A question that kohanim who serve in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) might face upon discharge is whether or not they may continue to perform the mitzvah of nesi’at kapayim (raising the hands to bless the people; Bemidbar 6:22-27). The basis of discussion of this issue is the Gemara (Berachot 32b) stating that a kohen who has killed is disqualified from performing nesi’at kapayim. As a source for this principle, the Gemara cites a pasuk from Yeshayahu (1:15), which teaches that because our hands are filled with blood, Hashem ignores us when we extend our hands (interpreted by the Gemara as a reference to nesi’at kapayim). The Rambam (Hilchot Nesi’at Kapayim 15:3) and the Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 128:35) codify this passage as normative Halachah. We will cite the rulings of Rav Moshe Feinstein, Rav Eliezer Waldenberg, and Rav Ovadia Yosef, who focus on the parameters and scope of this prohibition, discussing such issues as whether it applies to one who kills b’oness (under duress), one who kills a nochri, and one who kills in the course of performing a mitzvah.
Rav Moshe Feinstein – Oness
In a brief responsum, Rav Moshe Feinstein (Teshuvot Igrot Moshe Y.D. 2:158) rules that a kohen who was drafted into an army during a time of war and killed someone in the course of battle “is obviously eligible to perform nesi’at kapayim.” Rav Moshe cites a ruling of the Pri Chadash (cited by the Ba’eir Heiteiv O.C. 128:59) as a precedent. The Pri Chadash argues that if a kohen killed after being ordered to kill an innocent individual on pain of death, he may continue to perform nesi’at kapayim. Although the kohen acted incorrectly, for in such a case Halachah (Pesachim 25b and Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 157:1) requires that one forfeit his life rather than kill, he is not disqualified, since he was coerced.
The Mishnah Berurah (128:128) cites the Pri Chadash as normative.1See, though, Sha’ar Hatziyun 128:99, where he expresses some reservation about this ruling. Rav Feinstein writes: “If so (the Pri Chadash is correct), how much more so someone who was drafted into the army and is obligated to join due to the government regulations and did not act in contradiction to Halachah is permitted and even obligated to participate in nesi’at kapayim. This is a simple and clear matter.”2It appears that Rav Moshe’s ruling applies even to a kohen who was drafted to fight in an unjust war, since he was coerced to do so.
Rav Eliezer Waldenberg – Nochri Vicitms
Rav Waldenberg (Teshuvot Tzitz Eliezer 14:60) focuses on whether this prohibition applies to a kohen who has killed a nochri. Halachah clearly forbids murdering a nochri, and, because of the chillul Hashem involved, regards it as a more severe crime than killing a Jew.3See Mechilta D’Rabi Yishmael, Mishpatim, Masechta D’nezikin, parashah 4, Ra’avan to Bava Kama 113a, Sefer Yerei’im (245), Meshech Chochmah (Shemot 21:14), and Rav Yehudah Amital’s letter that appears in Alon Shevut 100:55-61 for more information about this subject. Nonetheless, a major rule of Talmudic analysis is that the source of a Halachah shapes its character. Accordingly, the Prishah (O.C. 128:46, printed in the Machon Yerushalayim edition) rules that killing a nochri is not encompassed by this rule, since he understands the pasuk cited from Sefer Yeshayahu as referring only to kohanim who killed Jews.
On the other hand, the Pri Megadim (O.C. 128:51) cites the Tzeidah Laderech (to Parashat Mishpatim), who believes that this disqualification applies to one who murders a nochri as well, since one who kills a nochri is classified by Halachah as a rotzei’ach (murderer).4For further analysis of this dispute between the Prishah and the Tzeidah Laderech, see Rav Moshe Shternbuch’s Teshuvot V’hanhagot (1:131).
A number of twentieth-century authorities rule in accordance with the Tzeidah Laderech, including Rav Ben-Zion Uzziel (Teshuvot Mishpetei Uzziel 3:10), Rav Gedalia Felder (Yesodei Yeshurun, Ma’arechet Nesi’at Kapayim 31), and Rav She’ar Yashuv Cohen (Techumin 6:31-44).
