָנָא בַּר תַּנְחוּם אָמַר. נִכְנְסוּ מֵאָה. עַד שֶׁיּוֹרוּ כוּלָּן. אַף בַּחֲזִירָה כֵן אוֹ רוֹב. כת פְּשִׁיטָא לָךְ רוֹב. מָה רוֹב. רוֹב הַהוֹרָייָה רוֹב הַמִּשְׁתַּייֵר. הֵיךְ עֲבִידָא. נִכְנְסוּ מֵאָה וּמֵתוּ מֵהֶן עֲשָׂרָה. אִין תֹּאמַר. רוֹב הַהוֹרָייָה. חֲמִשִּׁים וְאֶחָד. וְאִין תֹּאמַר. רוֹב הַמִּשְׁתַּייֵר. אַרְבָּעִים וְשִׁשָּׁה. HALAKHAH: “If the Court gave an instruction; then they realized that they erred,” etc. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Our Mishnah, for example, if Simeon ben Azzai40The paradigm of the know-all; he was ready to answer any question about religious law on the spot. The Babli knows of a number of famous rabbis who tried to imitate him but quickly were confronted with a question they could not answer. He never was ordained; therefore he could not have been part of the Court, but as an outsider he could have pointed out the Court’s error. was sitting before them. Where do we hold? If he removed67In general, the Piel form סַלֵּק, from the root סלק “to raise, lift”, means “to remove (from office)”, comparable to German entheben. Here it must mean, “to silence the opposing party” either by a convincing argument of the single opponent, or by a formal judgment of the High Court. them, their instruction would be invalid. If they removed him, his instruction would be invalid. But we hold in the case that each side stands by its answer. For him, their instruction is no instruction, for they did not remove him68Since they could not convince him, he does not have to follow them against his better knowledge; cf. Note 43.. For others it is an instruction, for he did not remove them. Does this not disagree with Rebbi Mana bar Tanḥum, since Rebbi Mana bar Tanḥum said, if a hundred came together, only if they instructed unanimously36The ruling triggers the obligation of a purification sacrifice only if it was unanimous, including the opinions of the law students sitting before the 72 members of the Court. Mishnah 4 requires in addition that the president of the court be present and voting [Babli 4b, Sifra Wayyiqra 2, Parašah 4(4).]? One explains it, that he was not present69At the vote.. Does this invalidate70The text of B is more intelligible: If he was not present, does this invalidate the vote?? He explains it following Rebbi, since Rebbi said, no one invalidates but the distinguished member of the Court (at Lydda) [only]71The ms. text, בלוד, “at Lydda” makes no sense since the High Court must sit in the ashlar hall on the Temple Mount. One has to read with B בלבד “only”. The president of the Court is the only one for whom no substitute can be found.. Since Rebbi Mana bar Tanḥum said, if a hundred came together, only if they instructed unanimously; is it the same in retraction or by majority? If it is obvious for you72Read כַּד “if it is” for כַּת “group” in the text. The reading of B, צַייְתֵי “they obey” might be acceptable; since everywhere a majority opinion of religious authorities is to be followed, it is obvious that a retraction by a majority has to be followed. The original instruction also would have had to be followed if rendered by a majority of the Court; it is only the obligation of a sacrifice which is triggered by a unanimous vote. by majority, what kind of majority? The majority of those who instructed or the majority of those remaining? How is this? If there were a hundred but ten of them had died. If you say, a majority of those who instructed, 51. If you say, a majority of those remaining, 46.
הִפְרִישׁ חַטָּאתוֹ. נִתְחָרֵשׁ אוֹ נִשְׁטֶה אוֹ נִשְׁתַּמֵּד אוֹ שֶׁהוֹרוּ בֵית דִּין מוּתָּר לֶאֱכוֹל חֵלֶב. רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר. נִדְחֵית חַטָּאתוֹ. רִבִּי שְִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ אָמַר. לֹא נִדְחֵית חַטָּאתוֹ. רִבִּי יוֹסֵי בֵּירִבִּי בּוּן אָמַר. רִבִּי אָחָא מַחְלֵף שְׁמוּעָתָא דְלָא אֲתִי מִילְּתֵיהּ דְּרִבִּי יוֹחָנָן פְלִיגָא עַל מִילְּתֵיהּ. דָּמַר רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בַּר בָּא בְשֵׁם רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. כוס זוֹרְקִין עָלָיו מִדַּם חַטָּאתוֹ וּמִדַּם אֲשָׁמוֹ. רַבָּנִן דְּקַיְסָרִין אָֽמְרִין. רִבִּי חִייָה אִמִּי מַחְלֵף. וחַד אָמַר כָּאֵן תַנָּייָה. 73This paragraph also is in Gittin 7:1, explained there in Notes 10–21. In the translation, the words in brackets follow the text of B. The ms. text here has quite a number of scribal errors. A parallel is in the Babli, Zebahim 12b. If somebody had selected his purification sacrifice when he became a deaf-mute, or insane, or an apostate, or the Court rules that fat may be eaten, Rebbi Joḥanan said, his sacrifice of purification is pushed aside74This version is confirmed in the Babli, 11a., Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, his sacrifice of purification is not pushed aside. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Aḥa switches traditions, to avoid that a word of Rebbi Joḥanan contradict his own word. For Rebbi Simeon bar Abba said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One sprinkles the blood of a purification sacrifice or a reparation sacrifice for a person [terminally ill]75In the ms: “a cup”.. The Rebbi of Caesarea said, Rebbi Ḥiyya and [Rebbi] Immi, [one] switches and one says like [this] Tanna.