Rav Waldenberg, however, rules in accordance with the Prishah. First, he notes that many prominent Acharonim endorse this view. These authorities include the Ma’amar Mordechai (O.C. 128:43) and the Kaf Hachaim (O.C. 128:208). Furthermore, Rav Waldenberg notes that the Prishah’s ruling was omitted from most editions of the Tur and was lost for many years due to censorship. Rav Waldenberg argues that as the Tzeidah Laderech was a student of the Prishah and most likely would not have disagreed with the ruling of his mentor had he been aware of it, the Prishah’s view should be considered authoritative. Rav Waldenberg applies the principle articulated by the Rama (C.M. 25:2) that a ruling of a later poseik need not be followed if an earlier source is discovered that contradicts the later poseik’s ruling, since perhaps the later authority was not aware of the earlier ruling and would have retracted his own ruling had he in fact known of it.
Rav Waldenberg thus concludes that a kohen who killed a nochri may perform nesi’at kapayim. He writes emphatically, “Kal vachomer ben beno shel kal vachomer (how much more so) a kohen who killed a nochri in case of war or other emergency should be entitled to participate in nesi’at kapayim.”
Rav Ovadia Yosef – Mitzvah
Rav Ovadia Yosef (Teshuvot Yechaveh Da’at 2:14) refers to the poskim (Teshuvot Tzvi Tiferet 37, Teshuvot Levushei Mordechai O.C. 2:17, and Teshuvot Vayitzbor Yosef 36) who grappled with the question of the eligibility for nesi’at kapayim of kohanim who fought in wars and killed soldiers from the opposing side. Rav Ovadia writes:
However, they addressed the issue based on their time and place, and the discussion focused primarily on the issue that they killed enemy soldiers among whom were Jews. [A lingering trauma in the collective Jewish conscience is the tragedy of Jews having fired on fellow Jews during World War I, since Jews were drafted into the armies of the opposing forces - C.J.] Here (in the case of Israeli soldiers who killed enemy soldiers), in a defensive war in which kohanim risked their lives to confront the enemy to save Jewish lives, it is proper to tell these soldiers ‘Yeyasher Kochacha and may your hands be strengthened.’ The matter is clear beyond any shadow of a doubt that they are eligible and worthy for nesi’at kapayim, and they should be blessed by the One Above.
We may add that Rav Ovadia’s ruling applies equally to non-Israeli citizens who volunteer to serve in the Israeli army, since they too are performing a mitzvah.5Rav Moshe’s reasoning, though, addresses only soldiers who were drafted into the army and presumably would not apply to volunteers. The ruling also seems to apply to one who has legitimately killed enemy non-combatants in the course of a justifiable military operation, since this is a tragic yet legitimate aspect of the mitzvah of waging war and defending innocent lives.6See our earlier chapter on this subject.
The Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 128:36)7See the Mishnah Berurah 128:133, who applies this ruling expansively. supports Rav Ovadia’s ruling. The Shulchan Aruch rules that a kohen remains eligible to perform nesi’at kapayim if an infant died as a result of the brit milah the kohen performed on him. The Mishnah Berurah (128:132, citing the Magen Avraham 128:52) presents three reasons for this ruling: the kohen intended to perform a mitzvah, perhaps the child was a neifel (non-viable),8A child less than thirty days old is considered to be a safeik neifel, possibly non-viable (Shabbat 135b). One is not culpable for killing a neifel (Rambam Hilchot Rotzei’ach 2:6). and perhaps the child died of other, unrelated causes.
The first reason applies to a soldier in the IDF. We should note that this ruling of the Shulchan Aruch also seems to apply to a soldier who mistakenly killed a fellow Israeli soldier in a “friendly fire” incident. Since this is an almost unavoidable, albeit tragic aspect of warfare, it would seem that in such a case a kohen may continue to participate in nesi’at kapayim, since his intentions were noble. This ruling might not apply, though, if the soldier failed to exercise proper care and caution in the action that led to the death of his comrade.9A kohen who, G-d forbid, killed someone due to reckless driving should consult a Rav to see if he may continue to perform nesi’at kapayim. See Teshuvot Yechaveh Da’at 6:16, Teshuvot V’hanhagot 1:131, and Rav Ezra Basri’s essay in Techumin (3:250-254).
Conclusion
Rav Waldenberg, Rav Feinstein, and Rav Yosef offer three distinct justifications for a kohen who killed enemy soldiers in the course of serving in the Israeli army to continue performing nesi’at kapayim.10Yosef Dov Soloveitchik (cited in Nefesh Harav p. 132) disagrees with all of the aforementioned poskim and rules that kohanim who killed as part of his service in the IDF is disqualified from performing nesi’at kapayim. As a precedent, he cites that David was disqualified from building the Beit Hamikdash because he had shed much blood (Divrei Hayamim 1:22:8). Rav Soloveitchik apparently accepts the ruling of the Pri Megadim (O.C. 128 Eishel Avraham 66) that even a kohen who killed under duress is disqualified as well as the rulings of those authorities who maintain that killing a nochri is included in the disqualification. He also apparently feels that the Shulchan Aruch’s dispensation in the case of the brit milah applies only if all three of the reasons cited by the Mishnah Beruruah are relevant, which is almost never the case in battle. It appears that he did not issue this ruling very often, though, as Rav Aharon Lichtenstein (reported by Rav Ezra Frazer) stated that he never heard Rav Soloveitchik do so.
Rav Frazer (Beit Yitzchak 35:651-652) notes that the only compelling proof to Rav Soloveitchik’s approach is the Zohar (Parashat Pinchas), which, according to Rav Felder’s understanding (Yesodei Yeshurun, Ma’arechet Nesi’at Kapayim 31), teaches that Pinchas initially was disqualified from serving in the mishkan because he killed Zimri ben Salu (a leader of the tribe of Shimon), despite the fact that Pinchas’s intentions were for the sake of a mitzvah and ended up saving Am Yisrael.
Since the Rama (O.C. 128:35; see, though, Shulchan Aruch ibid. and Bei’ur Halachah ibid. s.v. Afilu Asah) rules that a kohen can regain his eligibility if he does teshuvah, it seems that a kohen is disqualified only if he is considered to have sinned. Thus, a soldier in the Israeli army, who certainly has not sinned by killing the enemies, should not be disqualified. Thus, Rav Soloveitchik’s ruling is quite difficult to understand.
Furthermore, I recall that the kohanim who fought in the 1982 Lebanon War continued to participate in nesi’at kapayim at Yeshivat Har Etzion despite the fact that Rav Soloveitchik’s son-in-law and leading student, Rav Aharon Lichtenstein, was one of the roshei yeshivah at that time. Following Rav Soloveitchik’s ruling would deal a significant blow to the morale of Israeli soldiers for whom it is essential to enter combat with a clear and unambiguous understanding that the battles that they wage are clearly justified both morally and halachically. (Rav Soloveitchik does not question the legitimacy of these wars, as he compares them to the wars of David.) Indeed, when kohanim who served during the 1982 Lebanon War asked if they may continue to perform nesi’at kapayim, Rav She’ar Yashuv Cohen (Techumin 6:31-44) responded with a resounding “Yes,” stressing the legitimacy of that war. Although Rav Soloveitchik’s ruling emerges from both his profound reverence for human life and his deep moral character, it does not seem to constitute normative halachic practice. Rav Aharon Adler reports that this is the accepted practice in Israel. Indeed, Jesse Dunietz reports that Rav Aharon Lichtenstein told him that he permits IDF veterans to perform nesi’at kapayim.11Rav Moshe Shternbuch (Teshuvot V’hanhagot 1:131) records that the practice in England was to permit kohanim who fought in World War I to continue to participate in nesi’at kapayim even though they might have killed other Jews who were in the opposing armies. He does not record a contrary practice.