מָאן דְּמַחְלֵף לֵית לֵיהּ בְּאִילֵּין קִישׁוּאַייָה. כְּמָאן דָּמַר. לֹא נִדְחֵית חַטָּאתוֹ. מִי מְקַבְּלָהּ הֵימֶינּוּ. יַמְתִּין עַד שֶׁיַּחְזְרוּ בָהֶן בֵּית דִּין. אֶלָּא כְשֶׁהָיָה כֹהֵן עָבַד וְהִקְרִיב וְכִיפֵּר. הָיָה שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן עַזַּאי. מִי מְקַבְּלָהּ מִמֶּנּוּ. יַמְתִּין עַד שֶׁיַּחְזְרוּ בָהֶן בֵּית דִּין. כְּמָאן דָּמַר. לֹא נִדְחֵית חַטָּאתוֹ. He who switches has none of these difficulties76The one difficulty pointed out in the previous paragraph that R. Johanan accepts the sacrifice on behalf of a dying person even though the sacrifice of a dead person is impossible. The second difficulty is that R. Johanan permits the writing and delivery of a divorce document to a wife whose husband became insane after he had ordered the document to be written.. For him who says, his sacrifice of purification is not pushed aside77If the sacrifice becomes invalid, there is no problem. But since a purification sacrifice cannot be offered voluntarily, even according to him who said that the sacrifice remains valid, are the officiating priests not required to refuse the sacrifice after the Court ruled that the action for which it is offered was not forbidden?, who would accept it from him? He has to wait until the Court retracts, or if he was a Cohen who served, sacrificed, and atoned78A layman can do nothing but wait whether the Court change its mind. But a Cohen can bring his own sacrifice and eat its meat for atonement if at the moment of the action it would have been sinful for anybody. Since he does not have to explain his reasons to a priest, he is not dependent on the Court.. If he was Simeon ben Azzai79A layman who knows that the Court erred is not freed from an obligation to bring a sacrifice by the Court’s ruling; nevertheless he cannot find a priest who would accept it before the Court changes its mind., who would accept it from him? He has to wait until the Court retracts, for him who says, his sacrifice of purification is not pushed aside.
תּוֹלְדוֹת הוֹרָייָה כְהוֹרָייָה. הוֹרָייָה בְהוֹרָייָה מָה הֵן שֶׁיִּצְטָֽרְפוּ. הֵיךְ עֲבִידָא. אָֽכְלוּ צִיבּוּר חֲלָבִים וְהִפְרִישׁוּ קָרְבְּנוֹתֵיהֶן. אִין תֵּימַר. תּוֹלְדוֹת הוֹרָייָה כְהוֹרָייָה. בֵּית דִּין חַייָבִין. אִין תֵּימַר. אֵין תּוֹלְדוֹת הוֹרָייָה כְהוֹרָייָה. בֵּית דִּין פְּטוּרִין. כתי פְּשִׁיטָא לָךְ. תּוֹלְדוֹת הוֹרָייָה כְהוֹרָייָה. הוֹרָייָה בְהוֹרָייָה מַהוּ שֶׁיִּצְטָֽרְפוּ. הֵיךְ עֲבִידָא. הוֹרוּ בֵית דִּין. חֵלֶב כּוּלְייָא שֶׁלְּיָמִין מוּתָּר וְשֶׁלִּשְׂמֹאל ולו מִכְסֶה אָסוּר. חָֽזְרוּ וְהֶחֱלִיפוּ. אָֽכְלוּ רוֹב בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה וָרוֹב בַּשְּׁנִייָה. אִין תֵּימַר. מִצְטָֽרְפִין. חַייָבִין אַחַת. וְאִין תֵּימַר. אֵין מִצְטָֽרְפִין. חַייָבִין שְׁתַיִם. שְׁתֵּי הוֹרָיוֹת בָּעֲבוֹדָה אַחַת מָה הֵן שֶׁיִּצְטָֽרְפוּ. הֵיךְ עֲבִידָא. אָֽכְלוּ רוֹב וְשָׁחֲטוּ רוֹב. עַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּרִבִּי מֵאִיר חַייָבִין אַחַת. וְעַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּרִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן חַייָבִין שְׁתַּיִם. אָֽכְלוּ מִיעוּט בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה וּמִיעוּט בַּשְּׁנִייָה. עַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּרִבִּי מֵאִיר חַייָבִין. וְעַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּרִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן פְּטוּרִין. Are consequences of a ruling like the ruling? Do ruling within ruling combine80The meaning of these expressions will be explained by examples in the text.? How is that? If the public ate forbidden fat and designated their sacrifices. If you say that consequences of a ruling are like the ruling, the Court is liable81Most of the people ate forbidden fat (which makes the sinner subject to extirpation and therefore requires a sacrifice if inadvertent, Mishnah 3:7) without a ruling of the Court, and they already had dedicated their sacrifices when the Court ruled that eating fat is permitted. When it rescinded its ruling, it turned out that in the meantime nobody had acted on their instruction. According to the opinion that the ruling of the Court pushed aside the dedicated sacrifices, the Court certainly has to bring their own sacrifice since they invalidated the private sacrifices. But if one holds that the private sacrifices were re-installed upon recission, then if the rule is that consequences of instructions are like instructions, the Court still is liable for a sacrifice for preventing the purification offerings to be brought in the meantime, even though this was not included or intended in the original ruling. Otherwise, the private offerings will now be brought and the Court’s ruling is eliminated without further consequences.. If you say that consequences of a ruling are not like the ruling, the Court is not liable. The following should be obvious to you: the consequences of a ruling are like the ruling82This should not be so obvious since it implies that a purification sacrifice which for outside reasons could not be offered is reinstated when the outside reason disappears.. Do ruling within ruling combine with each other? How is that? If the Court ruled that the fat in the right side kidney was permitted but that of the left side and its cover83The fat in lumps outside the kidney which is forbidden together with the fat embedded in the kidney lobes. was forbidden; then they reversed themselves and said the opposite. Most ate the first time, and most the second time. If you say that they combine, they are liable for one. But if you say that they do not combine, they are liable for two84If the Court followed one wrong decision with another wrong one on the same subject, it is an unresolved question whether they have to offer one or two sacrifices when they finally see their errors.. Do two instructions about one kind of work85In B: “Two instructions about one kind of sin.” While the text as it stands is difficult, the text of B is impossible since, as explained in Makkot 3:11, while committing one sin one may commit any number of others at the same time.
The following example makes it clear that instead of “two instructions about one kind of work” one has to read “one instruction about two kinds of work.” combine? How is that? If a majority ate and a majority slaughtered86It seems that one contemplates the case that the Court decided that one does not have to keep the Day of Atonement. This one instruction implicitly allows both work (slaughter) and eating on that day; both are sins punishable by extirpation.. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are once liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are twice liable87The difference between R. Meïr, the presumed author of the anonymous statement in Mishnah 3:3, and R. Simeon is that R. Meïr holds that the sin determines the sacrifice whereas R. Simeon holds that the status of the sinner at the moment he becomes aware of his sin is determining. Since the Court issued one statement, they have to bring one sacrifice. Since the people became aware of two kinds of sins, two sacrifices are due. This shows that R. Simeon does not hold that the consequences of an instruction have the status of the instruction.. If a minority ate the first time and a minority the second time. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are not liable88If the two majorities together form a majority, the conditions for the Court to be liable are satisfied; for R. Simeon the two minorities cannot be combined..
אָמַר רִבִּי זְעִירָא וְשָׁהוּת בֵּינֵיהוֹן. רִבִּי מֵאִיר אָמַר. נוֹתְנִין לוֹ שָׁהוּת עַד שֶׁיִּשְׁמַע. רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר. עַד שֶׁיִּשְׁפַּע. וְתַנֵּי כֵן. הוֹרוּ בֵית דִּין בְּשׁוּק הָעֶלְיוֹן וְיָחִיד בְּשׁוּק הַתַּחְתּוֹן. בֵּית דִּין בַּבַּיִת וְיָחִיד בָּעֲלִיּיָה. פָּטוּר עַד שֶׁיִּשְׁמַע מַמָּשׁ. Rebbi Zeˋira said, the time span is between them89This refers back to the Mishnah, about a person who acted on the Court’s instruction after the Court reversed itself. It is stated in Sifra Wayyiqra 2, Paršetah7(3) that R. Simeon does not hold him liable (for a sacrifice) but R. Meïr does. It is explained that neither does R. Simeon free him forever nor R. Meïr hold him liable immediately, but R. Meïr holds him liable if he could have heard, and R. Simeon only if he had ample time to be informed. The reading of the ms., שֶׁיִּשְׁפַּע עַד, i. e., “until he had ample (time to be informed)” is preferable over that of B, “until he actually was informed.”. Rebbi Meïr said, one gives him time until he may hear. Rebbi Simeon said, until he must have heard, and we have stated so: If the Court instructed in the upper market and a single person was in the lower market, or the Court on the ground floor and a single person on the upper floor, he is not liable until he actually heard.
עַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּרִבִּי עֲקִיבָה אַדַּיִין הוּא סָפֵק. אָמַר רִבִּי בּוּן בַּר חִייָה. בָּעוֹמֵד בֵּין שְׁנֵי תְחוּמִין. בֵּין שְׁנֵי תְחוּמֵי אֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל לִתְחוּמֵי אֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל. In Rebbi Aqiba’s opinion it remains a doubt90This refers to R. Aqiba’s statement in the Mishnah. Even though the position of one who could have known but did not inform himself looks as if he should not be liable, a doubt remains and in fact he has to bring a suspended reparation offering (cf. Note 19).. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, if he stands between two domains, between two domains of the Land of Israel and domains of the Land of Israel91The reading in B is: Between domains of the Land of Israel and domains outside the Land. In this version, “overseas” mentioned in the Mishnah is interpreted to mean, “outside the Land.” The text of the ms. is to be read to mean that a person living outside of urban centers in the Land of Israel has the same status as a city dweller on an overseas trip, since he is far from sources of information..
רִבִּי אִמִּי בְשֵׁם רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ. לַהוֹרָייָה הִילְּכוּ אַחַר יְשִׁיבַת אֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל. לַטוּמְאָה הִילְּכוּ אַחַר רוֹב נִכְנָסִין לָעֲזָרָה. מַה. כָּל־כַּת וָכַת מְשַׁעֲרִין אוֹ אֵין מְשַׁעֲרִין אֶלָּא כַּת הָרִאשׁוֹנָה בִלְבַד. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹסֵי בֵּירִבִּי בּוּן. עַד שֶׁהֵן מִבַּחוּץ הֵן מְשַׁעֲרִין עַצְמָן. רִבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי. לִרְאִייָה הִילְּכוּ מִלְּבוֹא חֲמַת עַד נַחַל מִצְרַיִם. רִבִּי תַנְחוּמָא בְשֵׁם רִבִּי הוּנָא. טַעֲמָא דְּרִבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי וַיַּ֣עַשׂ שְׁלֹמֹ֣ה בָעֵת־הַהִ֣יא ׀ אֶת־הֶחָ֡ג וְכָל־יִשְׂרָאֵ֣ל עִמּוֹ֩ וגו׳. 92This paragraph is also in Pesahim 7:6 (34c line 66), following the wording of B. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. For instructions they considered the settlement of the Land of Israel93The definition of “majority” which would trigger the liability of the Court for a sacrifice for issuing false instruction counts only the Jewish population of the Land of Israel. Since the verse from 1Kings is not quoted here (in contrast to the Babli, 3a), the definition of the Land of Israel is that given in Ševiˋit 6:1, Notes 31–51.. For impurity they considered the majority of those coming to the Temple precinct94Babli Pesaḥim 94b. A private sacrifice may be presented in the Temple only by a person ritually pure. But the Passover lamb has the status of a public sacrifice; if most of the public are impure (of a kind which cannot be remedied by simple immersion in water), the sacrifice is slaughtered and eaten in impurity (cf. Nazir 9:2 Note 66.). How? Do they estimate every group or only the first group? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, when they are still outside they estimate themselves95Since the Temple courtyard was rather small, the Passover lambs were slaughtered in three groups. Making the count depending on the composition of the groups would lead to the paradoxical situation that a first group might be permitted to slaughter and eat the lamb in impurity while from a second group only the pure members are admitted and have to follow the rules of purity. Also, it is impossible to make the decision depending on “those in the Temple court” since only pure persons could enter the Temple precinct in the absence of a prior finding that most of Israel were impure.. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: For appearance96The assembly of all of Israel in a Sabbatical year (Deut. 31:10–13) could proceed in impurity if most of Israel in the domain of Solomon’s empire were impure. they consider from Levo- Ḥamat to the brook of Egypt. Rebbi Tanḥuma in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna: The reason of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi is, at that time Solomon celebrated the holiday, and all of Israel, 971K. 8:65 (misquoted in B.) etc.